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Abstract 
Occupational regulation is a well established, yet largely under researched, labour 
market institution in the UK. This thesis investigates the prevalence and impact of 
licensing, certification, accreditation and registration. The results indicate that 
occupational regulation is present across a large portion of occupations and that it 
can have a significant impact on wages, skills and quality.  
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Introduction 
This thesis will investigate occupational regulation in the UK. Occupational 
regulation throughout this thesis will refer to regulations that restrict entry to 
occupations through requiring memberships to professional bodies or minimum 
levels of competencies. Such regulation includes: licensing, certification, 
accreditation and registration.   
Licensing:  is enforced through legislation and requires individuals to obtain a 
license before they can legally join an occupation. To obtain a 
license, individuals must meet a minimum level of competency. This 
is often evidenced through the attainment of occupation related 
qualifications. 
Certification: is enforced through legislation. Unlike licensing, certification does not 
cover all of an occupation, just some tasks within it. Obtaining a 
certification is much the same as obtaining a license. Individuals 
must display a minimum degree of competency and meet any other 
requirements of the enforcement body. 
Accreditation: is not legally enforced. Accreditation is completely voluntary and 
provides no restriction for tasks an individual can undertake. 
However, accreditation may result in a protection of title. For 
example, only accredited accountants can call themselves Chartered 
Accountants. Individuals may still have to pass some barriers to 
entry to become accredited.  
Registration:  is legally enforced through legislation. Registration is compulsory 
for all individuals who work within a registered occupation. Unlike 
licensing or certification which are also legally enforced, registration 
does not require any minimum levels of competency to be displayed 
in order for an individual to join a register. 
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Despite the potential for regulation to restrict entry to occupations and affect the 
levels of supply in the labour market as a consequence, there has been very little 
research into the prevalence and impact occupational regulation has in the UK. This 
is particularly surprising given the growth in research on licensing in the US and the 
wealth of UK research on the closed shop, which also restricts supply. It is the aim of 
this thesis to begin to address the gaps and contribute to the existing research on 
regulation in the UK. To achieve this, two topics must be investigated: the 
prevalence of occupational regulation, and the impact of occupational regulation. As 
a result, this thesis is separated into three distinct yet complementary papers: the 
prevalence of occupational regulation, the impact of occupational regulation on 
wages and skills, and the impact of occupational regulation on quality. 
1. Occupational Regulation: Prevalence 
The aim of this paper is to determine the prevalence of occupational regulation at 
occupational level. In essence: how many jobs does each type of regulation cover? In 
order to answer this question, every occupation must be initially investigated using 
the EU database of regulated occupations and second, through desk research of each 
occupation. Where regulation is found present, the enforcement body was then 
contacted for more information on what the regulation entails and how restrictive it 
is. Where appropriate, the associated legislation was also found. The research 
undertaken took two years to complete. The length of the process was extended 
because no similar research or database has ever been attempted in such detail in the 
UK before. However, it is only through such research that a first insight into the 
extent of regulation can be realised. 
As a result of the research, a regulation database has been compiled. The occupations 
are ordered via the Standard Occupation Classification (SOC) system used by all of 
the national level datasets. Therefore, the database can be used to observe general 
characteristics of each type of regulation. As a consequence it was possible to 
describe a stereotype for each of the four types of regulations with regard to who 
enforces them, how they are funded, what the main aim of the regulation is, and the 
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barriers to entry for new applicants are. Here too, such detail has never been 
available before. 
Due to the database following the SOC system, the findings can be used in many 
other avenues of research relating to occupational regulation. This is because the 
regulation database can be merged with all national level datasets through the 
common SOC variable. This is very important since this paper not only adds 
valuable contributions to the existing research, but also allows for much more 
research in the future. An example of such research is found in paper two. 
2. Occupational Regulation: Impact on Wages and Skills 
Whilst paper one focuses on the prevalence of regulation at the occupation level, this 
paper applies the regulation database to the Labour Force Survey (LFS). The aim of 
the paper is to determine the effect regulation has on wages and skill levels. 
Occupational regulation may have this impact because it can restrict entry to 
occupations through requiring evidentiary minimum degrees of competency. 
Restricting supply in such a way may result in increased wages. By requiring 
individuals to display minimum competency, often through attaining professional 
qualifications, skill levels may increase, but this is not a certainty. 
As such, an analysis is conducted to observe if there is a significant association 
between regulations, wages and skill levels. Within this paper, wages are measured 
by an individual’s mean gross hourly wage. Skill levels are defined by the highest 
academic or vocational qualification held by an individual. This is then equated to 
the National Qualifications Framework (NQF).  
This is the first analysis that considers the impact of all the different types of 
regulation on wages and skills across all occupations. As such, this investigation 
contributes greatly to the research in the field. Further, through applying the 
regulation database to the LFS, this will be the first time that the percentage of 
individuals covered by each regulation is uncovered. 
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3. Occupational Regulation: Impact on Quality 
In addition to wages and skill levels, occupational regulation may theoretically have 
an impact on the quality of a service. This may occur because, assuming regulation 
increases individuals’ skill levels, the more skilled a practitioner is, the greater the 
quality of the service should be. As quality is measured differently across all 
occupations it is impossible to collate information on quality for all occupations. 
However, by focusing on an occupation that switched from accreditation to licensing 
in 2006, it is possible to investigate whether quality increased in this occupation as a 
result of licensing. The occupation in question is that of Nursery workers who 
became licensed as a result of the Childcare Act 2006. Quality of childcare has been 
monitored through government agency, Ofsted since the late 1990s. Through 
analysing Ofsted reports from 2000 to 2011 for each nursery school in the UK, it is 
possible to observe whether there has been a significant change in quality post-
licensing through conducting statistical analyses on the dataset compiled.  
Whilst focusing on one occupation cannot result in a general rule for the impact of 
regulation on quality, the study provides a first investigation into the impact of 
licensing in the childcare sector. This means that the findings not only contribute to 
the literature on occupational regulation, but also research conducted in education 
and early years care.  
Summary 
This thesis is the first investigation of occupational regulation in the UK that 
considers all types of regulation. As the first of its kind, the contributions to the 
current literature are vast. The findings not only provide a valuable insight into the 
prevalence and impact of regulation in the UK, but also allow for many more 
investigations as a result of the constructed regulation database.  
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Paper 1  
Occupational Regulation in the UK: Prevalence 
Occupational regulation, in this paper, relates to the limiting of entrants into an 
occupation through licensing, certification, accreditation or registration. It is the 
process through which entry into an occupation is restricted, to some extent and in 
some way, to those who meet the entry requirements. There has been very little 
investigation into this type of occupational regulation in the UK, and as such this 
paper endeavors to bridge the gap in the research. The aim of this paper is to begin 
an investigation into occupational regulation in the UK by providing the first concise 
definition and outline of occupational regulation and an investigation of its 
prevalence in the UK labour market.   
Occupational regulation is of particular importance because of current labour market 
trends. In light of declining trade union membership and coverage tied with 
decreasing training offered by employers, occupational regulation needs further 
understanding. This is because, as will be presented, occupational regulation is not 
only very prevalent in the labour market can also ensure that individuals covered by 
the regulation are adequately trained and skilled to conduct a given task within an 
occupation. As such if a significant association is found between regulation and skill 
levels policy makers may be able to utilise regulation to address the skill shortages 
experienced currently. However, in order for policy makers to utilise regulation 
effectively it is necessary to determine which type of regulation best serves the needs 
of the labour market. To understand this a detailed definition of each type of 
regulation is needed. 
This paper will first present the theory of occupational regulation and outline the 
hypotheses then investigated. Second, the methodology used to analyse the 
hypotheses will be outlined. Third, the results of the analysis will be presented. 
Lastly, a discussion of the main findings and their implications is provided.  
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1.1 Theory of Occupational Regulation 
The aim of this section is to provide a detailed overview of the literature surrounding 
occupational regulation in the UK. The structure of this section is as follows: first, a 
definition of occupational regulation will be provided. Second, an outline of the 
history of regulation in the UK will be presented. Third, an international comparison 
of occupational regulation will be undertaken. Lastly, the key characteristics of 
occupational regulation will be considered.  
1.1.1 Defining Occupational Regulation in the UK 
Far from a blanket set of regulations which are identical in nature and stringency, 
occupational regulation in the UK is a complex system containing many different 
forms of regulation which vary in terms of legal requirements, entry requirements, 
coverage of jobs, protection of title and function, and cost to both society and 
entrants. However, from the various different regulations, four main categories can 
be derived: registration, accreditation, certification and licensing; each is defined 
below. 
Registration 
Occupational registration requires individuals to register their details with an 
appropriate regulatory body. For example, in order to become a farrier, a person who 
fits horseshoes, one must register name and contact details with the Farriers 
Association. Registration is legally enforced, for example, farriers must be registered 
in accordance with the Farriers Registration Act 1975. Any individual who works in 
a registered occupation, but does not join the register, may face penalties, including 
fines and even prison sentences. Other examples of registered occupations include 
estate agents who must register themselves with the Office of Fair Trading, and 
medical secretaries who must register with the British Medical Secretaries and 
Administrators professional body. All registers are available to the public. This 
allows two uses: first, the public can search for a registered practitioner in their area 
to employ, and secondly, if a member of the public is not satisfied with the level of 
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workmanship they receive, the practitioner can be traced through the register and, if 
needed, reported to the relevant authorities. 
Registration does not demand any minimum degree of competency to be displayed 
and as a result there is no assessment or examining of individuals. Nor does an 
individual have to have a Criminal Record Background (CRB) check, pass any 
physical or medical checks, or meet any age requirements; anyone can join the 
register, and once a member of the register, membership is often for life. There is 
usually no cost involved in joining the register beyond minimal administration costs 
and time spent filing the required forms. As a result of the lack of barriers to entry, 
registration is regarded the least stringent of all regulation types in the UK despite 
being legally enforced.   
Accreditation 
Accreditation schemes are often advertised to potential members as a system 
indicating quality to consumers. For example, toymakers can become a member of 
the Toymakers Association, which may then indicate to consumers that the toymaker 
will produce a good quality of work having passed the entry requirements of the 
British Toymakers Guild (BTG). As a result of accreditation schemes being utilised 
as a measure of quality, there are often requirements for minimum levels of 
competency to be displayed. For instance, toymakers must submit a sample of their 
work to the BTG for judgment in order to join the accreditation scheme. Similarly, 
florists can become members of the British Florists’ Association if they have gained 
a Diploma in Floristry (NPTC Level 4) and a Master Diploma in Floristry (Level 5). 
Therefore the quality of work can be examined either internally by existing members 
or externally through nationally set examinations. Once a member of an accreditation 
scheme, the membership can be for life, as is the case for florists and toymakers, or 
dependent on continual examination, which is the case for members of the UK 
Construction Group. In all cases there will be an annual subscription charge because 
accreditation bodies are wholly self-funded.  
Accreditation schemes are not legally enforceable; they are instead voluntary 
schemes that individuals can choose to join. As they are not legally enforced, the 
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schemes are run by professional or industry bodies, which are self-funded and self-
regulated. They are not monitored by an external source, such as the government. As 
accreditation schemes are independently run, the range of entry requirements varies 
hugely across different industries, occupations and bodies. However, all will have 
membership costs in order to continue to be self-funding entities. 
Certification 
As with accreditation, certification schemes are voluntary; an individual can choose 
not to enter the scheme and still work in their chosen profession. For example a 
plumber is free to decide whether or not to join the Gas Safety Register. Similarly 
again, large portions of certification schemes are run independently of the state and 
are self-funded. Also, as with most accreditation schemes, individuals usually need 
to display a minimum degree of competency. However, unlike accreditation 
schemes, certification is not just an indicator of quality to potential consumers, but 
can offer legal protection of title or function for its members, and will be detailed 
below. 
Protection of title prevents any uncertified individual operating under the same title 
as a certified individual. For example, only accountants who pass the examinations 
set by the accountancy regulatory body can legally use the title Chartered 
Accountant. The same is true for Chartered Architects and Chartered Surveyors. If 
any uncertified individual wrongly uses the title associated with certification, then 
they are breaking the law and can face considerable fines and even prison sentences.  
Protection of function prevents an uncertified individual from undertaking certain 
tasks. For example, anyone can call themselves a plumber, but only those who hold a 
certificate issued by the Gas Safety Register (formally CORGI) can legally assume 
any task relating to gas, such as fitting or mending boilers. Anyone who carries out 
work without holding a legally required certificate risks hefty fines and prison 
sentences.  
As a result of the legally enforced restrictions on individuals in certified occupations, 
regulatory bodies charged with issuing certificates often insist certain requirements 
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are met. A Chartered Accountant, for example, must pass stringent Associated 
Chartered Accountant (ACA) exams and accumulate an adequate level of work 
experience before they are permitted to be known as Chartered Accountants. 
Similarly, plumbers must undergo training and pass exams in order to gain a gas 
safety certificate. It is also usual with certification that the regulatory bodies will 
require ongoing training and professional development for an individual to remain 
certified.  
Beyond penalties, such as prison sentences and fines, for those wrongfully using a 
protected title or undertaking a protected function, there are also penalties for those 
who are certified but who fall short of the regulatory bodies’ expectations once they 
have met the entry requirements.  For instance, if a certified plumber places the 
public at danger by taking short cuts when fitting gas pipes, they will lose their 
certificate and face fines or a prison sentence.  As a result, once within a certification 
scheme, individuals are monitored and must ensure a quality of service if they intend 
to remain certified.  
Licensing 
Gaining a licence is a legal requirement for any individual wishing to enter a licensed 
occupation. In order to legally work in a licensed occupation, individuals must meet 
a minimum degree of competency and overcome any other barriers to entry. The 
only exception is where licensing has been newly implemented and existing workers 
may qualify for automatic licenses under a ‘grandfathering’ scheme. Licensing 
protects both the title and the function of an occupation, such that it is illegal for any 
unlicensed individual to work as, or do any task conducted by, a licensed worker. If 
an individual is caught impersonating a licensed worker they face severe penalties 
which may include a prison sentence.  
Licences are issued by a regulatory body which may be part of a government 
department, a quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisation (QUANGO) or a 
professional body. However, all will be inspected and audited by the state, not least 
because of their monopolistic properties.  It is the most stringent form of 
occupational regulation, because both the title and function are protected, and 
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because of the level of monitoring of licensed workers. There are strict codes of 
conduct and formal grievance procedures available to the public to report 
unsatisfactory practitioners. Subsequently licensed practitioners can have their 
licence revoked if the regulatory body concludes malpractice. The findings may also 
escalate to legal proceedings and custodial sentences where necessary.  
Examples of licensed occupations include: doctors, who must have a licence to 
practice from the British Medical Association (BMA), security guards, who must 
have a licence from the Security Industry Authority (SIA), and barristers, who must 
pass the bar exams and register with a chambers. It is important to note that licensing 
bodies may use the terminology of a ‘register’ but if applicants are required to meet 
any minimum levels of competency in order to join a ‘register’, licensing is the type 
of regulation in place.  
Summary of Definition 
Occupational regulation in the UK is multi-faceted but can be categorised into four 
groups: registration, accreditation, certification and licensing. Each category differs 
in terms of entry requirements, legal enforcement and penalties for misconduct. 
Given the complexity of the regulation system in the UK it is important to consider 
the history of regulation. 
1.1.2 History of Occupational Regulation in the UK 
Occupational regulation has been present in the UK labour market for many 
centuries. This type of governance, as with all others, have been evolving and 
changing throughout history reflecting societal, legal, industrial and global trends.  
Wherever there is a trade or group of workers in a similar industry, there is often an 
informal association. Even if there are just social meetings or informal conversations 
concerning the nature of the job, informal associations tend to group workers 
together. Informal associations were the only form of trade associations in the UK 
for many centuries. However, from the 10
th
 century, the informal occupational 
associations were replaced by more formal associations, namely in the form of 
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guilds. Guilds of the early 11
th
 century were very much dependent on family, parish 
and religious connections, with no external monitoring and were very hierarchical. 
At the bottom were the trainees or apprenticeships, in the middle were the 
journeymen or wage earners and at the top were the masters who owned their own 
businesses. At the very top of the guild was the Grand Master. The Grand Master 
took an active role in allowing new members to join and in allowing existing 
members to graduate to the next level within the guild. Individuals were no longer 
guaranteed entry into an association just because of their family name or location, 
but rather had to meet the entry requirements of the guild. 
In 1066 the Norman Conquest changed the face of the UK forever. For the following 
500 years, the monarch of England was also the monarch of Normandy. The influx 
of French nobility and officials brought big changes to the UK labour market. French 
barons and lords created self-sufficient estates that employed apprentices from the 
surrounding area. With an increase in manors and apprenticeships a change towards 
upward social mobility was created. The linearity of occupations throughout 
generations of the same family was broken and the assumption that individuals 
would remain in the local community where they were raised was no longer held. 
This placed more importance on the requirement for individuals to be granted 
entrance to guilds on the quality of their work, and not their family connections. 
Further, one’s identity became strongly associated with the trade or profession 
entered into and less linked to one’s family or location. 
In the 12
th
 and 13
th 
century foreign competition was greatly increasing. Already there 
were many French immigrants working in England but there was now more 
movement of workers throughout Europe. Guilds allowed an avenue of protection for 
their members from such competition, since membership of a guild was a 
recognisable hallmark of quality. Consumers preferred hiring an individual who was 
a member of a guild as they were assured that they would receive good work. As 
guilds controlled who was granted entrance into them, they could restrict entry to UK 
citizens as a way to combat foreign competition.  
The end of the 14
th
 century and beginning of the 15
th
 century brought organisational 
changes to guilds. With the rise in power experienced due to the increase in 
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membership and coverage, many guilds now had the finances to build and occupy 
their own halls. Further, those members who resided in the higher ranks of the guilds 
were likely to have accumulated great personal wealth. This wealth can be witnessed 
in donations to the guilds made around the period, such as the Roman altar of the 
Goddess Diana donated to the Goldsmiths. Rich members pushed for a change in the 
status and perception of guilds. More precedence was placed upon formal 
ceremonies, livery (dress or regalia) and coats of arms. Existing members faced 
higher costs for the continuation of their membership. New applicants were now 
faced with more stringent barriers to entry, including greater displays of competency, 
higher application fees and at times, the requirement to have a ‘successful’ business. 
This shift saw the absolute end to the automatic inclusion of people within the same 
family or area being admitted to the guild. Membership was now judged on an 
individual basis. Throughout these changes, guilds were still heavily affiliated with 
the church and in many cases chose to operate under the official name of, for 
example, ‘The Worshipful Company of Vintners’ (a livery company of wine traders).   
A clear divide between the levels of hierarchy of the guild was appearing (Ward 
1997). Those who had accumulated wealth and resided high up in a guild, usually the 
employers, were in favour of the changes as they offered an air of exclusivity and 
increased social status. Those residing in the lower levels, usually the employees, 
who were not as financially fortunate, were not in favour of the changes as they were 
costly and did not reap proportional benefits when compared with the increased cost. 
Further, the financial burden reduced the potential for upward social mobility within 
the guild as employees could no longer save any earnings to start their own business 
and become Masters or Freeman (a person awarded freedom of a borough or city). In 
response to the changes, alternative organisations were founded by the employees. 
These organisations could not operate as a Worshipful Company and were 
commonly known as Yeoman or Fellowship Guilds. Conflict between the two was 
rife and as a result the first cases of industrial action occurred in a bid to suppress the 
Guilds/Worshipful Companies (Ogilvie 2011). Indeed, by the close of the 14
th
 
century the number of Yeoman guilds had become so great that those in authority 
took action to persecute the members. With so much unease and uncertainty 
surrounding the monarchy in the 14
th
 and 15
th
 centuries there was a great fear of an 
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uprising and revolt against the monarch and parliament from the, now collective, 
workforce 
Under the House of Tudor (1485-1603) major changes to the regulation of 
occupations occurred. In 1534 Henry VIII split from the Catholic Church declaring 
himself as Head of the Church of England. The Catholic Church was stripped of all 
its treasures and any land occupied was now to be owned by the sovereign. The 
Guild organisations or Worshipful Companies were heavily affected by the situation 
(Ogilvie 2011). Their close ties with the Church led to a great deal of their own 
property and treasures being seized. As a result the Guilds began to lose much of 
their power and influence. Further, the members of the guild also lost the financial 
support and many of the benefits associated with joining the guild. Therefore, 
membership (particularly new memberships) decreased.  
The Tudor period inflicted another deep blow to the guilds. Under Elizabeth I (1558-
1603) the Statute of Apprenticeships was passed (Ogilvie 2011). The statute, which 
came into force in 1563, played a major role in regulating anyone working in trades 
or crafts. It became a legal requirement for everyone in employment to undertake an 
apprenticeship, which would last seven years. This was the first time there was a 
legal requirement for all occupations to meet a barrier to entry in order to undertake 
any job. The law was further enforced through the Poor Relief Act 1601 (Poor Law). 
One aim of the Poor Law was to address the problem of supporting poor children. A 
two-tiered apprenticeship system was put in place to ensure that skilled 
apprenticeships were not reserved only for those from more comfortable 
backgrounds. Although those from a poorer background often graduated into 
housekeeping, masonry or farming, the law was very effective at increasing the skill 
levels of the lower classes and thus increasing employment. For the first time in 
England a register was kept detailing all workers, their occupation and where they 
had completed their apprenticeship.  
The change in law harmed the guilds by removing one of their last remaining uses. 
After they had been stripped of much of their wealth, the focus of many of the guilds 
had been to provide a minimum level of quality. Quality was assured through 
requiring a certain level of competency to be reached before an individual could 
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enter into a guild. However, the apprenticeships offered and required by guilds were 
variable in time, quality and price. The new requirements under the statute were far 
more stringent and thus superseded those of the guilds. This rendered the guilds 
surplus to requirements. Any guilds that survived the law often did so by becoming 
Freemasons or Oddfellows which often took the form of secret societies with limited 
members (Ward 1997). They became more of a social network and moved away 
from regulating the occupation from which they were born. 
The statute stayed in place until the early 19
th
 century and the start of the industrial 
revolution. At the beginning of the industrial revolution entrepreneurialism was at its 
peak. New technologies and power meant new industries were rapidly growing. New 
industries, in turn, meant new jobs with new skill requirements. Many of the industry 
leaders found the Statute of Apprenticeships was outdated and hindered progression. 
The main argument was that the statute was not written for the new occupations. 
Lengthy apprenticeships were not needed for many of the new jobs. Jobs were 
changing; technology meant that often less skill and knowledge was needed to work 
in existing occupations. As a result of this resistance, in 1814 the legal requirement 
for a blanket 7-year apprenticeship was abolished.  
After the statute was overturned, there was a significant reduction in licensing. It was 
those which had potential to harm the public that remained licensed, for example, 
doctors. As a result of the licensing reduction, professional bodies such as guilds 
regained significance, as they were no longer overshadowed by licensing. 
Professional bodies began establishing themselves, such as the Accounting 
Association, which certified or accredited individuals. This meant that in the UK a 
diverse range of occupational regulations were beginning to evolve. Some century-
old guilds had a renewed purpose and some new professional bodies were 
established, all of which added to the complex network of regulation in the labour 
market. As a result of such complexity there were many ways in which an 
occupation could become regulated. 
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1.1.3 Process of Regulation 
From the history of regulation presented above it is clear that regulation can take 
many different forms. No occupation is created with regulation. There must be a 
process through which the occupation becomes regulated. As previously discussed, 
there are four different types of regulation currently in the UK. Further, there are 
hundreds of different occupations. Therefore, there is not one single route to 
becoming regulated. Some regulations, for example the Medical Act 1983, are in 
place explicitly to protect the public. Others are in place to enhance professionalism, 
such as the Chartered Institute of Textile Process Operatives. Whatever the rationale 
for regulation, there was possibly a petition by a group of individuals to make it 
happen. If so, this group of individuals could be practitioners, members of the public 
or members of parliament or councils. 
As there are so many different regulations it would be impossible to outline the 
process of becoming regulated for all of them. Below are three examples of the 
history of regulation in arguably well-recognised occupations. 
Chartered Accountants 
The first society of accountants in the UK was based in Scotland and formed around 
1853 (Brown 1905). The group was formed in anticipation of a change in the law, 
necessitating lawyers to undertake much of the accountancy law associated with 
bankruptcy (Parker 1986). The group of accountants believed they needed to enhance 
their professionalism in order to adapt to the environmental and organisational 
changes that had been caused by the industrial revolution (Stewart 1986). The group 
was therefore created in order to protect their economic self-interest (Lee 1995). 
However, to gain professional recognition, they needed to be granted a Royal 
Charter.  
To become a chartered society, the group had to petition Queen Victoria. Their 
primary argument was that it was necessary to have a Chartered Accountancy group 
in order to protect the public (Lee 1995) and stated that it was very much in the 
public interest to regulate accountants so as to ensure that only those with the correct 
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qualifications could join. This would prevent the uninformed public from poor 
actuarial and accountancy work. On the grounds of this petition, a Royal Charter was 
granted and the control entry to the profession fell to the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants (Lee 1995).  
As a result of the Charter, Brown (1905) reported that Chartered Accountants 
increased demand for their service, and public confidence in the profession 
increased. Similar trends followed in the rest of the UK. To begin with there were 
five or six different institutes in the UK but to reduce competition and create a 
uniform level of competency, many of the smaller bodies merged (Howlitt 1966). 
Today, in order to become a Chartered Accountant, individuals need to display a 
minimum degree of competency. This involves sitting and passing a series of 
examinations set by one of the following institutions: 
 Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 
 Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland 
 Institute of Chartered Accountants in Scotland 
 Association of Chartered Accountants  
 Chartered Institute of Management Accountants 
 Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy 
Once an individual has passed the exams and accumulated adequate work experience 
they receive a practicing certificate. The certificate is subject to on-going related 
training and proven knowledge of changing accounting standards.  
The process of regulation here began with a group of individuals concerned for their 
own interests but it was only through that it was in the public’s interest for 
accountants to become regulation that legal recognition was received.  
Doctors 
The Medical Act 1858 resulted in the creation of the General Medical Council 
(GMC). The aim was to register all appropriately qualified doctors. The process of 
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regulation was two sided: on one side were the doctors and on the other the 
government. 
In the early 1800s there was an oversupply of healers (Stacy 1992), and not all had 
undergone training. Yet there was an increase in allopathic practitioners (proponents 
of alternative medicine) who were undertaking years of education and training in 
order to gain a qualification from a university (Stacy 1992). These allopath 
practitioners resented other healers who had not trained, so formed a group to try and 
gain professional recognition (Irvine 2006). The group of doctors wanted to protect 
their economic investment of spending years in training through professionalisation. 
However, there was little mention of public interest (Stacy 1992). In 1858 the 
government passed legislation that allowed the group of doctors, now the GMC, to 
hold and maintain a register of all appropriately qualified doctors. The register was a 
clear indicator to the public of the doctors’ knowledge and training, and as a result, 
increased their professional status. 
The Act stayed in place unchanged until the 20
th
 century and the Government who 
had created the National Health Service (NHS) in 1948 realised that the service had 
to be streamlined in order to meet the growing demands of the public. There was 
awareness of a lack of public confidence in state control of healthcare (Rivett 1998). 
As a result the government placed the GMC in control (Rivett 1998). The GMC, in 
return, received autonomy over the running and regulation of doctors (Irwin and 
Richardson 2006). The GMC were not regarded as particularly focused upon public 
interest and were more concerned with protecting their members (Pyke-Lee 1958). 
As a result, demand for unregistered doctors began to increase (Shaw 1957). The 
1950 Act did, however, enforce the need for good care and resulted in the GMC  
restricting entry to only those who had a postgraduate level qualification (GMC 
1967). Indeed, ‘good medical practice’ is the basis for registration and licence to 
practice (GMC 2006). 
The process of regulation in this case began with a group of individuals petitioning 
out of a vested interest, but then led to State involvement to ensure public safety. 
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Hackney Carriage Drivers 
The term Hackney Carriage is derived from ‘haquenee’, which is a horse. It was 
originally used to describe the horse drawn carriages present in London. Hackney 
carriages, and their drivers, have been regulated in London since around 1635 (Toner 
1992). The carriages were first regulated in London and Westminster by the 
government in order to reduce congestion in the streets. The emphasis was on public 
and consumer safety (Gallick and Sisk 1987). In 1869, in response to the 
Metropolitan Public Carriage Act 1869, the Metropolitan Police became the 
enforcing body of hackney carriages. The limitations on the number of carriages 
were lifted and a licence issued to any driver with an appropriate degree of 
competency and an appropriate vehicle (Toner 1992).  
The Transport for London Act 1985 extended the scope of regulation concerning 
hackney carriages in London. The regulation now covers the appearance of the driver 
and carriage, fares and how they are displayed, the size of the vehicle and the 
installation of taxi ranks (Beesley 1973). Today, Hackney Carriage is the technical 
term for motorised black cabs in London; indeed the last horse drawn carriage whose 
driver applied for a licence was in 1946. There have been many adaptations to the 
regulations over time: in 1938 the regulation required the drivers, not just the cabs, to 
carry a licence and the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 was passed 
requiring all cab drivers to have a CRB check. Adaptations of the regulations have 
largely been State-led in response to wider regulation changes, such as the 
implementation of driving licences or the wide use of CRB checks in the service 
sector. 
The government, in response to a concern for the public relating to congestion 
related accidents and the vulnerability of passengers, led the regulation of Hackney 
Carriages (Hackney Carriage Act 1635). The restrictions on entry reduced levels of 
competition but initially the regulation of cabs was not for the drivers’ economic 
gains. 
The UK process of regulation is complex, but it is not the only country to have 
occupational regulation. In order to conduct a valid investigation into regulation in 
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the UK, there must be a justifiable reason as to why research conducted in other 
countries cannot be extrapolated to the UK. Therefore, it is necessary to compare the 
UK with other countries where regulation is present. Due to the quantity of research 
conducted on regulation in the US, the first comparison will be concerned with the 
similarities and differences between the US and UK regulatory systems. Following, a 
sample of other European countries will be considered, namely: France, the 
Netherlands and Poland, chosen for their diverse political and cultural differences. 
1.1.4 International Comparison 
United States 
As discussed, occupational regulation has a long history in the UK. Yet regulation is 
also present in many other countries. One example is the United States. In the US 
individuals can be licensed, certified or registered (Kleiner 2000). Registration, as in 
the UK, requires an individual to join a register that records their contact information 
with a government agency before they begin working. Certified occupations are open 
to all individuals but some tasks are restricted to those that hold the relevant 
certificate, which very much the same as the UK certification process. Licenses 
restrict the right to practice to only those who hold a licence. Licensing, certification 
and registration as defined in the US map accurately to the UK licensing, 
certification and registration systems. However, accreditation does not feature in the 
current estimates of regulation in the US.  
Brinegar and Schmitt (1992) estimated that by the 1990s more than 1,100 
occupations would be licensed, certified or registered in the US. Indeed, according to 
the Department of Labour and the 2000 Census, by 2000 at 29% of the work force 
was indeed licensed (Kleiner 2006). Clearly regulation is very prevalent in the US, 
especially in the form of licensing. However, there are still limitations to the 
accuracy of measuring the prevalence of all types of regulation. There are no specific 
investigations into registration or certification by the Census or the Department of 
Labor (Forth et al. 2011). This implies that far more than 20% of the workforce is 
covered by occupational regulation. Further, as occupations have changed and grown 
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since the 1990s, Brinegar and Shmitt’s estimates should be approached with caution. 
For example, the service and financial sectors have increased, many of which are 
regulated. As a result, although there have been investigations into regulation in the 
US, there are still measurement issues, just as there are in the UK. 
Despite the similarities between the regulatory systems, there are some fundamental 
differences between the regulation systems of the US and the UK. In the US, 
occupational regulation can be controlled at the city, state or national level. This has 
resulted in some occupations being regulated in one state but not another. One 
example is the embalming laws, which vary from state to state. In many 
circumstances regulations may be recognised at the national level but are controlled 
and enforced at the state level, or at the city level; cab drivers, for example. This 
results in only licensed individuals being able to operate in the state, or city that 
issued the licence. It also means that if an individual loses their licence, as a result of 
malpractice for instance, they could move to a different state or city and gain another 
licence. This is in contrast to the UK where laws are set and enforced at the national 
level, ensuring that it is very difficult for an individual to ‘dodge’ being stripped of a 
licence, certificate or accreditation, or being removed from a register. 
The way in which occupations become regulated is also different in the US. In the 
US regulation is predominantly industry-led (Kleiner 2006). In order to become 
regulated, individuals form a professional body petition the government to gain legal 
recognition. The success is heavily dependent on the financial resources of a 
professional association and the number of members they have (Kleiner and Krueger 
2008). The more money an association and its members have, the more influence 
they have in the market, leading to a greater chance of regulation (Wheelan 1998). 
As successful regulation is dependent on the ability of professional associations to 
lobby the government, this suggests that the main motive of regulation relates to 
individuals having a vested interest in becoming regulated and not necessarily in 
protecting the public. This premise stands to reason given that licensing is reported to 
result in an estimated 15% wage premium (Kleiner and Krueger 2011). Once 
individuals are regulated they can expect to continue to benefit from the positive 
effects of regulation as it is very rare that occupations become deregulated in the US 
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(Kleiner 2000), but this has never happened in the UK. In addition, once an 
occupation is regulated, members often take an active role in restricting supply 
through lowering pass rates and restricting the amount of new members, increasing 
membership fees or increasing the syllabus (Kleiner and Kruegar 2011). 
One of the key theoretical arguments for regulation is the ability of regulation to 
protect the public from poor practitioners (see page 40). In the UK many of the 
practitioners that could harm the public are present in the public sector, most notably 
in the NHS. The NHS is a service that is funded by the public through tax and 
entitles the public to ‘free’ healthcare at the point of delivery. In the US, as in the 
UK, many occupations that can harm the public are in the healthcare sector. 
However, in the US, healthcare is not a publically run and funded entity. This has 
meant that when occupations have become regulated, prices have inflated in response 
to increased human capital with regard to the practitioners. This increase is passed 
directly onto the consumer. As a result there are numerous anecdotes about 
regulation actively increasing harm to the public, especially in the healthcare sector. 
For example, Rodemacher (1997) gives examples of patients trying to give 
themselves root canals instead of paying an expensive dentist. This is in stark 
contrast to the effects such regulation would have in the UK public healthcare sector. 
As a result one would assume that there might be more regulation in the UK because 
there could possibly be proportionately fewer negative effects on the public 
compared with the US.  
There are clear similarities in the regulation systems of the two countries; both have 
licensing, certification and registration present in the labour market, both have 
measurement issues surrounding the prevalence of regulation and both systems strive 
to respond to changes in the demands of occupations. However, there are also 
fundamental differences. In the US there is conflict between regulating occupations 
to protect the public and the potential harm caused by increasing the cost of 
healthcare. Further, in the US regulation is commonly led by professional 
associations petitioning the government rather than in response to public concern.  
Additionally, regulation in the US, even if set at the state level, is often enforced and 
controlled at state or city level resulting in differences across the country. As a result 
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of these differences, and the lack of research into accreditation in the US, it would be 
unreliable to extrapolate the US research and relate this to the UK.  
European Comparison 
Many occupations are also regulated across Europe. Similar to the UK there is a 
shared history of guilds and apprenticeships in many European countries. In response 
to the single market created by the European Union (EU), there is free movement of 
professionals across the EU. This means that a doctor in France can move to 
Germany and continue to work as a doctor. However, different occupations are 
regulated in different countries, with different entry requirements and restrictions. As 
a result it is very difficult to compare occupational regulation across the EU.  
The EU commission has created a database of regulated professions within the EU 
member countries. Although this is meant to give professionals an indication of any 
top-up qualifications needed if they move countries, the list is provisional. The 
professions are grouped together under generic terms, and as such some specific 
regulations relating to specific tasks may be lost. Also, some professions are not 
included on the list. For example, military officials are not included but are regulated 
in the UK. As a result, the list of licensed occupations in the UK within the database 
underestimates the amount of licensed occupations. The database also neglects to 
include any information or other forms of regulation. Yet despite the problems with 
the dataset the results as presented below in figure 1.1, do highlight the variance 
across the EU with regard to the number of licensed professions in each country.   
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Figure 1-1: Number of Restricted Occupations Per EU Country 
 
Source: EU Commission Regulated Professions Database 
As shown in figure 1.1 the three most regulated countries, according to this database, 
are Poland, Austria and the Czech Republic. According to the EU database, the UK 
has a similar number of regulated occupations as Germany, Lichtenstein, Denmark 
and Greece. As discussed, the database is provisional and is by no means a detailed 
account of occupational regulation in each country. As regulation varies across 
countries, three EU countries are considered in greater detail to highlight the role 
institutional characteristics play in regulation systems. The countries considered are: 
France, Poland and the Netherlands. 
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France 
The traditional liberated professions in France are occupations that are restricted to 
individuals meeting given requirements, similar to the licensing schemes in the UK. 
The schemes are predominantly run and controlled by professional bodies (Lacroix 
2013), unlike in the UK where licensing is heavily associated with government 
enforcement and involvement. In addition, the process of legally enforced regulation 
policies implemented in the late 1990s focused on the development and promotion of 
trade and craft (Lacroix 2013), which is similar to that of accreditation schemes in 
the UK. Unfortunately there is no appropriate data in France to accurately estimate 
the number of regulated individuals either with regard to licensing schemes or 
accreditation schemes. However, given the historical ties between the two countries, 
arguably France is one of the closest comparator countries to the UK especially 
given the broader spectrum of regulatory devices present.  
Netherlands 
As in the UK, the Netherlands have regulated some occupations so that the title and 
tasks associated with the occupation are closed to anyone who has not attained the 
necessary entry requirements. This directly maps to the definition of licensing used 
throughout this research. In the Netherlands 122 occupations are regulated in this 
way (Baarn 2013).  Regulation can require individuals to follow a strict code of 
practice, such as is the case of lawyers and doctors. A commitment to lifelong 
learning may also be required, similar to German regulations; an example of such 
occupations includes financial professionals.  
The Netherlands has a general principle of not regulating occupations unless there is 
a clear public interest, or there is a market failure that can be solved by regulation 
(Baarn 2013). Such is the focus on non-regulation that during the OECD’s 
Regulatory Reform Programme (1999-2004) many regulations reduced the 
restrictions placed on regulated individuals. The aim was to increase competition and 
reduce potential transparency issues (Baarn 2013), for instance, estate agents who, 
after the reform, no longer had their tariffs regulated. The Dutch system differs 
dramatically from the UK in its attempt to encourage a free market. Unlike the UK, 
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occupations are either licensed or not and the form licensing varies from sector to 
sector to meet the specific needs. Whilst there is data available, the Dutch system is 
so different from the UK that it is difficult to anticipate any parallel effects, and yet 
arguably the biggest difference is the willingness of the Dutch government to 
deregulate - something that has not occurred in the UK for at least 30 years.  
Poland 
Poland is a former communist country and as such has a very different historical 
context to that of the UK. In communist countries, state intervention features in 
every aspect of the country including the regulation of occupations and professionals 
(Buchner-Jeziorska and Evetts 1997). As such, the regulation of professionals in 
Poland has traditionally been enforced and managed solely by the State. However, 
since the move to a market economy, some professions are now regulated by 
professional bodies similar to those found in the UK (Buchner-Jeziorska and Evetts 
1997). Examples include lawyers, doctors and engineers. However, state intervention 
remains much higher than in the UK. At present over 350 professions in Poland 
restrict entry to individuals who have met some barrier to entry (Rojek 2013). 
However, the high portion of regulated professions has caused concern for the Polish 
government and deregulation of a further 71 professions is planned (Rojek 2013). 
Further, many of the remaining regulated occupations will have the barriers to entry 
reduced in order to encourage new incumbents. This may have been in response to 
the Public Opinion Research Centre (CBOS), which indicated that 29% of those 
questioned reported there was limited access to regulated professions. The regulation 
system in Poland is two-tiered, consisting only of licensed occupations and 
unlicensed occupations which is very different to the multi-level regulation system in 
the UK.  
Summary 
Attempts have been made to construct a database of all regulated occupations across 
the EU, but many licensed occupations are missing from the database and as a result 
the figures are grossly underestimating the prevalence of regulation across the EU. 
Further, through considering regulation systems in other EU countries, it is clear that 
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the systems of regulation are heavily dependent on the historical context and the 
focus of the government in each country. For example the ex-communist hold on 
Poland has shaped the regulation system into a government-led and controlled 
system where the number of occupations covered is far greater than other non-
communist countries such as the UK or the Netherlands. Similarly, the Dutch focus 
on free markets has led to deregulation and a reduction in entry requirements, in 
stark contrast to the French or UK approach to maintaining regulation. As a result of 
these contextual and historical influences on a country’s regulation systems, it is 
difficult to assume that the prevalence and effects of occupational regulation will be 
the same between two countries. If that were the case it would be necessary to 
consider each country independently. Further, the data for other EU countries is no 
more comprehensive with regard to regulation, and in some cases less detailed, such 
as in France. Therefore, the UK case is an appropriate starting place since although 
there are issues with the data, they are no worse than in other EU countries.  
As shown above, each country has a unique approach to regulating occupations. 
Different approaches can be the result of historical trends, government ideals or 
attitudes towards professionalism. Whatever the reason for the differences, because 
they exist it would be too simplistic to extrapolate the findings of one country to 
another. Consequently, it is necessary to consider the UK as a separate institutional 
network instead of an extension of EU or US models. Therefore it is imperative to 
outline the characteristics of occupational regulation with reference to the UK 
setting. 
1.1.5 Characteristics of Occupational Regulation 
Although occupational regulation is complex and varied, there are some general 
characteristics that apply to all regulations: the barriers to entry they have in place, 
and the rationale for the implementation of the regulation. Each is discussed in turn.  
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Barriers to Entry 
As discussed, accreditation, certification and licensing all have entry requirements. 
Barriers to entry will comprise one or more of the following: minimum competency 
levels, age requirements and/or numerical limitations. 
Minimum Levels of Competency 
Some regulations may require applicants to display a minimum degree of 
competency in order to be accepted. Competency is needed in order to ensure a good 
standard of work within the regulated portion of the occupation. However, the 
minimum levels of competency are not standardised across all occupations; there are 
huge variations between the requirements set by different regulatory bodies. Some of 
the different competency requirements are outlined below. 
Academic qualifications may be required to meet the obligatory barriers to entry. 
Doctors, for example, are required to attain a degree level qualification before they 
are permitted to treat patients. Academic qualifications signal that individuals can 
commit and focus on the subject matter. Literacy and numeracy levels are tested to 
ensure minimum levels of communicative skills are present. Additionally, if a degree 
is required, this level of qualification in particular shows that individuals are capable 
of self-learning, research and logical thought. All of these attributes can be 
transferred to the work place and may act as a good indicator of the quality of work 
that can be produced by the applicant.  Traditional academic qualifications are not 
the only qualifications that may be required. National Vocational Qualifications 
(NVQs) may be required by regulatory bodies instead of a degree. For example, 
some care home workers are required to hold an NVQ level 3 in a related course. 
NVQs test the knowledge of individuals in specific subjects and topics but are more 
practically based than traditional academic qualifications. NVQs involve written 
tests, so literacy skills are still established but the content of the course centres on 
real-life situations as opposed to theory. 
Some regulatory bodies require individuals to attend and complete training 
programmes. The content of the training schemes is solely focused on the occupation 
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and the skills needed to carry out tasks safely and competently. The compulsory 
training schemes may or may not require individuals to pass a test or exam on the 
content of a programme. An example of a compulsory training scheme is a course 
implemented by the Security Industry Authority (SIA), which regulates security 
guards in England and Wales. The scheme requires applicants to attend a three-day 
training programme in which they are trained in the basic skills needed in order to 
become a security guard. These skills include role-play where applicants are faced 
with situations they may have to deal with in practice, for example a drunk and 
aggressive person. They are also trained in health and safety. The programme 
culminates in a test, which is part multiple choice and part written, to test if 
applicants have understood and remembered the key points from the training. The 
test also means that literacy levels must be of a standard whereby written questions 
are understood and the answers are coherent. 
A period of work experience can also be part of the regulatory body’s criteria for 
applicants. Work experience will usually only feature as part of the qualifying 
characteristic, otherwise individuals would be working unregulated or untested. For 
example, Chartered Accountants must pass the ACA exams but also accumulate a 
number of days work experience to prove they can apply their formally acquired 
theoretical knowledge. The aim of insisting on work experience is to ensure that 
individuals are competent and capable of dealing with the public and doing the job. 
Regulatory bodies can also require a CRB check to reveal an individual’s criminal 
past, including any convictions and cautions given by the police. The rationale for a 
CRB check is to prevent the public being harmed by criminal practitioners. As such, 
CRB checks are particularly prominent in regulated occupations that have direct 
contact with vulnerable groups of society. For example, care home workers, child 
minders and doctors are all subject to CRB checks. They are also present in 
occupations where criminality is perceived as being high, such as in the security 
sector. The aim of requiring CRB checks here is to improve the reputation and public 
perception of the occupation. 
The barriers to entry, relating to testing for a minimum level of competency, put in 
place as a result of occupational regulation can, therefore, take many different forms 
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and comprise many different bundles of requirements. The reason for the differences 
is that each occupation needs a different set of skills and competencies to be carried 
out to a good standard. A doctor’s work is completely different from that of a 
plumber so it stands to reason that each needs to fulfill different requirements in 
order to become regulated. As the requirements are set to allow only those who are 
competent becoming regulated, the requirements should, in theory, be good 
predictors of the quality of work produced once in the occupation.  
Age Restrictions 
Age restrictions can be put in place. For example, forklift truck drivers must be 18 in 
order to gain their licence, lifeguards must be at least 16 and publicans must at least 
18 years of age. The reason why age restrictions are in place is often because the 
work involved requires a degree of strength, life experience or knowledge to be done 
to a safe standard and to reassure the public that they are in safe hands. For instance 
it is likely that a 16 year old will be perceived as being more competent than a 13 
year old in relation to working as a lifeguard. However, there are far more 
restrictions which may be utilised beyond human characteristics. 
Numerical Limitations 
Regulatory bodies can choose to limit the number of licenses, certificates or 
accreditations they give. This prevents the market being flooded by regulated 
practitioners and ensures an element of exclusivity. Some numerical limitations are 
explicit, for example, the number of hackney carriages used to be limited in London 
to prevent overcrowding and traffic on the roads. However, such limitations have not 
been in place since 1938; indeed numerical limitations are not currently present in 
the UK occupational regulation system. Yet the number of individuals that are 
regulated can be controlled through adjusting the pass marks, and thus the number of 
people entering the occupation following the required exams and tests. One example 
is that of barristers, who must pass the bar exams to practice. In the US the number 
of barristers is shown to be controlled by the difficulty of the bar exams, but further, 
the difficulty of passing is set in accordance with the demand for barristers at any 
given time (Pagliero 2007).  
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Barriers to entry, therefore, take three main forms: competency levels, age 
restrictions and numerical restrictions. All barriers to entry require monitoring, a 
level of bureaucracy and a cost to the individual and the regulatory body. Due to the 
costs and the time and effort involved in occupational regulation, one would expect a 
clear rationale behind petitioning for regulation.  
Rationale for Occupational Regulation 
Occupational regulation involves a considerable amount of organising, time and 
bureaucracy. Given the amount of work that is required in implementing regulations 
there must be a strong rationale for occupational regulation in the UK. Given the 
huge variety of regulations in the UK, there will be hundreds of different reasons as 
to why regulation of a given occupation is deemed necessary. However, all of these 
reasons can be grouped together into two distinct areas: public interest and vested 
interest.  
Public Interest 
In order for anything to be in the public interest it must have an overall positive 
impact on the general public. For occupational regulation to be in the public’s 
interest, the implementation of the regulation must aid society in some way. Moore 
(1961) argues that occupational regulation can be said to be implemented in the 
interest of the public if the following is true in relation to the given occupation: ‘lack 
of information’, ‘society knows best’ and ‘social costs exceed private costs’. 
Lack of information, or an asymmetry of knowledge, occurs when the consumer has 
a limited capability to assess the quality of a service they wish to purchase. For 
instance, only a qualified dentist can adequately assess the work of another dentist; a 
lay member of the public is unlikely to be capable of such an assessment. Indeed, 
Mitchell (1937) states that consumers are simply not equipped to make ‘wise’ 
decisions concerning complicated services. As a result, a market containing an 
asymmetry of knowledge will result in a two-tiered quality market, one tier 
consisting of high quality, high charging practitioners, the second tier consisting of 
low quality, low charging practitioners.  
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According to Gresham’s law, having a two-tiered quality system will leave the 
market flooded with undesirable practitioners. He uses the example of coins. When 
coins were first produced they all had the same metal content. Over time coins began 
to contain fewer of the expensive elements. When this began to happen there was a 
reduction in the number of older coins, containing the more expensive metal content, 
in the market. This is because each coin had the same ‘value’ to the consumer in 
terms of what they could buy and exchange for the coin, but they had a different 
‘value’ in terms of their worth when melted down. Therefore, those who had 
knowledge relating to the metal composition of coins would retain the coins with a 
higher metal composition and only exchange those coins with a less valuable 
composition. For those without this knowledge, they continued exchanging good 
quality coins for poor quality coins without realising. As a result only poor quality 
coins would remain in the market as the others were reserved for those aware of their 
value. In the same vein, consumers who are not aware of the quality of a service will 
only consider the value of a service by its price. The cheaper practitioners are likely 
to be those of poorer quality and so these consumers will create a market flooded 
with poor practitioners. Indeed there is a disincentive for practitioners with ‘good’ 
services to sell their wares. This is because consumers actively seek low costs, so in 
order to attract consumers they must lower their rates and as a result will not be paid 
their true worth (Akerlof 1970). This is highlighted in Akerlof’s example of second 
hand cars. In this market there are two tiers: one where good quality second hand 
cars are sold for a higher price and another where poor quality cars, or ‘lemons’, are 
sold cheaply. The consumer is often incapable of recognizsing a lemon and as such is 
only attracted by price. This results in only the cheaper cars being bought and forcing 
good dealers out of the market as they can no longer make a profit from their cars. 
This means that the market was flooded with lemons (if there were enough lemons), 
which is not in the public interest as they are more likely to be unsafe. 
Leland’s economic model supports this theory, stating that in markets where there is 
an asymmetry of knowledge, the equilibrium will be sub-optimal. This is because the 
wages of poor practitioners will be set artificially high and good practitioners will be 
forced out of the market causing unemployment. Wages are deemed to be set 
artificially high, as the increase has not purely been the result of natural changes in 
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the supply and demand of the labour market. It is not a natural result, but rather a 
result of poor practitioners undercutting (but still charging more than their worth). 
He suggests that occupational regulation, predominantly licensing, would ensure that 
minimum levels are set at the optimal level which meet society’s desired level of 
quality (Leland 1979), provided that the barriers to entry are set correctly (which of 
course is a very big ‘if’ given the array of entrance barriers which can be utilised by 
regulatory bodies).   
If regulation is to solve the asymmetry of knowledge between individuals and 
practitioners it must be the case that ‘society knows best’ (Moore 1961). If this is not 
the case then there is no benefit from the collective implementing standards as 
society has no superior knowledge over that of the individual. Any standards 
enforced by an ill-informed collective result in the same predicament; individual 
asymmetry of knowledge. Indeed, the results maybe more detrimental as individuals 
may cease to conduct their own research due to being blinded by the safety net of 
regulation. However, proponents of societal decisions such as Clark (1936) state that 
the collective is always better placed to make decisions than any one individual. 
Moore (1961) goes as far to state that even when an individual has perfect 
knowledge of a situation s/he will still not be as capable of making the correct 
decision as society would be. Individuals often evaluate services in terms of their 
previous personal experiences, which are too limited and specific to be generalised 
and accurate. Indeed, individuals often assess services too positively; where this is 
true they will be purchasing a service that is worth less than they are paying for it. 
This is certain to create a sub-optimal equilibrium and as a result be detrimental to 
society as a whole. 
The potential harm of poor quality services is detrimental not only to the client but 
also to society as a whole. Consider the example of a dentist; if an individual 
receives poor treatment from a practitioner they may have to seek care from the 
NHS, creating an expense for society as well as themselves. A doctor who does not 
diagnose a case properly may cause someone to miss more work than they would 
have done with a proper diagnosis and appropriate medicine. As a result the greater 
societal costs may come from benefits such as sick pay and being paid out. A bad 
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accountant (in terms of societal cost) may not calculate tax accurately and cause a 
cost to society by reducing the amount of tax being paid. In occupations where the 
cost to society is greater than the collective private cost of meeting the minimum 
barriers to entry enforced by occupational regulations, and the cost of monitoring and 
issuance for the regulator bodies, it is beneficial to society to have occupational 
regulations in place, as they will prevent a net loss to society (Moore 1961).  
Proponents of occupational regulation comply with Moore’s assessment. Shapiro 
(1986) suggests that regulation will certainly increase quality (see paper three) and 
will further benefit society as the marginal cost for increased quality is decreasing, 
meaning, the cost of regulating each individual decreases with every new applicant.  
Therefore, it is advantageous to attract as many applicants as possible. Additionally, 
the successful applicants will incur post-entry costs, so it is even more cost-effective 
to accept candidates. 
However, opponents to occupational regulation would argue that there is in fact no 
benefit to the public from such regulation. Whilst the focus of this chapter is not to 
analyse the effect regulation has on quality for regulation (see paper three), to benefit 
the public there should be an increase in the overall quality levels of the occupation 
regulated otherwise the public is still exposed to the poor quality services that they 
will not be able to identify due to their lack of knowledge. On the other hand, Kleiner 
and Kruger (1992) find no increase in quality relating to an increase in the stringency 
of the regulation of dentists in the US. Even where an increase in quality is found the 
increase in price associated with regulation (Shepard 1978, Kleiner & Kudrle 1992, 
Benham 1972, Benham & Benham 1975 and Ekeland, Heckman and Nesheim 2002) 
results in members of the public who want and/or need low-cost services being 
unable to purchase them anymore (Shapiro 1986). This may lead to an increase in 
do-it-yourself services that increase the likelihood of consumers injuring themselves 
as they may be even less equipped than a ‘poor’ practitioner.  
Gellhorn (1976) furthers the argument by stating that the barriers to entry regulations 
are not always correlated with the quality measures of the service to which they 
relate. Indeed Carroll and Gaston (1981) find that although the quality of the worker 
may improve, this does not necessarily lead to an increase in the quality of output. 
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Further, some of the common hurdles to regulation may result in an over-investment 
in human capital, which may lead to a waste of resources. Often workers will 
undertake activities that are very much below their credentials (Dorsey 1980). 
Therefore, not only are regulations costing money, but they also result in a loss of 
opportunities.  
Summary Public Interest 
The theories and evidence presented suggest that there may be no clear link between 
occupational regulation and public interest. However, not all of the evidence disputes 
that the aim of implementing regulation may have been in the public interest. The 
evidence merely comments on its ability, once implemented, to benefit the public. 
However, with this sentiment in mind one cannot state that all occupations that are 
regulated are done so with the aim of bettering the public. A doctor can cause actual 
bodily harm if s/he practices illegally posing a real threat to the public. The same is 
not true of horners (an individual who makes, for example, miniature tea sets out of 
horn) for example, yet both are regulated.  
In those occupations which are regulated but where there is not a direct obvious link 
to public safety, the reason for regulation must emanate from a vested interest. 
Vested Interest 
Having a vested interest means that an individual or group believes an action may 
have a direct positive impact on them. Friedman (1962) asserts that occupational 
regulation systems are almost always run in response to the self-interest of 
incumbents and gatekeepers, and not for public safety or benefit. This can be seen 
from the high costs relating to regulation, the potential deadweight losses and the 
dubious evidence surrounding quality and regulation. There is self-interest in 
becoming regulated because occupational regulation has potentially large benefits, 
namely increased wages and reduced competition. These benefits arise from three 
main sources: monopolistic power, increasing the professionalism of the occupation 
and increasing demand for the service. 
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Monopolistic Power 
Monopolistic power comes from the ability to control the supply side of the labour 
market through creating barriers to entry, controlling how many people can enter an 
occupation. These barriers to entry come in three forms: cost, age limitations and 
numerical limitations, discussed above.  
There are many studies surrounding the extent to which regulation, particularly 
licensing, can limit entry into an occupation, most of which find a very strong 
correlation between the presence and severity of the regulation, and restrictions on 
supply (Thornton & Weintraub 1979, Holen 1965 and Kleiner & Kruger 1992). Due 
to the ability of regulation to restrict supply, existing workers face potential financial 
benefits in that restricting supply has been found to correlate with increased earnings 
(Kleiner & Kruger 1992, Maurizi 1974 and Perloff 1980).  
As a result of the restricted supply, existing workers face less competition from new 
entrants and consumers have no choice but to buy the services available to them. 
These financial benefits are marginally decreasing over time as each new wave of 
entrants face higher entry costs. This is the polar opposite from the public interest 
situation – where costs are marginally reducing with each new entrant so more 
applicants and passes are required to reap the benefits of regulation. 
Gellhorn (1976) notes that increases in wages results, purely from the restriction of 
supply, are unlikely to be from an increase in quality. The high prices created are 
therefore caused purely through artificially restricting supply. Any artificial forces in 
the labour market prevent an optimal result being found because changes are not the 
result of market demand or a change in quality. One of the results of artificial wage 
rises is a deadweight loss to society. Employment will reduce causing higher wages 
but (at least in the short term) demand will remain comparatively unchanged. This is 
depicted in figure 1.2 where a deadweight loss triangle is formed. 
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Figure 1-2: Deadweight loss of restricting supply 
Source: Kleiner (2006) 
Whenever a deadweight loss is present, the optimal level of employment and 
consumer satisfaction cannot be met. This is because there are resources (shaded 
grey), which are left unused; the only outcome possible is sub-optimal.  
For those in the occupation, the gains can be exponential as long as the demand for 
their service is not price sensitive. Price sensitivity affects the demand side of the 
labour market. If a service is very price sensitive, when there are higher wages and 
therefore higher rents are charged, consumers will no longer pay for the service. 
Price sensitivity is affected by how easily a service can be substituted and how 
necessary a service is to the consumers as a whole. Where demand is not price 
sensitive the practitioners can increase their rents and, in general, consumers have no 
choice but to pay. This situation cannot be said to be in the interest of the public, as 
some will have to make sacrifices to afford the service or forgo the service all 
together, which may be harmful for them. For example if dentists increase their 
prices by 50% even though the service is a necessity, some consumers have no 
choice but to forgo dental treatment. Not going to the dentist is harmful to them as 
they may be in pain or their toothache may develop into something more sinister. As 
a result the artificial effects regulation causes in terms of higher prices is almost 
certainly detrimental to at least a portion of the public. 
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Professionalism 
Regulation also has the ability to increase the professionalism of an occupation. 
Abbott (1981) states that, generally, professionals need to sharpen the boundaries 
and portray a professional charisma to the public in order to continue being 
perceived as professionals. Regulation has the ability to aid this by acting as an 
indicator of professionalism to the public in the form of physical evidence such as 
certificates or licenses and also because of the legality around monitoring and 
regulating. Further, occupational regulation limits entry through setting barriers to 
entry. The exclusion of non-professionals, according to Abbott, is the way in which 
professionals analyse professionalism – barriers to entry realise this exclusion.   
Professionalism can be analysed with more detailed measures. The perception of 
professionalism falls into two fields: peer perception and public perception. Peer 
perception or intra-professional recognition has four sources: income, client status, 
substantive difficulty and power (Abbott 1981). Income is often regarded as a good 
indicator of professionalism (Stevens 1966, Carlin 1962). The more someone earns, 
the more likely a fellow worker is to regard the person as professional. Client status 
describes the correlation between the consumers’ professional status and the 
practitioners’ (Reader 1966). The difficulty of the task is also a source of 
professional indicators. The more complex and difficult an occupation is, the more 
likely it is to be interpreted as professional. Lastly the power an individual has over 
their tasks and their occupation conveys a sense of professionalism (Auerbach 1976).  
Occupational regulation can therefore raise professional perceptions on three levels. 
First, as discussed, regulation is positively associated with increased prices appealing 
to the relationship between perceived income and professionalism. Secondly, 
regulation can create a barrier to entry through requiring extensive training or 
examinations, suggesting that not everyone is competent enough to undertake the 
occupation, and this appeals to the perception of professionalism. Lastly, regulation 
can instil a sense of power, as existing professions can exercise their monopolistic 
power.  
 49 
 
Public perception of professionalism or extra-professional perception is drawn from 
three sources: income, power and education (Abbott 1981). The explanation of the 
link between income and perceptions of professionalism is identical to that of intra-
professional perceptions. Power and education in this case are heavily linked. The 
public is more likely to perceive an individual as a professional if they have had to 
spend time in further education or specific education relating to their occupation 
(Larson 1977). Power is then derived by applying this knowledge and training to an 
occupation, which a lay member of the public would not be able to do (Shils 1965). 
Occupational regulation correlates with extra-professional perceptions by forcing an 
individual to undertake training or education and by removing the possibility that a 
member of the public will be perceived as being able to conduct a task as well as a 
regulated worker. Hence, the education and power perceptions of that occupation are 
increased. 
Demand 
Occupational regulation may also increase demand for a service. The rationale for 
regulation increasing demand is two-fold. First, regulation suggests a reassurance of 
quality. As a result, consumers may be willing to buy services that they may not have 
previously. Secondly, increasing the professionalism of an occupation increases its 
public presence and its appeal. Again, consumers may begin to be attracted to 
services that they were unaware of until they were regulated. Whilst the theory may 
offer a sound logical relationship, the evidence linking regulation to an increase in 
demand is mixed. White (1978) and Gallick & Sisk (1987) find support for this 
notion, particularly in the latter study concerning taxi services. However, Benham & 
Benham (1975) and Adams, Jackman & Ekeland (2002) find that there is in actual 
fact a decrease in demand which fits with Shapiro’s (1986) theory that regulation 
will prevent some consumers from being able to access services once prices increase. 
Despite the evidence being mixed, the main aim of workers is to advance their 
position either financially and/or socially. As such, with theories suggesting that 
benefits can be gained from occupational regulation, it is clear to see why 
practitioners might be favourable towards their occupation being covered by 
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regulation. What is less clear is why so many of these occupations gain legal 
protection from the government when they, at best, have no positive impact on the 
public and at worst become detrimental. Stigler (1971) argues that politicians will 
always act in a way that ensures re-election. If occupations which lobby for 
regulation (involving legal enforcement) are large, influential, employing high tax 
earners and based in urban areas, then politicians are likely to support their case. As 
it is, these occupations can dramatically sway the result of an election. The gains to 
professional occupations in these circumstances are almost certainly to the detriment 
of society (Stigler 1971, Pelzman 1976).  
Summary of the reasons for regulation 
Occupational regulation is implemented because it is thought to be in the interest of 
the public to have the occupation regulated and/or that regulation can benefit workers 
within the occupation being regulated. Given the detrimental effects practitioners can 
have on the public, one might assume that the majority of occupational regulation is 
put in place with the intension of improving public safety. One would assume that 
this is achieved by increasing the minimum skill level of the workers. As such only a 
minority of occupational regulations would not have a direct link with public safety.  
Summary of Characteristics 
Two characteristics of regulation have been considered: barriers to entry and the 
rationale for regulation. These characteristics have implications on the restrictiveness 
of the occupation that funds the regulation of individuals and how the regulations are 
enforced. It is therefore the intension of this paper, not only to determine the 
prevalence of regulation at the occupational level, but also to determine if there are 
some significant trends relating to the characteristics of different types of regulation. 
The following section will outline the methods used to determine the prevalence and 
trends of regulation. 
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1.2 Methodology 
The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of the prevalence of occupational 
regulation in the UK and describe the main characteristics of such regulation. This 
section outlines how the aims have been addressed. First, the method of data 
collection is outlined. Second, the approach taken to construct the database is 
presented. Third, the variables used in the analysis are defined. Forth, the method of 
analysis used is described. Lastly, the limitations of the methods used are discussed. 
1.2.1 Data Collection 
The aim of this paper is to ascertain the prevalence of occupational regulation in the 
UK at occupation level. As there is no database of all the occupations that are 
regulated in the UK, the first step is to create a spreadsheet mapping the occurrence 
of regulations. To do this, every occupation in the UK needed to be investigated. 
Using the Standard Occupation Classification (SOC) unit groups this meant 
investigating 353 occupational groups. What can be known about occupational 
regulation is limited to the information that is provided by the regulatory bodies and 
the information embedded in legislation. This information will state the aims of the 
professional bodies, the minimum requirements for entrants and the benefits offered 
to entrants. This information can only be collated through an investigation of every 
occupation and regulating body in the UK. Given the number of occupations and 
regulatory bodies, the process of acquiring the necessary knowledge is very lengthy; 
indeed the process of data collection took two years. The recording of information 
must be undertaken pragmatically. The need for pragmatism overshadows the need 
for detailed definitions of each regulatory body and regulation characteristics, not 
least because this is the first investigation of its kind.  
Data collection was a lengthy process that comprised of four different avenues of 
investigation: 
First, the EU database of licensed occupations was investigated by cross referencing 
the listed occupations against their associated Act. This ensured that the licensed 
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occupations listed by the commission fit the definition of licensing used within this 
thesis. 
Second, all other occupations were investigated through extensive Internet searches 
in order to determine if any type of regulatory system was in place for the given 
occupation.  
Third, where some sort of regulation was present the enforcement body was 
contacted and interviewed with a view to determining the tyrpe and coverage of the 
regulation in place. 
Forth, where the interviews with the enforcement bodies suggested that licensing, 
certification or registration were present, the information was checked agaist any 
relevant Act to ensure that the legality of the regulation, and therefore its 
classification, was correct.  
Only after all four stages were competed was the information applied to the Standard 
Occupational Classification (SOC) system. 
EU Database 
The point of departure was to investigate the European Commission’s database of 
regulated occupations. The Commission provided this list for foreign individuals that 
wish to work in the UK to advise them of any qualifications needed for the 
professions listed. According to the Commission, the regulated professions in the UK 
are those listed in table 1.1; 95 occupations. However, some occupations are clearly 
neglected. For example, security guards who were licensed within the last decade do 
not appear on the list. After speaking to the EU Commission it became evident that 
the list is provisional. The Commission had not investigated every occupation within 
the EU countries on the database to determine if they were regulated. As a result, 
although the list provided a good departure point for the investigation, it was clear 
that further research was needed. 
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The next phase of the research involved desk research of each occupation that 
appears on the EU database. This involved investigating who the enforcement body 
was and contacting them for more detail regarding the regulation. In addition, an 
Internet search was conducted for all other occupations to ascertain if there were any 
regulations associated with the occupation. Where an occupational group was found 
to have more than one regulation, both regulations were recorded and both regulatory 
bodies contacted.  
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Table 1-1: EU Commission List of Regulated Occupations in the UK 
Actuary  
Acupuncturist 
Advocate 
Aeronautical Engineer 
Airport Fire Officer/Airport 
Fire-fighter 
Analytical Chemist 
Arbitrator 
Architectural and 
environmental Curator 
Arts therapist in the health 
service 
Banker 
Biochemist 
Biologist 
Blacksmith, Farrier, 
Forging, Stamping, 
Pressing 
Boat master 
Building Engineer 
Building Services Engineer 
Building Surveyor  
Chartered Scientist 
Chartered Secretary 
Chartered Technician  
Chemical Engineer 
Chemist 
Chief Engineer Class I 
Finishing Vessel 
Child Psychotherapist 
Chiropractor 
Civil Engineer 
Clinical Physicist 
Colourist 
Conveyance 
Dance Teacher 
Deck Officer Class I 
Fishing Vessel 
Deck Officer Class II 
Fishing Vessel 
 
Deck Officer III Fishing 
Vessel 
Dental Nurse 
Dental Therapist 
Diver, 1st Class 
Doctor Of Medicine 
Dyer And Colourist 
Electrical And Computer 
(Technology) Engineer 
Enamelling 
Energy Engineer 
Engineer 
Environmental Engineer 
Environmental Health 
Officer 
Forester 
Gas Engineer 
Gas Installer/Repairer 
Geographer 
Geologist 
Harbour Pilot 
Headmaster/School Director 
Health and Safety Officer 
Housing Expert 
Informatics Systems 
Engineer 
Insolvency Practitioner 
Inspector Of Weights and 
Measures 
Insurance Broker 
Insurance Underwriter 
Land Surveyor 
Landscape Expert 
Librarian 
Loss Adjuster 
Management Accountant 
Manager (Not Elsewhere 
Classified) 
Marine Engineer 
Meteorologist 
Minerals Surveyor 
Mining and Metallurgy 
Expert 
Mining Deputy 
Mining Electrical Engineer 
Mining Electrician 
Mining Manager 
Mining Mechanic 
Mining Mechanical 
Engineer 
Mining Surveyor 
Naval Architect 
Notary Public 
Optometrist (Ophthalmic 
Optician) 
Orthopaedist 
Osteopath 
Paramedic/Ambulance 
Nurse/Other Ambulance 
Professionals 
Petroleum Industry-
Production and Processing 
Of Fuels and Lubricants 
Physicist 
Plant Expert 
Professions in The Field of 
Waste Management and 
Disposal 
Public Finance Accountant 
Quantity Surveyor 
Road/Street Works Operator 
Road/Street Works 
Supervisor 
Shipbroker/Shipping Agent 
Structural Engineer 
Surgical Assistant 
Teacher in Further 
Education 
Textile Expert 
Textile Technologist 
Town Planner/Town and 
Country Planner 
Valuation Surveyor 
Veterinary Nurse 
Water Service Manager 
Source: EU Commission 
2009 
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A list was compiled of all the occupations, the potential regulations associated with 
them and the contact details of the enforcement bodies. Following on from this every 
enforcement body was contacted, and a telephone interview conducted with each. As 
a result of persistence and the Freedom of information Act 2000, a response rate of 
100% was achieved. The high response rate and the lengthy investigation into every 
occupation mean that the reliability of the results is far greater than the EU database. 
The data collated from the interviews is outlined below. 
Telephone Interviews 
The information collected via the telephone interviews was derived from the theory 
presented in the previous section. Table 1.2 contains the questions asked.  
Table 1-2: Telephone interview schedule 
Variable Reason for Inclusion Question Asked 
Possible 
Responses 
Compulsory In order to ascertain 
how restrictive a 
regulation is, it is 
necessary to determine 
if an individual has to 
be part of the 
regulation in order to 
do their occupation or 
whether it is voluntary. 
Does an individual 
have to be part of 
the regulation in 
order to legally do 
any part of their 
job? 
Yes, all aspects of 
the occupation are 
covered by the 
regulation. 
Yes, but only if 
they wish to carry 
out certain tasks. 
No, no part of the 
occupation in 
question is 
restricted to only 
those who are 
associated the 
regulation. 
Law If the respondent cites 
that some or all tasks 
of an occupation are 
restricted to those who 
are part of the 
regulation, it is 
When you say that 
tasks are restricted 
is there a law or 
piece of legislation 
that supports this? 
And do you know 
Metropolitan 
Police Act 1829, 
Private Security 
Industry Act 2001, 
Care Standards 
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Variable Reason for Inclusion Question Asked 
Possible 
Responses 
important to formalise 
this by considering if 
there is a specific law 
or piece of legislation 
that enforces this 
claim. 
the date of the Act 
this is tied to? 
Act 2000. 
 
Coverage As a result of the 
structure of the 
occupation coding 
system, one code can 
cover many job titles. 
To conclude how 
prevalent regulation is 
with accuracy it is 
necessary to record if 
it has full coverage of 
a unit group or partial 
coverage. 
What job titles are 
covered by your 
regulation? 
All the job titles 
on a unit group. 
Some of the titles 
in a unit group. 
Entry 
Requirements 
To observe how 
restrictive a regulation 
is and to conclude on 
the type of regulation 
present, it is necessary 
to report what the 
entry requirements are. 
How does 
someone join your 
regulation? What 
do they need to 
do? 
CRB check. 
Pass an entry 
exam. 
Present a sample 
of work. 
Pay fees. 
Attain a certain 
level of 
qualification. 
Enforcement 
Body 
To draw conclusions 
as to the links between 
government 
involvement and 
regulation, and also the 
presence of 
professional bodies, 
the characteristics of 
the enforcement body 
Is (name of the 
enforcement body) 
one of the 
following (list 
possible answers)? 
Chartered 
professional body. 
Non-chartered 
professional body. 
Government 
agency. 
A local authority. 
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Variable Reason for Inclusion Question Asked 
Possible 
Responses 
are recorded. A regulatory body. 
Something else. 
Funding In order to investigate 
the claims that only 
where there is a public 
interest does the 
government fund 
regulation, each 
enforcement body was 
asked how they are 
funded. 
How is (name of 
the enforcement 
body) funded? 
Government 
funded. 
Self-funded. 
A mixture of self 
and government. 
Some other 
source. 
Age To see if there are any 
historical trends or 
distinct patterns of 
regulation each body 
was asked when the 
regulation came into 
being. 
What date did the 
regulation, or 
enforcement body, 
begin or take 
effect? 
Year reported and 
in some cases the 
month as well. 
Rationale To investigate the 
theoretical arguments 
surrounding public 
safety and vested 
interest, each body was 
asked what the main 
rationale for their 
regulation was. 
What was the 
main reason for 
the creation of a 
regulation? 
Protection of the 
public. 
Display 
competency. 
Adhere to industry 
standards. 
Health and safety 
concerns. 
Up-skilling of the 
profession. 
Enhance 
professional 
recognition. 
Changes To ensure the results 
are accurate each body 
was also asked if there 
had been any changes 
Have there been 
any changes in the 
occupations 
covered by the 
Yes. 
No. 
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Variable Reason for Inclusion Question Asked 
Possible 
Responses 
in coverage, 
restrictions or 
enforcement since the 
regulation began. 
regulation? 
Have the entry 
requirements 
changed over 
time? 
Have there been 
any changes in the 
law that has 
impacted on the 
regulation? 
 
The interview was with either the research officer for the enforcement body or the 
communication manager and every question was open ended. A summary was 
recorded and then repeated back to the respondent to ensure the answer had been 
interpreted correctly. Given the vast number of occupations this section of the 
research took a considerable amount of time but yielded a wealth of information that 
can be applied in future investigations. Where law or legislation was mentioned, 
further investigation was conducted to confirm the answers via further Internet 
searches and cross-checking.  
1.2.2 Constructing the Database 
Following on from the extensive research of all the occupations and their regulation 
characteristics, a database was produced that would allow for statistical investigation. 
The first step was to categorise the occupations using the Standard Occupational 
Classification (SOC) system. Secondly, the regulation status of each group had to be 
determined. Lastly, the variables investigated, shown in table 1.2, were coded for 
analysis. 
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Standard Occupation Classification (SOC) 
The process of coding the occupations was drawn from the SOC codes. SOC codes 
classify occupations in the UK using a coding system that groups similar occupations 
together. Before SOC codes came into existence, occupations in the UK were 
recorded by title. This system led to thousands of different responses being recorded 
and as a result made any statistical or numerical analysis across all occupations very 
difficult, if not impossible. SOC(90), the first system of classification, was 
implemented in the early 1990s to adhere to the need for greater analysis of the UK 
labour market. It is now possible to track how many people are working within any 
occupational group, identify worker shortages and analyse wage differences between 
occupations. This in turn should allow for tighter control of the flows in the labour 
market and prevent skill shortages by pre-empting future labour market trends. SOC 
is used in all of the major national datasets in the UK including the Labour Force 
Survey (LFS), Census and the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). The 
Occupation Information Unit (OIU) maintains SOC for the Office of National 
Statistics (ONS). Any changes made to the SOC have, so far, been made in 
conjunction with the Institute for Employment Research (IER) at the University of 
Warwick. It is because of its widespread use and the close monitoring of its validity 
by the ONS and IER that the SOC codes are assumed to be a solid framework from 
which to analyse occupations. 
Despite widespread use, SOC(90) was replaced in 2000 by SOC(00). It was 
necessary to adapt the coding system for two primary reasons: first, in the 1990s 
technology advanced very quickly creating many jobs that did not fit naturally into 
the SOC(90) system, and second, by adapting the classification system it became 
possible to make it more consistent with the EU system, which allowed for more 
comparative analyses to take place (particularly important as the UK’s involvement 
in the EU had increased substantially during the 1990s). It is because of the 
advantages that SOC(00) offers over SOC(90) that it will be the coding system used 
in this investigation. 
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The structure of SOC(00) is a hierarchical grouping system. There are nine major 
groups, 22 sub-major groups, 81 minor groups and 353 unit groups. SOC groups 
occupations together by drawing ‘similar’ jobs together.  
Figure 1-3: The Structure of SOC(00) 
 
Similarity is determined through skill level and skill content. Skill levels relate to the 
time it takes an individual to become competent at a given job in terms of work 
experience and training. Skill content relates to the type of skills needed to do the 
tasks of the job. SOC is concerned with four distinct skill levels; the first level being 
general education up to those qualifications acquired before an individual can legally 
leave school. The second level is general education with work-related training or 
work experience. The third level of skills is concerned with the need to attain a 
higher level of general knowledge than level one, but less than degree level. Lastly, 
level four is concerned with professional qualifications and degree level knowledge.  
9 Major Groups 
22 Sub-major Groups 
81 Minor Groups 
353 Unit Groups 
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Figure 1-4: SOC(00) Skill Levels 
 
Below, in table 1.3, an example of how the major groups are formed in relation to 
skill levels is given. 
Table 1-3: SOC(00) Major Group Descriptors 
Major Group 
General Nature of Qualifications, Training, and 
Experience for Occupations in the Major Group. 
Managers and Senior 
Officials 
A significant amount of knowledge and experience of the 
production process and service requirements associated 
with the efficient functioning of organisations and 
businesses. 
Professional 
Occupations 
A degree or equivalent qualification, with some 
occupations requiring post-graduate qualifications and/or 
a formal period of experience-related training. 
Associated 
Professional and 
Technical Occupations 
An associated high-level vocational qualification, often 
involving a substantial period of full-time training or 
further study. Some additional task-related training is 
usually provided through a formal period of induction. 
Administrative and 
Secretarial 
Occupations 
A good standard of general education. Certain 
occupations will require further additional vocational 
training to a well-defined standard (e.g. typing or 
shorthand). 
Professional  or general 
knowledge at degree level  
Higher level of qualifications 
Work related 
training/experience 
School leaver qualifications 
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Major Group 
General Nature of Qualifications, Training, and 
Experience for Occupations in the Major Group. 
Skilled Trades 
Occupations 
A substantial period of training often provided by means 
of work-based training programmes. 
Personal Service 
Occupations 
A good standard of general education. Certain 
occupations will require further additional vocational 
training, often provided by means of a work-based 
training programme. 
Sales and Customer 
Service Occupations 
A general education and a programme of work-based 
training related to sales procedures. Some occupations 
require additional specific technical knowledge but are 
included in this major group because the primary task 
involves selling. 
Process, Plant and 
Mechanic Operatives 
The knowledge and experience necessary to operate 
vehicles and other mobile and stationary machinery, to 
operate and monitor industrial plant and other equipment, 
to assemble products from component parts according to 
strict rules and procedures and subject assembled parts to 
routine tests. Most occupations in this group will specify 
a minimum standard of competence that must be attained 
for satisfactory performance of the associated tasks and 
will have an associated period of formal experience-
related training. 
 
Elementary 
Occupations 
Occupations at this level will usually require a minimum 
general level of education (i.e. that which is provided by 
the end of the period of compulsory education). Some 
occupations at this level will also have short periods of 
work-related training in areas such as health and safety, 
food hygiene and customer service requirements. 
Whilst the above definitions of the major SOC groups indicate that one key factor in 
the classification of occupations is the skills required to enter, there is no definitive 
mention of occupational regulations. For example security guards, which are in 
major group 9, are shown to need school leaver qualifications. However the 
regulation relating to security guards requires them to attain a licence which entails 
the accumulation of more skills. As such, it is not sufficient to simply take the major 
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occupation groups as an indicator of barriers to entry and thus presence of regulation. 
Therefore, it was necessary to persist with the research conducted via the desk and 
telephone interviews to generate variables specific to occupational regulation and 
apply them to the SOC code data in order to ascertain the prevalence of regulation 
and enable the dataset to be applicable to other data for future research. 
1.2.3 Defining Variables 
Classifying Regulation Status 
Occupational regulation in the UK can take one of the following forms: registration, 
accreditation, certification or licensing. Each type of regulation has different 
characteristics. To analyse regulation in the UK accurately, as well as a binary 
variable ascertaining if regulation is present in the SOC unit group a second variable; 
regulation status, will be generated recording the type of regulation within the SOC 
unit group.  As no dataset yet exists within the UK that collects data on occupational 
regulation there is little guidance as to how to classify regulation status. As such, the 
criteria used to determine regulation type are drawn from Forth et al. (2010). 
To classify an occupation as licensed, certified, accredited, registered or unregulated, 
two criteria are considered: whether there is any legal requirement by the 
government for individuals to comply with the occupational regulation, and whether 
there is a requirement to demonstrate a minimum degree of competency. The criteria 
relates to the classification as shown in table 1.4. Once the regulation status has been 
determined, four variables were formed: 
Licensing: does the SOC unit code have licensing within it? (1=yes, 0=no) 
Certification: does the SOC unit code have certification within it? (1=yes, 0=no) 
Accreditation: does the SOC unit code have accreditation within it? (1=yes, 0=no) 
Registration: does the SOC unit code have registration within it? (1=yes, 0=no) 
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Once all occupations within the SOC unit group have been researched, the unit group 
is assigned an overall regulation status. The unit group regulation status is the 
‘highest’ regulation status in terms of legality and levels of entry requirements. 
Where there are two regulations of the same status, the older regulation is used. 
Table 1-4: Classification of regulation status 
 
Source: Bryson, Forth, Humphris, Kleiner and Koumenta 2010 
Where a unit group is concluded to be licensed, the legislative Act enforcing 
licensing was confirmed, particularly if this had not been provided during the 
telephone interview with the enforcement body. 
Coverage 
The way SOC groups together occupations means that many occupations can be 
covered by one unit code. Therefore, it is possible that when a unit code has a 
positive regulation status (that is licensing, certification, accreditation or registration) 
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recorded; it may not translate to every occupation in the group being covered by the 
regulation. For example, lollipop men/ladies are in the same unit group as security 
guards but they are not licensed.  
To overcome the issues associated with the classification system a more complex 
matrix of occupations can be constructed. This matrix would separate individuals not 
only by their occupation but also the industry in which they work. Using the example 
above, in order to only capture security guards (and not lollipop ladies) all those 
working the occupational unit code and within the security sector would be selected. 
The fundamental issue with this approach is the potential it has to exclude large 
portions of regulated individuals. A security guard may state they are working in the 
security sector but they may also state they are working in the retail sector if they are 
guarding the entrance to a shop, or the entertainment industry is they are standing on 
the door of a theatre. As a result of the problems associated with restricting the 
analysis though a more complex matrix of occupations only the SOC codes will be 
used. This will have limitations because the upper and lower bound estimates are 
likely to vary. However, until comprehensive data can be collated from every 
enforcement body in the UK or a specific question is included in national surveys 
relating to individual regulation status there will always be upper and lower bound 
estimates.  
In order not to overestimate the prevalence of occupational regulation it is necessary 
to have a variable indicating whether there is complete or partial coverage. Ideally, 
the exact number of occupations regulated in each unit group would be recorded as 
this would give the most accurate results. However, titles used to be recorded 
without a classification system, so there are too many job titles to realistically and 
accurately assess each one beyond those explicitly defined in the unit group 
definition. Therefore, two variables are generated: 
Complete Coverage: Are all the jobs in the SOC unit group covered under the 
regulation status? (1=yes, 0=no) 
Partial Coverage:  Are only a portion of the jobs in the SOC unit group covered 
under the regulation status? (1=yes, 0=no) 
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This will result in two estimates being created: a lower bound and an upper bound 
estimate. The lower bound estimate is computed by only considering unit groups 
where there is complete coverage. The upper bound estimate also includes unit 
groups where there is only partial coverage.  
Rationale for Regulation 
Whenever an occupational regulation is put into place there must be a reason as to 
why it has come into existence. Once all the key aims of the regulation are recorded 
they were allocated into seven main categories: 
Adherence to codes of conduct. The regulation is used mainly to provide codes of 
conduct and monitor regulated individuals as to their adherence to them. The 
Chartered Institute of Marketing, the Organic Control Bodies and the Chartered 
Institute for Personnel and Development all cite this as their main rationale for 
regulating. This is a binary variable (1=yes, 0=no). 
Demonstrate competence. The regulation is used mainly to indicate that members are 
capable of a minimum degree of competency. Examples of enforcement bodies that 
cite this as their main rationale include the Royal Geographical Society, Royal Town 
Planning Institute and the Register of Exercise Professionals. This is a binary 
variable (1=yes, 0=no). 
Establish or maintain industry standards. The main aim of the regulation is to set 
and/or maintain some sort of minimum industry standard. The Association of British 
Travel Agents and the Hairdressing Council both claim this as their main rationale 
for regulation. This is a binary variable (1=yes, 0=no). 
Gain professional recognition. The main aim of the regulation is to enhance the 
perception of the occupation so that it is regarded as a professional occupation. 
Enforcement bodies that cite this as their main rationale include the Chartered 
Institute of Textile Technologists, the British Toymakers Guild and the British 
Society of Medical Secretaries and Administrators. This is a binary variable (1=yes, 
0=no). 
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Health and safety. The main aim of the regulation is to ensure health and safety 
standards are kept to, protecting the workers and the public. The Chartered Institute 
of Waste Management, the Royal Society of Chemists and the Royal Society of 
Meteorologists all state that health and safety concerns were the main reason for their 
existence. The variable is binary (1=yes, 0=no). 
Protect the public. The main aim of the regulation is to protect the public from harm 
and excessive expense caused by poor quality services. Examples of enforcement 
bodies who explicitly state that protecting the public is their main function include 
the General Social Care Council, the Gambling Commission and the General 
Pharmaceutical Council. This is a binary variable (1=yes, 0=no). 
Level of Entry Qualifications (NVQ) 
In order to ascertain the level of entry qualifications, the requirements of the 
regulation are mapped against National Vocational Qualification (NVQ) levels. 
NVQs are defined by City and Guilds as qualifications that test an individual’s 
ability to actually do a job. They are rarely solely classroom based and completed by 
most in the workplace. NVQ levels span from 0 to 8, where level 8 is equivalent to 
the highest possible qualification level and includes doctorates. As such this variable 
takes the form of a scale (0-8). 
Table 1-5: National Vocational Qualifications (NVQ) level definitions 
NVQ Level Definition 
National Qualification 
Framework Estimation 
Level 1 This level requires attendance and completion 
of a course that covers a range of routine and 
predictable skills and tasks. 
Entry 
Level 2 This level requires attendance and completion 
of a course that covers a range of activities in a 
variety of different contexts. Group and team 
participation is often a firm part of the course. 
2 
Level 3 The activities covered at level 3 are no longer 
routine or predictable. As with level two, 
individuals consider how activities are 
performed in a variety of contexts. There is 
3 
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NVQ Level Definition 
National Qualification 
Framework Estimation 
much more autonomy and individual 
responsibility at this level compared to levels 1 
and 2. 
Level 4 At this level, individuals have a significant 
amount of autonomy. Further, it is likely that 
there is now much time dedicated to the 
responsibility of others’ work and the need for 
resource management. 
4-5 depending on the content 
of the course 
Level 5 The focus is applying a variety of 
competencies to many different environments. 
As with level 4, there are high levels of 
autonomy and responsibility. The main 
progression at level 5 is the analysis and 
evaluation of work and its impact on others. 
5-8 depending on the content 
of the course 
Level 6 This is equivalent to an Honours degree. 6 
Level 7 This is equivalent to a Master’s degree. 7 
Level 8 This is equivalent to a Doctoral degree. 8 
For example, a travel agent manager who wishes to become accredited by the 
Association of British Travel Agents must pass an exam that is equivalent to an NVQ 
level 2. A social service manager must have a degree and a postgraduate 
qualification, in order to become licensed by the General Social Care Council. An 
additional benefit to using NVQ levels is that because NVQs are so heavily focused 
on vocations and qualifying individuals to do a specific task or job, they are the most 
suitable way to measure qualification-related barriers to entry. Further, as a result of 
NVQ levels easily mapping to the National Qualification Framework (see page 160) 
for more detail) their inclusion allows for a wealth of future investigation into the 
effect regulation has on skill levels. 
Human Capital Expectations 
Whilst it is interesting to consider the qualification levels required by the regulations, 
the significance of these requirements can only be judged when they are compared to 
what individuals within the affected SOC unit group are assumed to have acquired 
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anyway – without the regulation. The assumptions of human capital relating to 
qualification attainment for each SOC major unit are found in the description of each 
group. The SOC system has its own system of levels, which are defined below in 
table 1.6.  
Table 1-6: SOC skill levels 
Level Definition 
One Skills acquired by an individual who completes full-time compulsory 
education and achieves a set of satisfactory school leaving examination 
grades.  
Two At least the same skills as level one with additional work related 
training and/or work experience. 
Three Post-compulsory education but not to degree level. May also include 
vocational education.  
Four ‘Professional’ qualifications including degrees or equivalent work-
related qualifications. 
The variable is, therefore, a scale (1-4) and will be used to separate out different 
existing skill levels and to observe any trends. 
Other Entry Requirements 
As qualifications are not the only way in which regulation can restrict entry, it is 
necessary to create variables which measure entry restrictions beyond NVQ levels. 
Work experience: does the regulation require any work experience from entrance? 
This variable is a scale (0=none, 1=1-2 years, 2=3-4 years, 3=more than 5 years). An 
example of this is the Institute of Healthcare Management; if a healthcare practice 
manager wishes to be accredited by the institute they must have at least two years’ 
work experience. Similarly, marketing associate professionals must have at least 
three years’ work experience to be accredited by the Chartered Institute of 
Marketing. 
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CRB check: does the regulation require a CRB check of entrants? This is a binary 
variable (1=yes, 0=no). Nurses, education assistants and paramedics all need CRB 
checks in order to obtain their licenses. 
Any other requirements: beyond qualifications, work experience or CRB checks; 
does the regulation require anything further from entrants? (1=yes, 0=no). For 
example, pharmacy managers must undergo a 52-week training scheme in order to 
get a licence from the General Pharmaceutical Council. A medical practitioner must 
complete a health test to ensure good health before the General Medical Council will 
issue a licence to practice. Also, anyone wishing to conduct an MOT on a car needs 
to hold a full and valid driving licence before they receive their licence to practice 
from the Vehicle and Operator Service Authority. 
Enforcement Body 
No matter the rationale for regulation, once it comes into force there must be an 
enforcing body. These bodies can take many different forms but can be categorised 
into one of five main groups. 
Regulatory body: the regulation is enforced by a body that is a separate entity to the 
government. It is responsible for the running and implementation of the body, and 
often is responsible for funding, but it is still subject to government inspection and 
auditing. This is a binary variable (1=regulatory body, 0=some other enforcement 
body). 
Government Agency: a governmental department or agency enforces the regulation. 
The enforcement in this case is monitored and implemented directly by the 
government and is often heavily subsidised by public money. An example of a 
government agency is the Financial Services Authority (FSA) and the Home Office. 
This is a binary variable (1=government agency, 0=some other enforcement body). 
Local Authority: local authorities enforce the regulation meaning each authority is 
responsible for implementing and enforcing regulation only within the geographical 
area that their authority covers. Examples of occupations regulated by the local 
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authority are market traders and cab drivers. This is a binary variable (1=local 
authority, 0=some other enforcement body). 
Professional body: the enforcement body in this case is completely separate from the 
government and has complete autonomy over managing the regulation and funding. 
The National Association of Paralegals, the Painting and Decorating Association and 
the British Floral Association are all examples of non-chartered professional bodies. 
This is a binary variable (1=professional body, 0=some other enforcement body). 
Chartered professional body: the enforcement body is the same as a professional 
body but it has achieved chartered status. Examples of chartered professional bodies 
include the Chartered Institute of Environmental Health, the Worshipful Company of 
Clockmakers and the Chartered Institute for Personnel and Development. This is a 
binary variable (1=chartered professional body, 0=some other enforcement body). 
Other: the enforcement body does not fit appropriately into any of the categories 
mentioned above, for example,  the National Youth Agency which is a registered 
charity and covers youth and community workers. This is a binary variable (1=an 
uncategorised enforcement body, 0=some other enforcement body). 
1.2.4 Analysis 
Once the database was constructed it was possible to produce the lower and upper 
bound estimates for the prevalence of regulation in the UK. As a result of 
categorising regulations into the four different types (licensing, certification, 
accreditation and registration), it was also possible to determine the lower and upper 
bound estimates for each of the regulations. As discussed, whilst generating upper 
and lower bound estimates will not provide an absolute numerical value as to the 
presence of regulation, because of the structure of the occupation classification 
scheme used, it is the only method of estimation. However, as this is the first 
investigation to be conducted to this extent, an interval of accuracy is still a vast 
improvement on the complete lack of estimation that currently exists.  
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In addition to determining the prevalence of regulation, this paper also aims to 
provide a general overview of the characteristics of regulation. The characteristics of 
interest are those that were most prominent in the literature, namely the main 
rationale for regulation, the stringency of entry requirements and the characteristics 
of the enforcement agency. The aim is to conclude if there is a general pattern or 
trend amongst the different regulations with regard to the three aspects.  
To conclude, if different regulations have different characteristics, an Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) is conducted. ANOVA is the statistical tool used to test the 
hypothesis that the means of all the groups involved are the same. The alternative 
hypothesis is, therefore, that the means are not all the same. ANOVA is an extension 
of the T-test, indeed for a two-sampled analysis the F-test is simply the square of the 
equivalent T calculation, however ANOVA is constructed to take into account 3 or 
more groups. The advantage of using ANOVA instead of simply undertaking 
multiple T-tests is that conducting just one calculation reduces the risk of wrongfully 
rejecting the null hypothesis. As each of the categories considered in this paper are 
independent, either an occupation is coded as registered, accredited, certified, 
licensed or not regulated at all, it is appropriate to use an independent ANOVA test 
as opposed to a factorial or dependent test. Significance is granted at the 5% level to 
ensure the possibility of rejecting the null hypothesis is reduced. 
1.2.5 Limitations 
The presence of two estimates is the main weakness of the research. It will be 
impossible to accurately compute a single figure that is representative of the presence 
of regulation in the UK because of the way in which occupations are coded. 
However, this is the most accurate approach that can be taken. Further, as this is the 
first initial investigation into all types of regulation, allowances for measurement 
error are inevitable and unavoidable until questions concerning regulation appear on 
the national surveys. A further limitation to the analysis is the reliance on the 
enforcement bodies to give honest answers when interviewed, although every effort 
was taken to minimise false information by cross checking answers with internet and 
regulatory documents.  
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The following section will present the results of the analysis described above. 
1.3 Results 
The following section presents the results of the investigation outlined in the 
methodology. The focus of the results is to highlight the extent to which occupational 
regulation is present across occupations in the UK and to create some generalisable 
characteristics as to how regulation in the UK stands at present. 
1.3.1 Prevalence of Occupational Regulation 
From the extensive investigation in to the regulation status of every Standard 
Occupational Classification (SOC) unit group in the UK, using the criteria presented 
in the methodology (table 1.4), 189 of the 353 SOC unit groups contain occupational 
regulation.  
As described in detail throughout this paper, occupational regulation can be 
separated into four broad categories: licensing, certification, accreditation and 
registration. Figure 1.5 separates the presence of regulation into these four 
categories. Further, as discussed in the methodology, the nature of the SOC unit 
groups means that it is often the case that a regulation present in a SOC unit group 
will not have complete coverage. As such, figure 1.5 highlights the number of unit 
groups with full and partial coverage for each of the regulation types. 
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Figure 1-5: Presence of Occupational Regulation by Type of Regulation and Coverage 
 
The results show that licensing is present in over 23% of the SOC unit groups and 
that in over 15% of SOC unit groups, the entire group is covered by licensing (82 
and 53 groups respectively). This means that at least 15% of occupations, at the unit 
level, cannot be undertaken without a licence being obtained. The ‘list of licensed 
occupations’ details what these unit groups are, and which are completely covered by 
licensing.  
Certification is shown to be the main regulation present in nearly 6% of unit groups 
and in over 5% of unit groups, all the occupations are covered by certification (20 
and 18 groups respectively). The ‘list of certified occupations’ details the title of the 
certified unit groups and the extent of coverage certification has within them. 
Accreditation is found to be present in over 18% of SOC unit groups and in over 
11% of groups, accreditation has universal coverage (67 and 40 unit groups 
respectively). The unit groups covered by accreditation are shown in the ‘list of 
accredited occupations’. 
Registration is present in over 5% of unit groups and nearly 1.5% of unit groups have 
registration covering all of the occupations within it. The full list of occupations 
covered by registration is shown in the ‘list of registered occupations’. 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
Partial
Coverage
Full
Coverage
 75 
 
1.3.2 Licensed Occupations 
As defined previously, a licensed occupation is one that requires an individual to 
obtain a licence in order to legally undertake any part of the occupation. There are 82 
SOC unit groups that have some sort of licensing scheme within their group. All of 
these occupation groups are listed below: 
List of Licensed Occupations  
(*full coverage of unit group) 
1171 Officers in the Armed Forces* 
1172 Police Officers (inspectors and above)* 
1173 Senior Officers in ire, Ambulance, Prison and related services* 
1174 Security Managers* 
1182 Pharmacy Managers 
1184 Social Services managers 
1185 Residential and day care managers 
1223 Restaurant and catering managers* 
1224 Publicans and managers of licensed premises* 
2211 Medical practitioners* 
2212 Psychologists* 
2213 Pharmacists/pharmacologists* 
2214 Ophthalmic opticians* 
2215 Dental Practitioners* 
2216 Veterinarians* 
2314 Secondary education teaching professionals* 
2315 Primary and nursery education teaching professionals* 
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2316 Special needs education, teaching professionals* 
2411 Solicitors, lawyers, judges and coroners* 
2419 Legal professionals* 
2442 Social workers* 
2443 Probation workers* 
3112 Electrical/Electronics Technicians* 
3211 Nurses* 
3212 Midwives* 
3213 Paramedics* 
3214 Medical Radiographers* 
3215 Chiropodists* 
3216 Dispensing opticians* 
3217 Pharmaceutical dispensers* 
3218 Medical and dental technicians 
3221 Physiotherapists* 
3222 Occupational therapists* 
3223 Speech and language therapists* 
3229 Therapists 
3231 Youth and community workers* 
3312 Police Officers (sergeant and below)* 
3313 Fire service 
3314 Prison service officers (below principal officer) 
3319 Protective service associate professionals 
3442 Sports coaches, instructors and officials 
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3511 Air traffic controllers* 
3512 Aircraft pilots and fight engineers* 
3513 Ship and hovercraft officers* 
3520 Legal associate professionals 
3535 Taxation experts* 
3565 Inspector of factories, utilities and trading standards* 
3566 Statutory examiners 
3568 Environmental health officers* 
5111 Farmers 
5211 Smiths and forge workers 
5231 Motor mechanics, auto engineers 
5314 Plumbers, heating and ventilation engineers 
5431 Butchers, meat cutters* 
5432 Bakers, flour confectioners* 
5433 Fishmongers, poultry dressers* 
5434 Chefs, cooks 
6111 Nursing auxiliaries and assistants 
6113 Dental nurses 
6121 Nursery Nurses 
6122 Childminders and Related Occupations 
6123 Playgroup leaders/assistants 
6124 Education Assistants 
8111 Process operatives 
8211 Heavy goods vehicle drivers* 
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8212 Van drivers* 
8213 Bus and coach drivers* 
8214 Taxi, cab drivers and chauffeurs* 
8215 Driving instructors 
8221 Crane drivers* 
8222 Fork-lift truck drivers* 
8223 Agricultural machinery drivers* 
9223 Kitchen and catering assistants 
9225 Bar Staff 
9241 Security guards and related occupations 
9249 Elementary security occupations 
The list denotes that of the 82 unit groups, 53 are completely covered by a licence; 
meaning everyone in that group must have a licence. In the remaining groups only 
some individuals need a licence. For example, in group 5111 Farmers it is only 
organic farmers that need a licence from one of the organic control bodies. Similarly, 
in group 5231 Motor Mechanics and Auto Engineers, it is only those who wish to 
carry out a Ministry of Transport (MOT) test that needs a licence from the Vehicle 
and Operator Service Authority. 
Each of the licenses examined is accompanied by legislation that enforces the 
licensing scheme. For example, all restaurant and catering managers must hold a 
licence in accordance with the Food Safety Act 1990; all opticians must hold a 
licence in accordance with the Opticians Act 1958; and, all air traffic controllers 
must be licensed to comply with the Civil Aviation Act 1971 and Directive 
2006/23/EC. As a result of researching the statutory instrument, it is possible to note 
the ages of licenses. Below is a summary of the results: 
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Table 1-7: Number of Licensing Legislations by Year 
 Before 1950 1950-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2010 Total 
Number 
Licensing 
Legislation 
21 14 3 16 15 69 
*Number of legislations is less than the number of SOC units with licensing because legislation can 
cover more than one occupational group i.e. the Childcare Act 2006 covers groups 6121, 6122, 6123 
& 6124. 
Whilst most licensed occupations have been in place for many years there have been 
some occupations that have become licensed since 2001. This is the case in group 
6121 Nursery Nurses, group 6122 Childminders and Related Occupations, group 
6123 Playgroup Leader/Assistants and 6124 Education Assistants. Licensing was 
extended to more job titles in these groups in accordance with the Childcare Act 
2006 which stated that all individuals who spent more than two hours caring for 
children and/or the child is under the age of five, have to hold a licence necessitating 
a Criminal Record Background (CRB) check. The job titles now covered by 
licensing in these groups were initially certified. However, some occupations went 
from being unregulated to licensed. These included some job titles in group 9225 Bar 
Staff who may need to be licensed if they are selling alcohol. This was in response to 
the Licensing Act 2003. Some individuals in group 9241 Security Guards and 
Related Occupations may also need a licence if they work in the security sector and 
are not ‘in-house’ security, so as to comply with the Private Security Industry Act 
2001. 
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Table 1-8: Number of Licenses by SOC Skill Level of Unit Group 
Skill Level 1 Skill Level 2 Skill Level 3 Skill Level 4 
Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage 
4 4.9 18 22.0 38 46.3 22 26.8 
If one considers the presence of licensing with regard to the defined skill level of the 
occupational group, licensing is predominantly present (over 73%) in unit groups 
described as having at least a SOC skill level 3 (post compulsory education, but not 
to degree level, and may also include vocational education). Nearly 27% of unit 
groups that have licensing within them have been given a SOC skill level of 4 
(‘professional’ qualifications, including degrees or equivalent work-related 
qualifications). This shows that whilst licensing is present across a spectrum of 
occupations, there is a heavy weighting towards occupations that are defined as 
needing a fairly high degree of skill.  
Barriers to Entry 
With regard to barriers to entry, all licenses are shown to require some level of 
qualification.  
Table 1-9: Qualification Requirements mapped to the National Qualification 
Framework 
 
None 
Required 
Below 
Level 2 
Level 2 Level 3 
Level 
4-6 
Level 
7-8 
Don’t 
Know 
Total 
Number 
of 
Licenses 
0 20 11 6 32 2 11 82 
*’Don’t Know’ indicates where the entry qualifications could not be accurately mapped to the NQF 
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Licenses are shown to require a range of qualifications ranging from below a level 2, 
where only basic knowledge and ability to learn are needed, up to a level 8, which is 
equivalent to a Doctorate. However, licensing is more likely to require qualifications 
of level 4 and above; level four equating to qualifications above A-level standard. 
Qualifications are not the only entry requirement of licenses. CRB checks are 
required by 32 of the unit groups covered by licenses. These include all unit groups 
covered by the Childcare Act 2006; Midwives covered by the Midwives Registration 
Act 1902; and, all unit groups covered by the Higher Education Act 1998. Some 
licenses also require work experience before an individual can become fully 
qualified. In such licensing schemes, two ask for 1-2 years’ work experience (group 
2411 Solicitors, Lawyers, Judges and Coroners, group 3217 Pharmaceutical 
Dispensers), one asks for four years’ work experience (2419 Legal Professionals 
NEC), and two ask for various amounts of work experience determined by sector, 
age, tasks and interaction with the public (group 3565 Inspectors of Factories, 
Utilities and Trading Standards and group 3566 Statutory Examiners). 
There may also be other forms of entry requirements such as medical checks, fitness 
assessments, declaration of compliance or a full driving licence. Of the unit groups 
covered by licensing, 53 are required to meet some additional criteria like the 
examples given above.  
Rationale for Licensing 
Interestingly, all of the licensing enforcement bodies cited protection of the public as 
their main function either by demonstrating competence to protect the public, 
adhering to standards to protect the public, enforcing health and safety to protect the 
public or just to protect the public. The only bodies not to mention protecting the 
public in their rationale were the organic control bodies that regulated farmers, who 
stated that their main function was to ensure members were adhering to codes of 
conduct, and the Vehicle and Operator Service Authority who simply state the need 
to demonstrate competency as their main function. One can argue that the need to 
demonstrate competency and adhere to codes of conduct is ultimately to protect the 
public.  
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Enforcement Body 
The enforcement bodies for licensing are mostly regulatory bodies (39%) or 
government agencies (32.9%). Regulatory bodies are organisations set up with the 
aim of enforcing a specific regulation. They are not solely controlled by the 
government though will often fall into the bracket of a Quasi-Autonomous Non-
Governmental Organisations (QUANGOs). Examples of regulatory bodies include 
the Bar Council, the Health Professions Council, the General Dental Council and 
Office of Standards in Education (OFSTED). However, despite the regulatory bodies 
being QUANGOs, only 3 are self-funded (the Bar Council, the Royal College of 
Veterinary Surgeons and the Council for Licensed Conveyors).  
Government agencies are those that are within a governmental department. Examples 
include: the Prison Service, the Civil Aviation Society and the Office for Fair 
Trading. All government agencies are funded by the government. In addition to 
government agencies, some licenses are enforced by local authorities, for example 
group 8214 Taxi, Cab Drivers and Chauffeurs. 
Professional bodies enforce other licenses. These are set up as separate entities from 
the government and as such have autonomy over their running, although they must 
adhere to any relevant legislation. Professional bodies can be chartered such as the 
Chartered Institute of Environmental Health, which is the only chartered institute that 
enforces licensing and covers most licenses associated with food preparation. The 
institute is self-funded. Other professional bodies are not chartered, such as the 
Security Industry Authority (SIA), the British Institute of Innkeeping, the Joint 
Industry Board, the Nursing and Midwifery Council and the Organic Control Bodies. 
All of these professional bodies state they are self-funded. In total, 69 licenses are 
enforced by bodies that say they are government funded, whereas 13 state they are 
self-funded (and ultimately self-managed).   
Summary of Licensing 
In summary, from the dataset constructed, licensing is likely to require an individual 
to attain a qualification, a CRB check and meet other criteria specific to that licence. 
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The enforcement body is more likely to be a QUANGO in the form a regulating 
body, or a government agency, and is likely to be government funded. The rationale 
for the licensing to exist is almost always given as protecting the public. 
1.3.3 Certified Occupations 
As defined previously, a certified occupation is one where an individual can choose 
to acquire a certificate. A certificate will enable them to carry out duties they could 
not otherwise legally do. Certification is however, completely voluntary. If an 
individual chooses not to get a certificate but they would like to work in the 
occupation, they can do so, but they cannot do the task covered by the certificate. As 
such, it is not mandatory for the occupation, but rather elements of the tasks within it. 
For example, anyone can work as a plumber, but only those who have a gas safety 
certificate can fit boilers. 
List of Certified Occupations  
(*full coverage of unit group) 
1233 Hairdressing and Beauty Salon Managers and Proprietors* 
2121 Civil engineers* 
2122 Mechanism engineers* 
2123 Electrical engineers* 
2124 Electronics engineers* 
2125 Chemical engineers* 
2126 Design and developments engineers* 
2127 Production process engineers* 
2128 Planning and quality control engineers* 
2129 Engineering professionals* 
2431 Architects* 
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3113 Engineering technicians* 
3114 Building and civil engineering technicians* 
3119 Science and engineering technicians 
 3121 Architectural Technologists and Town Planning Technicians* 
3443 Fitness instructors* 
3449 Sports and Fitness Occupations* 
8115 Rubber Process Operatives 
8118 Electroplaters* 
Of those 19 groups, 17 are completely covered, meaning every job title and every 
individual within that group can become certified if they so wish. The two unit 
groups where this is not the case is group 3119 Science and Engineering Technicians 
where only engineering technicians are certified and group 8115 Rubber Process 
Operatives where only individuals who work with unformed rubber are certified. 
All but three of the occupations covered by certification have protection of title 
which means that only those who are certified can refer to themselves by a given 
title. For example, certified engineers can call themselves Chartered Engineers and 
certified architects can call themselves Chartered Architectural Engineers. The three 
exceptions are fitness instructors, rubber operatives and sports and other fitness 
occupations.  
The first certification scheme began in 1964. The Hairdressing Council was given 
the ability to restrict some tasks, mainly involving chemicals, to their members. The 
scheme was in response to the Hairdressers Registration Act 1964. Most certification 
occurred between 1980 and 1989. All certification that started in this period was 
enforced by the Engineering Council who certifies engineering related occupations 
(Groups 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 3113, 3114 and 
3119) and restricts some tasks undertaken by those occupations. The body received 
its royal charter in 1981 and began certifying individuals in 1985. The Architects Act 
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1997 meant that all occupations associated with architectural work could become 
certified (groups 2431 and 3121). In the last decade, sports and fitness instructors 
gained a certificate recognised by the Register of Exercise Professional, which was 
established in 2002.  
Table 1-10: Number of Certification by SOC Skill Level of Unit Group 
Skill Level 1 Skill Level 2 Skill Level 3 Skill Level 4 
Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage 
0 0.0 5 26.3 5 26.3 9 47.4 
Certification appears across a range of SOC units, but it is only present in 
occupations defined as having at least a SOC skill at level 2, (at least the same skills 
as someone who has completed full time education, with additional work related 
training and/or work experience). However, certification is most present in 
occupations defined by SOC as having a skill level of 4, which denotes that the 
occupations need ‘professional’ qualifications including degrees or equivalent work-
related qualifications. These occupations include architects, engineers and town 
planners. This suggests that certification is more likely in occupations that require a 
high skill set. 
Barriers to Entry 
As with licensing, certification provides barriers to entry. If an individual chooses to 
become certified and enables themselves to legally offer a protected service to 
consumers, they must meet the entry requirements of the certification scheme in 
place.  
One prominent entry requirement is the need to attain a given level of qualifications.  
  
 86 
 
Table 1-11: Qualification Requirements mapped to the National Qualification 
Framework 
 
None 
Required 
Below 
Level 2 
Level 2 Level 3 
Level 
4-6 
Level 
7-8 
Don’t 
Know 
Total 
Number of 
Certificates 
0 0 7 0 2 10 0 19 
The results show that just over half (52.6%) of certification requires an attainment of 
a level 7-8 qualification (qualifications equivalent to masters or doctoral level). 
Occupations requiring this level of qualification are those relating to engineering, i.e. 
individuals who wish to become Chartered Engineers. Those occupations requiring 
level 2 qualifications (equivalent to a GCSE grade A*-C) include hairdressers and 
fitness instructors. There are no certification schemes that ask for qualifications 
below level 2, meaning that all certification requires at least a qualification 
equivalent to GCSE grades A*-C. 
Interestingly, compared to licensing where CRB checks are fairly common, CRB 
checks are only listed as a requirement for Electrical Engineers who are working for 
nuclear or defence-related industries. No other schemes explicitly require any CRB 
checks. With regards to work experience, certification schemes can require a certain 
amount of work experience before a certificate is issued. For example, architects, 
architectural technologists and town planning technicians are all required to have at 
least two years’ work experience in the field before they can become Chartered 
Architectural Technicians. Similarly, Chartered Engineers need work experience to 
gain a certificate, though the amount of experience varies depending on the exact 
nature of the work, the industry and the sector. In all, eight occupational unit groups 
are required to have some level of work experience before they can obtain a 
certificate and protected title. 
Certification schemes may also require some other entry requirements. These other 
entry requirements could include age restrictions, health checks or full driving 
licenses. For example, fitness instructors must have Civil Liability Insurance cover 
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before they can be certified. In total, eight of the certified unit groups need to meet 
some other entry requirements beyond qualifications, work experience or CRB 
checks to become certified. 
Rationale for Certification 
As with licensing, the bulk of certifications (63%) state that their main reason for 
regulating is to protect the public. These occupations are all covered by the Chartered 
Engineering certification scheme. Only three of the cited certified unit groups 
demonstrated competence as their main rationale, with no mention of its impact on 
public safety. These are all occupations covered by the Chartered Architectural 
Technician certification scheme. The remaining occupations claim that establishing 
and maintaining industry standards with a view to professionalism is the main reason 
for regulating. These included occupations regulated by the Hairdressing Council. 
Enforcement Body 
A regulatory body enforces all but one of the certification schemes. Regulatory 
bodies are organisations set up with the aim of enforcing a specific regulation. 
Examples of regulatory bodies include The Engineering Council, the Architects 
Registration Body and the Register of Exercise Professionals. Interestingly, all the 
regulatory bodies enforcing certification are government funded apart from the 
Register of Exercise Professionals, which is self-funded. The only certification 
scheme not enforced by a regulatory body is that of hairdressers. The Hairdressing 
Council is a non-chartered professional body which claims to be totally self-funded, 
but these claims are not always true. 
Summary of Certification 
In summary, if an occupation is covered by certification it will most likely cover the 
whole SOC unit group. The certificate is likely to cover more skilled occupations. It 
is also likely to require qualifications above degree level and possibly some work 
experience. It is less likely to require a CRB check but may require some occupation-
specific requirements. The enforcement body is very probably a regulatory body 
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which is government funded, and it is very likely that a certified individual will also 
have a protected title in addition to a protected function. 
1.3.4 Accredited Occupations 
If an occupation is covered by an accreditation scheme, an individual within that 
occupation can chose to join. The scheme does not protect any tasks an occupation 
may cover, as is the case with certification. Accreditation simply accredits the 
individual with being able to meet the entry requirements and signals this to the 
public.  
List of Accredited Occupations  
(*full coverage of unit group) 
1122 Managers in construction* 
1132 Market and sales managers 
1134 Advertising and public relations managers* 
1135 Personnel, training and industrial relations managers* 
1161 Transport and distribution managers* 
1183 Healthcare practice managers* 
1226 Travel agents managers* 
1235 Recycling and refuse disposal managers 
2111 Chemists* 
2112 Biological scientists and biochemists 
2113 Physicists, genealogists and meteorologists* 
2131 IT strategy and planning professionals 
2132 Software professionals 
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2322 Social science researchers 
2421 Chartered and certified accountants* 
2422 Management accountants* 
2423 Management consultants, actuaries, economists and statisticians* 
2432 Town planners* 
2433 Quantity surveyors* 
2434 Chartered surveyors (not quantity surveyors)* 
2451 Librarians* 
2452 Archivists and Curators* 
3123 Building inspectors* 
3131 IT operations technicians 
3414 Dancers and choreographers 
3431 Journalists, newspaper and periodical editors* 
3531 Estimators, Valuers and Assessors* 
3533 Insurance underwriters* 
3537 Financial and accounting technicians 
3543 Marketing associate professional  
3562 Personnel and industrial relations officers* 
3563 Vocational and industrial trainers and instructors* 
3567 Occupational hygienists and safety officers 
4122 Accountants and wage clerks, book-keepers, other financial clerks 
4137 Market research interviewers* 
4212 Legal secretaries* 
5112 Horticultural trades 
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5113 Gardeners and groundsmen/groundswomen 
5119 Agricultural and fishing trades 
5224 Precision instrument makers and repairers* 
5232 Vehicle body builders and repairers* 
5234 Vehicle spray painters* 
5241 Electricians, electrical fitters 
5312 Bricklayers, masons 
5313 Roofers, rook tillers and slaters* 
5315 Carpenters and joiners* 
5316 Glazers, window fabricators and fitters* 
5319 Construction Trades 
5321 Plasterers* 
5322 Floorers and wall tillers* 
5323 Painters and decorators 
5419 Textiles, garments and related occupations* 
5496 Floral arrangers and florists* 
5499 Hand craft occupations 
6212 Travel agents* 
6213 Travel and Tour Guides 
6221 Hairdressers and Barbers 
6291 Undertakers and mortuary assistants* 
8113 Textile Process Operatives 
8135 Tyre, exhaust and windscreen fitters 
8141 Scaffolders, stagers, riggers* 
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8149 Construction operatives* 
9111 Farm workers 
9112 Forestry workers 
9121 Labourers in building and woodworking traders* 
9129 Labourers in other construction trades* 
9225 Bar staff 
Research into regulation found that 67 occupational unit groups had some form of 
accreditation present. Of those, 40 unit groups were completely covered by an 
accreditation scheme meaning every individual in that group could choose to join. 
Unit groups where complete coverage was found include group 1135 Personnel, 
Training and Industrial Relations Managers, where all individuals can choose to 
become a member of the Chartered Institute of Personnel Development (CIPD), and 
group 6212 Travel Agents where all individuals can choose to become members of 
the Association of British Travel Agents. Examples of unit groups that only have 
some jobs covered by an accreditation scheme are group 5499 Hand Craft 
Occupations where only toymakers and wig makers can chose to be accredited, 
group 5113 Gardeners and groundsmen/groundswomen where only those involved in 
landscaping can join the Landscape Institute, and in group 5119 Agricultural and 
Fishing Trades where only foresters can be accredited by the Institute of Chartered 
Foresters. 
As with certification, accreditation can offer protection of title by a chartered 
institute. For example, members of the Chartered Institute of Biologists (concerning 
group 2112 Biological Scientists and Biochemists) can use the title Chartered 
Biologists. Similarly social science researchers (group 2322) who are members of the 
Chartered Institute of Geographers can use the title Chartered Geographer. Of the 67 
unit groups where accreditation exists, 38 offer such a title.  
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Accreditation has been present in the UK for many years. The oldest accrediting 
institution found is the Royal Geographical Society which was formed in 1830. The 
society accredits geographers and is a chartered professional body. 
Table 1-12: Accreditation Schemes by Year 
 Before 1950 1950-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2010 Total 
Number 
Accreditations 
12 8 6 18 16 60 
* 7 were unknown 
The table above shows that accreditation schemes have been steadily increasing over 
time. In the past 10 years there have been 16 new schemes introduced. These 
include: group 1134 Advertising and Public Relations Managers who are covered by 
accreditation in 2005, group 4212 Legal Secretaries, covered by accreditation in 
2005, and group 6212 Travel Agents, covered by accreditation in 2006. 
Table 1-13: Number of Accreditations by SOC Skill Level of Unit Group 
Skill Level 1 Skill Level 2 Skill Level 3 Skill Level 4 
Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage 
5 7.5 8 11.9 34 50.7 20 29.9 
 
As with licensing and certification, accreditation is present across a variety of SOC 
groups. Accreditation is also present in occupations that require a variety of skill 
levels. By using the SOC assigned skill levels for occupational unit groups, one can 
observe the spread of accreditation. Over half accredited unit groups are defined as 
having a SOC skill level of 3 (needing post compulsory education, but not to degree 
level). Indeed, most accredited unit groups require at least this level of skill with a 
further 29.9% being defined at level 4 (professional qualifications including 
degrees). This suggests that, as with certification and licensing, accreditation is more 
likely in occupations that require a fairly high skill set. 
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Barriers to Entry 
Although accreditation is voluntary and does not offer any protection of function, the 
schemes still have barriers to entry. One barrier to entry is that of qualifications. 
Accreditation schemes may ask for an individual to have attained a certain level of 
qualification before they are accredited.  
Table 1-14: Qualification Requirements mapped to the National Qualification 
Framework 
 
None 
Required 
Below 
Level 2 
Level 
2 
Level 
3 
Level 
4-6 
Level 
7-8 
Don’t 
Know 
Total 
Number of 
Accreditations 
1 2 19 9 31 3 2 67 
 
Apart from one, all accreditation schemes require qualifications that can be mapped 
to the National Qualification Framework. The only accreditation scheme that does 
not require this is the accreditation that covers group 313 IT Operations Technicians. 
This accreditation welcomes academic qualifications, but does not insist upon them. 
The qualifying criteria are, instead, work experience of 8-10 years, professional 
references and an assessment interview. Many accreditation schemes require a 
qualification at level 2. These accreditations cover all those unit groups where the 
Construction Skills Certification Scheme has coverage, including group 5323 
Painters and Decorators and group 5312 Bricklayers and Masons. The most common 
level of qualification required is between levels 4-6 (equivalent to any post A-level 
standard qualification up to degree level). Examples of unit groups in this category 
include: group 1122 managers in construction, group 1183 Healthcare Practice 
Managers, and group 4212 Legal Secretaries. With around half (50.7%) of 
accreditation schemes requiring qualifications above A-level standard, accreditation 
appears just as demanding as certification or licensing with regard to qualification 
requirements. 
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In contrast with licensing and certification, none of the 67 accreditation schemes 
required an individual to have a CRB check. However, some accreditation schemes 
did require individuals to have work experience in order to accredit them. In total, 24 
of the 67 schemes required some level of work experience. The most popular bracket 
of experience required was between one and two years (13 out of 67 schemes). 
Examples of work experience requirements are found in the following unit groups: 
3543 Marketing Associate Professionals who need three years’ work experience in 
order to be accredited by the Chartered Institute of Marketing, group 3567 
Occupational Hygienists and Safety Officers who need five years’ work experience 
to become accredited by Institute of Occupational Health and Safety, and group 5323 
Painters and Decorators who need one year’s work experience to be accredited by 
the Painting and Decorating Association. 
Accreditation may also require other barriers to entry to be met. These may include 
an assessed interview, as is the case for those wishing to be accredited by the Royal 
Institute of Chartered Surveyors, a health and safety test, a requirement for anyone 
wishing to be accredited by the Construction Skills Certification Scheme, or a 
portfolio of work as is the case for those wishing to become members of the 
Chartered Institute of Management Accountants. In all, 43 of the 67 accreditation 
schemes require something else from individuals other than qualifications - CRB 
checks or work experience.  
Rationale for Accreditation 
In total 18 of the accreditation schemes researched stated that protection of the public 
was the main reason why their scheme existed. These included the Chartered 
Institute of Accountants, the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors and the British 
Institute of Funeral Directors. The stated reason these bodies gave was to 
demonstrate competence and thereby protect the public (37 of the schemes 
mentioned this as their main reason). These included the Chartered Insurance 
Institute, the Landscape Institute and the Worshipful Company of Clockmakers. In 
addition to these reasons, professionalisation (self-interest) was cited for four of the 
unit groups covered the British Toymakers Guild, the Institute of Trichologists, the 
Hairdressing Council and the Society of Dyers and Colourists. 
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Enforcement Body 
Almost all of the enforcement bodies of regulation are professional bodies (separate 
entities from the government). As such, they have autonomy over their running. In 
total 66 of the schemes are enforced by a professional body. Of these, 36 are 
chartered professional bodies, such as the Chartered Institute of Logistics and 
Transport, the Royal Society of Chemists and the Chartered Institute of Librarians 
and Information Professionals. The remainder of professional bodies (35) are not 
chartered and include the Society of Archivists, the National Association of 
Paralegals and the British Florist Association. All of the professional bodies are self-
funded. The only accreditation enforcement body not to be a professional body is the 
Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors who describe themselves as a regulatory 
body.  
Summary of Accreditation 
In summary from the findings outlined above some general statements can be made. 
If a unit group is covered by a regulation it is likely to be an occupation that requires 
a skill set of at least some post compulsory school level. It is also likely that the 
accreditation will require a level of qualifications of at least A-Level standard. Work 
experience between one and two years may be needed, along with some other 
occupation-specific requirements. It is unlikely that a CRB check will be needed. 
The enforcement body is most likely to be a professional body, which may or may 
not be chartered, but is likely to be self-funded. The most likely rationale for the 
accreditation is to allow members to demonstrate their competency at their given 
occupation. 
1.3.5 Registered Occupations 
If an occupation is registered, all individuals wishing to work in the occupation must 
join the appropriate register. This is a legal requirement and is therefore not 
voluntary. Registration schemes do not require any levels of competency to be 
shown or tested. They do not have barriers to entry beyond the need to submit 
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personal information and to join the register, though there may be an administrative 
cost involved. 
List of Registered Occupations  
(*full coverage of unit group) 
1131 Financial Managers and Chartered Secretaries 
1151 Financial Institution managers* 
1152 Office Managers 
1225 Leisure and sports managers 
1239 Managers and proprietors in other services 
3532 Brokers* 
3534 Finance and investment analysts/advisors* 
3544 Estate agents/auctioneers 
4121 Credit controllers* 
4123 Counter clerks 
4132 Pensions and insurance clerks 
 4211 Medical Secretaries* 
6124 Educational assistants 
6211 Sports and leisure assistants 
6222 Beauticians and related occupations 
7121 Collector salespersons and credit agents 
7122 Debt, Rent and Other Cash Collectors 
7124 Market and street traders and assistants 
9226 Park attendants 
 97 
 
9229 Elementary personal services occupations 
The list above shows all the occupational unit groups where registration is present; in 
total there are 20 groups where registration is present. Of these there are 5 
occupational unit groups completely covered by registration, meaning everyone in 
that unit group must be registered. The unit groups with complete coverage are: 1151 
Financial Institution Managers, 3532 Brokers, 3534 Finance and Investment 
Analysis/Advisor, 4121 Credit Controllers, and 4211 Medical Secretaries.  
All registration schemes are enforced by Law. Such legislation includes the 
Consumer Credit Act 1974, the Financial Service and Markets Act 2000, and the 
Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982.  
 
Table 1-15: Accreditation Schemes by Year 
 Before 1950 1950-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2010 Total 
Number 
Accreditations 
0 2 1 0 15 18 
* 2 were unknown 
Some of the earliest known registration schemes were started by the Office of Fair 
Trading in response to the Consumer Credit Act 1974. These schemes covered 
groups 7121 Collector Salesperson and Credit Agents, and 7122 Debt, Rent and 
Other Cash Collectors. However, the biggest surge in registration has occurred since 
2000 as a result of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 and the Gambling 
Act 2005. The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 affected most occupations 
connected with the financial industry that were not already regulated by some other 
means. These unit groups included Financial Institution Managers (111), Finance and 
Investment Analysis/Advisor (3534), and Brokers (3532). Similarly the Gambling 
Act 2005 covered most jobs associated with the gambling industry that were not 
already regulated; included, Leisure and Theme Park Attendants (9226), Sports and 
Leisure Assistants (6211) and Counter Clerks (4121). Interestingly in gambling 
occupations individuals are required to have a clean criminal record and a stable 
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financial record, but this is the only entrance requirement of all the registration 
schemes researched. In addition to these two Acts the Consumers, Estate Agents and 
Redress Act 2007 came into force which meant that many occupations in Estate 
Agents and Auctioneers (3544) became registered.  
Rationale for Registration 
All but one of the registration schemes cite protection of the public as their main 
rationale to regulate. The only exception is Medical Secretaries (4211) who state that 
the main reason for registration is to gain professional recognition.  
Enforcement Body 
Of the enforcement bodies operating the schemes, all schemes affected by the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2005 are enforced by the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA). The FSA is a government agency and so is government funded. 
Likewise, all those occupations registered in response to the Consumer Credit Act 
1974 are regulated by the Office of Fair Trading, which is also government funded. 
Beauticians and related occupations, and market and street traders, registered in 
response to the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982, are 
regulated at the local authority level and are government funded. 
Some registration schemes are enforced by regulatory bodies. These are bodies set 
up purely to enforce regulation and are usually QUANGOs. The Gambling 
Commission regulates all unit groups affected by the Gambling Act 2005. The 
Gambling Commission is the only enforcing body of registration to be a regulatory 
body, but it is government funded. 
The remaining registration schemes are non-chartered professional bodies. This 
means they are set up and run as separate entities from the government or local 
authorities. The enforcement bodies in question are the Ombudsman for Estate 
Agents or Surveyors Ombudsman Service, who register estate agents and 
auctioneers. Also included is the British Society of Medical Secretaries and 
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Administrators, who register medical secretaries. Both of them are non-chartered 
professional bodies and are self-funded.  
Summary of Registration 
In summary, if an occupation is covered by registration it is likely to be enforced by 
a government agency, which is government funded. It will almost certainly be the 
result of legislation that makes registration compulsory in order to try and protect the 
public. There are no entry requirements except where the Gambling Commission, 
who will require a clean criminal record and a stable financial history, enforces the 
registration.  
1.3.6 Comparing Types of Regulations 
In order to establish the characteristics of each type of regulation and determine how 
they differ from each other, an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was conducted on 
some of the main characteristics signalled by the literature, namely; barriers to entry, 
public safety and the enforcement bodies. The point of departure will be an overview 
of the different regulations with regard to their coverage. 
Coverage 
The research has indicated that 189 SOC unit groups have some regulation present 
within them. Table 1.16 summarises the results. 
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Table 1-16: Summary of the Coverage of Occupational Regulation in the UK 
 
Full Coverage Partial Coverage Total 
 Number 
of Unit 
Groups 
Percentage 
of Unit 
Groups 
Number 
of Unit 
Groups 
Percentage 
of Unit 
Groups 
Number 
of Unit 
Groups 
Percentage 
of Unit 
Groups 
Any Regulation 115 32.6 73 20.7 189 53.3 
Licensing 53 15.0 29 8.2 82 23.2 
Certification 17 4.8 2 0.6 19 5.4 
Accreditation 39 11.0 28 7.9 67 19.0 
Registration 5 1.4 15 4.2 20 5.7 
From the summary of the results in table 1.16 it is clear that licensing is the most 
dominant form of regulation with regard to coverage, followed by accreditation, 
certification and registration. The lower and upper bound estimates that are a result 
of the nature of the SOC unit groups, suggest that occupational regulation is 
presently in-between 32.6% and 53.3% of occupations.   
 
Table 1-17: Regulation Status by Year of Commencement 
Regulation 
Status 
Before 
1950 
1950-
1979 
1980-
1989 
1990-
1999 
2000-
2010 
Don’t 
Know 
Total 
Licensing 21 14 3 16 15 13 82 
Certification 0 1 12 0 6 0 19 
Accreditation 12 8 6 18 16 7 67 
Registration 0 2 1 0 15 2 20 
Total 33 25 22 34 52 22 188 
Table 1.17 indicates licensing has always been the dominant form of regulation. The 
findings also show that accreditation and certification were not present at all until 
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after 1950. The expansion of regulation over the past 20 years appears to be focused 
on licensing and accreditation, though registration has increased substantially in the 
past 10 years due to the Gambling and Finance Acts. 
In terms of geographical coverage, most regulations cover all of the UK.  
Table 1-18: Geographical Coverage of Regulation 
Regulation 
Status 
UK Only GB 
Only 
England 
and Wales 
Only 
Scotland 
Total 
Licensing 81 0 1 0 82 
Certification 19 0 0 0 19 
Accreditation 65 1 1 0 67 
Registration 20 0 0 0 20 
Total 185 1 2 0 188 
However there are three exceptions. The British Toymakers Guild only covers 
individuals working in Great Britain, the National Association of Licensed 
Paralegals only covers individuals working in England and Wales, and local 
authorities only licence some bar staff in England and Wales. 
The distribution of regulation across the spectrum of occupations can be viewed in 
two ways: the amount of regulation by SOC major groups and the amount of 
regulation by the SOC skill level.  
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Table 1-19: Regulation by SOC Major Group 
Coverage of Unit 
Groups 
Licensing Certification Accreditation Registration Total 
 Number % Number % Number % Number % Number % 
Managers and 
Senior Officials 
11 13.4 1 5.3 8 11.9 5 25.0 25 13.3 
Professionals 13 15.9 10 52.6 14 20.9 0 0.0 37 19.7 
Associate 
Professionals and 
Technical 
28 34.1 6 31.6 11 16.4 3 15.0 48 25.5 
Admin and 
Secretarial 
0 0.0 0 0.0 3 4.5 4 20.0 7 3.7 
Skilled Trades 8 9.8 0 0.0 18 26.9 0 0.0 26 13.8 
Personal Service 5 6.1 0 0.0 4 6.0 3 15.0 12 6.4 
Sales and Customer 
Service 
0 0.0 2 10.5 0 0.0 3 15.0 5 2.7 
Process, Plant and 
Machine 
Operatives 
14 17.1 0 0.0 4 6.0 0 0.0 18 9.6 
Elementary  3 3.7 0 0.0 5 7.5 2 10.0 10 5.3 
Total 82 100.0 19 100.0 67 100.0 20 100.0 188 100.0 
*All coverage included (both full and partial unit group) 
Table 1.19 shows that regulation is more prevalent in major groups 1-3. However, 
regulation does feature across all occupational major groups. Whilst licensing and 
certification follow the trend of appearing more frequently in major groups 1-3, 
accreditation and registration appear more evenly across the major groups and 
encompass, proportionately, more occupations lower down the spectrum than do 
licensing or certification.  
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If one considers regulation with regard to the SOC skill level of the unit groups, 
71.8% of regulations are within occupational groups defined as requiring a SOC skill 
level of at least 3 (post compulsory education). 
Table 1-20: Regulation by SOC Skill Level 
 Licensing Certification Accreditation Registration Total 
 No % No % No % No % No % 
Level 
1 
4 4.9 0 0.0 5 7.5 2 10.0 11 5.9 
Level 
2 
18 30.0 5 26.3 8 11.9 11 55.0 42 22.3 
Level 
3 
38 46.3 5 26.3 34 50.7 5 25.0 82 43.6 
Level 
4 
22 26.8 9 47.4 20 29.9 2 10.0 53 28.2 
Total 82 100.0 19 100.0 67 100.0 20 100.0 188 100.0 
*All Unit groups included (both full and partial coverage) 
Of the different types of regulations, the majority of certification is present in 
occupations needing professional qualifications at degree level (SOC skill level 4). 
The majority of licenses and accreditation are found in occupations that need post 
compulsory education, but not degree level (SOC skill level 3). Registration is most 
prevalent in occupations requiring compulsory education levels with some work 
related training (SOC skill level 2). In order to determine if there is a significant 
difference between the prevalence of each type of regulation and the SOC skill 
levels, an Analysis of Variance was conducted. 
  
 104 
 
Table 1-21: ANOVA of occupations by SOC skill levels 
 
Mean Number F Sig 
Registration 2.35 20 3.956 0.000 
Accreditation 3.03 67 
Certification 3.15 20 
Licensing 3.00 82 
Total 2.88 189 
The results presented in table 1.21 support the premise that the different types of 
regulations differ in their prevalence in the different skill levels. The results of the 
ANOVA indicate that registration is present, on average, in occupations that require 
a lower skill set compared to the other types of regulation. The results also suggest 
that certification is more likely to be present in higher skill level occupations. 
As a result of the descriptive statistics and ANOVA, results presented some 
conclusions. First, licensing is the most prevalent form of regulation and registration 
is the least. Over 98% of regulations cover the whole of the UK (there are only 3 
which do not). Regulation is present across all major SOC groups. Licensing and 
certification are more likely to be present in major groups 1-3; whereas accreditation 
and registration are more likely to be present in the other major groups. Statistically, 
the regulations are significantly different with regard to the skill levels of the 
occupations they cover. Certification is more likely in highly skilled jobs while 
registration is more likely in lower skilled jobs. Licensing and accreditation are most 
likely to be found in medium skilled occupational groups. 
Barriers to Entry 
Licensing, certification and accreditation all have barriers to entry. These barriers 
prevent an individual from attaining a licence, certificate or accreditation until 
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certain criteria have been met. The main barriers used are qualifications (both 
vocational and educational), CRB check and work experience. However, there are 
other barriers that a regulation can use such as: age, health checks or work samples. 
Qualifications 
When qualifications are used as a barrier to entry an individual must attain a certain 
level of qualification before they can gain entrance to the regulation. The 
qualifications required by the regulation can, in the most part, be transposed to the 
National Qualification Framework (NQF). This is particularly important because 
without a national scale it is very difficult to compare, say, an accountant’s ACA 
qualification with a security guard’s SIA qualification.  
Table 1-22: Regulation Status by NQF Qualification 
Regulation 
Status 
None 
Below 
Level 
2 
Level 
2 
Level 
3 
Level 
4-6 
Level 
7-8 
Don’t 
Know 
Total 
Licensing 0 20 11 6 32 2 11 82 
Certification 0 0 7 0 2 10 0 19 
Accreditation 1 2 19 9 31 3 2 67 
Total 1 22 37 15 65 15 13 168 
*Registration has no entry requirements, ‘don’t know’ denotes when a qualification cannot be 
accurately translated to the NQF 
The table above shows that regulation can require a range of qualification levels. 
Whilst licensing and accreditation have balanced qualification requirements (ranging 
from 2 – 8), certification appears to have a higher average qualification requirement 
with 52.6% requiring a level 7-8 (equivalent to post graduate to doctorate level). 
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Table 1-23: Type of Qualification by NQF Level Required 
Type of 
Qualification 
Educational Vocational Either Total 
Below Level 2 0 22 0 22 
Level 2 0 36 1 37 
Level 3 1 14 0 15 
Level 4-6 52 7 6 65 
Level 7-8 14 1 0 15 
Total 67 80 7 154 
The qualifications required by regulation can either be educational or vocational, or a 
mixture of the two. Table 1.23 illustrates that qualifications of level 3 and below are 
almost all vocational. Similarly NQF level 4 and above requirements are nearly 
always educational. The table also shows that qualifications are usually educational 
or vocational, and are rarely a combination of the two. 
In order to ascertain if one regulation is more stringent in terms of qualification 
demands than another, it is necessary to consider what the skill set required by the 
occupation would be if it were unregulated and compare this to what the regulation is 
demanding. To do this the SOC skill level of the occupational unit group is equated 
to the NQF. This was then deducted from the NQF level required by the regulation. 
As a result it is possible to measure the additional qualification demands of the 
regulation over and above the existing needs of the occupation. An ANOVA was 
conducted to see if the regulations were similar in their levels of barrier to entry or 
not. The results of the ANOVA are presented below. 
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Table 1-24: Additional qualification requirements by regulation type 
 
Mean Number F Sig 
Accreditation -0.923 67 40.424 0.000 
Certification 0.600 19 
Licensing 0.541 82 
Total -0.041 168 
 
The results indicate a significant difference between the regulation types and the 
additional qualification requirements. Certification is shown to require the greatest 
increase of qualification level, closely followed by licensing. Accreditation is shown 
to require qualification levels below what is expected from the occupation in terms 
of its SOC skill level; this is shown by the negative mean value. As such one can 
suggest that accreditation does not utilise qualifications as a barrier to entry since if 
someone is able to do the job, their skill set would already be above that of the 
required level.  Therefore, the only regulations shown to be significant using 
qualifications as a barrier to entry are licensing and certification (though to different 
degrees). 
Criminal Record Background (CRB) Check 
Regulations can also require individuals to have a clean criminal record. To establish 
if this is the case, a CRB check is undertaken. Table 1.26 presents the frequency of 
CRB checks across all occupational regulations. 
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Table 1-25: CRB requirements by regulation types 
  
CRB Check 
Number Percentage 
Any Regulation 41 21.7 
Licensing 32 39.0 
Certification 1 5.0 
Accreditation 0 0.0 
Registration 8 40.0 
The results indicate that just over a fifth (21.7%) of all regulated occupations require 
a CRB check. Licensing and registration require the majority of the CRB checks 
(39% and 40% respectively). Certification requires only one CRB check, and no 
accreditation schemes state that a CRB check is required.   
Table 1-26: CRB requirements by regulation type 
 
Mean Number F Sig 
Registration 0.040 20 0.236 0.046 
Accreditation 0.000 67 
Certification 0.005 19 
Licensing 0.390 82 
Total 0.041 188 
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The ANOVA results presented in table 1.26 show that there is a statistically 
significant difference between the different types of regulation and the need for CRB 
checks. The results suggest that Licensing and registration require significantly more 
CRB checks than certification or accreditation. 
Work Experience 
In addition to qualifications and CRB checks, a regulation can also require a period 
of work experience before an individual qualifies. As work experience requires an 
individual to undertake work related to the occupation, this requirement is mostly 
associated with certification and accreditation. However, some licensing schemes ask 
for work experience too. A licensed professional supervises all work experience 
which takes place during or after professional exams are taken. Examples of licenses 
where work experience is needed are pharmaceutical dispensers, solicitors and 
lawyers. Below is a table summarising the work experience required per regulation 
status. 
Table 1-27: Years of Work Experience by Regulation Status 
Regulation 
Status 
None 1-2 Years 3-4 Years 5+ Years Varies Total 
Licensing 75 3 1 0 3 82 
Certification 13 0 0 0 6 19 
Accreditation 43 13 5 5 1 67 
Total 131 16 6 5 10 168 
The table above shows accreditation schemes that have the greatest requirement for 
work experience, with 24 schemes requiring a level of experience. Of those unit 
groups covered by certification schemes only six require any work experience, and 
seven licensing schemes require experience.  
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In order to ascertain if there is a statistically significant difference between the 
regulation statuses and this particular barrier to entry, an ANOVA was conducted. 
Given the small numbers of schemes with work experience, the variable used was 
‘presence of work experience requirement’ as opposed to length of work experience 
required. 
Table 1-28: Work experience requirements by regulation type 
 
Mean Number F Sig 
Accreditation 0.552 67 0.011 0.989 
Certification 0.316 19 
Licensing 0.085 82 
Total 0.298 168 
Despite the observed requirements of work experience differing across the regulation 
statuses, the results from the ANOVA suggest that there is not a significant 
difference between the different types of regulation and this barrier to entry. 
Rationale for Regulation 
Regulatory bodies were asked what the main rationale was for their regulation. Table 
1.29 contains the results. 
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Table 1-29: Rationales for Regulation 
Regulation 
Status 
Protect 
the 
Public 
Demonstrate 
Competence 
Health 
and 
Safety 
Up 
skill 
Professional 
Recognition 
Adherence 
to Codes 
of 
Conduct 
Establish/ 
Maintaing 
Industry 
Standards 
Total 
Licensing 75 16 7 0 0 5 0 82 
Certification 12 1 12 0 6 0 0 19 
Accreditation 18 37 12 14 3 7 3 67 
Registration 19 0 0 0 1 1 0 20 
Total 124 54 31 14 10 13 2 188 
From the results it can be observed that almost 70% of all regulations claim that 
protection of the public is the main reason for their regulation. The second most 
common reason for regulation is to demonstrate competence (28.7%). Health and 
safety concerns were stated by 16.5% of the regulations. The least common response 
was to maintain or establish industry standards (1.1%).  
From the literature presented in this paper, the justifications of particular interest 
were ‘protection of the public’ and ‘professionalism’.  Protection of the public is the 
most (or joint most) common rationale for licensing, certification and registration. 
However, it was only the rationale for 26.9% of accreditation schemes. 
Professionalisation, which would suggest mostly benefits for the practitioners and 
not the public, was not given as a reason by any licensing regimes. 
Professionalisation was cited by some certification, accreditation and registration 
schemes. 
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Table 1-30: Protection of the public by regulation type 
Regulation Type Mean N F Significance 
Registration 0.950 20 42.589 0.000 
Accreditation 0.254 67 
Certification 0.650 20 
Licensing 0.902 82 
Total 0.651 189 
 
Table 1-31: Professionalisation of occupations by regulation type 
Regulation Type Mean N F Significance 
Registration 0.005 20 11.195 0.000 
Accreditation 0.045 67 
Certification 0.300 20 
Licensing 0 82 
Total 0.005 189 
The results from the two ANOVAs above suggest there are great differences between 
the types of regulations and their reasons for existence. Protection of the public is 
cited significantly more for licensed and registered occupations when compared to 
certification or accreditation. Conversely, professionalisation of the occupation is 
cited significantly more times as the main reason for certification and accreditation. 
The results suggest that registration and licensing are more likely to give similar 
rationales for regulation, as are certification and accreditation. 
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Enforcement Body 
A regulation can be enforced by different enforcement bodies. These bodies can be 
separated into five main categories: regulatory body, government agency, local 
authority, chartered professional body and non-chartered professional body. 
Regulating bodies are organisations set up with the aim of enforcing a specific 
regulation. They are not solely controlled by the government; though will often fall 
into the definition of a QUANGO. Government agencies are those that are within a 
governmental department. Professional bodies enforce other licenses. These are set 
up as separate entities from the government and as such have autonomy over their 
running, although they must adhere to any relevant legislation. Professional bodies 
can be chartered which means they have been granted a royal charter and members 
can use the term ‘chartered’, such as a Chartered Accountant. Other professional 
bodies are not chartered and do not offer such titles to their members.  
Table 1-32: Enforcement Body by Regulation Status 
 
Regulatory 
Body 
Gov. 
Agency 
Local 
Authority 
Chartered 
Prof. Body 
Prof. Body Other Varies Total 
Licensing 32 27 15 0 3 1 4 82 
Certification 14 5 0 0 0 0 0 19 
Accreditation 1 0 0 36 30 0 0 20 
Registration 8 8 2 0 2 0 0 67 
Total 55 40 17 36 35 1 4 188 
 
The table above shows that the majority of licensing, certification and registration is 
enforced by regulatory bodies or government agencies; whereas, accreditation 
schemes are predominantly enforced by professional bodies, chartered or not. In 
terms of funding, all government agencies and local authorities are government 
funded. The other types of enforcement bodies may be government funded, or self-
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funded, or a mixture of the two. Below is a summary of the funding of each type of 
regulation. 
Table 1-33: Funding by Regulation Status 
  
Government Funded Self-Funded 
Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Any Regulation 92 48.9 96 51.1 
Licensing 69 84.1 13 15.9 
Certification 5 26.3 14 73.7 
Accreditation 0 0.0 67 100.0 
Registration 18 90.0 2 10.0 
 
Table 1.33 shows that the majority of regulation is self-funded (51.1%). However, 
this is largely because accredited occupations are found to be 100% self-funded and 
this then skews the results. Licensing and registration are predominantly government 
funded (84.1% and 90% respectively), whereas certification is mainly self-funded 
(74.7%) but over a quarter of all certification is funded by the government (26.3%). 
Table 1-34: Regulation of occupations by funding 
Regulation Type Mean N F Significance 
Registration 0.900 20 8.6246 0.001 
Accreditation 0.000 67 
Certification 0.263 19 
Licensing 0.841 82 
Total 0.489 188 
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The ANOVA results presented above suggest that there is a statistically significant 
difference between the regulation statuses and how they are funded. As mentioned 
above, licensing and registration are mostly government funded while only some 
certification is. Accreditation is very unlikely to receive any government funding. 
1.3.7 Summary of Results 
Table 1-35: Summary of results 
 Results 
Coverage Licensing 82 occupational unit groups (53 complete 
coverage) 
 Certification 19 occupational unit groups (17 with 
complete coverage) 
 Accreditation 67 occupational unit groups (40 with 
complete coverage) 
 Registration 20 occupational unit groups (5 with complete 
coverage) 
Age Only licensing and accreditation schemes that are still in existence 
today have been founded before 1950. Certification and accreditation 
have been present since 1950. All regulation types have increased 
over time. There has been no deregulation of occupations found. 
Coverage Over 98% of regulations have complete coverage of the UK. 
SOC Major 
Group 
Regulation is most prevalent in major groups 1-3. Licensing and 
certification are also most prevalent in groups 1-3. Accreditation and 
registration are more evenly distributed across all SOC major groups. 
SOC Skill Level There is a statistically significant difference in the skill levels of 
occupations covered by the different types of regulation. Certification 
is most prevalent in highly skilled occupations. Accreditation and 
licensing are found in medium to high skill level occupations. 
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 Results 
Registration is found in comparatively lower skilled occupations. 
Barriers to 
Entry 
Qualifications A statistically significant difference in the 
additional qualifications required by the 
regulations compared to the defined skill 
level of the occupation. Certification is found 
to require the highest qualifications followed 
by licensing. Accreditation is shown to 
require lower qualifications than the skill 
level required to undertake the job. 
 CRB Checks A moderately statistically significant 
difference between the types of regulation 
and presence of CRB checks is found. 
Licensing requires far more CRB checks than 
any of the other regulations. Only 4.1% of all 
regulations require a CRB check. 
 Work Experience There is no statistically significant difference 
between the amounts of work experience 
required by the different regulations. Overall, 
29.8% of all regulation requires work 
experience before full entry is granted. 
Rationale  Protection of the 
Public 
A statistically significant difference between 
the different types of regulation is found. 
Over 90% of licensing and 95% of 
registration state that protection of the public 
is their main rationale. Only 25.4% of 
accreditation schemes cited this as their main 
rationale and 65% of certification schemes. 
 Professionalisation A statistically significant difference between 
the different types of regulations and the 
focus on professionalisation is found. A total 
of 30% of certification schemes cite 
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 Results 
professionalisation as their main aim, 
whereas 4.5% of accreditation schemes state 
this is their focus. Only 0.5% of registration 
schemes state this is their focus, and no 
licensing schemes mention 
professionalisation as part of their main aim. 
Enforcement 
Bodies 
Characteristics Regulatory bodies, government agencies or 
local authorities enforce most licensing, 
certification and registration schemes. 
Accreditation schemes are predominantly 
enforced by professional bodies, chartered or 
non-chartered.   
 Funding A statistically significant difference in the 
funding of regulation is found between the 
different types of regulation. Over 84% of 
licensing and 90% of registration is 
government funded, 26.3% of certification is 
government funded. All accreditation 
schemes are found to be completely self-
funded. 
1.4 Discussion 
Mapping the prevalence of occupational regulation has never been conducted in such 
detail before this piece of research. This is the first investigation into all four types of 
regulation: licensing, certification, accreditation and registration. The results show 
that of the 353 Standard Occupation Classification (SOC) unit groups, 188 are 
covered, to some extent, by regulation. This shows that regulation is a major 
institutional actor and warrants investigation. This section will discuss whether the 
results have supported the theory presented at the start of this paper. First, the results 
will be compared with the countries used in the theoretical comparison earlier on. 
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Second, the characteristics of regulation will be discussed in relation to typifying 
each of the four different types of regulation.  
1.4.1 International Comparison 
The list of regulated occupations indicates that occupations are regulated across the 
spectrum in the UK. Regulation is present in all of the 9 Standard Occupation 
Classification (SOC) major groups. However, in order to determine whether the UK 
is indeed different in terms of regulation compared to other European countries and 
American states, it is necessary to compare and contrast the occupations regulated in 
each country. 
As discussed previously, data regarding regulation is sparse in many countries. The 
majority of data that does exist focuses on licensing. Table 1.36 indicates if 
occupations licensed in the UK are also licensed in a selection of other countries 
noted previously as having different approaches to regulation than the UK. 
Table 1-36: Comparison of occupational regulation in the UK with other countries 
UK 
US (state 
of New 
York) 
Poland Netherlands France Germany 
Officers in the Armed Forces*     
Police Officers (inspectors and 
above)* 
    
Senior Officers in fire, Ambulance, 
Prison and related services* 
    
Security Managers*     
Pharmacy Managers     
Social Services managers     
Residential and day care managers     
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UK 
US (state 
of New 
York) 
Poland Netherlands France Germany 
Restaurant and catering managers*     
Publicans and managers of licensed 
premises* 
    
Medical practitioners*     
Psychologists*     
Pharmacists/pharmacologists*     
Ophthalmic opticians*     
Dental Practitioners*     
Veterinarians*     
Secondary education teaching 
professionals* 
    
Primary and nursery education 
Teaching professionals* 
    
Special needs education teaching 
professionals* 
    
Solicitors, lawyers, judges and 
coroners* 
    
Legal professionals*     
Social workers*     
Probation workers*     
Electrical/Electronics Technicians*     
Nurses*     
Midwives*     
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US (state 
of New 
York) 
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Paramedics*     
Medical Radiographers*     
Chiropodists*     
Dispensing opticians*     
Pharmaceutical dispensers*     
Medical and dental technicians     
Physiotherapists*     
Occupational therapists*     
Speech and language therapists*     
Therapists     
Youth and community workers*     
Police Officers (sergeant and 
below)* 
    
Fire service     
Prison service officers (below 
principal officer) 
    
Protective service associate 
professionals 
    
Sports coaches, instructors and 
officials 
    
Air traffic controllers*      
Aircraft pilots and fight engineers*     
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York) 
Poland Netherlands France Germany 
Ship and hovercraft officers*     
Legal associate professionals     
Taxation experts*     
Inspector of factories, utilities and 
trading standards* 
    
Statutory examiners     
Environmental health officers*     
Farmers     
Smiths and forge workers     
Motor mechanics, auto engineers     
Plumbers, heating and ventilation 
engineers 
    
Butchers, meat cutters*     
Bakers, flour confectioners*     
Fishmongers, poultry dressers*     
Chefs, cooks     
Nursing auxiliaries and assistants     
Dental nurses     
Nursery Nurses     
Childminders and Related 
Occupations 
    
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Playgroup leaders/assistants     
Education Assistants     
Process operatives     
Heavy goods vehicle drivers*     
Van drivers*     
Bus and coach drivers*     
Taxi, cab drivers and chauffeurs*     
Driving instructors     
Crane drivers*     
Fork-lift truck drivers*     
Agricultural machinery drivers*     
Kitchen and catering assistants     
Bar Staff     
Security guards and related 
occupations 
    
Elementary security occupations     
Source: EU Commission Entry Regulation Database 
Interestingly, only a few of the licensed occupations in the UK are also licensed in all 
of the other countries. Occupations in the armed forces, police, primary and nursery 
education, doctors, therapists, lawyers and legal associates, motor inspectors, gas, 
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heating or ventilation workers, and dental practitioners, are all regulated across the 
countries. However, many occupations licensed in the UK are not licensed in at least 
one of the other countries considered. In general, there seems to be more emphasis 
on regulating occupations associated with criminals, security and all other 
individuals working with children, including playgroup leaders, education assistants 
and special needs teachers. These occupations are not widely licensed elsewhere. A 
possible explanation is the extent of the public sector in the UK. Many of the 
occupations licensed are based mainly in the public sector, for example doctors, 
nurses and teachers. Given that the government funds and controls the public sector 
and almost all licensing schemes, it may be the case that licensing is a tool used by 
the government to further manage individuals working in the sector. A further reason 
for the extent of licensing in the UK could relate to the customers of the licensed 
practitioners. Many of the customers are from vulnerable sections of society, (e.g. 
children, disabled and sick individuals). These sections of society have a clear lack 
of knowledge, and thus power, concerning the treatment they receive and are unable 
to assess a quality practitioner resulting in an asymmetry of knowledge (Mitchell 
1937). It is also the case that poor practitioners could cause significant social costs if 
their service is not of a suitable standard. As with the NHS, legal aid and emergency 
services are such a huge part of UK society, and funding by the government, it is 
reasonable to assume that the government would strive to reduce possible harm to 
the public and reduce spending on these services as a result. Therefore, a benefit is 
made to society through cutting societal costs (Shapiro 1986). This very much 
supports Moore’s (1961) reasoning for using regulation to protect the public and 
suggests that licensing is very much focused on protecting the public in the UK 
rather than providing practitioners with the benefits a restricted occupation may 
have. 
Yet despite the apparent extensive amount of licensing in the UK, there are many 
occupations that are licensed in the other countries observed, and not in the UK. 
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Table 1-37: Occupations licensed elsewhere but not in the UK 
Occupation Licensed UK 
Town Planner New York, Germany, Netherlands, Poland Certification 
Architect New York, Germany, France, Netherlands, Poland Accreditation 
Barber New York, Germany Certification 
Accountant New York, Germany, Netherlands, Poland Accreditation 
Funeral Director New York Accreditation 
Groom New York Unregulated 
Animal Trainer New York, France Unregulated 
Insurance Agent/Assistant New York, France Registered 
Interior Designer New York, Germany, France Unregulated 
Jockey New York Unregulated 
Outdoor Guide New York, Germany, France Unregulated 
Engineers New York, Poland Unregulated 
Librarian New York, Poland Accreditation 
Chimney Sweep Germany Unregulated 
Wig-Maker Germany Accreditation 
Plasterer Germany Accreditation 
Roofer Germany Accreditation 
Scaffolder Germany Accreditation 
Translator/Interpreter Germany, Poland Unregulated 
Broker France Registration 
Forester France, Poland Accreditation 
Carpenter Germany, France Accreditation 
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Occupation Licensed UK 
Plaster Germany, France Accreditation 
University Teacher/Professor France, Netherlands Unregulated 
Archivists Netherlands Unregulated 
Bailiff Netherlands Registered 
Archaeologist Poland Accreditation 
Surveyor Poland Accreditation 
Few of the occupations that are licensed elsewhere are unregulated in the UK. 
Instead they are regulated via certification, accreditation or registration. For the most 
part, one can observe that the occupations in table 1.36 have different characteristics 
than those presented in table 1.37. For example, the majority of occupations licensed 
in the UK are present in the public sector; they have a great deal of interaction with 
vulnerable portions of society and they can cause sizeable social costs if they are not 
conducted correctly. As such, there is no obvious need to protect the public through 
regulating every aspect of the occupation through licensing (Moore 1961). However, 
some of the tasks associated with the occupations could cause harm to the public. For 
example, a town planner could cause huge societal costs if the roads are unsafe for 
pedestrians. As a result these occupations are certified in the UK to restrict 
potentially harmful activities to only competent practitioners. Indeed, this is the case 
with almost all certified occupations in the UK. From those investigated, 12 of the 19 
certification schemes are set up to protect the public, just as 75 of the 82 licensing 
schemes are. The difference is that not all of the activities in occupations covered by 
certification pose a threat to the public. As such, only those tasks that do pose a 
threat to the public are regulated. Therefore, Moore (1961) is further supported in his 
argument that protection is the firmest rationale for regulation.. 
In a similar vein, some of the occupations that are licensed elsewhere are registered 
in the UK. As with occupations that are certified instead of licensed, there appears to 
be no obvious potential for every task covered by registered occupations to cause 
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substantial harm to the public. However, there may be more subtle negative effects to 
the public. An example is that of stockbrokers. Brokers are registered in the UK in 
order to protect the public, just as 19 of the 20 registered occupations that exist to do. 
Brokers can cause harm if their advice to, and management of, their clients’ wealth is 
dishonest. Whilst it is not deemed necessary to test for specific competencies, joining 
a register is legally enforced so practitioners can be held responsible should their 
practice be corrupt. As a further insurance to clients, individuals who need to be 
registered cannot gain insurance until they are in fact registered. There are not 
enough society costs to cause licensing or certification to occur, both are costly and 
extensive types of regulation. As such, it is occupations where there is not a need to 
check particular competencies but where there is a need to financially protect clients 
from poor practice, that registration is used.  
1.4.2 Characteristics of Occupational Regulation 
Protecting the public appears to be the key motivation for licensing, certification and 
registration. This could account for why it is only in these types of regulation that a 
criminal record background check is required. It may also account for why the 
government only enforces and funds these regulations. However, there is a fourth 
type of regulation in the UK, accreditation, which has no legal instrument forcing 
membership and no government funding or enforcement. 
Accreditation follows a different pattern. Of the occupations accredited in the UK, 
only 18 of 67 state that their main aim is to protect the public. Indeed, the 
occupations covered by accreditation appear to pose no immediate harm to the public 
in terms of societal or individual cost. This could explain why there is no 
government intervention or funding within accreditation schemes. These occupations 
have very low barriers to entry when compared to licensing and certification, which 
may further highlight the lack of a need to ensure high levels of competency within 
the occupations and the lack of potential harm to the public. Accreditation schemes 
are not enforced or funded by the government so arguably do not need to justify their 
existence through protecting the public and preventing societal costs. They are 
demand driven; whilst there are practitioners wishing to be accredited, they will have 
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a place in the market. Friedman (1962) argues that there is a huge incentive for 
practitioners to become regulated in order to benefit from the monopolistic 
environment it can create. In addition, Abbott (1981) states that, generally, 
professionals need to sharpen the boundaries and portray a professional charisma to 
the public in order to continue being perceived as professionals.  
Friedman (1962) further argues that all regulation is the result of a pursuit for 
personal gain on the part of the practitioner. Although regulated practitioners may all 
benefit from being regulated, the results do not support such a drastic hypothesis. 
Licensed, certified and registered occupations have clear links to the public and 
obvious potential to cause harm and, as a result of the government funding and 
intervention observed, it seems implausible to suppose that this is purely for the 
interests of the practitioners. 
Despite some trends emerging relating to the type of regulation and the rationale for 
that regulation, it may not be the case that all occupations where practitioners may 
harm the public are regulated by licensing or registration. This is because some 
occupations that are recorded as accredited in the UK are licensed elsewhere, such as 
scaffolders and roofers. Arguably these occupations could pose real harm to the 
public. Perhaps there is another explanation beyond potential harm to the public that 
is determining the regulation status of some occupations in the UK, however making 
such a conclusion would require further investigation.  
The results show that regulation appears across all of the SOC major groups and this 
is also true of registration. Yet licensing and certification are far more prevalent in 
SOC major groups 1, 2 and 3, whereas accreditation is more likely in SOC major 
groups 6, 7, 8 and 9. This poses an alternative hypothesis as to how occupations are 
regulated. Perhaps rather than just basing regulation on potential harm to the public, 
how professional the occupation is perceived to be also affects its regulation.  
Traditionally all licensing and certification schemes were solely focused on the upper 
SOC major groups. Only since 1990 have a notable portion of licensing and 
certification schemes appeared in lower major groups. Indeed these newer 
occupations, licensed or certified, that are positioned lower down the SOC spectrum 
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are often dubbed “pseudo professions” (Fernie 2010). These are occupations never 
regarded as professions in the traditional sense of the term, but are now regulated in 
response to concerns over malpractice, such as the case with security guards (Fernie 
2011). However, licensing and certification is still predominantly present towards the 
upper SOC major codes suggesting regulation is still unbalanced across all the 
different occupational groups. This supports the idea that it is occupations that are 
perceived as being professional that are stringently regulated. This supports the 
notion that it is through the exclusion of non-professionals, according to Abbott 
(1981), that professionals analyse professionalism – barriers to entry realise this 
exclusion.   
With regard to the skill levels of regulated occupations, most regulation is in 
occupations that require skill levels equivalent to some post-compulsory education 
level. Certification is present in occupations with an average skill level of 3.15, 
followed by accreditation with 3.03, licensing with 3 and registration with 2.35. This 
may suggest that accredited occupations demand a fairly high skill level and so there 
is no need to legally enforce a minimum competency level. Or it could support the 
idea that these occupations have a real asymmetry of knowledge because the skill 
levels of practitioners is relatively high and so clients are not well-placed to assess 
the quality of the work because they do not have the adequate skills. This would 
mean that at least one of Moore’s (1961) criteria for a need to protect the public is 
satisfied, yet this is not shown to result in more stringent types of legally enforced 
regulations being used. However, when one considers the additional qualifications 
required by each regulation, both licensing and certification require significantly 
more from entrants than accreditation. Therefore, once regulated there could be a 
levelling out whereby licensed and certified individuals’ qualification levels increase 
to enter the regulations, and accredited individuals remain at the same level. Yet, an 
asymmetry of knowledge would still exist. 
Therefore, the results support theorists who commentate on the links between a need 
to protect the public and regulation. They also support the presence of vested 
interests on the behalf of the practitioners relating to some types of regulation. Yet 
the results have challenged some of the assumptions made with regard to the 
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rationale and characteristics of regulation. It appears that the perception of the 
occupation is of particular importance where regulation status is concerned. This is 
where the UK differs from some of the other countries used in the comparison. This 
suggests that regulation is far more related to professionalisation than previously 
thought. 
1.4.3 Summary 
To summarise occupational regulation in the UK, one must view regulation as a 
multifaceted institutional actor in the labour market. There are four different types of 
regulation, each with differing characteristics above and beyond the extent to which 
they limit entry to occupations and tasks within occupations. Accreditation is 
arguably the most unique type of regulation having no legal instrument supporting it 
or interaction with the government. It is also the fastest growing regulation and the 
most likely to be created because of the vested interest practitioners have in 
becoming regulated. In comparison to other countries, regulation in the UK is 
comprehensive, but some occupations licensed elsewhere, are not here in the UK. 
This could be because of the heavy focus to protect the public where any 
government, legal or social funding is concerned. It may also be because of the 
perception of the occupations in question: more occupations regarded as 
‘professional’ are regulated than those not deemed as traditional professional 
occupations.  
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Paper 2  
Occupational Regulation in the UK: Impact 
The previous paper assessed the prevalence of occupational regulation at the 
occupation level. In addition to determining the prevalence, the paper also detailed 
some of the key characteristics of each regulation: licensing, certification, 
accreditation and registration. The results show that occupational regulation is highly 
prevalent with 189 of 353 SOC unit groups being covered by some sort of regulation. 
Whilst investigating the prevalence of regulation at the occupation level is a very 
important point of departure in order to gain a full picture as to the extent of 
regulation, it is necessary to determine how many individuals are covered by 
regulation and what impact regulation has on the labour market. 
This paper endeavours to analyse the macro level effects that may arise as a result of 
occupational regulation in the UK labour market. As with much labour market 
research the focus will predominantly centre on the wage effects of regulation. 
However, this paper will also consider the effects regulation may have on skill 
levels. As regulation often requires a minimum degree of competency from potential 
incumbents, there may be potential for regulation to have an up-skilling effect 
(where the average level of qualification across the occupation has increased) on the 
supply side of the labour market.   
This paper will be structured as follows: first, the theory and evidence surrounding 
the impact of occupational regulation on wages and skill levels is presented. Second, 
the method used to investigate the impact that regulation has on wages and skills in 
the UK is outlined. Third, the results of the analysis are presented. Lastly, the key 
findings and the implications are discussed. 
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2.1 Theory of the Impact Occupational Regulation has on Wages and Skills 
Occupational regulation is an artificial actor within the labour market. It is not a 
natural development of activity relating to supply or demand but an imposed foreign 
body created from an outside element (the government or a professional body). Any 
artificial occurrences in the labour market will have an effect on those within it. For 
example, the national minimum wage, brought in during 1998, was imposed by the 
government and was not the result of a change in supply or demand, but the result of 
petitioning from the public and policy makers’ attempts to improve the living 
standards of low earners. The subsequent wage increases were therefore artificial, 
not the result of supply and demand shifts. Foreign bodies will always ‘disturb’ their 
surroundings. In the labour market this means that either the supply side or the 
demand side are affected. Whenever there is a change in one side of the labour 
market there will be a change in the equilibrium point (the wage and number of 
people employed when supply equals demand) and so the number of people 
employed and the wage (or price) that they receive. Subsequently, the other side of 
the labour market may or may not respond, causing further shifts of the equilibrium 
point. Artificial instruments, therefore, can affect the labour market and change 
overall macro levels. For example, one of the effects of the national minimum wage 
was a truncation of the wage distribution, which increased the mean gross hourly 
wage in the UK (Metcalf 2002). This section will present the theory and evidence 
surrounding the impact regulation has on wages and skill levels. 
2.1.1 Wage Effects of Occupational Regulation 
The labour market is split into two sides: supply and demand. Over time the level of 
demand will equate to the level of supply creating a natural equilibrium point. This 
equilibrium point will indicate what the wages and prices need to be in order for the 
equilibrium to be maintained. Economic theory states that any change in the supply 
or demand of a particular market will result in a change of both wages and prices. If 
the changes are not a natural result of changes in supply and demand then, certainly 
in the short term, the new equilibrium point creates a deadweight loss in the labour 
market because demand will no longer equal supply. As discussed, regulation is not 
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the result of natural changes in the labour market, so the effects will result in a new 
equilibrium point being made. The aim of this section is to present the main theory 
concerning the impact regulation may have on wages.  
Occupational regulation can impact the labour market, and subsequently impact 
relative wages (and prices), in three ways: restricting supply, changing demand and 
changing the wages in similar non-regulated occupations.  The following section will 
address each in turn. 
2.1.1.1 Restricting Supply 
Occupational regulation restricts supply as it creates a barrier of entry into a given 
occupation. In an unregulated occupation, an individual can begin work instantly, but 
in a regulated occupation, such as medicine, an individual cannot begin work 
instantly but must instead undergo years of education and training before he/she can 
legally work as a doctor; the barrier to entry in this case is the requirement to train 
and achieve a specific qualification. Barriers to entry can take many forms - 
examinations, membership costs, requiring certain human characteristics, work 
experience and qualifications. However, all barriers to entry can be broken down into 
three categories which are cost, numerical limitations and age (Rottenberg 1980).  
Cost covers any requirement that imposes a charge onto the applicant, often even 
when they do not ultimately gain entry. Some costs are easily identifiable, for 
example, the fees for gaining a specific qualification or membership costs but, 
arguably, there is a cost element to all barriers to entry. For instance, even if there are 
no fees associated with gaining a certain qualification or there are no membership 
costs, there will the opportunity cost (the individual forgoes the opportunity to earn 
money while time is spent applying for entry). To illustrate this, in the eight years it 
takes for a doctor to qualify, they are prevented from working in a full-time 
occupation. Therefore, not only do doctors have to pay the fees to train, they must 
also account for the money they could have earned over the period of training if they 
had been working full-time. As a result the total cost is as summarised below. 
Total Cost = Associated Fees + Opportunity Cost 
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The second way in which regulation can create a barrier to entry is through creating a 
minimum age requirement. This restricts supply and creates exactly the same effects 
as a standard cost of entry. Examples of age limitations include lifeguards who are 
required to be at least 16, crane operators who must be at least 18 and miners who 
are required to be 16 and above. The reason for minimum age requirements is to, 
(allegedly), ensure safety for the workers and customers, in the same way; for a UK 
driving licence there is a minimum age to ensure that drivers have a minimum level 
of experience and maturity. There will still be a cost to entry, as there will have to be 
an application process and proof of age. Additionally, applicants needing to wait 
until they are old enough, will forego earning the same wage as they would if they 
worked in their desired occupation creating an opportunity cost if this wage is higher 
than their earnings in the job they undertake in later life. As a result, the cost of 
minimum age requirements on the individual is found from the same calculation 
above. 
Numerical limitation (restricting the number of individuals who can have a licence, 
certificate or accreditation) is the final way in which entry into an occupation can be 
restricted. Here there will also be an application process and so a cost borne by the 
applicant in terms of time and possibly fees for applying. One of the common 
examples of numerical limitation is that of taxi drivers. Traditionally, only a certain 
number of taxi licences are issued per borough or county to prevent flooding the 
roads of busy areas with commercial vehicles. As mentioned, there is also a cost 
associated with applying to be a taxi driver; it is a relatively long process with many 
counties requiring a minimum skill standard including a criminal record background 
check.  
The effects on wages are largely determined by whether the numerical limitation is 
below or above the existing equilibrium point. If the limitation is below the natural 
equilibrium point, then practitioners can charge inflated prices and will not be met 
with restrictions on demand. If the point is set above the natural and current 
equilibrium, then there should be no effect on the prices in the short term. However, 
in both circumstances because of the associated costs, there will be an increase in 
wages in the short term. Although numerical limitations are no longer in practice in 
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the UK, as it can be a feature of barriers to entry, it is still an important consideration 
to make when considering future policies. 
Summary of the Theoretical Association on the Impact of Regulation on Supply 
From the above theory it is clear that all occupational regulation has the ability to 
restrict supply through causing a barrier to entry for individuals. The costs are both 
actual and opportunity-based. Clearly the higher the fees, the greater the cost to the 
applicant but also the length of time it takes to successfully gain entrance bears a 
cost. The longer it takes for an applicant to apply and pass, the greater the cost to 
them as they forego greater earnings during the application period. Therefore, the 
greater the stringency of requirements, the greater the amount of time to qualify and 
the greater the cost to applicants (Ekeland et al.2002). Greater restrictions lead to 
greater changes in the supply side of the labour market and therefore, the greater the 
effect on wages. 
Evidence: Impact of Occupational Regulation on Supply 
The evidence relating to the impact regulation has on the supply side of the labour 
market in terms of changing the wage levels is largely confined to the US and 
Canada; each is presented below. 
Holen's (1965) study on medicine, dentistry and law in the late 1940s uses data from 
the US census and National Income Division surveys. The findings suggest that there 
is an inverse association between pass rates and wages. The more difficult it is to 
pass the minimum requirements for entry into an occupation, the higher the wages 
are. The conclusion drawn from this is that this occurrence is due to the restriction on 
supply created by increasing the minimum pass mark level. The study notes that 
when the pass marks are lower, there is less of a restriction to the occupation and so 
less of a wage premium. Similarly, Maurizi’s (1974) study of 24 different licensed 
occupations on data from the Council of State Government between 1940 and 1950 
shows a negative association between pass rates and wages. Both studies clearly 
show support for the link between the opportunity cost associated with regulation 
(created by the longer time it takes to pass an exam when the pass mark increases), 
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restricting supply and increasing wages. However, whilst both of these studies use a 
wide range of occupations, the focus is solely on licensing (not certification, 
accreditation or registration) and as a result, the effect all types of regulation has on 
restricting supply and increasing wages cannot be accurately extrapolated.  
These results are also supported by Muzondo and Pazderka’s (1980) study of 20 
occupations, some licensed, some certified and others un-regulated. Using the 1971 
Canadian census the study found a positive association between fees and wages. 
They find that when the actual fees to enter an occupation increase, so do the wages 
of all workers within the occupation. This was because every time the fees increased, 
the proportion of people unable to pay increased and supply was further restricted. 
Therefore, the assumption that the actual cost of regulations is linked to higher wages 
is supported. Yet, as with the previously mentioned studies, not all types of 
regulations are tested for, and therefore the effects of accreditation and registration 
cannot be assumed. 
A more recent study is that of Kleiner (2000) who shows that the greater the 
requirements for educational attainment, the higher the wages. The study is not 
concerned with a specific form of regulation, but a particular form of barrier to entry. 
Therefore, whilst the results can be used to conclude that there is evidence that 
stringency is related to higher wages, it cannot be concluded that the same result is 
found across all types of barriers to entry. Also, in line with previous evidence to this 
study, it is not conducted in the UK and therefore it is too presumptuous to assume 
that the same conclusions are found in the UK because of the institutional differences 
discussed in the previous paper. 
Fernie’s (2010) study of security guards shows that there was no effect on wages 
after licensing was introduced within the UK (in response to the Private Security 
Industry Act 2001). Although this is likely to be as a result of the low entry 
requirements held by the Security Industry Authority (SIA), the lack of a macro level 
analysis of regulation across all occupations means that a strong general conclusion 
cannot be found. An investigation into the effects of licensing on the wage 
distribution using the Labour Force Survey from 2009 indicates a wage premium of 
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approximately 13% (Humphris et al. 2010). However, this study did not encompass 
all occupations nor did it account for the many different forms of regulation. 
As can be seen from the evidence relating to the effects of licensing on the supply 
side of the labour market with regard to wages, there is a distinct absence of UK 
research, none of which covers all the occupations in all of the regulation typologies. 
Although there is support for the notion that the more stringent the regulation 
requirements (in terms of both cost and competency), the greater the restriction on 
supply and the greater the wages. From the evidence available it is impossible to 
extrapolate the real effect regulation has on restricting supply and increasing wages 
in the UK at present. 
The effects on wages resulting from regulation cannot be solely established by 
considering one side of the labour market. In the short-term with any restriction in 
supply, a wage/price increase is predicted. However, most of the regulated 
occupations in the UK are no longer in the short-term period of impact. In the long-
term, the effects on the magnitude of wage premiums are largely determined by 
changes in demand as a result of regulation. 
2.1.1.2 Effects on Demand 
Artificial actors, such as regulations, can also have an effect on the demand side of 
the labour market. As with any changes in the labour market, the effects are 
measured in two ways: short-term and long-term. When regulation is implemented in 
the short-term, the demand side will remain constant. This is because it takes time for 
individuals to fully adapt to changes in the services they desire. If one assumes that 
all types of regulation result in an increase in wages (resulting from a restriction in 
supply) a deadweight loss will occur. In the long-term however, the demand side has 
time to adapt and adjust to the changes in prices and wages caused by changes in the 
supply side. In the long-term, the demand side of a particular market where 
regulation has been implemented for some time, can do one of three things: decrease, 
remain constant or increase.  
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The way in which the demand curve shifts, or doesn’t, affects the final wage/price. If 
demand decreases, then in the long-term the equilibrium point changes less than the 
initial change which occurs in the short-term. If demand remains constant, then there 
continues to be a deadweight loss and there is no change from the effects that have 
taken place in the short-term. If demand increases, then the equilibrium point results 
in a wage increase that is greater than that which occurred in the short-term. 
How demand responds to changes in the supply side of the market is heavily 
dependent on the service in question. Economic theory suggests that individuals will 
act rationally towards changes in the supply side. As such, four aspects must be 
considered in order to predict how demand will change: whether the service has a 
good substitute, what the elasticity of demand is, what percentage the service is of 
total expenditure, and how other services are affected (Marshall 1952). However, 
social theory would suggest that consumers are not always rational and may have 
irrational preferences when choosing services, as a result economic theory may not 
exactly predict outcomes. 
When the price of a service increases due to a change in the supply side, if there is an 
alternative service available to the consumer, all other things being equal, they will 
choose to substitute the more expensive service for the alternative one. For example, 
if you wish to get a light switch changed and the cost of an electrician has increased 
due to regulation, then it is likely you will choose to employ a handyman who is 
capable of the same task but much less expensive. If the substitute is not of the same 
value as the service desired, then individuals must consider the extra worth of having 
their desired service over any alternative. For instance, a handyman can change the 
light switch but they are unlikely to identify any bigger issues with your electrics. If 
you value an electrician’s ability to do that, then you are less likely to substitute for a 
handyman. Where there are no substitutions and the individual values the service, 
then even a rise in price is unlikely to reduce demand. When assessing the impact 
occupational regulation has on demand, it is logical to suggest that the impact will 
vary with the availability of substitutes available.  
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Most services will have a negative elasticity of demand. This is the extent to which 
change in demand is directly linked to change in price, meaning; when price 
increases, demand decreases. Some services have a very low elasticity (close to zero) 
meaning that demand is largely unaffected by changes in price and some have a 
positive elasticity of demand, meaning when prices increase, as does demand. 
Although it seems illogical for demand to increase when prices increase, it is not 
impossible. One such example is the increased demand when prices of potatoes rose 
in Ireland during the Great Famine of 1845-1852. A service’s elasticity is linked to 
the number of substitutions available (as described above) and how essential the 
service is to the individual. If the service is essential to the consumers and there are 
no similar substitute services available, then that service is said to be inelastic with 
regard to price and demand, and is likely to remain consistent despite fluctuations in 
price. An example of an inelastic service is that of funeral directors. There are no 
substitutes and very little opportunity for individuals to decide not to use their 
services, therefore, even if the price doubled it is unlikely that demand would reduce 
by the same degree. Where there are substitute services available and/or the service 
is not essential but a luxury, then the service will be very price elastic and demand is 
likely to decrease when any increase in price occurs. An example of a price elastic 
service is that of a beautician; the simple alternative to seeing a beautician is to do 
the work oneself. Not going to a beautician will not dramatically worsen one’s life 
and so, if their prices double, it is likely that individuals will stop going and demand 
will decrease every time there is a price increase.  
Changes in demand are also affected by the percentage of an individual’s total 
expenditure a service accounts for. If a service has a 50% price rise, but this price 
rise represents 0.5% of an individual’s budgeted expenditure, then it is not likely to 
have much of an impact on whether they will purchase the service or not. However if 
this 50% rise is equal to 50% of the budgeted expenditure of an individual, then it is 
likely to have a big negative impact. Yet, the true impact of a price change can only 
be measured by considering the change in price relative to an individual’s income 
and their budgeted expenditure.  
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Demand is also affected by how other services change. If a price increase in one 
service occurs when other services increase their prices, then demand is likely to 
decrease as an individual’s budget is likely to decrease. If other services drop prices 
then they may take custom away from the more expensive services, or conversely, 
this may mean that individuals have more money to spend on a more expensive 
service. The effects of changes in other services are most prevalent between 
secondary and primary markets, more of which is mentioned in section 2.1.1. 
It is clear that in economic theory, the way in which demand changes in response to 
price changes is highly dependent on the characteristics of the service in question. 
Whether the service is essential, can be substituted and how much of an individual’s 
expenditure is allocated, all have a big impact on how demand changes (or does not). 
However, economic theory assumes that individuals always make rational decisions 
based on logical arguments, although this is not always the case. For example, 
despite vegetables being cheaper and better for us, many people choose more 
expensive, poor quality fast food. 
Summary of the Theoretical Impact of Regulation on Demand 
Changes in demand may not simply be as a response to wage increases in the supply 
side but as a social reaction. Instead, the presence of regulation may have an 
independent relationship with demand. Occupational regulation may make services 
more desirable to consumers. An increase in desirability comes from the ability of 
regulation to signal quality to potential consumers (Spence 1973). When occupations 
become regulated, practitioners may be perceived as becoming legally recognised as 
honest and upstanding (Frank 1988). This results in an increase in demand because 
the potential consumers are reassured of the quality of the service for which they are 
paying. They may also be willing to pay more to regulated practitioners for this 
reassurance and peace of mind. Additionally, regulated practitioners can be reported 
to the regulating body if they do not provide an adequate service thereby ensuring 
consumers are safe in the knowledge that if they do receive poor services there will 
be some compensation and disciplinary action taken.  
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Evidence: Impact of Occupational Regulation on Demand 
From the theory surrounding the possible impact of occupational regulation on the 
demand side of the market, it is clear that there is no definitive prediction as to how 
the overall price effects will play out. Effects on the demand side are very difficult to 
measure at the macro level because in many cases there are no appropriate datasets 
and too many possible variables which may have an impact on results. This makes a 
firm conclusion as to the role regulation plays very difficult. However, there have 
been three key occupation-specific case studies in the US, which endeavour to 
further investigate the relationship. 
One of the first studies investigating the impact regulation has on demand is that of 
Benham and Benham (1975). They used a health survey conducted in 1970 from the 
National Opinion Research Center for Health Administration Studies at the 
University of Chicago. They focus on the effect that making regulations more 
stringent and widespread has had on the optometry profession. They compare states 
where regulation has remained constant, to states where regulation has grown and 
thus created a higher price for eyeglasses. Using the sale of eyeglasses as a measure 
of demand they conclude that demand for them was significantly negatively 
associated with price. In fact, they found that between 4.7% and 5.9% fewer people 
obtained eyeglasses in states where regulation had grown, which suggests that 
regulation is inversely associated with demand. 
However, two later studies contest the negative impact concluded by Benham and 
Benham (1975). First, White (1978) investigates the demand for female technologists 
between US states that had regulation and states that did not. Two types of regulation 
were considered: firstly, a regulation brought in less than ten years previously which 
required technologists, technicians and aides to be licensed but not necessarily have a 
college degree, second, an older regulation where technicians were unregulated but 
everyone was required to have a college degree. The results showed that despite an 
increase in costs due to licensing, there was no overall effect on demand for 
technicians in states that required them to be regulated.  
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Secondly, Gallick and Sisk (1987) assess the impact that regulation had in the taxi 
industry by the US medallion system. The system, like licensing, restricted entry into 
the industry and controls competition. Although prices were likely to increase the 
authors argue that because there was a reduction in search costs for the consumer and 
because the quality of the service was guaranteed, the volume of taxi rides would 
increase. This suggested a positive association between regulation and demand. 
The evidence, therefore, provides very mixed results and prevents an accurate 
prediction as to the impact regulation has on demand. As seen by the studies above, 
in order to assess the impact regulation has on either side of the labour market, it is 
necessary to have a control group - a comparator from which changes can be 
benchmarked. The assumption is that changes in the primary market (where 
regulation occurs) do not cause changes in the secondary market (the comparator 
market where there is less or no regulation). However, it may be naïve to suggest that 
any markets are completely independent. Further, if changes do occur in the 
secondary market, then this may distort the strength of conclusions made using them 
as a comparator. 
2.1.1.3 Effects on Secondary Markets 
Secondary markets allow analyses of wage effects to control for an array of human, 
job and locational characteristics which may account for fluctuations in wages, as is 
the case in the Humphris et al. (2010) analysis of the impact of occupational 
regulation on wages in the UK.  The reason for approaching the analysis in this way 
is because there are relatively few occupations that have become licensed in the past 
ten years making a difference in difference analysis very difficult. However as 
mentioned there are difficulties in approaching analysis in this way, and scholars 
such as Ballow and Podgorsky (1998) suggest that in order to accurately conclude 
the impact occupational regulation has on wages in this way, one must consider the 
effects on secondary markets that regulation in a primary market can affect the 
secondary market in terms of both supply and demand. Each is discussed below. 
Supply in the secondary market can increase or remain constant in response to 
regulation in a preferred occupation. An increase in supply would occur from 
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individuals who cannot gain entry into their preferred occupation seeking to enter the 
best alternative. If all individuals are assumed to act rationally then there would be a 
small number of best alternative occupations, which are defined as occupations 
similar in task and industry. The harder the entry requirements, and the greater the 
cost of entry, then the greater the influx of these individuals. For example, if an 
individual wishes to become a primary school teacher but they cannot afford to 
undertake a teaching course to gain the minimum qualifications required then they 
may apply to be a classroom assistant instead, as this is similar work but with much 
lower barriers to entry. One might assume that if it were harder to become a teacher 
it would result in a greater supply of classroom assistants; if supply increases, 
assuming demand remains constant, wages should decrease. However, if the entry 
requirements to the primary market are not set very high then it is unlikely those 
individuals will seek employment in the secondary market and so supply, and wages, 
will remain constant. 
Demand in the secondary market may also change as a response to regulation in the 
primary market. As ever, demand can increase, decrease or remain constant. Demand 
may increase if consumers and employers do not value the difference between the 
primary and secondary services to pay a premium.  If this is the case, then it is likely 
they would prefer to pay less and buy from the secondary market. If many 
individuals act in the same way, then demand will increase. The effect on wages will 
be positive if a rise in supply does not diminish the effects of the rise in demand.  
Demand for services in a secondary market may decrease if they are not a true 
substitute for those in the primary market. If an individual has to have a primary 
service then it may be the case that, because prices have increased, they spend more 
money there and have less to spend elsewhere. It may also be the case that, due to 
regulation, services in the primary market become more appealing than those in the 
secondary market. If this is the case, and even if they can be substituted, individuals 
are more likely to choose regulated services over unregulated services causing a 
reduction in demand. A reduction in demand, especially if coupled with an increase 
in supply, will cause a decrease in wages (and prices) in the secondary markets. 
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There will be no effect on demand in the secondary markets if the services are 
complements to the regulated services (and demand has not increased there), or if 
there are many secondary services for each regulated primary service. A spread of 
secondary services would mean that the impact is minimal in each individual market 
meaning the overall mean value change is reduced for every additional alternative 
occupation available.  
Summary of the Theoretical Impact of Regulation on Secondary Markets 
According to the theory, secondary markets can be affected by occupational 
regulation resulting in either a rise or fall in wages and prices. The impact of 
regulation for secondary markets is determined by the characteristics of the 
occupations and whether they complement or substitute their regulated counterparts. 
Evidence: Impact of Occupational Regulation on Secondary Markets 
There are very few investigations that explicitly address the impact that regulation 
may have on secondary markets. As with most evidence on occupational regulation, 
the analysis is conducted in the US and on specific case studies. Each is presented 
below. 
Stigler (1971) concludes that there will be an increase in supply to the secondary 
markets, which will almost certainly, in every case, result in a reduction of average 
wages. This reduction makes the relative change in wages of those who become 
regulated greater when using the secondary market as the control group. Filer, 
Hamermesh and Rees (1994) also support these findings. They show that regulation 
in one market creates over-supply in another reducing wages and prices in the 
oversupplied market. Ballou and Podgorsky (1998) analyse the change in the 
minimum requirements to become a teacher. They conclude that the longer it takes to 
become a teacher, the more suitable applicants who are capable of passing, seek 
employment elsewhere. This is detrimental as it can result in fewer capable 
applicants becoming teachers. This in turn may reduce the quality of service amongst 
teachers, which can decrease wages. 
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The limited evidence on secondary markets suggests that there is an increase in 
supply, but the conclusion on wages differs. This suggests that there may not be a 
universal conclusion for the effects on wages in the secondary market. 
2.1.1.4 Evidence: Overall Impact of Occupational Regulation on Wages 
From the evidence presented, the overall impact of regulation on wages is 
inconclusive. Both the supply and demand side of the market are affected by the 
implementation of regulation. If the regulation is stringent enough, then supply is 
restricted and wages should increase. However, if demand also decreases, the effect 
the change in supply has on wages may be counterbalanced by the changes in 
demand. Though demand may not necessarily decrease, as previously mentioned, it 
may remain constant or even increase. Further, as it is uncertain as to the impact 
regulation has in markets other than those which are regulated, it would be 
impossible to anticipate how regulated occupations compare with unregulated 
occupations in terms of wages.  
Due to the many different dimensions that may affect wages - beyond considering 
the evidence that relates to each dimension separately - it is also necessary to 
consider the overall effect on wages. Most studies find a positive association 
between the regulation considered and wages. However, one of the earliest studies 
finds the reverse effect. Holen (1965) uses data derived from the 1950 US Census 
and National Income Division surveys in the late 1940s. The study focuses on three 
licensed professions: medicine, dentistry and law. The analysis shows there to be a 
distortion of supply between regulated and non-regulated states and a significant 
inverse relationship between licensing and the wages of lawyers and dentists. 
However, a clear limitation to the research is the limited sample of occupations 
which makes generalising the results significantly limited. 
Despite the negative association found by Holen (1965), many scholars have 
concluded otherwise. Shepard (1978) focuses on the association between restricting 
the supply of dentists though licensing and wages. Using data from the American 
Dental Association National Fee Survey conducted in 1970, the analysis concludes 
that there is a significant positive association between wages and licensing.  
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Muzondo and Pazderka (1980), who used the 1971 Canadian Census data to 
investigate whether there was a correlation between education, fee setting and 
advertising restrictions (which are all characteristics of some regulations) with 
wages, conclude that there is a significant association between licensing and 
certification with wages. Twenty occupations are considered; a mixture of licensed, 
certified and unregulated occupations.  
In a similar vein, Perloff (1980) investigates the wage changes of labourers (who are 
unregulated), plumbers (who are licensed) and electricians (who are licensed), 
relative to wage changes in the manufacturing sector. By considering how each 
group’s wages increase over time and comparing the growth rates, they conclude that 
licensing prevents wage equalisation between sectors because the licensed 
occupations prevent growth and allow wages to grow at a faster rate than those of 
unregulated labourers. It is also insinuated that regulation may play a further role 
where wages are significantly higher in construction compared to manufacturing 
because of the skill levels required by the licensing body. 
Moore et al. (1981) also concludes a positive association between licensing and 
wages. They used US National Longitudinal Surveys for women aged between 14 
and 24 and 30 to 44. The figures date from 1967 onwards and cover a variety of 
occupations, some regulated (licensed or certificated) and others not. The analysis 
shows that regulated women earn significantly more than unregulated women. 
However, the authors state that this was the result of licensing rather than 
certification because licensing has a greater ability to restrict supply and, generally, 
requires entrants to have higher qualifications.  
Other scholars who arrive at a positive association between licensing and wages are 
Kleiner and Kudrle (1992). They use data from the American Dental Association 
between 1984 and 1990 to analyse the effects of regulation within the occupation. 
The analysis shows that wages are significantly positively associated with licensing. 
Further they note that in this case, demand exceeds supply and those already in the 
occupation benefit from any decreases in pass rates. However Kleiner (2000) 
concludes that licensing seems to have a positive impact on wages but that the 
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magnitude of this impact varies hugely between occupations. The results suggest that 
those occupations which require a higher level of education - such as dentists - reap 
the largest wage premiums, where those that only require a low level of education 
benefit from a smaller wage premium, such as cosmetologists. The conclusions are 
drawn from an analysis conducted on the Public Use Sample from the US Census 
Bureau data from 1990. 
The only UK-focused research into regulation and wages is Humphris et al. (2010), 
who also found a significant association between licensing and wages. They used the 
2010 UK Labour Force Survey to compare unregulated and licensed occupations in 
all non-Chief Executive Officer (CEO) occupational groups. The analysis concluded 
that there is a wage premium of approximately 13% for licensed occupations. This is 
the only current macro-level analysis of regulation in the UK and only considers one 
form of regulation; licensing, as such the results cannot be generalised across all 
regulations. This study builds upon their findings by considering all occupations and 
all types of regulation thus providing a more comprehensive analysis of the impact of 
regulation. 
Overall Summary of Evidence on Impact of Regulation on Wages 
In general, the evidence presented concludes a positive association between licensing 
and wages. Although the extent of the impact varies between different occupations, 
the results concur with the theory. However, the impact of licensing in the UK 
cannot be fully concluded as not all occupations are considered in this UK-focused 
study. Further, even in the US literature, licensing has been widely investigated. 
Occupational regulation can also take the form of certification, accreditation and 
registration. None of these ‘types’ of regulation have been fully investigated across 
all industries and sectors. Therefore, from the existing evidence, a conclusion as to 
the impact of occupational regulation (in all its forms) cannot be determined at 
present. In addition, the majority of research is conducted outside of the UK. From 
the previous paper, the UK is shown to have a unique regulation system formed as a 
result of its individual institutional setting, legislative process and public sector. As 
such, this paper aims to investigate the following hypothesis:  
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H1: Occupational regulation has a positive effect on wages in the UK 
2.1.2 Skills Effects of Occupational Regulation 
Many scholars have written extensively on the topic of skill shortages in the UK 
(Meager 1986, Green and Ashton 1992, Machin 1996, Bosworth 1999, Mackenzie, 
Kilpatrick and Akintoye 2000, Haskel and Martin 2001). In recent years, high 
unemployment coupled with many unfilled job vacancies, signal that severe skill 
shortages exist. However, more individuals are attending university for both 
undergraduate and postgraduate degrees than ever before (Steedman and Vaitilingam 
2011). The rise in academic qualifications suggests that not all skill levels are the 
result of academic pursuits. West and Steedman (2003) suggest that one of the main 
problems with the system is that there are very few visible links between education 
and the labour market. In other words, the academic knowledge learned is not 
comprehensive enough to satisfy the demands of the labour market. They argue that 
it is relatively easy to make the case for the need of academic qualifications. There is 
a common understanding and appreciation for everyone to have a grasp on numeracy 
and literacy, but vocational education can be less easy to justify. Yet, West and 
Steedman (2003) state that the lack of vocational training is having a real impact on 
skill levels in the UK, not least because they find that vocational education leads to 
an increase in occupational proficiency.  The aim of this section is first, to present an 
overview of the UK education system with regard to academic and vocational 
qualifications, second, the theory and evidence surrounding the impact regulation has 
on skill levels is discussed. 
2.1.2.1 The UK education System 
The UK education system results in two types of qualifications: vocational and 
academic. Below each is discussed with relation to skill levels. 
Vocational Education 
Vocational education is any form of education based on a particular vocation, or 
occupation. This form of education is usually provided in line with National 
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Vocational Qualifications (NVQs), City and Guilds, or guidelines set by some other 
qualification body (West 2004). Vocational education is the means by which 
individuals learn how to carry out the main tasks of an occupation which results in 
the candidate attaining a formal qualification.  
Disadvantages of Vocational Education 
It is argued that good vocational education fosters both progression and credibility 
(West 2004). However, there are many criticisms of vocational education that 
dispute such a claim. West (2006) notes that there are three main criticisms of 
vocational education: technical, moral and market.  
Technical criticism of vocational education states that the system is not credible 
because it is impossible to adopt a single scale across all the different occupation-
specific schemes (Wolf 1995). As such, it is very difficult for employers and the 
public to understand what the formal qualifications mean and how reliable they are. 
This problem may be prominent because there is a lack of a general syllabus in many 
vocational education courses (Smithers 1993).  
The moral criticisms of vocational education build upon the technical issues. The 
main argument is that it is not morally correct to categorise vocational learning as an 
education (Hyland 1994). The lack of syllabus and commonality ensuring basic 
literacy and numeracy skills means that vocational learning is not an adequate 
education (Hyland 1994). In addition, there is often a lack of any theoretical 
underpinning being taught (Grugulis 2003). This could result in surface level 
learning and an inability of students to adapt their practical knowledge to new or 
mutated situations. Traditional academic education focuses very much on theory; this 
of course is one of the main concerns. If there is too much theory than practical 
ability can become overshadowed.  
Market critiques of vocational education state that not all occupations are suited to 
such an approach (West 2004). Further, that the market cannot support such 
education without public funding (ibid.). This is supported by the Learning and Skills 
Research Council who, in 2004, found that vocational training is most effective if it 
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is supported, at least in part, by public funding. There is also a debate as to how 
useful vocational education qualifications are in the market. Wolf (1995) argues that 
there is a great danger in deconstructing occupations into testable parts. Through 
deconstructing them, an individual can lose sight of the overall purpose of the task. 
As a result, coupled with the lack of theoretical understanding, an individual may 
gain the formal qualifications but still remain unable to work in the occupation in 
question. The lack of stability in the system (Unwin 1999) and the difficulty in 
understanding the levels of qualifications also adds to the dubious market value of 
vocational education. This may occur because employers cannot judge the human 
capital value of each level accurately. Maybe it is as a consequence of all these issues 
that Cook et al. (2000) finds that the majority of employers and employees have had, 
on balance, negative experiences with vocational training and qualifications.  
Benefits of Vocational Education 
Despite the argued disadvantages of vocational education there are benefits 
associated with this type of education. In a study of healthcare workers, Rainbird et 
al. (2004) found that when the employees attained an NVQ level 3 in healthcare, the 
organisation reaped some sizable positives. The staff stated they felt more 
empowered and showed higher levels of commitment to their employer. There were 
improvements in the retention rate of staff, and managers (who had not taken part in 
the course), felt they had a better understanding of the healthcare industry. These 
findings are supported by Sargeant (2000) who finds that both employees who attend 
vocational education and their managers (that don’t), both increase their performance 
levels. Roe et al. (2006) also shows that employers are more likely to regard their 
staff as ‘skilled’ if the staff have associated NVQs. Jessup (1991) remarks that the 
benefits of vocational education, such as the NVQ system, should have positive 
effects because it allows assessment to take place in real-world situations and focus 
on the specific competencies needed for high performance. Indeed, vocational 
education may actively lead to improved literacy and numeracy levels - subjects 
normally associated with academic education (Gray 2006). This is as a result of the 
examining mechanisms used in vocational training and also the competencies needed 
for most occupations. In order to gain a formal qualification, many vocational 
 150 
 
courses will involve a written test at some point (Gray 2006). This not only tests the 
students’ understanding of the content, but also ensures that they have a good level 
of literacy and/or numeracy as this will impact their results. In addition Waterhouse 
and Vigona (2004) state that narrowing numeracy and literacy skills focused on the 
needs of occupations, would actually improve skill levels across a whole industry 
and sector. 
Beyond improving literacy, numeracy and competence levels of individuals, 
vocational education has further benefits. Vocational education allows individuals to 
take responsibility for their own development and enforces the importance of gaining 
transferable skills (Figgis et al. 2001). This is particularly important as not all 
employers are of the opinion that it is their responsibility to train and develop their 
employees (Corarie et al. 2005). Workforces with a high proportion of formal 
vocational skills are also more likely to have a culture of learning, innovation and 
development (Figgis et al. 2001); something desired and needed by organisations if 
they are to be competitive.  
On balance, an education that can improve employee performance, literacy and 
numeracy levels, and increase individuals’ transferable skills must warrant being 
accepted as a legitimate means to educate and raise the skill levels of individuals 
who do not choose a pure academic route. 
Academic Education 
Despite the credibility and benefits of vocational education, academic education still 
holds a firm position within the UK education system. Schooling is compulsory to at 
least the age of 18 which should ensure that all individuals have a suitable level of 
literacy, numeracy and information technology skills for the labour market. Indeed, 
Eraut (2009) states that with most academic learning taking place before full-time 
employment, there is a clear association between most subjects taught and vocational 
relevance. Subjects such as business studies, accountancy, psychology and law can 
all be taken as part of a secondary education. However, there is a clear difference 
between subjects with a vocational link taught in an academic situation, and subjects 
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taken within a vocational education setting (Eraut 2009). Academic study focusses 
heavily on the theoretical framework and context of subjects (Grugulis 2003). As a 
result, students are taught based on academic research as opposed to personal 
experience (Eraut 2009). This may reduce the usefulness of academic qualifications 
in the labour market. 
Yet with wage premiums associated with academic qualifications (Harkness and 
Machin 1999), qualifications must have a positive value in the labour market. 
Whether the value is associated with the content learned or the ability of academic 
qualifications to rank individuals (Weiss 1995), employers are still found to be 
willing to pay more for qualifications. Perhaps this is a result of the positive 
association between academic qualifications and employee performance (Bowman 
and Mehay 1998), although this does vary depending on the qualifications. Woo 
(1986) and Gerhart and Milkovich (1989), find that academic qualifications that have 
heavy links with occupations show they have the greatest value on the labour market 
and result in the highest wage premiums.  
One would be hard-pushed to argue that academic qualifications do not have a 
positive impact on one’s skill levels. The numeracy, literacy and information 
technology covered in general education are an invaluable asset. Learning and 
thinking independently, in an academic context, also has clear advantages.  
Summary of Skills 
The UK system encompasses both academic and vocational education. Whilst the 
case for academic qualifications may be more commonly accepted, vocational 
education is also shown to have value for individuals and their employers. As such 
both academic and vocational education contributes positively to an individual’s skill 
level.  
However, the distribution of these skills is not uniform across all the SOC major 
groups. Whilst advanced academic qualifications are most prevalent in medium and 
high-skilled occupations, there is a heavy concentration of vocational qualifications 
in low-skilled occupations (West 2003). This may suggest that there is a two-tiered 
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system operating in the labour market. Alternatively, it may suggest that medium and 
high skilled jobs, which contain more task variety and complexity, benefit most from 
the theoretical content of academic education, whereas lower-skilled occupations are 
more suited to the practical and occupation-specific content of vocational education.  
The most important conclusion to be made is that both academic and vocational 
qualifications are shown, on balance, to improve an individual’s skill set and lead to 
increased performance and productivity. 
2.1.2.2 Occupational Regulation and Skill Levels 
Occupational regulation provides barriers to entry for any individual wishing to 
become part of the regulation. These barriers to entry can involve requiring an 
individual to have a driving licence, a clean criminal record, or be of good physical 
health. However, some of the regulations (licensing, certification and accreditation) 
may require a minimum degree of competency. In order to ascertain if an individual 
is competent, many regulations require that a certain qualification be obtained. As 
discussed previously, qualifications can be academic or vocational, but both are 
shown to increase one’s overall skill level. The level of qualification required varies 
across different regulations and different occupations. Table 2.1 contains the 
qualification levels required by each regulation. In order to compare the different 
types of qualifications, all qualifications are mapped to the National Qualification 
Framework (NQF) (see methodology for more detail). 
Table 2-1: Regulation by qualification requirement 
 None 
Below 
Level 2 
Level 2 Level 3 
Level   
4-6 
Level   
7-8 
Don’t 
know* 
Total 
Licensing 0 20 11 6 32 2 11 82 
Certification 0 0 7 0 2 10 0 19 
Accreditation 1 2 19 9 31 3 2 67 
Total 1 22 37 15 65 15 13 168 
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* Don’t know occurs when the qualification does not map accurately to the NQF 
Table 2.1 clearly shows that almost all regulations require a minimum level of 
qualification from their entrants. The majority of regulations require qualifications 
ranging from level 4 to 6. This is equivalent to qualifications beyond A-levels up to 
degree level. In terms of academic and vocational qualifications, regulation follows 
the trend of the population. 
Table 2-2: Skill levels by type of education 
 Academic Vocational Either Total 
Below Level 2 0 22 0 22 
Level 2 0 36 1 37 
Level 3 1 14 0 15 
Level 4-6 52 7 6 65 
Level 7-8 14 1 0 15 
Total 67 80 7 154 
Lower skill requirements are more likely to result in vocational qualifications, 
whereas high-skill demands are more likely to result in academic qualifications. 
Interestingly, vocational qualifications account for 52% of all qualification demands. 
The requirement of qualifications made by regulations is also present throughout the 
SOC major groups. 
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Table 2-3: NQF requirement by SOC major group 
 None 
Below 
Level 2 
Level 2 Level 3 
Level   
4-6 
Level   
7-8 
Don’t 
know 
Total 
Managers 
and Senior 
Officials 
0 1 7 0 9 1 2 20 
Professionals 0 0 0 0 24 13 0 37 
Ass. 
Professionals 
and 
Technical 
Staff 
1 2 1 9 24 1 7 45 
Admin and 
Secretarial 
0 1 0 0 2 0 0 3 
Skilled 
Trades 
0 4 11 4 4 0 3 26 
Personal 
Service 
0 0 5 2 1 0 1 9 
Sales and 
Customer 
Services 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Process, 
Plant and 
Machine 
Operatives 
0 11 8 0 0 0 0 19 
Elementary 
Occupations 
0 2 5 0 1 0 0 8 
Total 1 22 37 15 65 15 13 168 
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However, it is not simply the case that because a regulation requires a level of 
qualification to be obtained, an individual’s skill set increases. This is because the 
regulation may set the requirements below what is likely to have already been 
achieved by the individual. For example, managers and senior officials are likely to 
have already obtained qualifications associated with completing compulsory 
education (level 2) so a regulation demanding a level 1 qualification will not increase 
their skill level. As such, further investigation is required in order to conclude that 
regulation has a positive impact on skill levels.  
Evidence on the Impact of Regulation on Skill Levels 
As with many of the issues surrounding occupational regulation and its possible 
effects, there is relatively little evidence surrounding the topic. However, since the 
turn of the century, there has been some key UK based research into the area.  
Two studies on licensing and skill levels are that of Gospel and Thompson (2003), 
and Gospel and Lewis (2010). Both studies are concerned with the effects the Care 
Standards Act 2000 has had on the skills of care home workers in the UK. The Act 
requires that a proportion of employees in a care home have to be licensed in order 
for the care home to operate legally. The reasoning for the change in regulation was 
concerned with up-skilling the profession. By requiring care home workers to sit 
NVQ assessments, there was assurance that individuals had good levels of literacy 
and numeracy. It was hoped that by introducing these tests and insuring minimum 
knowledge levels, workers would be more skilled at their job resulting in higher 
productivity and quality of care. Indeed, the second study found that higher 
proportions of workers are attaining the required qualifications. This, they 
concluded, shows that the Act has actively improved skill levels in the industry. 
However, caution must be taken as the earlier study indicated that, although skill 
levels may increase in terms of NVQ levels, the availability of additional training 
offered decreased. This meant that the minimum skill requirement quickly became 
the maximum for the industry. As employers had no legal obligation to provide 
further training in addition to the legal minimum, they ceased to run any additional 
in-house or external programmes. The regulation therefore did improve the bottom 
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end, but also removed any incentive for top end training to continue. As a result 
overall skill levels may have actually reduced. 
Fernie (2011) and Lister (2001) focus on the security industry and conclude a similar 
result, finding that the minimum skill requirements for security guards were quickly 
becoming the maximum. Licensing in the security sector came into effect in response 
to the Private Security Industry Act 2001. The Act states that all security workers, 
who are not employed directly by the proprietor, must be licensed. The course that 
must be attended and exam that must be passed are equivalent to an NVQ level 2. 
The rationale for the act was that licensing was necessary to protect the public. The 
assumption was that by bringing in a minimum requirement, skill levels would 
increase, and a better quality of service would be provided. However, both Fernie 
(2011) and Lister (2001) found that licensing meant that minimum requirements are 
unlikely to be surpassed because there is little incentive for firms to continue offering 
in-house training schemes. In-house schemes, according to Fernie (2011) are often 
more comprehensive and detailed than those offered by the Security Industry 
Authority (SIA). As such they both found that skill levels have bottomed-out and few 
firms are offering any training above the requirements of the SIA.  
One study which fails to see an improvement of NVQ levels as a result of regulation 
is Lloyd’s (2005) case study into the effect of the Register of Exercise Professionals 
(REP). The register requires exercise professionals, mainly personal trainers, to 
attend courses and work towards an accreditation which could be mapped across to 
an NVQ level. The aim of the register is to create an element of professionalism in 
the industry and also to signal quality to the consumer. However, the scheme is 
largely unable to increase skill levels. This was, according to Lloyd, because the 
register was industry-led and too focused on the commercial benefit of the scheme 
rather than the skill levels of the members. As a result the scheme did not result in 
individuals attaining NVQ levels higher than they already achieved prior to entering 
the occupation. 
The most recent study on the association between skill levels and regulation is that of 
Tamkin, Miller and Williams (2013). In their study they questioned a variety 
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regulated occupations which include, pharmacy technicians, retail investment 
advisers, gas engineers, domestic energy assessors, painters and decorators, chartered 
IT professionals, chartered dyers and colourists, electricians, youth workers and 
accredited travel professionals. In total the study had 439 respondents comprising of 
both employees and employers. A total of 66% of employers stated that since 
regulation came into effect in their industry they had noticed raised skill levels: 49% 
stated that they had increased to a great extent. However, many employers and 
employees felt the skill levels set by the schemes were set at the wrong level, with 
22% of employers and 8% of employees stating they were set too low. Yet overall 
with 57% of respondents stating they would not possess such high skill levels 
without regulation, the conclusion appeared to indicate a positive association for 
those regulated occupations included in the survey.  
The evidence presented suggests that regulation may have a positive association with 
skill levels in some occupations. The most recent and comprehensive study, which 
considers several regulated occupations, certainly suggests a positive association. 
However, all the evidence is a series of case studies on individual occupations. There 
is not a study that considers all occupations to confirm if regulation really does 
increase the skill levels, as measured by academic and vocational qualifications, of 
individual workers. As such this paper will test the hypothesis: 
H2: Occupational regulation has a positive association with skill levels 
Summary of Impact 
From the theory and evidence presented in these sections, two potential labour 
market areas could be affected by regulation: wages and skills. It is the aim of this 
paper to analyse if regulation has an impact in these areas. Therefore the following 
section will outline the method used to analyse the significance of this impact.  
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2.2 Methodology 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the impact occupational regulation has on 
wages and skill levels. This section will outline how the aim has been addressed. 
First, the data used for the analysis are described. Second, the variables used in the 
analysis are defined. Third, the method of analysis is described, and lastly, the 
limitations of the method used are discussed.  
2.2.1 Data 
The aim of this paper is to ascertain the impact occupational regulation has on 
individuals in the labour market. Therefore it is necessary to use data that not only 
identifies individuals’ wages and skill levels, but also their regulation status. 
Unfortunately no such dataset exists in the UK. As a result two datasets were merged 
in order to generate the variables needed in the analysis, they are: the Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) and the regulation database. 
The Labour Force Survey (LFS) 
The LFS came into existence in 1973. Between 1973 and 1983 the survey was 
conducted once every two years. However, because the data was increasingly used to 
formulate policy and evaluate exiting policies, from 1984 the survey was then 
conducted annually. In 1992 the survey became quarterly and covered approximately 
60,000 households. The current sample represents approximately 0.16% of the 
population in England, Wales and Scotland, and 0.23% of the Northern Ireland 
population.  
The Office for National Statistics (ONS) is responsible for the design and 
implementation of the survey. The LFS uses a rotational sampling method where 
each respondent is included in five consecutive quarters. Each quarter in which the 
respondent is included is called a ‘wave’. Each wave is exactly 13 weeks apart so the 
last wave is a year after the first. In any two consecutive quarters, approximately 
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80% of the respondents will be the same. The rotational design means that there is 
greater accuracy in the results and an analysis of annual changes can be conducted. 
The method of respondent selection comprises two parts: first, the UK is separated 
into geographical areas and second, the respondents are selected via a stratified 
selection method. In each quarter there are 17,380 new respondents. As there are up 
to five waves in each quarter, there will be up to 86,900 potential respondents per 
quarter.  
The LFS questionnaire itself is comprised of core questions which are included in 
every quarter of the survey and non-core questions which are only present in one or 
two quarters. Characteristic questions such as age, sex and ethnicity are also only 
questioned once, as these do not change over the course of the respondents’ 
participation. The interviews in the first wave are conducted face-to-face and 
thereafter, if appropriate, via telephone. The results are recorded via Computer Aided 
Input (CAI), which ensures the results are consistent and accurate. The interviewers 
carry out the coding of the responses. With variables which need interviewer 
discretion and prove a more complex task to code, such as occupations, the coding 
takes place after the interview and is checked through a follow-up telephone call to 
the respondent. This ensures that the data collected is as representative of the 
respondent and the population as possible. 
Errors 
In theory datasets are completely accurate and representative of the population.  
However, in practice the potential for errors in a dataset is present. Errors can be 
categorised into two areas: non-sampling errors and sampling errors.  
Sampling errors are those that occur in the selection of the sample. The aim of any 
national dataset is to represent the population but the sample chosen may not be truly 
representative. This may occur through selecting too small a sample, or not using a 
stratified sampling technique. With the LFS, the sample size is big enough and 
contains enough waves to imply validity. However the stratification is concerned 
with geographical area only. This results in a clustering effect concerning the 
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characteristics of the people living in any given postcode. This is resolved by the 
inclusion of a weighting variable which compensates for any over or under 
estimation. As such, the conclusion with using national data is that the sampling 
errors are minimised and at a far lower level than achievable with primary data 
collection. 
Non-sampling errors are errors that occur after the sample has been selected. There 
are three broad types: observation, measurement and processing.  Observation errors 
relate to the response rate of the sample and the ability of the sample to answer the 
questionnaire and contribute to the dataset. Measurement errors are errors that occur 
as a result of an interviewer error, an error on the questionnaire or a respondent error 
such as misinterpreting the question or the answer to a question they have asked. 
Processing errors occur after the answers have been given.  Errors of this nature are 
the result of a problem in the system of inputting the answers or a problem with 
coding.  
In the LFS there are scrupulous quality checks and training of both interviewers and 
data inputters, which reduce the likelihood of measurement errors. The questions on 
the LFS are reflective of the questions used on the census, which have been used on 
the population with no problems or respondent confusion. As such, although there 
are likely to still be some errors in the dataset it is unlikely that these errors would be 
large enough to impact on the validity of any analysis. 
Regulation Database 
The regulation database contains information relating to the regulation status of 
every Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) group. In addition, the database 
contains information as to whether every occupation in a SOC group is covered by 
the regulation or whether only some occupations are covered. The regulation 
database was constructed as part of the investigation carried out in paper one (see 
page 57 for more detail). As the database and the LFS contain the SOC variable, the 
two databases can be merged to result in the regulation status of individuals. 
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2.2.2 Defining Variables 
As the aim of the paper is to analyse the impact that regulation has on wages and 
skills, and the dependent variables in the analysis are ‘wages’ and ‘skills’. The 
independent variable is ‘regulation status’. In addition to the dependent and 
independent variables, control variables are included to reduce the chance of the 
hypotheses being falsely accepted. Each of the variables is defined below. 
Dependent Variables 
A statistical analysis defines dependent variables as the factors which are potentially 
affected by the independent variable. In this investigation the dependent variables are 
wages and skill levels. 
Wages 
Wages are measured by recording the typical gross hourly wage. The gross hourly 
wage is used to eliminate any interference from income tax, national insurance, 
student loan repayments or variations in the number of hours worked. The aim of 
recording ‘typical’ income is to reduce the chance of distortion from a periodical 
change in working terms, for example, increased hourly rates if someone has just 
worked overtime for extra money. The gross hourly wage will be recorded in pennies 
and therefore will be a continuous variable.  
Skill Levels 
As discussed at length in the previous section, attainment of qualifications can be a 
good measure of an individual’s subsequent skill levels. Both educational and 
vocational qualifications are predictors of skill. Therefore, in order to measure skill 
levels these are the parameters used. In order to equate different types of 
qualifications, both academic and vocational, on the same scale the National 
Qualification Framework (NQF) is used. 
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The NQF came into existence to clarify how different qualifications relate to each 
other. The framework has changed over time. Initially there were five levels; 
however in 2004 the framework was restructured to allow for better inclusion of 
postgraduate level qualifications. The framework now has eight levels. Table 2.4 
outlines the details of each level. 
Table 2-4: NQF Levels 
Level Description 
Example 
Qualifications 
Equivalent 
Higher 
Education 
Qualifications 
NVQ 
Levels 
Level 8 The qualifications 
indicate that an 
individual is an expert 
in their field. They 
are involved in 
expanding and 
developing new ideas 
and knowledge. 
City and Guilds 
Diploma of 
Fellowship 
Level 8 
Advanced 
Professional 
Award 
Doctorate 
Higher Doctorate 
At least 
level 5 
Level 7 The qualifications at 
this level indicate an 
individual’s highly 
developed in-depth 
knowledge that can 
be applied to a variety 
of complex situations.  
City and Guilds 
Membership 
Level 7 
Advanced 
Professional 
Award 
Master’s Degree 
Medical Degree 
PG Cert/PG Dip 
At least 
level 5 
Level 6 The qualifications at 
this level indicate in-
depth knowledge of a 
field of study. 
Individuals are able to 
apply their 
City and Guilds 
Graduateship 
Level 6 
Advanced 
Professional 
Award 
Bachelor’s 
Degree 
Graduate 
Certificate 
At least 
level 4 
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Level Description 
Example 
Qualifications 
Equivalent 
Higher 
Education 
Qualifications 
NVQ 
Levels 
knowledge to a 
variety of situations. 
Level 5 The qualifications at 
this level indicate a 
high level of expertise 
and development of 
advanced knowledge 
of a subject. 
Level 5 
Professional 
Award 
Higher National 
Certificate 
Foundation 
Degree 
Diploma in 
Further Education 
At least 
level 4 
Level 4 The qualifications at 
this level indicate 
higher knowledge and 
information than that 
of level 3 
qualifications. 
City and Guilds 
Licentiateship 
Level 4 
Professional 
Award 
Certificate of 
Higher Education 
Level 4 
Level 3 The qualifications at 
this level indicate an 
ability to gain and 
learn new knowledge 
and information with 
some ability to apply 
knowledge with no 
supervision. 
A Levels 
AS Levels 
City and Guilds 
Level 3 
 Level 3 
Level 2 Qualifications at this 
level indicate an 
ability to learn new 
knowledge and 
information. With 
some guidance and 
GCSE at grades 
A*-C 
City and Guilds 
Level 2 
 Level 2 
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Level Description 
Example 
Qualifications 
Equivalent 
Higher 
Education 
Qualifications 
NVQ 
Levels 
supervision 
knowledge can be 
applied. 
Level 1 The qualifications at 
this level indicate 
basic knowledge and 
the ability to learn 
with guidance. 
GCSE at grades 
D-G 
City and Guilds 
Level 1 
 Level 1 
Entry 
Level 
The qualifications at 
this level indicate 
basic knowledge and 
the ability to learn 
under direct 
supervision and 
guidance. 
Entry Level 1 
Certificate 
BTEC Level 1 
Certificate 
 Foundation 
learning tier 
 *Source: Office of Qualifications and Examinations Regulation 
By using the NQF, a 9-scale variable will be generated. This means that almost all 
qualifications can be included in the analysis and ensures that vocational 
qualifications are given correct weighting to their academic counterparts.  
Independent Variables 
An independent variable is not dependent on any other variable in the analysis. It is 
the variable that is being analysed to see if it has a significant impact on the 
dependent variables. In this investigation the independent variable is regulation 
status. 
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Regulation Status 
To determine the regulation status of an individual, each occupation in the UK had to 
be investigated so that its regulation status could be recorded. The first step was to 
categorise the occupations using the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) 
system. Secondly, the regulation status of each group had to be determined. The 
process of coding the occupations follows the SOC system. The codes classify 
occupations in the UK using a coding system that groups similar occupations 
together. SOC is used in all of the major national datasets in the UK including the 
Labour Force Survey (LFS), Census and British Household Panel Survey (BHPS).  
The Occupation Information Unit (OIU) maintains SOC for the Office of National 
Statistics (ONS). Any changes made to the SOC have, so far, been made in 
conjunction with the Institute for Employment Research (IER) at the University of 
Warwick. It is because of its widespread use and the close monitoring of its validity 
by the ONS and IER, that the SOC codes are assumed to be a solid framework from 
which to analyse occupations. The structure of the SOC 2000 is a hierarchical 
grouping system. There are nine major groups, 22 sub-major groups, 81 minor 
groups and 353 unit groups. SOC groups occupations by drawing ‘similar’ jobs 
together.  
Occupational regulation in the UK can take one of the following forms: registration, 
accreditation, certification or licensing. To analyse regulation in the UK accurately, 
as well as a binary variable ascertaining whether regulation is present in the SOC 
unit group a second variable, type of regulation, will be generated.  As no dataset 
within the UK that collects data on occupational regulation exists, there is little 
guidance as to how to classify regulation statuses. As such, the criteria used to 
determine regulation type are drawn from Forth et al.2010. 
To classify an occupation as licensed, certified, accredited, registered or unregulated, 
two criteria are considered: whether there is any legal requirement by the 
government for individuals to comply with the occupational regulation, and whether 
there is a requirement to demonstrate a minimum degree of competency. The criteria 
 166 
 
relates to the classification as shown in table 2.5. Once the regulation status has been 
determined, four variables are formed. 
Licensed: does the SOC unit code have licensing within it? (1=yes, 0=no) 
Certified: does the SOC unit code have certification within it? (1=yes, 0=no) 
Accredited: does the SOC unit code have accreditation within it? (1=yes, 0=no) 
Registered: does the SOC unit code have registration within it? (1=yes, 0=no) 
Once all occupations within the SOC unit group have been researched, the unit group 
is assigned an overall regulation status. The unit group regulation status is the 
‘highest’ regulation status in terms of legality and levels of entry requirements. 
Where there are two regulations of the same status, the oldest regulation is used. 
Table 2-5: Classification of regulation status 
 
Source: Bryson, Forth, Humphris, Kleiner and Koumenta 2010 
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Where a unit group is concluded to be licensed, the Act enforcing licensing was 
confirmed, particularly if this had not been provided during the telephone interview 
with the enforcement body (more information on the construction of the regulation 
database can be found on page 57). 
Coverage 
The way SOC groups together occupations means that many occupations can be 
covered by one unit code. Therefore, it is possible that when a unit code has a 
positive regulation status recorded (licensing, certification, accreditation or 
registration); it may not translate to every occupation in the group being covered by 
the regulation. For example, lollipop traffic staff are in the same unit group as 
security guards, but are not licensed. In order not to overestimate the prevalence of 
occupational regulation, it is necessary to have a variable indicating whether there is 
complete or partial coverage. Ideally, the exact number of occupations that are 
regulated in each unit group is recorded, as this would give the most accurate results. 
However, titles used to be recorded without a classification system, so there are too 
many job titles to realistically and accurately assess each one beyond those explicitly 
defined in the unit group definition. Therefore, two variables are generated: 
Complete Coverage: are all the jobs in the SOC unit group covered under the 
regulation status? (1=yes, 0=no) 
Partial Coverage:  are only a portion of the jobs in the SOC unit group covered 
under the regulation status? (1=yes, 0=no) 
This will result in two estimates being created: a lower bound and an upper bound 
estimate. The lower bound estimate is computed by only considering unit groups 
where there is complete coverage; the upper bound estimate also includes unit groups 
where there is only partial coverage.  
The presence of two estimates is the main weakness of the research. It will be 
impossible to accurately compute a single figure that is representative of the presence 
of regulation in the UK because of the way in which occupations are coded. 
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However, this is the most accurate approach that can be taken. Further, as this is the 
first initial investigation into all types of regulation, allowances for measurement 
error are inevitable and unavoidable until questions concerning regulation appear on 
national surveys. 
Control Variables 
Control variables are included in an analysis to prevent the impact an independent 
variable has being over inflated. As this investigation is concerned with impact in the 
labour market, the control variables used will reflect those included in traditional 
labour economic models. In order for reliable comparisons between the US and UK 
the variables used mirror those used by Kleiner throughout his research in the field. 
The control variables are separated into two categories: human capital variables and 
job characteristic variables. All of the variables used are taken directly from the LFS. 
Each variable is defined below: 
Human Capital: 
 Gender: are you male or female? (1 = male, 0 = female) 
 Age: how old are you? (1 = 16-19 years old, 2 = 20-29 years old, 3 = 30-39 years 
old, 4 = 40-49 years old, 5 = 50-59 years old, 6 = 60 years old or over) 
 Disability: do you currently have a disability? (1= registered disability and work 
limited, 2 = registered as disabled, 3 = unregistered disability but work limited, 4 = 
no disability) 
 Skill Level: what is the level of your highest qualification? (matched to the National 
Qualification Framework (NQF), a scale variable from 0-8 not a control variable 
when skill level is the dependent variable investigated) 
Job Characteristics: 
 Union Member: are you currently a member of a trade union? (1 = member, 0 = not 
member) 
 Trade Union Coverage: is your pay and/or working conditions affected by a trade 
union? (1 = covered, 0 = not covered) 
 Temporary Work: is the work you do in any way temporary? (1 = in some way 
temporary, 0 = permanent) 
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 Full Time: do you currently work full time? (1 = yes, 0 = no) 
 Sector: do you currently work in the public sector? (1 = yes, 0 = no) 
 Workplace Size: how many employees are currently working in your workplace? (1 
= less than 25, 2 = 25-499, 3 = 500 or more) 
 Major Occupational Ranking: what is your current and main occupation? (1 = 
managers and senior officials, 2 = professional occupations, 3 = associate 
professionals, 4 = administration and secretarial, 5 = skilled trades and occupations, 
7 = sales and customer services, 8 = process, plant and machine operatives, 9 = 
elementary occupations) 
 Region of Work: in which region is your main workplace located? (1= central 
London, inner London, outer London and South East, 0 = somewhere else) 
 Tenure: how long have you worked for your current employer? (1 = less than 3 
months, 2 = 3 to 6 months, 3 = 6 to 12 months, 4 = 1 to 2 years, 5 = 2 to 5 years, 6 = 
more than 5 years) 
2.2.3 Analysis 
Since the aim of this paper is to determine the impact of regulation on wages and 
skill levels, in order to analyse the impact regulation has, it is necessary to conduct a 
statistical analysis on the data. The statistical analysis used is regression. 
Regression Analysis 
There are two types of least square regressions: ordinary least square and non-linear 
squares. Ordinary least squares (OLS), is appropriate for use on a finite set of 
variables and uses a closed expression in order to compute the associations between 
the dependent and independent variables. The OLS method is used because the LFS 
is a finite dataset and the variables used are scaled. 
The aim of OLS is so that the overall solution or model minimises the sum of the 
squares of the errors made on normally distributed data. Hence the sum of the 
squared residuals is as small as possible, where the residual values are the difference 
between the predicted and observed values. The empirical model produced by OLS 
shows the association of variables and how they are correlated; the results do not 
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determine causality on non-longitudinal data. As a result, further analysis is needed 
to conclude, with statistical significance, the direction of the relationship. 
The assumption of the process is that all variables follow the normal distribution and 
that the independent variables are not correlated with each other. However, the 
central limit theorem states that in large samples this implies that the variables can be 
approximated to the normal distribution. The datasets used are large enough to 
comply with the central limit theorem, and as a result, it is assumed that all variables 
used can be approximated with the normal distribution. 
A significant association is concluded if the beta value calculated (the correlation 
between the variable in question and the dependent variable) has an associated 
significance of less than 0.05, and a very significant association is concluded if this 
value is less than 0.01. The effectiveness of the model is determined by its ability to 
explain the dependent variable. This is shown by the R-squared of the model. The R-
squared shows the portion of the dependent variable explained by the model. The R-
squared adjusted shows this in terms of the standard deviation of the dependent 
variable. The higher the R-squared, the better the model. 
In order not to overstate the impact that regulation has on wages and skills, other 
variables that may also have an impact are controlled for. For example, gender has an 
impact on wages, so this impact must be accounted for in order not to assume the 
impact is as a result of regulation. As a result, the probability of a type 1 error is 
minimised. 
Variables 
A summary of the variables included in each regression is presented in table 2.6. 
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Table 2-6: Summary of Regression Variables 
Variables 
H1: Occupational 
regulation has a positive 
association with wage 
levels in the UK 
H2: Occupational 
regulation has a positive 
association with skill levels 
 
Dependent Wage levels Skill Levels 
Independent Occupational Regulation 
Status 
Occupational Regulation 
Status 
Control Human Capital, 
Job Characteristics, 
Coverage of Regulation 
Human Capital, 
Job Characteristics, 
Coverage of Regulation 
Model 
As a result of including the variables listed above, the model generated from the 
analysis into the impact regulation has on wages will take the following form: 
Ypay = βihXih + βijXij + βirXir + ε 
Where Xih represents human capital variables such as education, age and 
gender, Xij denotes job characteristics such as sector and location Xir is the 
regulation status of the individual and ε is the error. 
The model relating to the impact regulation has on skill levels will take the 
following form: 
Yskill = βihXih + βijXij + βirXir + ε 
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Where Xih represents human capital variables such as education, age and 
gender, Xij denotes job characteristics such as sector and location, Xir is the 
regulation status of the individual and ε is the error. 
2.2.4 Limitations 
The main limitation of this analysis is the unavoidable situation of two estimates 
relating to the prevalence of regulation. As explained in the first paper, two estimates 
occur because of the SOC classification system, and also because regulations are not 
always compulsory for every individual in a regulated occupations. As there is no 
other way of determining an individual’s regulation status other than applying the 
regulation database, there is nothing that can be done to remedy the situation. 
A further limitation relates to the human capital variables included in the analysis. 
The variables, whilst extensively cover many aspects which impact upon wage and 
skill levels, are a finite list. In reality there are many more factors that can impact 
upon wage and skill levels, however the variables used are reflective of traditional 
labour economic models. In addition, the measurement of skills may not capture 
every aspect of a skill. The NQF only approximates vocational and academic 
qualifications; some skills are not so easily quantified. Yet this is the most valid way 
in which to define skill levels in such a large sample.  
Therefore, even though there are limitations to the analysis, the results presented in 
the next section are still deemed valid. 
2.3 Results 
The following section presents the results of the investigation outlined in the 
methodology. First, the sample will be presented with regard to the percentage of 
individuals that are regulated. Second, the regulation status of individuals will be 
disseminated by the human capital variables of the sample. Third, the regulation 
status of individuals will be presented with regard to job characteristics. Lastly, the 
results of the analysis will be presented.  
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2.3.1 Sample 
In the previous paper, the prevalence of regulation at the occupational level was 
evaluated. It is only through the construction of the regulation database in paper one 
that individual estimates can be presented. This is because the regulation database 
was merged with the Labour Force Survey (LFS) to estimate the regulation status of 
individuals. 
Table 2-7: Individual Regulation Status  
Regulation Status Upper Bound (%) Lower Bound (%) 
Licensing 31 14 
Certification 3 3 
Accreditation 19 10 
Registration 6 2 
Unregulated 40 72 
Total 100 100 
Base 152,191 152,191 
*All employees and self-employed from QLFS Jan-Sept 2010 
The results indicate that up to 60% of individuals are regulated. Licensing is shown 
to be the dominant form of regulation with up to 31% of individuals being licensed 
followed by accreditation, registration and certification respectively. As discussed 
previously, the nature of occupation classification means that there will always be 
upper and lower bound estimates with no absolute number being reliably found. The 
estimates relating to the coverage of each regulation are presented below. 
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Table 2-8: Individual Regulation Status by Coverage 
Regulation Status All Jobs (%) 
Some Jobs 
(%) 
N/A (%) Base (No.) 
Licensing 14 17 0 48,206 
Certification 3 1 0 5,107 
Accreditation 10 10 0 28,970 
Registration 2 4 0 8,661 
Unregulated 0 0 0 61,247 
Total 28 32 0 152,191 
Base 42,948 47,996 61,247  
*All employees and self-employed from QLFS Jan-Sept 2010 
The results show that 28% of individuals are in occupations where regulation has 
complete coverage over the SOC unit group. This means that at least 14% of 
individuals are licensed and at least 2% are registered. Of the voluntary regulations, 
at least 3% of individuals have the choice of whether or not to become certified, and 
at least 10% have access to an accreditation scheme.  
2.3.2 Human Capital Characteristics 
By estimating the number of regulated individuals, it is possible to estimate coverage 
by human capital characteristics, such as those used in wage and skills models as 
control variables. 
 175 
 
Gender 
Table 2-9: Individual Regulation Status by Gender (lower bound estimates) 
Regulation Status Male (%) Female (%) Total (%) Base (No.) 
Licensing 52 48 100 21,863 
Certification 87 13 100 4,097 
Accreditation 69 31 100 14,575 
Registration 55 45 100 2,413 
Unregulated 50 50 100 109,243 
All 53 47 100 152,191 
*All employees and self-employed from QLFS Jan-Sept 2010 
Table 2.9 clearly shows that more men than women are in regulated occupations. 
This is true for all the different types of regulations. However, they are split equally 
in unregulated occupations. This may suggest that, relatively speaking, more women 
are unregulated than regulated. Similarly more men may be attracted to regulated 
occupations compared to women. In order to determine if there is a significant 
difference between the regulations with regard to gender composition, an Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) was conducted. The results are significant (F= 720.56, Sig= 
0.001). This indicates that there is a significant difference in the gender composition 
between the regulation categories. In particular, certification and accreditation have a 
significantly higher proportion of men when compared to licensing and accreditation.  
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Age 
Table 2-10: Individual Regulation Status by Age (lower bound estimates) 
Regulation 
Status 
16-19 
(%) 
20-29 
(%) 
30-39 
(%) 
40-49 
(%) 
50-59 
(%) 
60+ 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
Base 
(No.) 
Licensing 0 15 26 29 22 8 100 21,863 
Certification 1 20 25 26 20 8 100 4,097 
Accreditation 2 22 25 25 18 7 100 14,575 
Registration 0 18 29 28 18 7 100 2,413 
Unregulated 5 21 20 26 19 9 100 109,243 
All 4 20 22 26 20 8 100 152,191 
*All employees and self-employed from QLFS Jan-Sept 2010 
The results show that for all types of regulation the majority of regulated individuals 
are between 20 and 59. There are relatively few regulated individuals under the age 
of 20, which could relate to the skill levels of the regulations being at a level of at 
least compulsory education. However, the age distribution of regulated individuals is 
very similar to that of unregulated, suggesting there is no significant difference in the 
age profile of regulated workers. As a consequence of the age profiles being so 
similar, no ANOVA was conducted. 
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Ethnicity 
Table 2-11: Individual Regulation Status by Ethnic Group (lower bound estimates) 
Regulation 
Status 
White 
(%) 
Mixed 
(%) 
Asian 
or 
Asian 
British 
(%) 
Black 
or 
Black 
British 
(%) 
Chinese 
(%) 
Other 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
Base 
(No.) 
Licensing 88 1 6 3 0 2 100 21,847 
Certification 92 1 3 1 1 1 100 4,094 
Accreditation 93 1 4 2 0 1 100 14,565 
Registration 89 1 7 2 1 1 100 2,413 
Unregulated 91 1 4 2 0 1 100 109,182 
All 91 1 5 2 0 1 100 152,101 
*All employees and self-employed from QLFS Jan-Sept 2010 
In terms of ethnicity, licensing and registration are shown to have more individuals 
from ethnic minorities when compared to the composition of unregulated 
occupations, or indeed, the whole labour market. The voluntary regulations, 
certification and accreditation, are shown to have fewer individuals from ethnic 
minorities. An Analysis of Variance was conducted to observe if these differences 
were significant. The ANOVA results indicate that there is a significant difference 
between the proportions of ethnic minority groups within the regulation categories 
(F= 10.75, Sig= 0.000). Certification and accreditation have the lowest proportions 
of ethnic minority groups in comparison to licensing and registration. 
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Disability 
Table 2-12: Individual Regulation Status by Disability 
Regulation 
Status 
DDA and 
Work-
Limiting 
Disabled 
(%) 
DDA 
Disabled 
Only 
(%) 
Work-
Limiting 
Disabled 
Only (%) 
Not 
Disabled 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
Base 
(No.) 
Licensing 5 6 3 86 100 21,863 
Certification 4 6 2 88 100 4,097 
Accreditation 4 6 3 87 100 14,575 
Registration 3 7 2 88 100 2,413 
Unregulated 6 6 3 85 100 109,243 
All 6 6 3 85 100 152,191 
*All employees and self-employed from QLFS Jan-Sept 2010 
The results show that the proportion of disabled individuals is similar in regulated 
occupations to that of unregulated occupations. However there are differences 
between the types of regulation. Registration and certification are shown to have 
fewer individuals who are disabled. Due to these differences an ANOVA was 
conducted. The results were not statistically significant (F-1.1726, Sig=0.999). 
Therefore, there is no proven difference in the proportion of disabled workers 
between the different types of regulation, or in fact the labour market as a whole. 
The results show that occupational regulation does have an impact on the 
composition of the workforce in occupations notable for ethnic minorities and 
women. The impact is particularly prevalent where accreditation or certification is 
present. However, there is no significant effect shown for the presence of disabled 
workers. 
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2.3.3 Job Characteristics 
Not only can estimates be made concerning the human characteristics of regulated 
individuals, but estimates can also be made about the characteristics of jobs held by 
regulated individuals. 
Occupation 
Table 2-13: Individual Regulation Status by SOC Major Group (lower bound 
estimates) 
 
Licensing 
(%) 
Certification 
(%) 
Accreditation 
(%) 
Registration 
(%) 
Unregulated 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
Base (No.) 
Managers 
and senior 
officials 
6 0 12 3 78 100 23,241 
Professionals 40 13 22 0 24 100 21,102 
Assoc Prof 
and 
Technical 
26 4 10 5 55 100 22,485 
Admin and 
Secretarial 
0 0 3 4 94 100 17,147 
Skilled 
Trades 
2 0 21 0 77 100 15,771 
Personal 
service 
0 0 2 0 98 100 13,831 
Sales and 
customer 
service 
0 0 0 0 100 100 11,027 
Process, 
plant and 
machine 
51 6 1 0 42 100 10,054 
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Licensing 
(%) 
Certification 
(%) 
Accreditation 
(%) 
Registration 
(%) 
Unregulated 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
Base (No.) 
operatives 
Elementary 0 0 7 0 93 100 17,533 
All 14 3 10 2 72 100 152,191 
*All employees and self-employed from QLFS Jan-Sept 2010 
The results indicate that the distribution of regulated individuals is not equal across 
all of the SOC major groups. The group with the highest percentage of workers, 
definitely covered by regulation, is the professionals, with 76%. The second most 
regulated group is process, plant and machine operatives, with at least 58% covered 
by regulation. Sales and customer service have no individuals who are definitely 
covered by regulation. In terms of the prevalence of each type of regulation, 
accreditation is the only type of regulation to be present in the most SOC major 
groups (8 out of 9), and registration is found to be in the fewest groups (3 out of 9). 
There appears to be no specific trends, such as licensing being found only in the 
upper groups. However, one notable finding is the lack of any regulation other than 
accreditation in the elementary major group.   
Employment Status 
Table 2-14: Individual Regulation Status by Employment Status (lower bound 
estimates) 
 
Licensing 
(%) 
Certification 
(%) 
Accreditation 
(%) 
Registration 
(%) 
Unregulated 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
Base 
(No.) 
Employee 14 3 9 2 73 100 129,530 
Self-
employed 
14 3 15 2 67 100 22,643 
All 14 3 10 2 72 100 152,173 
*All employees and self-employed from QLFS Jan-Sept 2010 
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With regard to employment status; licensing, certification and registration are all 
found to be just as prevalent for self-employed individuals as those employed. 
Accreditation is the only type of regulation that varies between the two groups of 
people. There are notably more self-employed individuals in occupations where 
accreditation has complete coverage than employed individuals.  
Location 
Table 2-15: Individual Regulation Status by Region of Workplace 
 
Licensing 
(%) 
Certification 
(%) 
Accreditation 
(%) 
Registration 
(%) 
Unregulated 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
Base 
(No.) 
North 
East 
14 3 8 1 74 100 6,490 
North 
West 
15 3 9 1 72 100 17,535 
Yorks 
and the 
Humber 
14 3 9 1 73 100 13,625 
East 
Midlands 
15 3 8 1 73 100 11,066 
West 
Midlands 
14 3 9 1 74 100 12,963 
East of 
England 
14 3 10 1 71 100 13,608 
London 14 2 12 4 67 100 17,255 
South 
East 
13 3 10 2 73 100 19,952 
South 
West 
13 3 9 1 73 100 13,559 
Wales 15 2 9 1 72 100 6,624 
Scotland 15 3 9 1 72 100 13,255 
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Licensing 
(%) 
Certification 
(%) 
Accreditation 
(%) 
Registration 
(%) 
Unregulated 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
Base 
(No.) 
Northern 
Ireland 
17 2 10 1 70 100 5,593 
All 14 3 10 2 75 100 151,525 
*All employees and self-employed from QLFS Jan-Sept 2010 
The prevalence of regulation by geographical location of the workplace indicates that 
there are no distinct differences between the geographical locations presented. The 
only exception relates to registration. There are more registered individuals in 
London relative to other areas. One possible explanation is that London is the 
financial centre of the UK. The majority of registration relates to the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) requirement for individuals working in the sector to join 
the register. Therefore, more people are registered in London because more people 
work in the financial sector in London than in other areas.  
Industry 
Table 2-16: Individual Regulation Status by Industry (SIC) (lower bound estimates) 
 
Licensing 
(%) 
Certification 
(%) 
Accreditation 
(%) 
Registration 
(%) 
Unregulated 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
Base (No.) 
A. Agriculture, 
forestry and 
fishing 
3 0 0 0 96 100 2,012 
B. Mining and 
quarrying 
4 19 14 0 64 100 553 
C. 
Manufacturing 
4 10 7 1 78 100 14,903 
D. Electricity, 
gas 
3 16 11 1 70 100 896 
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Licensing 
(%) 
Certification 
(%) 
Accreditation 
(%) 
Registration 
(%) 
Unregulated 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
Base (No.) 
E. Water 
supply, 
sewerage, waste 
15 6 6 0 72 100 999 
F. Construction 2 5 31 0 62 100 11,214 
G. Wholesale, 
retail, repair of 
vehicles 
6 0 3 0 89 100 20,645 
H. Transport 
and storage 
40 1 6 1 52 100 7,470 
I. 
Accommodation 
and food 
services 
13 0 15 0 71 100 7,459 
J. Information 
and 
communication 
1 1 23 0 74 100 4,889 
K. Financial and 
insurance 
activities 
1 0 14 25 60 100 5,667 
L. Real estate 
activities 
1 0 5 1 94 100 1,467 
M. Prof, 
scientific, 
technical active. 
9 10 21 2 58 100 9,526 
N. Admin and 
support services 
5 1 11 1 83 100 6,950 
O. Public admin 
and defence 
24 2 8 1 65 100 10,220 
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Licensing 
(%) 
Certification 
(%) 
Accreditation 
(%) 
Registration 
(%) 
Unregulated 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
Base (No.) 
P. Education 31 1 4 0 64 100 17,223 
Q. Health and 
social work 
29 0 3 2 66 100 20,870 
R. Arts, 
entertainment 
and recreation 
1 4 9 0 85 100 4,132 
S. Other service 
activities 
3 1 7 0 89 100 3,957 
All 14 3 10 2 72 100 151,052 
*All employees and self-employed from QLFS Jan-Sept 2010 
The notion that registered individuals are more likely in the financial sector is 
enforced by the results presented in table 2.16 above. The results show that 
registration is most prevalent in the financial and insurance sector. Accreditation has 
the most coverage in the information and communication sector. Certification has the 
most coverage in the mining and quarrying sector and licensing has the most 
coverage in the transport and storage sector. In terms of proportion, regulation has 
the greatest coverage in the transport and storage sector with at least 48% of 
individuals working in the sector being covered by regulation.  
The distribution of regulated occupations across different job characteristics 
indicates that overall regulation mirrors unregulated occupations. There are some 
exceptions however; there are proportionally more registered individuals in the 
financial sector than one would expect, but this is accounted for by the registration of 
many financial occupations since 2000. This may also account for why there is more 
registration in London than expected. There are proportionally more self-employed 
individuals covered by accreditation schemes than one may expect. However, there 
are very few notable differences between each type of regulation, and indeed 
regulated and unregulated occupations. 
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2.3.4 Results of the Analysis 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the impact that regulation has on wages and 
skill levels. In order to meet this aim, a regression analysis was conducted. The 
results for wages and skill levels are presented below. 
Wages 
By merging the regulation status and coverage of regulations of each SOC unit group 
with the labour force survey, an investigation into the wage levels of individuals 
could be undertaken. As discussed, the upper and lower bound estimates prevent an 
absolute mean wage for each regulation being found. However, this is unavoidable. 
The results are presented below. 
Table 2-17: Mean Gross Hourly Wage by Regulation Status 
 
Mgrs & 
Snr 
Officials 
Profs 
Assoc 
Prof 
& 
Tech 
Admin 
& 
Secret 
Skilled 
Trades 
Pers 
Servs 
Sales 
& Cust 
Service 
Proc, 
Plant 
& 
Mach 
Elemen 
 
All 
Lic. full 
cov. 
14.54 18.86 16.17  7.62   9.67  15.45 
Lic. partial 
cov. 
13.25  15.08  9.77 8.57 6.91 7.97 6.88 8.74 
Cert. full 
cov. 
 17.78 13.38     10.83  15.72 
Cert. partial 
cov. 
  12.35   6.79    8.42 
Acc. full 
cov. 
18.71 19.20 14.85 11.17 10.73 8.85  8.08 6.33 15.60 
Acc. partial 
cov. 
20.09 19.38 14.28 11.51 10.52 10.38  11.46 8.63 14.40 
Reg. full 21.24  20.45 11.18      18.34 
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Mgrs & 
Snr 
Officials 
Profs 
Assoc 
Prof 
& 
Tech 
Admin 
& 
Secret 
Skilled 
Trades 
Pers 
Servs 
Sales 
& Cust 
Service 
Proc, 
Plant 
& 
Mach 
Elemen 
 
All 
cov. 
Reg. partial 
cov. 
22.61  13.47 10.67  7.21 8.62  6.30 16.88 
Unregulated 18.26 17.24 13.76 10.49 11.81 9.13 8.14 10.09 7.72 11.84 
All 18.14 18.57 14.96 10.70 10.70 8.58 7.42 9.79 7.49 12.55 
Base 5,074 4,449 4,869 4,314 2,367 2,970 2,767 2,160 4,012 32,982 
*All employees and self-employed from QLFS Jan-Sept 2010 
Overall, the mean gross hourly wage of the sample is £12.55. Individuals working in 
unit groups where there is no regulation present have a mean gross hourly wage of 
£11.84. Fir the total workforce, whenever regulation has full coverage over a unit 
group, the mean gross hourly wage is shown to be higher than those in unregulated 
groups. Where regulation has partial coverage, the mean gross hourly wage remains 
higher for accreditation and registration but the mean gross hourly wage is less for 
licensing and certification when compared to the average wage of individuals 
working in occupations where no regulation is present at all. 
The results presented in table 2.17 appear to indicate sizable differences in the mean 
gross hourly wages between the different types of regulations and between regulated 
and unregulated individuals. For managers and senior officials, where licensing is 
present (either with full coverage of an occupational group or partial coverage) the 
mean gross hourly wage is less than the unregulated counterparts. Where 
accreditation and registration are present (either with full coverage or partial 
coverage) the average gross hourly wage is seen to be greater than unregulated 
individuals. For professional occupations, any presence of regulation (either with full 
or partial coverage) has a greater gross hourly rate than where no regulation is 
present. In the associate professional and technical group, all licensing and 
accreditation (regardless of the extent of coverage) is shown to have higher average 
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gross hourly wages than where no regulation is present. Where certification and 
registration have full coverage over a group, the average gross wage is higher than 
where there is no regulation. Where certification and registration have partial 
coverage over a group, the average wage is less than that found within unregulated 
units. In the administrative and secretarial major group, the average gross hourly 
wages are greater where any regulation is present, regardless of the extent of 
coverage, compared to where there is no regulation at all. Conversely, in the skilled 
trades’ major group, where regulation is present (either covering a whole group or 
part of a group) the average wage is less than where there is no regulation. The same 
is true for personal services, apart from where accreditation has partial coverage of a 
unit group where average gross wages are greater than where no regulation is 
present. In the sales and customer services’ major group where licensing has a partial 
coverage over unit groups, the mean gross hourly wage is less than that of where no 
regulation is present. Where registration has partial coverage, the average gross 
hourly wage is greater than where no regulation is present. Within the process, the 
plant and machine major group, where certification has full coverage and where 
accreditation has partial coverage, the mean gross hourly wage is greater than where 
no regulation is present. However, for all other incidences of regulation (either full 
coverage or partial coverage) the mean gross hourly wage is less than where there is 
no regulation. Where accreditation has partial coverage in the elementary major 
group, the mean gross hourly wage is greater than where there is no regulation; 
however in all other incidences of regulation the mean wage is lower. 
Although the results appear to suggest an overall positive impact on wages from 
regulation, it is necessary to conduct a regression in order to control for other 
variables which may have an effect on wages. This prevents the impact of regulation 
being exaggerated. 
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Table 2-18: Regression results of wage effects 
Regulation Status Coverage 
β            
 (without controls) 
β                               
(with controls) 
Licensing All 27.000** 0.269** 
Some 34.040** -0.272** 
Certification All 17.370** 0.320** 
Some 7.430** -0.345** 
Accreditation All 16.760** 0.438** 
Some 7.900** 0.261** 
Registration All 21.890** 0.273** 
Some 17.130** 0.202** 
Base: All individuals who are employees or self-employed, 31,914 respondents 
Source: QLFS Jan-Sept 2010 
** Significant at the 0.001 level, * significant at the 0.05 level 
From table 2.18 it can be observed that all of the beta values are significant both 
without controls and with controls. Therefore, the first conclusion to draw is that 
regulation does have a significant impact on wages. Secondly, where regulation 
covers all of the SOC groups, the association is significantly positive both with and 
without controls. Thirdly, when controls are added, the magnitude of the beta values 
dramatically decrease, and in some cases changes sign.  The only negative 
associations occur in licensing and certification, where the regulation only covers 
part of the SOC code.  The overarching conclusion is, however, that in most 
situations occupational regulation will have a significantly positive association with 
an individual’s gross hourly wage, even when human and job characteristics are 
controlled for. 
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To further investigate the association of regulation with pay, the same analysis was 
conducted on each of the major SOC groups individually. The results are presented 
in table 2.19. The results show that there are varying associations between the 
independent and dependent variables across the occupation spectrum. How the 
associations vary is described below by discussing each type of regulation in turn. 
  
1
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Table 2-19: Wage Impact by SOC Major Group 
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Licensing 
Occupational licensing has a significant negative association on wages for managers 
and senior officials, skilled trades, sales and customer services, and process, plant 
and machine operatives. It has a significant positive association with professionals, 
associate professionals and technicians. All of the associations have the same 
significance and direction whether the regulation covers some or all of the SOC 
groups. 
Certification 
Certification has a significant positive association with wages for professionals with 
and without controls. For associate professionals and technicians, and process, plant 
and machine operatives, it only has a significant positive association without 
controls. The results are the same for when the regulation covers all of the SOC 
groups and when it only covers part of the group. 
Accreditation 
Accreditation has a significant positive association with wages across all of the SOC 
major groups before the controls are added. Once the control variables have been 
taken into account, accreditation has a significant positive association with the 
professionals in the cases where regulation covers the whole group, and where it 
covers part of the group. A significant positive association is also found when 
accreditation is found covering part of the group in managers and senior officials, 
administration and secretaries and elementary occupations. A significant negative 
association is found in skilled occupations where the regulation covers all or part of 
the group. A significant negative association is also found where accreditation covers 
the entire group in elementary occupations. 
Registration 
Registration has a significant positive association with wages across all of the 
testable major SOC groups before the controls are added, regardless of whether the 
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regulation covers some or all of the SOC groups. Once the controls are added, 
registration still has a significant positive association with managers and senior 
officials, for both full and partial coverage. Within the associate professionals and 
technicians, and administrators and secretaries groups there is a significant positive 
association only where there is full coverage of the regulation. For personal services 
and elementary occupations there is a significant negative association where 
registration has partial coverage. 
Summary: Wages 
In the results above, we can see that there are differing levels of associations across 
the major SOC groups. However, what is certain is the significant impact regulation 
has on the wage distribution; an impact which, in the majority of cases, is positive. 
Skill Levels 
As with wage levels, by applying the regulation and coverage variables to the Labour 
Force Survey (LFS) it is possible to collate information as to the average skill levels 
(in terms of highest qualification level in accordance with the National Qualification 
Framework) by regulation status.  
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Table 2-20: Mean NQF Level by Regulation Status 
 
Mgrs & 
Snr 
Officials 
Profs 
Assoc 
Prof & 
Tech 
Admin 
& 
Secret 
Skilled 
Trades 
Pers 
Servs 
Sales & 
Cust 
Service 
Proc, 
Plant 
& 
Mach 
Elemen 
 
All 
Lic. full 
cov. 
4.9 6.9 6.2  3.9   3.8  5.8 
Lic. partial 
cov. 
5.0  5.8  4.6 5.1 4.4 3.7 3.8 4.7 
Cert. full 
cov. 
 6.2 5.8     4.0  5.8 
Cert. 
partial cov. 
  5.6   4.9    5.0 
Acc. full 
cov. 
5.7 6.4 6.0 4.7 4.6 5.0  3.9 4.8 5.6 
Acc. partial 
cov. 
5.8 6.4 5.8 5.0 4.6 4.3  4.2 3.7 5.2 
Reg. full 
cov. 
5.4  5.9 4.8      5.5 
Reg. partial 
cov. 
5.8  5.4 4.8  5.3 4.2  4.0 5.4 
Unregulate
d 
5.7 6.6 5.8 4.8 4.9 4.5 4.7 4.0 3.8 5.0 
All 5.6 6.6 5.9 4.9 4.6 5.0 4.5 3.9 3.8 5.2 
Base 22,65
4 
20,21
6 
21,13
1 
16,39
1 
15,42
6 
13,05
7 
10,18
7 
9,83
6 
15,90
2 
144,80
0 
*All employees and self-employed from QLFS Jan-Sept 2010 
The results presented in table 2.20 show that skill levels vary between the SOC 
major groups and between different regulation statuses. In the managers and senior 
officials’ major group, the average skill levels of individuals partially covered by 
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accreditation or registration are shown to be higher than the average skill levels 
where no regulation is present. However, all other forms of coverage and regulation 
have the same average skill levels or less than where no regulation is present. Within 
the professional major group where licensing has full coverage of a unit group, the 
average skill levels of covered individuals is higher compared to where there is no 
regulation. All other forms of regulation in the professional group are shown to have, 
on average, lower skill levels regardless of the extent of coverage of a regulation. 
Where licensing, accreditation or registration has full coverage of a unit group in the 
associate professionals and technician major group, the mean skill levels are higher 
than those where no regulation is present. All other regulation statuses and coverage 
within the major groups have the same or lower average skill levels compared to 
unregulated groups. In the administrative and secretarial major group, the only 
regulation to have a mean skill level exceeding that where no regulation is present is 
accreditation where there is partial coverage. In all other circumstances, individuals 
working in occupations where regulation is present do not have a mean skill level 
that exceeds individuals working in completely unregulated occupations. In all 
situations where regulation is present in an individual’s occupational unit group, the 
average skill levels are less than those of their unregulated counterparts in the skilled 
trades’ major group. The same is true of the sales and customer services’ major 
group. 
In the personal services’ major group, where licensing or registration has partial 
coverage of a unit group, individuals have an average skill level greater than 
individuals where no regulation is present. This is also the case where accreditation 
has full coverage. In all other cases, the average skill levels do not exceed those 
where no regulation is present. In the process, the plant and machine major group is 
the only incidence where regulation is shown to have an associated mean skill level 
higher than that of unregulated occupations, but only where accreditation has partial 
coverage. The reverse is true within the elementary occupations’ major group where 
accreditation of only partial coverage has a mean skill level less than that of 
unregulated workers. In all other situations, where regulation is present, a higher 
mean skill level is found. 
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There are differences between the SOC major groups. However, overall each type of 
regulation has a mean skill level greater than where no regulation is present, apart 
from where licensing or certification has partial coverage. Interestingly, it is where 
licensing or certification has full coverage over unit groups that average skill levels 
are found to be at their highest. 
Yet the descriptive statistics are not enough to form conclusions as to the association 
between regulation and skill levels. In order to determine whether a statistically 
significant association does exist, a regression analysis was carried out.  
Table 2-21: Regression results of the association between qualification levels and 
regulation  
Regulation Status Coverage 
β                     
(without controls) 
β                     
 (with controls) 
Licensing All 38.18** 0.582** 
Some 15.97** -0.167** 
Certification All 20.03** 0.554** 
Some 0.66** -0.022 
Accreditation All 25.55** 0.385** 
Some 9.19** 0.134** 
Registration All 10.38** 0.337** 
Some 7.99** 0.256** 
Base: All individuals who are employees or self-employed, 144,735 respondents 
Source: QLFS Jan-Sept 2010 
** Significant at the 0.001 level, * significant at the 0.05 level 
Table 2.21 contains the results from the regression analysis on the association 
between regulation status and qualification levels. In all cases, apart from when 
certification covers part of the occupational group after controls are added, the 
association is significant, which implies that in nearly all circumstances, 
occupational regulation has an important association with an individual’s highest 
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qualification level. Further, before controls are included, this association is 
significantly positive for all circumstances. After controls are added, the beta values 
decrease. However, in all but one of the circumstances, the significant associations 
remain positive. The exception is when licensing only partially covers an occupation 
group, here there is a significantly negative association when controls are added. 
Where a regulation covers the entire occupational group, the extent of the association 
reflects the regulation continuum. Licensing has the largest beta value, followed by 
certification and lastly accreditation.  
Table 2.22 separates the results into the SOC major codes and shows that the effects 
change across the different groups. Each regulation status is discussed in turn. 
Licensing 
Licensing has a significant association with skill levels across all of the SOC major 
groups both with and without control variables and regardless of whether there is full 
group coverage. Although all the associations are positive when no controls are 
added, and after controls are included, a significant negative association is found 
within the managers and senior officials, skilled trades, sales and customer services 
and, process, plant and machine operatives groups, - both where there is full 
coverage and partial coverage. The professional major group, personal services’ 
major group and elementary occupations’ major group still have a positive 
significant association after controls are accounted for. Within the associate 
professionals and technicians’ major group, only where there is full coverage is there 
a significant positive association after control variables are added. Where there is 
partial coverage, this association becomes negative after the inclusion of control 
variables. 
Certification 
Certification has a significantly positive association with skill levels in all of the 
SOC major codes where certification is present, before human and job characteristics 
are controlled for. After control variables are added there is only a significant 
association shown within the professionals and personal services major SOC groups. 
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Within the professionals’ major group this association becomes negative after the 
control variables are added. Conversely, in the personal services group the 
association remains positive. 
  
1
9
8
 
Table 2-22: Impact on Skills by SOC Major Group 
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Accreditation 
Where accreditation schemes are present in SOC major groups they have a 
significant positive association with skill levels before control variables are included 
in the analysis, regardless of whether the regulation has complete or partial coverage. 
After human and job characteristics are added, the association between accreditation 
and skill levels varies across the SOC major groups. Within the managers and senior 
officials’ group, accreditation is significantly positively associated with skills only 
where the regulation has partial coverage. In the professionals’ major group once 
controls are added, the association between accreditation and skills becomes 
significantly negative where there is complete or partial coverage. The same is true 
in the skilled trades’ major SOC group. In the associate professionals and 
technicians’ group once the control variables are present; there is a less significant 
negative association, but only where the regulation has partial coverage. The 
administrators and secretaries’ major group shows that there is still a significant 
positive association with skill levels but, again, only when the regulation has partial 
coverage, the same is true for the process, plant and machine operatives’ group. 
Personal services show that once controls are added, there is a significantly negative 
association with skill levels but only where there is complete coverage of the SOC 
unit group. The elementary occupations’ group also shows that there is only a 
significant result where a regulation has complete coverage, but this association is 
positive. 
Registration 
Where registration is present, either covering all or some of a group, there is a 
significant positive association with skill levels before human or job characteristics 
are controlled for.  Once human and job characteristics are controlled for, a 
significantly positive association is still present in the managers and senior officials’ 
major group and the personal services’ major group, but only where the regulation 
has partial coverage. There is still a significant positive association in the associate 
professionals and technicians’ major group where the regulation has complete 
coverage. Within the managers and senior officials’ group where there is complete 
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coverage, the association becomes significantly negative. Similarly, the association 
within the sales and customer services group becomes significantly negative, but 
only where the regulation has partial coverage. In all other circumstances, the 
association between registration and skill levels becomes insignificant when control 
variables are added. 
Summary: Skill Levels 
Occupational regulation is significantly positively associated with skill levels, either 
where there is complete or partial coverage, before human and job characteristics are 
controlled for. After control variables are added, where a regulation has complete 
coverage, there is still a significantly positive association for all of the regulation 
types. The results for regulations with partial coverage vary, as does the impact 
across different SOC major codes. In conclusion there is partial support for the 
hypothesis that occupational regulations have a positive association with skill levels, 
but that one must be careful when drawing a universal rule as there is too much 
variation. 
2.3.5 Summary of Results 
The results of the analysis indicate that there is support for the following hypotheses: 
H1: Occupational regulation has a positive effect on wages in the UK 
H2: Occupational regulation has a positive association with skill levels 
The following section will discuss the results in more detail. 
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2.4 Discussion 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the impact of occupational regulation on 
wages and skill levels. By merging the regulation database (created in paper one) and 
the Labour Force Survey (LFS) it was possible to conduct a statistical analysis 
including all of the necessary variables. The merged dataset indicated that at least 
28% of individuals work in occupations covered by regulation. At least 14% of 
individuals work in occupations that are licensed and at least 2% work in 
occupations that are registered, as such, at least 16% of the working population must 
be regulated in order to legally work. Of the voluntary regulation schemes, at least 
3% of individuals are covered by certification. This means at least 3% of the working 
population needs to become regulated to carry out every aspect and task associated 
with their occupation. At least 10% of individuals are covered by accreditation 
schemes, though these schemes are completely voluntary and do not protect any 
functions. This suggests that regulation covers a substantial proportion of individuals 
in the labour market and cements the findings in paper one, which suggests that the 
prevalence of occupational regulation warrants greater research to be conducted on 
the impact regulation has. 
This section will discuss some of the key findings of the results presented in the 
previous section. First, the impact on wages will be discussed. Second, the impact on 
skill levels will be considered. Lastly, the impact regulation has on the composition 
of the occupations it covers is discussed. 
2.4.1 Wages 
The results show that there is a significantly positive association between all the 
different types of regulations and wages where there is complete coverage of the 
SOC unit group. This association also stands once control variables are added. After 
the controls are included, the magnitude of the positive wage differentials range from 
.269 (licensing) to .438 (accreditation). Ekeland et al. (2002) argue that such wage 
premiums exist because regulation restricts supply and any restriction on supply will 
result in a rise in wages. However, Stigler (1971) argues that it is as a result of 
 202 
 
increasing the supply in secondary markets, rather than as an absolute effect of 
restricting supply. Further, Spence (1973) and Frank (1988) argue that regulation 
impacts demand positively and when there is an increase in demand there will 
always be an increase in wages. In order to conclude which theory is correct, further 
investigation is needed, but what can be concluded is that regulation has a significant 
positive effect on wages overall. This supports studies by Muzado and Pazdeka 
(1980), Perloff (1980), Moore et al. (1981), Kleiner and Kudrle (1992), and 
Humphris et al.(2010). 
The impact regulation has on wages varies in size and direction with the extent of 
coverage. 
Coverage 
The UK classification system clusters occupations together so it is often the case that 
only a portion of the clustered occupations are regulated. As a result many 
regulations are defined as having partial coverage, whilst others are defined as 
having full coverage if regulation covers every occupation in the group. The strong 
positive wage differential exists where regulations cover all of a SOC unit group. 
This is not always the case where regulations only have partial coverage. Where 
licensing and certification only have partial coverage in a unit group, there is a 
significantly negative wage differential. This is the first investigation into regulation 
that has dealt with the issue of varying coverage. Studies based in the US, where the 
majority of research into regulation has taken place, do not have to account for 
coverage because the datasets contain different variables (for more detail see page 
57). Therefore, there currently exists no theoretical argument as to why this variation 
in wage premium should occur with changes in coverage. However, some possible 
theories now follow. 
First, as a result of the occupational coding in the UK, sometimes very different 
occupations are grouped together. It may be the case that the regulation does have a 
positive wage effect in the occupations it covers, but that the average wage for the 
SOC group is reduced by unregulated occupations. Therefore, there is the possibility 
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that the wage differential is falsely and negatively altered because of the weighting of 
unregulated occupations in a given unit group.  
Second, not all types of regulation have negative associations wages when there is 
partial coverage. Only licensing and certification have negative associations where 
there is partial coverage. One other explanation centres on the nature of the 
regulations in question; both licensing and certification legally restrict tasks 
associated with some occupations by testing competency levels. These tasks may not 
be unique to an occupation, for example a plumber may need to be on the gas safety 
register but an electrician may also need to be. For a consumer, it may be the case 
that where there is a choice between a regulated individual and an unregulated 
individual, they actively choose the latter as they believe them to be cheaper. As a 
result, demand for regulated individuals may decrease for all activities not covered 
by the regulation. This is enforced by Gresham’s law that states when consumers are 
faced with a decision it will be based on price because they are not usually in a 
position to judge quality of work. This is because there is an asymmetry of 
knowledge between practitioners and consumers. When decisions are made on price, 
the result is a flooding of the market with ‘lemons’; cheap inferior practitioners 
(Akerlof 1971). In this circumstance, cheap practitioners would be unregulated. If the 
drop in demand of regulated practitioners is great enough, it is possible that price, 
and therefore wages, could be reduced. This argument would support the study by 
Benham and Benham (1975) who find that regulation has a negative effect in the 
optometry sector, which results in lower wages. This argument is counter to that 
presented by Spence (1973) and Frank (1988) who both argue demand should 
increase.  
The variation of wage premiums with regard to the coverage of regulation should be 
viewed with caution. Whilst every effort is made to code regulation accurately, until 
the coding can take place at the individual level and not the occupational unit group, 
any results drawn from analysis including partially covered groups will never be 
conclusive. This has two implications; first, when drawing conclusions on the impact 
that regulations have on wages, the emphasis should be on investigating occupations 
with full coverage of regulations. Second, far more resources need to be spent to 
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obtain precise estimates on the impact of regulation, which affects at least 28% of the 
working population. 
Major Occupational Groups 
Further investigation into the impact of regulation on wages shows that the 
associations vary across many of the SOC major groups. This suggests that far from 
being a static institutional characteristic, regulations are different across the labour 
market.  Kleiner (2000) also finds that although regulation has an overall positive 
impact on wages, when the results are separated into different groups of occupations, 
the magnitude of the effects vary hugely. Kleiner’s research is US based, but similar 
results are found in the UK where trade union wage effects are investigated. 
Blanchflower and Bryson (2010) find that union wage premiums also differ across 
occupations. There may be several explanations for the occurrence of regulation 
resulting in a negative wage differential and the variation in the magnitude of 
premiums across different occupations. 
First, as shown in the previous paper, regulations often require qualifications that are 
markedly under what the SOC skill level suggests. As a result, entrance into a 
regulated occupation may not be restricted enough to result in wage premiums. 
Further, it might be the case that individuals obtain the regulations, which they can 
do relatively easily, and enter occupations that they could not otherwise because the 
qualification requirements were too high. For example, in the security sector 
individuals are often employed on the basis that they have obtained a licence and not 
on work experience or references. This has led to an influx of individuals gaining 
employment that would have otherwise been disregarded by employers (Fernie 
2012). If there is an oversupply of regulated individuals, employers can pay them 
less. 
Second, as is the case where regulations have partial coverage, faced with the choice 
between a regulated individual and an unregulated individual, a consumer is likely to 
choose the unregulated person unless they need a legally restricted service. This 
could result from a distorted perception as to the price of regulated workers. For 
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example, if a plumber is needed to change a tap, a consumer may seek a plumber 
who does not have certificates and accreditations because they think that this 
plumber will be much cheaper and the service they require does not need a certified 
individual. As with most occupations, simple tasks often comprise the bulk of the 
work and as such, if demand for unregulated workers increases as a result of this 
perception, then wages will increase for unregulated workers. If the demand is so 
great, they could eclipse the regulation wage premium. 
Third, the value consumers attribute to regulation may not be the same across all 
jobs. For instance, managers and senior officials may be licensed but licensing in this 
group is shown to have a significantly negative association with wages. This might 
be because consumers do not have personal interaction with these individuals and 
therefore, they do not value the safeguard of regulation. As such they are indifferent 
between regulated and unregulated individuals and are likely to choose whichever 
they perceive as being better value for money. Consumers’ choices may also be 
dictated by how well they believe they are placed to assess the work conducted. An 
example could be skilled trades where a significant negative association is also 
found. If an individual believes they can assess the quality of work conducted by a 
carpenter, then they are unlikely to pay a premium for a regulated worker because 
the insurance of the regulation to control quality is unneeded. Therefore, one reason 
for the different impacts on wages across the SOC major groups would be consumer 
choice; it is only if the consumer feels there is value to the regulation for themselves 
and they do not feel well placed to judge the work, that they likely to be willing to 
pay more for a regulated worker. As demand drops, so does the price and 
subsequently the wages. 
Fourth, when employers are employing or promoting staff, they may reward 
attainment of a regulation in place of work experience or other qualifications. If work 
experience or other human capital demands a higher return than a regulation then the 
individual is going to receive less than they would have received had the regulation 
not been in place. This would account for why more negative wage differentials are 
present in the upper SOC major groups. Groups where individuals have accumulated 
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a wealth of human capital could find their attributes overshadowed by employers’ 
wishes to identify regulated individuals. 
Despite the ambiguity surrounding partial coverage of regulations and the difference 
in associations across SOC major groups, there are still statistically significant 
associations between all types of regulations and wages. Further, it is possible to 
conclude that where a regulation covers a whole unit group, this significant 
association is positive, thus showing support for the hypothesis and reinforcing the 
related theory. As a first investigation into the impact on wages from regulation, this 
study has provided a significant indication which can inform and lead future 
research. 
2.4.2 Skill Levels 
The aim of the analysis was to discern whether regulations have a positive 
association with skill levels, defined as qualification levels in accordance to the 
National Qualification Framework (NQF). After controls are included in the model, 
regulation is still shown to have an overall positive association with skill levels. This 
supports the findings of other studies into regulation and skill levels by Gospel and 
Thompson (2003), Gospel and Lewis (2010), and Tamkin, Miller and Williams 
(2013), who all find a positive association between regulation and skill levels in the 
occupations they analysed. The wider implications of the findings are that regulation 
could be used to reduce the skill shortages in the UK labour market. Regulation can 
do this because the qualifications demanded by regulations are heavily based on the 
knowledge and skills needed to conduct a certain occupation. Steedman (2003) states 
that the missing component to the UK system is a strong link between qualifications 
and occupational demands. Therefore, as regulation is designed to meet the 
occupational demands, it could fill the gap in the UK system. 
However, as with wages, once the results are separated by the coverage that 
regulation has, and by the SOC major groups, the magnitude of the association 
varies. 
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Coverage 
The results show that there is a significant positive association between skills and all 
types of regulation where the regulation has complete coverage over the SOC unit 
group. Where there is partial coverage of a unit group, a positive association is still 
significant with accreditation and registration, but there is a significantly negative 
association with licensing and no significant association with certification at all. The 
explanation as to why this could occur is similar to why there are differing wage 
premiums with different regulation coverage. The clustering of occupations in 
accordance with the SOC system means that regulated and unregulated occupations 
may be in the same unit group. There is no way to identify which individuals are 
regulated in such a group. If the unregulated individuals have a skill level 
significantly lower than the regulated workers, the mean for the whole group is 
reduced, and as a result can cause a negative association when included in the model. 
Major SOC Groups 
Not only does the association between regulation and skill levels differ with the 
coverage of regulation, but there are also variations in magnitude across the different 
SOC major groups. This may be expected given the differing conclusions of research 
into regulation and skill levels. Gospel and Thompson (2003) and, Gospel and Lewis 
(2010), find a positive association in the care home sector. However, Lister (2001) 
and Fernie (2011), both find a negative association in the security sector. There are 
some possible explanations as to why these variations occur which will now follow. 
First, as shown in the previous paper, different regulations require different levels of 
entry qualifications. Many of the regulations do not require qualifications that are a 
higher level than would be needed to enter into a given unit group. In fact, in many 
cases the level of qualifications required is significantly lower. This would mean that 
regulated workers need lower qualification levels than would be expected by the 
occupations definition. 
Second, employers are less likely to encourage workers to gain additional 
qualifications if they have already met the requirements of a regulation. This is 
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because they would increase their human capital, and as a result would be likely to 
demand higher wages. This will lead to the minimum requirements of a regulation 
becoming the maximum skill level of the occupation. As such, if the minimum 
requirements of a regulation are not set at a high level, the overall skill levels of an 
occupation could reduce as alternative or additional training and skills are reduced. 
Such an argument is made and proven by the research of Lister (2001) and Fernie 
(2010). 
Third, different occupations have different demands. Not all regulations require 
qualifications to ensure that individuals are skilled. Nor do all customers demand 
services to be conducted by highly qualified individuals. In many circumstances 
there are other important factors that will result in a competent practitioner such as 
experience, CRB checks or age. These will not result in higher skills as shown on the 
NQF, but should result in higher competency.  
Overall, regulation is shown to have a positive impact on skill levels (as measured by 
highest NQF level). If the qualification demands of regulations are set high enough 
then there should always be a positive association where a regulation has full 
coverage of a SOC unit group. However, it is important to highlight that not all 
occupations need high qualification levels to improve the quality of the service. 
Other attributes may be more important. Therefore, it is never going to be acceptable 
to use regulation to increase the barriers to entry through setting high entrance 
qualifications because quality workers may be deterred. As such, the aim of 
regulation should not solely be to increase skill levels but to increase the quality of 
the service in question. 
2.4.3 Compositional Effects 
The results show that there are significant differences in the composition of different 
types of regulation, and an overall difference between the compositions of regulated 
occupations compared to unregulated occupations. The significant differences are 
found with gender and ethnicity. No other significant difference is found in the other 
human and job characteristics used in the analysis. 
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Gender 
The results show that fewer women are present in all regulated occupations than 
men. However, where no regulation is present, there are equal proportions of men 
and women. As a result, these differences are shown to be significant. Further, there 
are significant differences between the different regulations. Certification and 
accreditation are proven to have significantly fewer women than licensing and 
registration.  
The results may be surprising given that female education levels have increased a lot 
since the early 20
th
 century with roughly equal numbers of girls and boys leaving 
school with GCSEs and A-levels, and there are now more female graduates that ever 
before. With girls consistently attaining higher marks in course work and achieving 
higher grades in examinations, the academic barriers to entry implemented by 
regulatory bodies seem unlikely to pose disproportionate stress or concern for 
women relative to men. Even in terms of physical capability, it appears there are 
fewer and fewer occupations in which women cannot progress with their career in 
line with their male counterparts.  
However, there are some key factors that may negatively influence a woman’s 
decision to enter a regulated occupation. As in all cases, the cost of regulation may 
prove a great deterrent. It may be more of a deterrent for women when compared to 
men because of characteristics of women’s activity in the labour market. First, 
women on average have a shorter tenure than men meaning the cost of meeting the 
requirements of regulation may not be fully paid off or they may not be able to 
progress to the same level once they have spent time out of work attaining the 
required skills. In addition, women are more likely to spend periods of time out of 
the labour market for family commitments such as children and elderly relatives. 
Spending periods of time out of the labour market may not only cause total income 
over the course of one’s working life to decrease, but also makes promotion less 
likely. In addition, spending time out of the labour market may mean that women are 
not able to keep up with continuous professional development, which is required in 
some regulated occupations such as chartered accountants, lawyers and teachers. 
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Therefore, if women cannot see themselves continually benefitting from choosing a 
regulated occupation over an unregulated occupation, or if they predict that 
continuous development may not always be possible, then they may be deterred from 
choosing to enter the regulated occupation. 
Money is another factor which may heavily influence whether a woman chooses to 
enter a regulated occupation. On average, women earn less than men when all other 
things are equal (Blackaby, Booth and Frank 2005) so it will take women longer than 
men to recoup the money spent on gaining entry into a regulated occupation. As with 
ethnic minorities, women have lower promotion rates than men and so have limited 
access to higher rents and benefits (Blackaby, Booth and Frank 2005). One of the 
benefits of working in a regulated occupation is the potential to earn higher rents (see 
section X). However if the wage differentials are different for men and women then 
regulated occupations could be less appealing for women than men. Men may 
benefit, when considering wages, from working in a regulated occupation more than 
women if the pattern for further education can be extrapolated to professional 
qualifications. Machin (1996) investigate the wage premiums of graduating 
university. They show that the wage differentials in how much more an individual 
earns after attending university, is higher for men than it is for women. Although 
both genders have a positive differential, university may still be perceived as 
benefitting men more and as a result could lead women to seek higher rents by other 
means. Assuming this could also occur with the attainment of professional 
qualifications often required by regulation, women may feel that they do not benefit 
as much as men. Not earning as much as men is a factor as it results in the cost of 
meeting the regulatory requirements taking longer to recoup.  
In addition, there is a high proportion of female dominated occupations covered by 
licensing and registration. Occupations typically associated with women are 
disproportionally covered by licensing and certification compared to typically male 
occupations that are covered by accreditation and certification. All occupations in the 
caring sector (for example care workers, nurses and social workers) are covered by 
licensing and accreditation, and are occupations associated with women workers. 
Historically male dominated occupations, such as those in finance, are covered by 
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accreditation and certification. Therefore it may not be the regulation that deters 
women from entering certified or accredited occupations but the characteristics of 
the occupations and the tasks within them. 
Therefore, occupational regulation may deter women because it may increase the 
wage inequality between the genders and be perceived as unfair; women may not be 
able to fully meet the terms of the regulations by continually developing 
professionally, and finally, the shorter tenure and gaps in the labour market may 
mean the cost of entering a regulated occupation take too long to recoup. 
Ethnicity 
The results show that in occupations where no regulation is present, 91% of 
individuals state their ethnicity as white. Regulated occupations are shown to vary in 
the proportions of individuals from ethnic minorities. Licensing and registration have 
a greater percentage of ethnic minorities than unregulated occupations. However, 
certification and accreditation have fewer. The ANOVA results prove that the 
different types of regulation are significantly different in their ethnic compositions.  
Although individuals from ethnic minorities are often shown to excel in the 
workplace, (the highest earners being Asian men), on average the language skills of 
ethnic minorities are lower (Alpin, Shakleton and Walsh 1998) which may make the 
prospect of having to pass a written test or navigate the bureaucracy involved in 
joining the occupation daunting. Further, as such features may not be necessary to 
show competency in the occupation applied for. one has to question whether tests set 
by regulatory bodies are biased against non-natives. 
Ethnic minorities also have a higher likelihood of less stable employment and shorter 
tenure (Demireva and Kelser 2011) resulting in taking longer to recoup the cost of 
entering a regulated occupation. At worse, the cost may never be recouped. Further, 
if employment is far from guaranteed on meeting the entrance requirements then the 
time, effort and money spent on becoming regulated may seem too great a risk. In 
line with less stable employment and shorter tenure, promotion rates are lower 
among ethnic minorities (Demireva and Kelser 2011) meaning access to higher 
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salaries and benefits may be restricted, which would also prolong the period of time 
needed to recoup any associated costs with entering the occupation. Both the 
unstable employment and low promotion rates are in spite of higher than average 
productivity rates (Dustmann, Fabbri, Preston and Wadsworth 2003). High 
productivity shows that, generally, one would assume individuals from ethnic 
minorities to be more than capable of competently working within a regulated 
occupation. However if they do not gain access to high level management or fear 
they cannot pass the exams it may be more in their interest to work their way up 
informally in unregulated occupations.  
Another way in which ethnic minorities may be deterred from entering into regulated 
occupations is the formality of the application process. As with any application 
process there are many levels of bureaucracy when entering a regulated occupation. 
Many forms need to be submitted and procedures must be adhered to. Traditionally, 
individuals from ethnic minorities are more likely to gain a job or enter an 
occupation informally through family and friends’ connections (Battu, Seaman and 
Zenou 2011), which is in stark contrast to the entrance process into regulated 
occupations. As such, minority groups may be further deterred from regulated 
occupations. Interestingly, the results are the same for individuals who are first and 
second generation immigrants, although second generations to a lesser extent. This 
may indicate that over time such deterrents may dissipate and any compositional 
impacts are dependent on cohort rather than ethnicity. 
Summary of Results 
Overall, regulation is shown to have a positive association with wages. However, 
where licensing and certification have partial coverage over a SOC unit group a 
negative association is found. There are two reasons why this may occur: first, where 
these regulations only have partial coverage there may be an alternative occupations 
that is unregulated and not subject to price controls or wage limits imposed. This is 
very prevalent in the public sector where licensing is most prominent but wages are 
set on a sector pay scale. Second, demand for licensed or certified service providers 
may not be high enough to result in a pay premium. Consumers may perceive 
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licensed and certified workers as too expensive, even if they are not, and actively 
seek unregulated individuals, raising their wages. 
 Similar trends are seen with regard to the impact of regulation on skill levels. 
Overall a positive impact is observed. However, as with wages, where licensing has 
partial coverage a significant negative association is found. This can be explained by 
considering the barriers to entry imposed through licensing. Through interviews with 
the enforcement bodies it became clear that the qualification levels demanded from 
licensing were often set considerably lower than the expected qualification levels 
described in the definition of the SOC unit group. For example, Chartered 
Accountants are covered by a SOC code where the majority of individuals hold a 
degree. However the qualification levels required by the Chartered Institute of 
Accountants are less than degree level.  
As SOC major groups 2 and 8 are the highest in terms of individuals covered by 
regulation, results associated with these two groups are determined to be of great 
significance. The premise is that results from other SOC major codes may distort the 
findings particularly if few individuals within the group are regulated. 
The impact of regulation on wages and skills in SOC major group 2 (professionals) is 
shown to be significantly positive, even after control variables are included in the 
model. This is case for all the types of regulation present within the major group 
(licensing, certification and accreditation).  The same results are observed for skill 
levels before controls are added. After controls are included a negative association is 
found on skill levels from certification and accreditation. This supports the notion 
raised earlier in the thesis that the barriers to entry to regulations are often set lower 
than one would expect from the SOC code descriptor. However, given the existence 
of wage premiums the barriers to entry must still be restricting the supply of workers, 
though this may be the result of barriers other than qualification levels such as time, 
money and bureaucracy.  
Within SOC major group 8 (process, plant and machine operatives) licensing is 
associated with a wage penalty after controls are added (all other regulations have no 
 214 
 
significant impact after controls). This is likely to be the result of consumers not 
valuing licenses within the group because knowledge asymmetry is less extreme and 
alternative unregulated occupations are more likely. Similarly, licensing is negatively 
associated with skill levels in the group. This suggests, as in group 2, that the barriers 
to entry are set too low to have any impact on skills. However, in group 8 the lack of 
wage premium also suggests that other barriers to entry are also not restricting 
supply enough to increases wages. 
Through considering these two prominent SOC major groups one could posit that 
regulation, particularly licensing, has the opposite impact to other labour market 
institutions such as trade unions. Unions are usually associated with wage premiums 
amongst the lower SOC codes (Gosling and Machin 1995, Machin 1997) where as 
licensing is having a significant impact on the upper SOC groups. 
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Paper 3  
Occupational Regulation in the UK: Impact on Quality 
Traditional economic theory would eschew the idea of any intervention in the labour 
market because if left, any market will eventually result in a natural equilibrium as 
resources are exchanged in a free market (Leland 1979). However, Akerlof (1970) 
argues that in certain circumstances, a lack of regulation would result in market 
failure. Market failure occurs when there is gross asymmetry between the knowledge 
of consumers and the knowledge of practitioners. Where consumers are incapable of 
assessing the quality of a service, they will be led predominantly by price (Akerlof 
1970). This would mean that occupations would be flooded with non-professionals 
who could undercut good-quality practitioners and take advantage of consumers’ 
naïvety. Akerlof (1979) likens this to second-hand cars. If second-hand cars are 
cheap enough they will be more desirable than new cars. As such, most people will 
demand them even though many are ‘lemons’ (see page 41 for more information). 
This results in the market being flooded with ‘lemons’ because no one recognises the 
value of a new car. Similarly, Gresham’s law states that in a market where there are 
two coins identical in monetary value but one has a higher value in terms of mineral 
composition, only the ‘cheaper’ coin will be left (Giffen 1891). This is because those 
aware of the worth of the coins in terms of metal will melt down the more ‘valuable’ 
coins and sell the melted metal for more than the original coins’ monetary worth. 
Therefore, bad money will always chase good money out of the market. 
Leland (1979) argues that where there are information asymmetries in a market, any 
equilibrium reached will be suboptimal because there will be an oversupply and 
demand for cheaper, less quality goods. Where this occurs, it becomes socially 
desirable to have a minimum standard of quality implemented (Leland 1979). It is 
desirable because imposing such a standard would prevent low quality services being 
present and limit the loss of good quality practitioners leaving the market because 
they do not want to reduce their prices. 
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This argument appeals to the notion that one of the main reasons to regulate is to 
protect the public (see page 40).  Regulation can protect the public by filtering out 
bad practitioners: it can achieve this through enforcing barriers to entry. However, in 
order for anything to be in the public interest, it must have an overall positive impact 
on the general public. For occupational regulation to be in the public’s interest, the 
implementation of the regulation must aid society in some way. Moore (1961) argues 
that occupational regulation can be said to be implemented in the interest of the 
public if the following is true in relation to the given occupation: ‘lack of 
information’, ‘society knows best’ and ‘social costs exceeding private costs’. 
Therefore, for regulation to be truly in the public interest, it must increase quality 
levels so social costs are reduced. 
Given the clear importance for regulation to increase quality levels before it can 
fulfil its prominent aim of protecting the public, it is the intention of this paper to 
investigate the impact regulation has on quality. As Kleiner and Kudrle (2008) note, 
in order to make a universal conclusion relating to the impact regulation has on 
quality; one would have to investigate every occupation at workplace and national 
level to understand the micro and macro impact of regulation. This is would be a 
colossal task. Instead this paper will assess the impact regulation has had with 
particular reference to one growing occupation: nursery workers. 
The structure of this paper will be as follows - first, the theory and evidence 
surrounding the association between regulation and quality, and quality within the 
childcare sector are presented; second the methodology used to analyse the impact 
regulation has had on the quality of childcare are outlined and third the results of the 
analysis are presented. Lastly, the results are discussed with regard to their 
importance and implications.  
3.1 Theory: Occupational Regulation, Quality and Nursery Workers 
The aim of this section is to present the theory and evidence surrounding the impact 
regulation has on quality. As this paper is concerned with investigating the impact of 
regulation on childcare, this section is split into two subsections: first, the theory 
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concerning regulation is presented and second, the theory surrounding the regulation 
of nursery workers and quality of childcare is described. 
3.1.1 Theory of the Impact Occupational Regulation has on Quality 
In order to begin an investigation into the association between regulation and quality, 
it is necessary to consider what is meant by quality.  According to Larsen (2013), 
when one considers quality the two elements are: quality of input and quality of 
output. 
Quality of input measures the quality of individuals who conduct a service. This 
might be measured in terms of their human capital such as their highest level of 
qualification, or the number of years work experience they have.  
Quality of output measures the quality of work produced by individuals through a 
service. Quality of work could be assessed through customer satisfaction, or the 
reduction is societal costs related to a certain occupation.  
The nature of regulation is to restrict entry only to individuals that meet the entry 
requirements. In this way, regulation can influence the quality of input. However, it 
cannot directly control the quality of output. It can only try to increase the quality of 
output through influencing the input. Therefore, the relationship between regulation 
and quality can be depicted as follows: 
Figure 3-1: Relationship between regulation and quality 
 
In order for regulation to have an impact on the quality of output, both associations 
must be satisfied. 
Occupational 
Regulation 
Increase in 
Quality of 
Input 
Increase in 
Quality of 
Output 
 218 
 
Regulation and Quality of Input 
When an employer is looking to recruit or a consumer is looking for a practitioner, 
they select individuals based on some signal of quality (Spence 1981). There is often 
no way of really knowing how good an individual is at their occupation until after 
they have been employed, so employers and consumers may go to great lengths to 
investigate the quality of a practitioner. Regulation can act as such a signal because it 
indicates that an individual has had to meet some requirements in order to become 
regulated.  
The entry requirements imposed by a regulation are barriers to entry that applicants 
must overcome. Barriers to entry can take many different forms. However, all 
barriers to entry can be broken down into three categories, which are cost, numerical 
limitations and age (Rottenberg 1980).  
Cost covers any requirement that imposes a charge onto the applicant, often even 
when they do not ultimately gain entry. Some costs are easily identifiable. For 
example, the fees for gaining a specific qualification or membership costs but, 
arguably, there is a cost element to all barriers to entry. For instance, even if there are 
no fees associated with gaining a certain qualification or there are no membership 
costs, there is still an opportunity cost (the individual forgoes the opportunity to earn 
money while time is spent applying for entry).  
The second way in which regulation can create a barrier to entry is through creating a 
minimum age requirement. This restricts supply and creates exactly the same effects 
as a cost of entry. There will still be a cost to entry, as there will have to be an 
application process and proof of age.  
Numerical limitation (restricting the number of individuals who can have a licence, 
certificate or accreditation) is the final way in which entry into an occupation can be 
restricted. Here there will also be an application process, and so a cost borne by the 
applicant in terms of time and possibly fees for applying.  
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Regulations implement all barriers to coincide with their main aim. As the majority 
of regulations are stated to be in place to protect the public (see page 40) this 
suggests that the barriers to entry have an association with the quality expected from 
a regulated individual. However, consumers can only use regulation as a predictor of 
quality if there is a positive association between quality of input and quality of 
output. 
Quality of Input leads to Quality of Output 
Whilst regulation may be a signal for consumers, not all signals directly link 
education, qualification and regulation directly to productivity and quality. Spence 
(1981) states that the three types of signalling are pure signalling, pure human capital 
and the rationing model. 
Pure signalling relates to using qualifications to distinguish between two groups of 
people. This could also be applied to regulation. Regulation is used to split the 
population into two parts - regulated individuals and unregulated individuals. In this 
case signalling is not relating qualifications or regulation to productivity but 
indicates the nature of a practitioner. If consumers are using regulation to indicate 
personal attributes, then they are not linking regulation to quality of output, but to the 
quality of the individual. 
Human capital signalling occurs where there is an accepted relationship between 
qualifications (and acceptance into a regulated occupation) and to levels of quality 
and productivity. Where this signalling holds true, the relationship between quality 
of input and quality of output is realised. 
The rationing model is where qualifications and entry into a regulation are used to 
ration highly productive or professional jobs. There is no proven association between 
qualifications and regulation with productivity and quality. Nor is there any 
perception of human qualities being linked to quality. Here qualifications and 
regulation are used purely to restrict entry into occupations so monopolistic power 
and professional image remain intact. 
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As a result, regulation may be a signal, but not indicative of quality. Only human 
capital signalling has a direct link with predicting increased productivity and quality. 
If regulation is a pure signal, its only use is to differentiate between two people, 
regulated and unregulated. It does not serve to signal that one group is of better 
quality than another. Similarly if regulation is part of the rationing model then it is 
not being used to predict quality, rather as a way in which to keep exclusivity within 
certain occupations. Therefore what regulation signals is heavily dependent on its 
ability to filter out poor quality practitioners and leave only competent individuals 
able to enter a regulated occupation. 
For the requirements of a regulation to filter applicants so that only competent 
practitioners enter a regulated occupation, entrants must require minimum levels of 
competency to be attained by the applicants. In order for competency to be reliably, 
assessed qualities needed by the occupation must be deconstructed into measurable 
tasks in order for competency to be rated objectively. Whilst there is a general 
movement to deconstruct many occupations and tasks to undertake such monitoring 
and assessment, call centres and many civil service jobs for example, it is often very 
difficult to do this with every aspect of an occupation. For instance many good 
quality practitioners have characteristics that are very difficult to measure; a doctor’s 
bedside manner, for instance. However, it is often such qualities that effect how the 
overall output is assessed by consumers. Therefore, whilst many competencies can 
be tested for, many of the underlying triggers of quality cannot be screened 
(Goldhaber 2004).  
One may assume, therefore, that testing as many competencies as possible would 
increase the likelihood of improving the quality of output. However, this approach 
may actually decrease quality levels. This is because the cost of entering the 
occupation will increase. An increase in cost may deter some individuals from 
entering the regulated occupation. It may be the case that the more competent 
individuals are, the greater opportunities available to them outside of the regulated 
occupation, and they are therefore likely to pursue these avenues (Wang and Weiss 
1998). This results in a loss of some of the most able individuals from an occupation. 
Even if the cost does not deter individuals from meeting the requirements, once 
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regulated, this cost may be passed on to the consumers in the form of increased 
prices (Cox and Foster 1990). If this happens, regulation will only increase quality 
for high earners, since low earners may cease to be able to afford the service in 
question (Shapiro 1986). Assuming that no service is worse than a bad service, this 
would decrease the average levels of output quality across the occupation (Currie and 
Hotz 2004).  
From the above theories, doubt is cast over the ability to predict quality of output by 
filtering input, either because there is too little or too much testing of relevant 
competencies. Yet many have asserted that even if only some of the competencies 
are tested and the practitioners’ abilities to perform only some tasks are signalled, 
this should still have some positive impact on the market (Arrow 1963, Leland 1979, 
Weingast 1980 and, Law and Kim 2005). This is because there will still be an 
increase in the minimum levels of quality even if those levels are not optimum 
(Larsen 2013).  
Evidence 
The theory surrounding the association between regulation and quality is ambiguous 
in predicting the direction and significance of the association. In order to predict how 
quality may be affected by regulation, it is necessary to consider the evidence 
surrounding the topic. As highlighted previously in this thesis, for regulation to have 
an impact on the quality of a service it must firstly improve the quality of input by 
improving the skill levels of practitioners. As the impact of regulation on skills has 
been discussed at length in the previous paper, and a positive association is found, 
the evidence in this section will focus on the impact regulation has on the quality of 
output. 
The following studies find a positive association, a negative association or no 
association between regulation and the quality of output. 
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Positive Association 
In 1980 Dorsey investigated occupations relating to cosmology in the US. The 
sample consisted of 374 Illinois-based practitioners and 575 based in Missouri.  The 
findings suggest that quality varies when different measures of competency are in 
place. Also, the more thorough the measures of competency, then the higher the 
quality levels. However, the written licensing examinations appeared biased against 
the less educated, ethnic minorities, apprentices and non-natives. Testing for 
competencies not directly associated with productivity, he suggests, could prevent 
good quality practitioners entering the profession. 
Begun (1980) investigated the link between restrictive licensing and quality in the 
optometry industry. He finds that different states have different laws restricting 
optometrists. Restrictiveness was measured by ranking states in terms of 
requirements for education, advertising, location and training. The quality measures 
used were examination length, examination complexity, and use of technology and 
equipment. Through questionnaires of optometrists across different states he 
concludes that there is a positive association between restrictiveness of licensing and 
the quality of care provided, and yet the reliability and validity of the conclusion was 
tarnished by the low response rates of the questionnaire (54%). 
Holen’s (1977) study into the licensing of dentists took place between 1966 and 
1969. The aim of the research was to determine if there was an effect on quality by 
reducing the pass rates of dentists through more restrictive licensing. The measure of 
quality used was participation in further professional qualifications. The analysis 
concludes that the more restrictive the licensing, the greater the probability of further 
professional qualifications being pursued. The issue with the research is based upon 
the assumption that further professional qualifications lead to a better quality of 
service. This link is debatable as highlighted previously in this paper (see page 42). 
In a further study Holen (1978) found that the restriction of dentists through lower 
pass rates of licensing exams has a negative effect on quality. In this study the 
measure of quality was the availability of dentists. The results conclude that the 
lower the pass rates, and the fewer dentists there were in a state has no effect on the 
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number of visits made to a dentist per capita. However, this is disputed by Carroll 
and Gatson (1981) who find that lower pass rates lead to fewer dentists resulting in 
long waiting lists and fewer visits per capita. 
Shilling and Sirmans’ (1988) investigated the impact licensing had on the quality of 
work conducted by real estate agents. Using data from the National Association of 
Real Estate License Law Officials (1983) and the National Association of Realtors 
they analyse the link between the pass rates and the level of demand, and also, the 
pass rates and number of complaints. In the US the law states that real estate agents 
must be licensed. To gain a licence, individuals must pass a written test, pay fees and 
meet certain educational requirements. The pass rates and difficulty of the tests vary 
from state to state and the sample consisted of data from 35 states. They concluded 
that an increase in demand generated a decrease in the pass rate of real estate 
licensing examinations. In addition they found that a decrease in pass rates reduced 
the total number of complaints made about the industry. Yet this is contrary to an 
earlier study. Carroll and Gaston (1979) analyse the association between the 
restriction of real estate agents through licensing and the quality of their work. Using 
the duration of a vacancy prior to sale as a measure of quality they find that in states 
where the restriction of agents is high, and there are fewer per capita, there are lower 
levels of quality. In essence, the more restrictive the licensing of an occupation, the 
longer real estate remains vacant. 
Another study to use the number of customer complaints as a measure of quality is 
that of Maurizi (1974) who analysed 32 licensing bodies in California. He 
investigates whether there is a link between the restrictiveness of a licensing scheme 
and the number of complaints the licensing board receive. The results show that the 
more restrictive a licensing scheme, the fewer complaints are received about the 
practitioners. This suggests that the higher the barriers to entry are for an occupation, 
the better the quality of work and the fewer complaints. However, in a later study 
Maurizi found that licensing was associated with an increase in customer complaints 
(1977).  Through investigating the restrictiveness of licensing in the construction 
industry, and the association restrictiveness had on the level of complaints, Maurizi 
finds that the number of complaints increases when entry becomes more restrictive. 
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Instructors began teaching students how to pass the written test, rather than the 
practical skills needed to excel in the occupation when the tests became harder to 
pass. 
In 2004, Currie and Hotz investigated the association between the regulation of 
childcare workers and the quality of childcare provided in the US. From data on the 
leading causes of death in young children they find that unintentional injuries are the 
number one cause of death for 1-5 year olds. Under the assumption that good care 
prevents such injuries, they measured the quality of care by the occurrence of 
unintentional injuries. Using state level data about childcare regulations and 
individual data on medically attended injuries they tested to see if the restrictiveness 
of licensing results in fewer injuries. Restrictiveness of licensing was measured with 
regard to the ratios of adults to children, the number of mandatory inspections and 
the education levels required for care providers. The sample consisted of 50 states 
studied between 1987 and 1998. The results show that the higher minimum 
education levels are for childcare workers the lower the frequency of injuries, 
although the impact of inspections and ratios of staff to children is unclear. The main 
issue with the study is that a number of states do not act as the results expect. 
Therefore, the conclusions may not be universally applicable. The conclusion 
suggests that tighter educational requirements for childcare workers lead to higher 
quality care. However, prices increased resulting in fewer children being served. 
Therefore, the average quality, when taking into account the increase in lack of 
access, may be ambiguous. 
Negative Association 
There is more research that finds a negative association between regulation and 
quality.    
Hogan (1983) found that despite restrictive licensing and pass rates, physicians were 
still found to be incompetent. Through reviewing studies of physicians’ competency 
he found that physicians were not investigating patients’ medical history, recognising 
emotional problems or keeping good records. Of more concern was the finding that 
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physicians were not up to date with treatment development or diagnosis. Licensing 
was therefore shown to be no guarantee of competency. This evidence is supported 
by Gaumer (1984) who finds that when tested, pathologists missed 37% of evidence 
crucial to diagnosing patients. Even after more monitoring and continuous training 
became part of the licensing of physicians, Derbyshire (1983) finds that there is a 5% 
rate of incompetent physicians in the US.  He suggests that this showed the 
regulation of medical staff to be ineffective. 
Maurizi (1980) finds that regulation has a detrimental effect in terms of number of 
customer complaints. The research is conducted in the construction industry and 
finds that the number of complaints post regulation is higher than in the period prior 
to regulation. The conclusion was that restricting entry reduced quality. This may be 
the result of increasing the quality of input not resulting in increasing the quality of 
output. A similar conclusion was reached by Carroll and Gaston (1981). They 
investigated the impact regulation had on quality levels with regard to electricians 
and dentists. They argue that electrical accidents increased since the increase in 
regulation, and significantly longer waiting times at the dentist occurred. This could 
have been as a result of deterring competent workers and/or restricting supply so 
much that demand could not be met.  
Carroll and Gaston (1981) investigate the link between licensing and quality with 
regard to plumbers and electricians in the US. Their first study considers the 
licensing of plumbers. By using sales of do-it-yourself plumbing equipment as a 
measure of quality, they found that the more restrictive licensing is, the fewer 
plumbers there are and the lower the quality of plumbing work.  
The study assumes that individuals cannot produce the same quality of plumbing 
work as a licensed plumber. Therefore, in their second study of electricians, Carroll 
and Gaston (1981) used the number of accidental deaths by electrocution as their 
measure of quality. They found that where licensing is more restrictive, as measured 
by pass rates, there are fewer electricians and more deaths by electrocution This 
shows an inverse relationship between licensing and quality. 
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Negative associations are found in the security sector by Lister (2001) and Fernie 
(2010). The explanation for such a finding is the inability of the Security Industry 
Authority (SIA) to adequately test the competencies needed to be a good security 
worker. In addition, it is felt that the pass marks are too low to be able to filter out 
incompetent workers, but because of the requirement for the tests to be written, some 
potentially very good security workers are unable to pass the exam. The research 
questioned the need for comprehensive written English skills in such an occupation. 
They argued that this may have deterred some very competent individuals who felt 
they might not have the required literacy skills, skills which, according to the 
authors, may not even be good predictors of a quality output. 
Berger and Toma (1994) investigate the effects of state teacher certification 
requirements on SAT performance across US states. They use SAT data from 1972 
to 1990 as the measurement of quality. The research appreciated that many factors 
can affect SAT scores. As a result of this, many variables that may influence scores 
are included. These factors include: pupil-teacher ratios, annual salaries of teachers, 
availability of schools, number of private schools, per capita incomes, ethnic 
population, average family size and percentage of students in a metropolitan area. 
The inclusion of so many control variables reduced the chances of inflating the 
impact of minimum education requirements for a teacher. The results show that there 
is a negative association between minimum education standards of teachers and 
average SAT scores. This is especially prevalent where teachers are required to hold 
a Master’s level degree.  
Angrist and Guryan (2008) also find the regulation of teachers can have a negative 
effect on quality. Their concern is with the quality of individuals who become 
teachers. In the US the regulation of teachers is fairly standardised with regard to the 
minimum levels of education required to meet the demands of the regulations. They 
found that after these standardised education requirements were enforced the quality 
of individuals enrolling on the courses decreased. They measured quality by 
recording the undergraduate degrees individuals attain prior to beginning the training 
course. The main issue with the research is the assumption that individuals with 
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better undergraduate degrees will be better teachers. This link was neither 
investigated nor shown to be valid. 
All of the research concluding a negative association between regulation and quality 
prove that regulation does not always improve the quality of input, and that quality 
of input does not always result in increased quality of output. 
No Association 
Just as some research has found a positive association between regulation and 
quality, and some has found a negative association, some research has found no 
association present at all. 
Martin’s (1982) research into the association between the regulation of pharmacists 
and quality in the US concludes that there is no association between the 
restrictiveness of licensing schemes and quality. The measure of quality used is the 
number of malpractice suits brought against pharmacists per state. The measure of 
restrictiveness is the pass rate of the pharmaceutical licensing exams. 
Goldhaber and Brewer (2000) investigate the association between different types of 
teacher certification and quality in 12
th
 grade US classes. Using the National 
Educational Longitudinal Study of 1988 their sample consisted of 3,786 12
th
 grade 
students in mathematics and 2,524 students in science. Using test scores as a measure 
of quality they concluded that there is little evidence to suggest that teacher 
certification is related to student achievement. They suggested that the results cast 
doubt over the need to enforce standardised certification across all states and all 
subject areas. 
Using six years’ of student test performance data across public schools in New York, 
Kane et al. (2008) investigated the association between the certification status of 
teachers and quality. The reading and mathematics scores of students measured 
quality. The control variables are students’ prior test scores, number of students per 
class, classroom (size and quality), grade, school related factors and the experience 
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of the teacher. The research concludes that there is no association between 
certification status and student performance.  
Kleiner and Kudrle (2000) sampled 464 US air force recruits across 50 states with 
regard to the quality of dental work in different states, and the extent of regulation 
varies. Using the air force recruits’ evaluation of dental services as the measure of 
quality, the findings suggest that there is no association between regulation and 
quality. 
Lloyd (2009) investigated regulation in the fitness industry in the UK. She 
interviewed 17 gym managers to gauge how fitness accreditation schemes, aimed at 
fitness instructors, are viewed by employers. The results indicate that there is an 
over-supply of ‘qualified’ individuals in the sector. This had led to a lack of 
employer-led training schemes. The minimum level of competency ensured by the 
accreditation schemes has become the average level across the industry. As the 
accreditation schemes are often not as comprehensive as employer training schemes 
used to be, overall quality in the industry may have decreased. Yet in order to make 
such a conclusion, more extensive research is needed. Therefore, this paper 
concludes a lack of association between regulation and quality. 
Evidence suggesting a lack of association between regulation and quality implies that 
regulation does not fulfil one of its key aims of protecting the public. Whilst quality 
is not decreasing, given the social costs associated with regulation, a lack of impact 
on quality may be as detrimental as a negative effect. 
Summary 
The evidence presented above shows the association between regulation and quality 
of services to vary hugely between different occupations. Further, where different 
research is conducted on the same occupations, it is clear that the way in which 
quality is measured can greatly influence the results. For example, where the quality 
of real estate agents is measured by complaints, a positive association with licensing 
is found. However, where quality is measured by length of time houses are 
unoccupied, a negative association is found. This highlights the need for careful 
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consideration in defining and recording quality in such research. The mixed 
conclusions also show that different occupations may respond very differently to 
regulation.  
As it is the intention of this paper to investigate the impact regulation has on quality 
in the UK with regard to childcare, time must be spent considering the aims of the 
Childcare Act 2006; why it was deemed necessary and how quality can be measured 
before a valid analysis can be undertaken. 
3.1.2 Regulation of Nursery Workers 
In the run up to the 2005 general election Labour’s manifesto included many family 
friendly policies to try and sway the female vote. The aim was to increase the 
number of women in the labour market. As a consequence, after the election, as 
Labour was voted in for their third term, the government looked to how they could 
realise their manifesto.  
In order to encourage greater female participation in the labour market, changes to 
childcare had to be made. Beyond the availability and cost of childcare, the quality of 
childcare had to be set at a level acceptable to working families.  
The perception of childcare in the media was poor. The following headlines are a  
selection of Daily Mail newspaper headlines: 
“Working mothers risk damaging their child’s prospects” (Steve Doughty 2001) 
“Daycare can make toddlers grow up unruly” (Steve Doughty 2002) 
“Children of working mothers lag behind” (Sarah Harris 2003) 
“My nursery nightmare” (Barry Collins 2004) 
“Childcare ‘no substitute for mum’” (Barry Collins 2005) 
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With parts of the media portraying childcare as expensive and low quality, a 
childcare reform was needed. As a result, in 2006 the Childcare Act was passed. The 
aim of the Act was to increase the quantity and quality of childcare. Further to the 
Act addressing quantity and quality, the government put in place provisions to 
subsidise childcare for working families.  
With regard to the quantity of nursery schools (including reception classes), there 
was an initial increase, as shown in figure 3.2. However, the number of childcare 
providers decreased after 2007. Overall, since 2006, when the Act came into force, 
the number of childcare provisions has increased, though not to the same degree as 
witnessed directly after the act in 2007. 
Figure 3-2: Frequency of nursery schools and reception classes by year 
 
Source: Childcare and Early Years Survey Results 2011 
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Figure 3-3: Average weekly cost of childcare in relation to earnings 
 
Source: Childcare Trust 2011 and the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 2003-2009 
With regard to the average cost of childcare, as can be observed from figure 3.2 
above, there was a sharp decline between 2006 and 2007. However, from 2007 to 
2009 the average cost of childcare, measured as a percentage of average earnings, 
increased. Yet the cost in relation to earnings is still lower than before 2006. Further, 
as the results do not take into account subsidisation of childcare by the government, 
the cost is likely to account for a lower percentage of one’s earnings than indicated. 
From the data presented in figure 3.2 and figure 3.3, one can conclude that the 
government was effective at increasing the provision of childcare and reducing the 
costs relative to average earnings, yet the impact was not long-standing with quantity 
decreasing and costs increasing after 2008. It is the impact government policy and 
the Childcare Act had on the quality of childcare that is unclear. There exists no 
comprehensive study into the effect that regulation had on the quality of childcare. 
Therefore, it is the aim of this paper to fill the gap in the evidence surrounding the 
relationship between regulation and quality in relation to childcare. 
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Quality and the Regulation of Nursery Workers 
The Childcare Act 2006 was introduced in response to the Labour government’s 
objective to increase the availability and quality of childcare. The Act came into 
effect during the 2006/2007 academic year. The Act requires all childcare workers to 
register with the Office for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills, 
(Ofsted), if they work with children aged seven and under. To join the register 
certain background checks have to be conducted, most notably a Criminal Record 
Background (CRB) check. Within six months of registering, all supervisors and 
childcare managers must attend and pass a training course, which is equivalent to a 
National Vocational Qualification (NVQ) level 3. In addition, 50% of all other staff 
working within a nursery school or reception class must attend and pass a training 
course, which is equivalent to an NVQ level 2. Prior to the Act, training courses were 
voluntary and only primary childcare workers were required to undergo background 
checks. CRB checks were present before the regulation, therefore they will not be 
considered in this paper as an impact upon quality. 
The change in regulation relating to childcare workers was shown to have a 
significant positive effect on the qualifications of childcare workers (Forth et al. 
2011). Following a diff-in-diff analysis on childcare occupations (6121 nursery 
nurses, 6122 childminders and related occupations, 6123 playgroup leaders and 
assistants, and 6124 education assistants) the authors find that although there was an 
increase in workers qualified to NVQ level 2 and above post regulation, there already 
existed an upward trend with regard to qualification levels, therefore the results are 
not conclusive.  
Although the Act uses the terminology joining a ‘register’, under the parameters 
defining different types of regulation presented in paper one, the ‘register’ is actually 
a form of licensing. This is because, not only must childcare workers join a register 
but many must also meet minimum levels of competency in order to legally work 
with children. It is the legal requirement for competency that is unique to licensing. 
Therefore, throughout this paper the regulation of childcare workers is referred to as 
the licensing of childcare workers. 
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Quality in the Act 
The Childcare Act (2006) aims to increase the quality of childcare. To assess if it has 
achieved this, it is necessary to understand how quality is defined in the Act. 
“An Act to make provision about the powers and duties of local authorities and other 
bodies in England in relation to the improvement of the well-being of young 
children; to make provision about the powers and duties of local authorities in 
England and Wales in relation to the provision of childcare and the provision of 
information to parents and other persons; to make provision about the regulation 
and inspection of childcare provision in England; to amend Part 10A of the Children 
Act 1989 in relation to Wales; and for connected purposes. 
In this Act “well-being”, in relation to children, means their well-being so far as 
relating to— 
(a) physical and mental health and emotional well-being; 
(b) protection from harm and neglect; 
(c) education, training and recreation; 
(d) the contribution made by them to society; 
(e) social and economic well-being. 
An English local authority must prepare assessments of the sufficiency of the 
provision of childcare (whether or not by them) in their area (“childcare 
assessments”).” 
The Childcare Act 2006 (Chapter 21 11
th
 July 2006) 
From the extract above it is clear that the primary concern of the legislation is 
children’s well-being. Using well-being as a measure of quality may be problematic 
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given the difficulty in forming a reliable scale. However, the Act outlines five 
distinct areas of well-being that are targeted: health and emotional well-being, 
protection from harm and neglect, education, training and recreation, the contribution 
to society, and social and economic well-being. Therefore, by using the aims of the 
Act as a basis for improving children’s well-being, five distinct measures by which 
to test quality can be identified. 
Table 3-1: Childcare Act 2006 aims and quality measures 
Aim 
 
 
Quality Measure 
 
 
Physical and mental 
health and emotional 
well-being 
  
Quality of caring 
 
Protection from harm 
and neglect 
 
 
Quality of leadership and 
management 
 
Education, training and 
recreation 
  
Learning standards 
 
The contribution made by 
them to society 
  
Behaviour of the Children 
 
Social and economic 
well-being 
  
Quality of the provision 
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By using the aims of the Act to form variables by which quality can be measured, it 
is possible to investigate the impact of licensing. However, before further 
investigation can take place, an understanding of why regulation is needed must be 
evaluated in order to justify why an increase in quality is so important. 
Need to Regulate 
Licensing of nursery workers was deemed necessary by the Labour government to 
assure parents that their children will receive a good quality of care, which in turn 
leads to a greater use of childcare and more women entering the labour market. 
However, the importance of childcare in the early years had far greater impacts on 
society than easing parental concern. The impact of early years childcare is visible 
not just at the time the childcare is provided, but long after the care is given.  
Future Effects 
The impact that experiences in one’s early years has on the rest of one’s life is 
substantial. Early years experiences can affect emotional, social and behavioural 
characteristics. The early years are critical in introducing individuals to social 
situations and are key in introducing monitoring and evaluating appropriate 
responses to a range of different situations (Corsaro 1985). If socialisation and 
behaviour are not instilled during the early years, success within the education 
system and in the workplace is dramatically reduced. Linked to the notion of 
socialisation and behaviour is emotional development. Stroufe (1997) argues that 
emotional development in the early years is key because this is the period of time 
that will affect emotional control and interpretation to the greatest extent throughout 
one’s life. Neglect in the early years is also linked with socialisation, behaviour and 
emotional development. Kotch, Lewis, Hussy and English (2008) argue that neglect 
in the early years by care providers, parents or others will have adverse effects on 
one’s well-being later in life. The chances of antisocial behaviour and poor 
performance in the education system are greatly increased where neglect is 
experienced. Mustard (2006) shows that beyond emotional, academic and 
behavioural development, early years experiences can alter the physical biology of 
 236 
 
the brain. He shows that experience-based development can change neurological 
functions and establish neurological pathways that affect the competence and health 
of individuals throughout their lives. He further proves a link between negative 
experiences during early years and antisocial behaviour during teenage years. He 
states that the quality of caregiving in the early years is one of the key components in 
development.  
All of the evidence presented above suggests that early years care will have a lasting 
impact on individuals who receive the care. The effects cannot only impact on 
individuals’ success in the education system but also in society generally. This in 
turn can impact upon success in the labour markets and have greater effects on 
society through employment rates, crime levels and expenditure on benefits. 
However, some of the impacts of childcare can be seen immediately. 
Present Effects 
As noted earlier, the government’s initiative in the 1990s was to encourage women 
back into the labour market and a key component of this was to make childcare much 
more accessible. The availability of childcare was therefore paramount in increasing 
the levels of employment, particularly amongst women. This had wider implications 
than affecting individual families. The supply of childcare actively affected the 
supply of labour, especially in sectors dominated by women such as the care 
professions. However, it was not just the availability and price of childcare that 
would affect an individual’s choice to work. The quality of childcare is very 
important since it takes the place of a traditional family arrangement. The attachment 
and responsibility towards one’s children creates a need for good quality childcare. 
With monitoring from external bodies like Ofsted and regulation by local authorities, 
the quality of any given childcare provider is more transparent than ever before, 
making the relationship between quality and demand significantly more direct.  
Therefore, immediate effects of childcare centre on the availability and the quality of 
the care provided. If there is not enough childcare available or the quality is too low 
for parents to accept, then labour supply decreases which affects productivity and 
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prices throughout the labour market. It is because of the potential impact that early 
years childcare may have that makes the regulation of nursery workers, and the 
investigation as to the effects that such regulation has, so important.   
The impact on wages and skills is addressed in a feasibility study conducted for the 
department of Business Innovation and Skills (Forth et al 2011). The results indicate 
that licensing has a negative impact on wages and a positive impact on skill levels. 
However, the impact on wages was only significant after controls were added and the 
increase in skill levels may have been part of an upward trend of skill levels 
occurring pre-licensing. As such there are no strong conclusions that can be made as 
to the impact licensing has on wages and skill levels of childcare workers.  
The Childcare Act 2006 
The Childcare Act 2006 focused on ensuring that the demand for childcare would be 
met and the care provided would be of good quality to prevent the detrimental effects 
of bad childcare outlined above. The Act is split into 101 sections, comprehensively 
covering aspects of childcare. The sections of particular interest are 39-98, which 
outline the regulation of childcare providers and workers. These sections focus on 
the implementation of the Early Years Foundation Stage (EYFS) and the raising of 
standards through implementation of the Ofsted childcare register. 
Early Years Foundation Stage  
Sections 39-48 of the Childcare Act 2006 outline the introduction of the EYFS. The 
EYFS is a mutation of Birth to Three Matters Foundation Stage and the standards for 
daycare, all of which were the prominent guides for childcare after the Childcare Act 
2006. The aim of the EYFS according to the Department for Education follows:  
“The Early Years Foundation Stage (EYFS) sets the standards that all early years 
providers must meet to ensure that children learn and develop well and are kept 
healthy and safe. It promotes teaching and learning to ensure children’s ‘school 
readiness’ and gives children the broad range of knowledge and skills that provide 
the right foundation for good future progress through school and life.” 
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Page 2, Statutory Framework for the Early Years Foundation Stage, Department for Education 2012 
In order to fulfil its aim the EYFS endeavours to ensure both quality and consistency 
across all care providers, a secure foundation that prepares children for entering 
school, and learning and development to aid children in the level demanded by year 
1 education in England and Wales. To do this, the EYFS have implemented strict 
guidelines similar to the syllabus demands of later education. Care providers are 
required to incorporate the areas presented in table 3.2. 
Table 3-2: EYFS educational programme requirements. 
Area Definition 
Communication and Language Involves giving children opportunities to 
experience a rich language environment; to 
develop their confidence and skills in expressing 
themselves, and to speak and listen in a range of 
situations. 
 
Physical Development Involves providing opportunities for young 
children to be active and interactive and to 
develop their co-ordination, control and 
movement. Children must also be helped to 
understand the importance of physical activity, 
and to make healthy choices in relation to food. 
 
Personal, Social and Emotional 
Development 
Involves helping children to develop a positive 
sense of themselves, and others; to form positive 
relationships and develop respect for others; to 
develop social skills and learn how to manage 
their feelings; to understand appropriate 
behaviour in groups, and to have confidence in 
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Area Definition 
their own abilities. 
 
Literacy Involves encouraging children to link sounds 
and letters and to begin to read and write. 
Children must be given access to a wide range of 
reading materials (books, poems and other 
written materials) to ignite their interest. 
Mathematics Involves providing children with opportunities to 
develop and improve their skills in counting, 
understanding and using numbers, calculating 
simple addition and subtraction problems, and to 
describe shapes, spaces and measures. 
 
Understanding the World Involves guiding children to make sense of their 
physical world and their community through 
opportunities to explore, observe and find out 
about people, places, technology and the 
environment. 
 
Expressive Arts and Design Involves enabling children to explore and play 
with a wide range of media and materials, as 
well as providing opportunities and 
encouragement for sharing their thoughts, ideas 
and feelings through a variety of activities in art, 
music, movement, dance, role-play and design 
and technology. 
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Source: Department for Education 2012 
All of these areas are monitored when Ofsted inspections take place. There must be 
detailed plans of how each area is covered and how the outcomes are measured. A 
further requirement of the framework is to regard every child as a unique individual, 
for example, where English is not the first language of a child, extra support should 
be given which should be evident in the planning documents.  
There is also emphasis on providers to reflect upon how activities have worked. As 
the aim is to develop children, the reflections should be based on how effective 
activities and teaching have been in enhancing children’s learning. The Department 
for Education (2012) states that effective teaching should involve three aspects in the 
early years: playing and exploring, active learning and, creating and thinking 
critically. 
It is important to note that while all childcare workers can become fully licensed, 
only a certain percentage of workers in a nursery need to be licensed by law. Table 
3.3 details how many licensed individuals are legally required to be present. 
Table 3-3: EYFS Ratio Requirements 
Age of Children Ratio Requirements 
Under Two There must be at least one member 
of staff for every three children;  
at least one member of staff must 
hold a full and relevant NVQ level 3 
qualification, and must be suitably 
experienced in working with 
children under two;  
at least half of all other staff must 
hold a full and relevant level 2 
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Age of Children Ratio Requirements 
qualification;  
at least half of all staff must have 
received training that specifically 
addresses the care of babies; and  
where there is an under two-year-
olds’ room, the member of staff in 
charge of that room must, in the 
judgment of the provider, have 
suitable experience of working with 
under twos. 
 
Aged Two There must be at least one member 
of staff for every four children;  
at least one member of staff must 
hold a full and relevant level 3 
qualification; and, at least half of all 
other staff must hold a full and 
relevant level 2 qualification.  
 
Aged Three and Over (no qualified 
teacher present) 
There must be at least one member 
of staff for every eight children;  
at least one member of staff must 
hold a full and relevant level 3  
qualification; and,  
at least half of all other staff must 
hold a full and relevant level 2 
qualification.  
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Age of Children Ratio Requirements 
 
Aged Three and Over (qualified teacher 
present, operating between 8am and 
4pm) 
There must be at least one member 
of staff for every 13 children, and  
at least one other member of staff 
must hold a full and relevant level 3 
 qualification.  
 
Aged Three and Over (qualified teacher 
present, operating between 8am and 
4pm and outside the hours of 8am to 
4pm) 
There must be at least one member 
of staff for every eight children;  
at least one member of staff must 
hold a full and relevant level 3 
qualification; at least half of all other 
staff must hold a full and relevant 
level 2 qualification.  
 
Aged Three and Over (affiliated with a 
school but not a reception class) 
There must be at least one member 
of staff for every 13 children;  
at least one member of staff must be 
a school teacher as defined by 
Section 122 of the Education Act 
2002 and the Education (School 
Teachers’ Qualifications) (England) 
Regulations 2003, and at least one 
other member of staff must hold a 
full and relevant level 3 
qualification.  
 
 243 
 
Age of Children Ratio Requirements 
Reception Classes (aged 4-5) The School Standards and 
Framework Act 1998 (as amended 
by the Education Act 2002) limit 
the size of infant classes to 30 
pupils per schoolteacher. ‘School 
teachers’ do not include teaching 
assistants, higher level teaching 
assistants or other support staff. 
Consequently, in a normal teaching 
session, a school must employ 
sufficient schoolteachers to enable 
it to teach its infant classes in 
groups of no more than 30 per 
school teacher. 
 
Source: Department for Education 2012 
The framework states that the ratios must be kept to and that all nurseries must 
supply information relating to the childcare provider and anyone else who will be in 
unsupervised charge of children. Each child is also to be assigned a key person who 
is responsible for specifically monitoring that child and liaising with parents. 
Additionally, providers must ensure all staff have a good understanding of English to 
the extent that they are capable of liaising with parents, emergency services and 
social services. There must also be someone with a paediatric first aid certificate on 
the premises at all times. 
Ofsted Childcare Register 
Sections 31-98 of the Childcare Act 2006 outline the implementation of the Early 
Years register. All providers caring for children aged 0-5 must, by law, join the 
register and commit to adhering to the EYFS as detailed above. The aim of the 
 244 
 
register is to improve the quality and standards of care. It does this by forcing care 
providers to attend training courses that cover skills needed to care for children, the 
content of the EYFS, health and safety and business skills. These courses combined 
with a CRB check are the only way in which an individual can join the register and 
legally work as a childcare provider. The qualifications that are granted through 
successfully completing the course are equivalent to at least a level 3 NVQ. 
Additionally, all staff must also attend health and safety training and first aid training 
if they are to be in sole charge of children. At all times someone with a current 
paediatric first aid certificate must be present.  
The Childcare Act places the onus on the manager and main provider of care to 
ensure all staff have the relevant qualifications. If there are significant changes, 
Ofsted should be informed. A valid copy of registration certificates should be made 
available to the parents and guardians of children. As Ofsted accredits the 
certificates, all parents and guardians should also be provided with Ofsted’s contact 
details should they wish to complain. 
As discussed earlier, although Ofsted refers to the regulation as a register, because of 
the minimum degrees of competency which must be met in order for many workers 
to legally work in childcare, the regulation status of childcare workers is considered 
equivalent to licensing in this paper. 
Course Contents 
The training courses that childcare workers need to attend in order to become 
licensed are provided nationwide by various different Ofsted-accredited trainers. All 
of the courses must contain the following core units (though the title may vary): 
1. Develop and promote positive relationships 
2. Develop and maintain a healthy, safe and secure environment for children 
3. Promote children’s development 
4. Reflect on and develop practice 
5. Protect and promote children’s rights 
*Source: City and Guilds “Children’s care, learning and development” course (2013) 
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The aims of the Act, the core units covered, and the measures of quality are all 
heavily related. 
Figure 3-4:  Mapping the aims of the Childcare Act 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Aim of the Act 
Core Unit Covered 
by the Compulsory 
Course 
Measure of Quality 
Physical and mental 
health, and 
emotional well being 
Develop and 
promote positive 
relationships 
Quality of caring 
Protection from 
harm and neglect 
Develop and maintain 
a healthy, safe and 
secure environment for 
children 
Quality of 
leadership and 
manegemnt 
Education, training 
and recreation 
Promote children’s 
development 
Learning standards 
The contribution 
made by them to 
society 
Protect and 
promote children’s 
rights 
Behaviour of the 
children 
Social and 
economic well 
being 
Reflect on and 
develop practice 
Quality of 
provision 
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On completion of the course, the qualification level received ranges from an NVQ 
level 2 up to NVQ level 4. The level received depends on the complexity of the 
material covered and the amount of individual research conducted by the students. 
The cost of the course varies between different colleges. However City and Guilds 
advise that the cost of a year-long, full-time course should be around £1,500 before 
tuition top-ups, and at most £9,000 after. If students are below the age of 18 when 
commencing the course there are no tuition fees. As many childcare workers have to 
be licensed to work with children they may have to fund their study themselves in 
order to find employment. Yet, as the onus is on the sector leaders to ensure staff 
meet the minimum requirements, employer funding may be available. 
Penalties 
Despite the attainment of the necessary qualifications and the completion of a 
criminal background check, childcare workers are still subject to penalties. Care 
workers who breach the guidelines imposed by the Act or are party to any criminal 
activity may result in expulsion from the register. If this occurs the individual, or 
individuals in question cannot legally work in early years childcare. Further, those 
living or working with such an individual may face investigations and restrictions on 
their work. Ofsted are particularly well-placed to execute such bars because under 
the Act all personal information involved in childcare is provided and a daily record 
of the children being cared for is also available. If extreme cases of malpractice 
occur, the case can be passed over to social services and the  police where prison 
sentences may be applicable. 
Purpose of Regulation 
The purpose of regulating nursery workers is, therefore; firstly to allow the 
government to achieve its ambition of increasing the number of women in the labour 
market. By concentrating on the quality of provision, the government believed that 
more women would be encouraged back into the workplace. Secondly, the regulation 
aimed to increase the perception of childcare, given the important role it plays in the 
labour market and economy. The aim was to prevent any of the detrimental effects 
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resulting from poor childcare discussed above. The way in which licensing may 
enhance quality and perceptions of nursery workers is discussed below. 
Quality of Childcare 
The quality of childcare on offer is often a parent’s primary concern, along with 
price and availability. The availability of good care in the early years is so important 
for children’s development and well-being (Mustard 2006). However, as discussed, it 
is only once a child is placed with a childcare provider that the true quality of 
childcare is known. Where such information asymmetry exists in a market the result 
is often market failure (Leland 1979).  If this occurs, the market is flooded with poor 
practitioners because they can undercut the price of quality providers. Customers are 
attracted by lower prices as they are unable to observe the difference in quality 
between providers. 
Even if children are aware that the care they are given is poor, it may be some time 
before any conclusions can be made. This is because early years care can have a 
lasting impact upon individuals throughout their lives. As a result of the important 
role childcare plays in developing children and on the wider economy, it is necessary 
to implement measures of quality and monitoring. With the government’s initiative 
to make childcare available to everyone who desires it, came a shift from local 
authorities regulating and monitoring childcare to a national agency from 2001: 
Ofsted. Good quality became incentivised through targets, training and regular 
inspections (Tanner et al. 2006).  Such measurement and monitoring of quality 
provides a transparent way for the public to compare different childcare providers. 
Further, as Ofsted could recommend the closure of poor quality childcare providers 
there was a real incentive for all to provide at least a satisfactory level of care.   
In order to allow for comparison and monitoring of quality over time, Ofsted targets 
specific qualities and measures them on a scale ranging from unsatisfactory to 
excellent. There are several issues with measuring quality in this way. First, 
assuming that measures of quality can be executed objectively by many different 
inspectors who will observe, evaluate and record quality may be too naïve an 
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assumption (Moss and Pence 1994). Any number of factors could impact upon a 
report, either positively or negatively, and prevent a true depiction of the quality of 
care provided. There are also issues with the scales and measures used, for example 
it is very difficult to rate an inner city and a rural play group on the same scale for 
quality of provision when they both offer such different experiences.  
Second, the process of determining how quality should be measured is very long and 
detailed; the length process suggests that the results should be reliable and valid. 
However, there is a danger that the measures can become static and immutable 
(Williams 1994). This may happen because the process of implementing any 
nationwide survey demands resources in terms of time and money. Changing a 
survey is equally draining. As a result official documents are often treated as fixed 
(Williams 1994) and do not change to suit changes in demand for different 
characteristics of quality or changing public concern. This may affect the usefulness 
of such quality measures and make them outdated. 
Lastly, the ethical issues surrounding measuring the quality of care cannot be 
overlooked. Childcare can be observed as a series of instrumental tasks based on 
functional knowledge (Cameron and Boddy 2006). However, many would view 
childcare as encompassing many different demands (Moss et al. 2006). For many, 
childcare is a replacement for care given by mothers (Mooney and Munton 1997), if 
childcare is meant to mimic the mother-child relationship (Stinger 1993), how can 
one define a good parent? In this situation quality is dependent on the child, the 
situation, the tasks and issues present, and the other children present. There are so 
many influencing variables that a generic scale of bad to good is not appropriate, as it 
cannot capture the complexities of what is needed from the care provider. As a result, 
whilst most would agree to basic core standards the extended measures of quality 
encompassed in Ofsted’s crude measures are not likely to reflect everyone’s view of 
quality care (Tanner et al. 2006).  
Despite some clear issues surrounding the measurement and monitoring of quality, 
the importance of childcare and the impact it has on individuals and the general 
economy make quality a key issue. Any attempt at measurement and providing the 
 249 
 
public with more information is better than no attempt at all. Further, it is only 
through a standardised national approach to defining, monitoring and recording 
quality levels that transparency can be found. That said, one must always view the 
measurement of quality in the childcare sector with caution and allow for other 
immeasurable characteristics of quality. 
Improving Perceptions of Childcare 
The regulation of nursery nurses and assistants may also improve the public 
perception of the occupations.  
Despite the importance of childcare, nursery nurses and assistants are often regarded 
as low status, low skilled and sometimes not even regarded as ‘proper’ occupations. 
The explanation of such perceptions lies in the nature of the tasks associated with the 
occupation, the levels of skills and pay in the occupation, and the characteristics of 
the workforce. 
The reason why the perceptions of childcare are so important are first, because how 
we perceive a service affects how much we are willing to pay for it. Second, because 
how we perceive a service impacts on the level of quality we expect. Third, how we 
perceive an occupation affects if we will work within it. This is important because 
the Labour government wanted to increase the number of women in the labour 
market. As female workers dominate childcare positions, increasing the perception 
may attract more women into the occupation and therefore the labour market. This 
would in turn aid the aim to increase the availability of childcare because there 
would be a greater supply of childcare workers.  
Nursery nurses and assistants are caregivers. Such care is heavily linked to the 
maternal nature. Indeed the common discourse associated with childcare is 
suggestive of a natural, instinctive process by which caregivers, predominantly 
women, fulfil their jobs (Greener 2009). The issue of moral order and responsibility 
is a central theme when providing care as it is for mothers (Mooney and Munton 
1997). As a result of the perception of work being natural and instinctive, the 
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understanding of childcare may be that no additional skills are required beyond one’s 
female nature.  
Indeed the female nature of the work associated with providing care, particularly to 
children, is one explanation as to why it is not regarded as a profession. Osgood 
(2009) argues that professionalism is associated in neo-liberal discourse with 
masculine traits. These include control over one’s occupation and the tasks within it, 
the extent of monitoring and inspection, and the rate of pay received (Greener 2008). 
Whilst nursery workers have a great amount of autonomy, they also have high levels 
of monitoring and inspection, ultimately in the form of Ofsted inspections. The rates 
of pay are generally low (Rolfe 2005), which is not a common trait of professional 
occupations. In addition, nursery workers are price takers: they cannot individually 
influence the industry norms of pricing and pay (Greener 2009). Therefore, despite 
autonomy in task there is little autonomy over fees. As such, nursery workers are not 
demonstrating enough masculine traits to be regarded as professionals. There is also 
the issue surrounding ease of entry into an occupation. If an occupation is easy to 
enter then it is unlikely to be regarded as a high status occupation (Turner 1987). 
Although nursery workers do require an NVQ level 3 in order to enter the 
occupation, the poor public visibility of skill requirements, results in occupation 
inequality (Grimshaw and Rubery 2007) 
There is also general debate concerning all occupations that require ‘soft’ skills. 
There is great difficulty with regard to quantifying the soft skills required by certain 
jobs (Littler 1982). As a result of an inability to quantify these types of skills, there is 
often no direct association with pay (Findlay et al. 2009). As such, many skills 
associated with female dominated occupations that rely on soft skills, like childcare, 
are undervalued (Grimshaw and Rubery 2007). This problem is even more prevalent 
in the childcare occupations because it is inconceivable to quantify what skills are 
learned and what skills are a part of one’s nature - particularly given the closeness of 
tasks to mothering.  
Some prospective care workers may also fail to differentiate between formal 
childcare and babysitting children as an addition to their routine of work (Wheelock 
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and Jones 2010). This is despite the tasks associated with childcare being very 
diverse and often centring, not just on the practice of caring, but also on the 
monitoring and interpreting of infant behaviour and development (Moss et al. 2006). 
As such, there is debate as to what extent childcare is a skilled profession. This is 
important because how professional society views childcare will affect how much 
parents are willing to pay for it. It will also affect how many women will be attracted 
to working as childcarers.  
Further to the nature of tasks, are the general characteristics of the workforce. 
Childcare providers, in general, have lower levels of education particularly when 
compared to those that use their services (Cameron et al. 2002). Those demanding 
childcare generally work in high status occupations and have high levels of 
education. The paradox in the characteristics of care providers and their customers 
shines a light on the low status and skill of nursery workers and assistants with 
regard to education levels (Cameron et al. 2002). It also poses an interesting premise: 
perhaps it is through observing such a paradox that the occupation of childcare can 
be justified as a true profession. If highly educated individuals are choosing the 
service and are reliant upon it, then those within childcare must be providing 
something that is highly desirable and necessary to high status individuals. If the 
customer-provider mirror is correct, the status of the providers should be similar to 
that of their customers. However, there appears little evidence that this is the case 
(Calder 1990). 
Some scholars argue that the general perception of childcare is deeply affected by the 
circular process of care (Bryson et al. 1999). It is only when individuals experience 
childcare first-hand that they are likely to assign appropriate value to the service and 
observe the skill required in order for good quality care to be provided. Even though 
around one third of households are joint earners or lone parents, who presumably 
rely on some sort of childcare if they wish to work (Hutton 1996), the vast majority 
of the public may not have had personal experience with childcare and so are 
incapable of assessing its ‘true’ value. 
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In all, despite the quality of care given by nursery workers affecting the development 
of self-esteem, confidence in abilities and development in children’s relationships 
with others (Pugh et al. 1987), nursery workers are generally viewed by society as 
low status workers who, as a result of their lack of academic ability, chose to enter 
into the occupation (Calder 1990). The lack of pay, training and skill levels are 
compensated by the high levels of satisfaction in nursery nurses and assistants 
(Greener 2009) but the low pay observed by the public may deepen the perception 
that the occupation is not professional and is low status. 
If an occupation is licensed, then this conveys that there is an element of skill 
associated with the tasks of the occupation. Licensed individuals must display 
competency and gain the relevant qualifications. This makes the occupations 
exclusive and limited to a select group. As such, through licensing the public may 
recognise childcare not as an extension of maternal instinct but as a learned 
profession. 
Licensing may further the professionalism of the sector through its ability to make 
the occupation closed. One of the defining characteristics of professional occupations 
is their ability to restrict and control who can enter them. Licensing has the ability to 
do just this. Pre-regulation, any individual could become a nursery nurse or assistant. 
That resulted in a very fluid movement of employees. Turnover and retention rates in 
the sector have traditionally been very poor. The movement of employees was 
influenced by growing competition in other sectors. Supermarkets and other service 
sector jobs often pay more and have less emotional strain than childcare. As such, 
jobs in other sectors became desirable for many individuals who were already 
working in childcare or considering doing so. This has clear implications for the 
availability of childcare but can also be detrimental to children as consistency in care 
is a major component in emotional development. Licensing may aid turnover and 
retention issues by increasing an individual’s identity with childcare. The premise 
would follow that if an individual spends time and resources becoming licensed to 
work in an occupation they are less likely to want to leave the occupation. However, 
one obvious negative impact that licensing may have is if the barriers to entry are set 
too high, then other sectors may become even more desirable.  
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Summary 
One of the main aims of the Childcare Act 2006 and the subsequent licensing of 
nursery workers was to increase the quality of care provided to children. This could 
be achieved through licensing because incompetent potential workers could be 
filtered out via the minimum degrees of competency demanded. It could also occur 
because licensing can increase the perception of nursery workers and as a result 
attract more competent individuals into the occupation.  
It is the intention of this paper to analyse if an increase in quality occurred as a result 
of licensing. Quality is measured by the quality of the provision, the behaviour of the 
children, the learning standards, the quality of caring, and the quality of leadership 
and management, all of which are derived from the aims of the Childcare Act 2006 
and the core units covered in the compulsory training course. The hypothesis to be 
tested is as follows: 
H1: Licensing of nursery workers has increased the quality of childcare 
The following section will outline the method used to analyse the impact regulation 
has had on the quality of childcare. 
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3.2 Methodology 
The aim of this paper is to analyse whether licensing has increased the quality of 
childcare in nursery schools following the Childcare Act 2006. This section will 
outline how the hypothesis has been investigated. The section will take the following 
form: first, the data used in the analysis are described; second, the variables used in 
the analysis are defined; third, the method of analysis used is outlined and finally, the 
limitations of the method are discussed. 
3.2.1 Data 
As the aim of the paper is to ascertain the impact licensing has had on the quality of 
childcare within nursery schools it was necessary to use a dataset that covered as 
many nursery schools as possible from both before and after the change in regulation 
that occurred in 2006. As a result, the data used is sourced from Ofsted.  
Office for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills (Ofsted) 
Formal inspections of schools have occurred since 1833 to monitor how well state 
grants are used in providing education to children (McLaughlin et al. 1996). Initially 
the inspections were concerned with grants awarded to religious institutions that 
provided education to poorer children. However, under the Education Act 1902, 
inspections were expanded. From 1902, all state-funded schools have been subject to 
inspection by local authorities to monitor the levels of education provided.  
Under the Conservative government, the Education (Schools) Act 1992 was passed. 
The Act highlights a need for standardisation of education throughout the country. In 
response to the Act, Ofsted was created to assess providers using a national 
framework. Ofsted is a non-ministerial government department of Her Majesty’s 
Inspector of Schools in England.  Initially, Ofsted was only responsible for 
inspecting primary and secondary schools. However, since 2001, Ofsted has also 
been responsible for inspecting early years education and care. Before 2001, the 
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Daycare Standards Act 1992 and the Children’s Act 1989 placed responsibility for 
monitoring upon local authorities.  
Prior to 2005, Ofsted inspections took place every 6 years, unless a school performed 
particularly badly in which case inspections would be conducted more frequently. 
Providers were inspected for approximately one week by the inspectors having been 
given two months’ notice prior to inspections. From 2005 to 2012 inspections were 
conducted, on average, every three years. Providers are now inspected for between 
two and three days and are given two days’ notice. The increased frequency of 
inspections and reduced notice periods are hoped to have increased the accuracy of 
the inspectors’ reports because providers have less time to prepare for a visit.  
The increased frequency of the inspections and the reduced notice period from 2005 
onwards were to increase the accuracy of the inspectors’ findings. If the accuracy of 
the reports is not consistent, then comparing quality results over time may result in 
falsely accepting hypotheses, resulting in a type I error. However, as the hypothesis 
to be tested is suggesting that quality should increase as a consequence of licensing, 
wrongfully accepting the hypothesis is less likely as a result of the increase in 
accuracy over time. This is because if accuracy increases because providers cannot 
portray higher quality than is usual, then overall scores of quality will reduce, thus 
refuting the hypothesis. Further, as Ofsted reports provide the only nationwide, 
longitudinal data in the sector, it is still the most reliable measure of provider quality 
because it is the only survey to capture such a large sample. 
As the licensing of nursery workers came into effect in 2006 as a result of the 
Childcare Act 2006 it is necessary to observe quality levels before this date and after 
in order to be able to conclude whether a difference in quality has occurred as a 
result of the regulation. Therefore, the period of time where quality is observed is 
from 2000 to 2011. This provides six years’ data for pre-licensing quality and six 
years’ data post-licensing.  In order to construct the dataset every Ofsted report from 
2000 to 2011 relating to nursery schools was found, read and the results recorded. 
This resulted in a dataset containing the results from 1,139 Ofsted reports.  Whilst 
every nursery school should have been captured at least once in the dataset, there is 
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still a possibility that the data does not capture the whole population. For example, 
nurseries set up post 2009 may not have experienced their first inspection before 
2011. As such, whilst the data is a very good representation of the population, it must 
still be defined as a sample. The number of reports included in the analysis is shown 
in table 3.4. 
Table 3-4: Number of Ofsted reports by year 
Year 
Number of 
Ofsted Reports 
Per cent 
Cumulative Per 
cent 
2000 81 7.1 7.1 
2001 93 8.2 15.3 
2002 72 6.3 21.6 
2003 20 1.8 23.4 
2004 54 4.7 28.2 
2005 47 4.1 32.3 
2006 113 9.9 42.2 
2007 159 13.9 56.1 
2008 122 10.7 66.8 
2009 155 13.6 80.4 
2010 151 13.2 93.7 
2011 72 6.3 100 
Total 1139 100  
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As can be observed in the table above 32.3% of the reports included occurred prior to 
the Childcare Act 2006, which enforced licensing in the occupation. As such 67.7% 
of the reports included were recorded after licensing came into force. This could 
result in ‘licensed’ reports being artificially present in the sample, however, there are 
still 367 ‘unlicensed’ reports included. Yet the unequal weighting of pre- and post-
licensing reports limits the reliability of the results.  
3.2.2 Defining Variables 
As the aim of the paper is to analyse the impact regulation has on the quality of 
childcare, the dependent variables in the analysis are measures of quality. The 
independent variable is regulation status. In addition to the dependent and 
independent variables, control variables are included to reduce the chance of the 
hypotheses being falsely accepted. Each of the variables is defined below. 
Dependent Variables 
Quality 
As shown previously, quality can be measured through many different variables. 
However, within this study the measures of quality used are derived directly from the 
aims of the Childcare Act 2006 and the core units present on the compulsory training 
course, which must be attended and passed before a licence can be issued. 
The five measures of quality used in the analysis are as follows: 
1. The quality of the provision 
2. The behaviour of the children 
3. The quality of the leadership and management 
4. The quality of caring 
5. The learning standards 
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Despite the questionnaire that the inspectors need to complete evolving over time, 
these key areas of quality have remained a permanent feature over the period 
included in the analysis.  
The universal appearance of these variables in every inspector’s report and each 
measure being heavily associated with the development and ability of children to 
successfully transition into year 1 level education, as supported by the results from 
the practitioner interviews, means that these measures of quality should reflect the 
aim of the Act and the definitions of quality from the practitioners. 
However, as discussed, the questions that feature in the inspectors’ reports have 
varied over the period of time in question. As such, the different measures of quality 
must be identified in each version of the report. Table 3.5 contains an outline as to 
how each dimension is defined and coded. 
Table 3-5: Definition of variables 
Dimension Year Question Measure Recoding 
Quality of 
Provision 
00/04 13 Quality and 
range of 
curriculum  
Excellent  
Very Good Good 
Satisfactory 
Unsatisfactory  
1=Unsatisfactory 
2=Satisfactory 
3=Good  
4=Very Good 
15 Provision for 
special needs 
16 Provision for 
language 
17 Provision for 
personal 
development 
18 How well the 
school cares 
05/06 20 How effective is 
the teaching and 
learning in 
meeting the full 
range of learners' 
needs? 
1=Outstanding2=
Good  
3= Satisfactory 
4=Inadequate 
1=Inadequate 
2=Satisfactory 
3=Good 
4=Outstanding 
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Dimension Year Question Measure Recoding 
21 How well do the 
curriculum and 
other activities 
meet the range 
of needs and 
interests of 
learners? 
22 How well are 
learners cared 
for, guided and 
supported? 
07/09 20 How effective 
are the teaching 
and learning in 
meeting the full 
range of learners' 
needs? 
21 How well do the 
curriculum and 
other activities 
meet the range 
of needs and 
interests of 
learners? 
22 How well are 
learners cared 
for, guided and 
supported? 
10/11 9 How effectively 
are children in 
the EYFS helped 
to learn and 
develop? 
10 The quality of 
teaching 
11 The extent to 
which 
curriculum 
meets children's 
needs 
12 The 
effectiveness of 
care, guidance 
and support 
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Dimension Year Question Measure Recoding 
Behaviour 00/04 9 Behaviour in and 
out of class 
Excellent 
Very Good Good 
Satisfactory 
Unsatisfactory  
1=Unsatisfactory 
2=Satisfactory 
3=Good 
4= Excellent 
05/06 13 The behaviour of 
learners 
1=Outstanding2=
Good 
3= Satisfactory 
4=Inadequate 
1=Inadequate 
2=Satisfactory 
3=Good 
4=Outstanding 
07/09 13 The behaviour of 
learners 
10/11 4 Children's 
behaviour 
Leadership 
and 
Managemen
t 
00/04 19 Leadership and 
management 
from the head 
Excellent 
Very Good Good 
Satisfactory 
Unsatisfactory  
1=Unsatisfactory 
2=Satisfactory 
3=Good 
 4=Excellent 
20 Governors 
fulfilling roles 
21 Value for money 
22 School’s 
evaluation of 
performance 
23 Strategic Use of 
Resources 
05/06 23 How effective 
are leadership 
and management 
in raising 
achievement and 
supporting all 
learners? 
1=Outstanding2=
Good 
3= Satisfactory 
4=Inadequate 
1=Inadequate 
2=Satisfactory 
3=Good 
4=Outstanding 
24 How effectively 
leaders and 
managers at all 
levels set clear 
direction leading 
to improvement 
and promote 
high quality of 
care and 
education 
25 How effectively 
performance is 
monitored, 
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Dimension Year Question Measure Recoding 
evaluated and 
improved to 
meet challenging 
targets 
26 How well is 
equality of 
opportunity 
promoted and 
discrimination 
tackled so that 
all learners 
achieve as well 
as they can? 
27 How well and 
efficiently are 
resources, are 
deployed to 
achieve value for 
money? 
28 The extent to 
which governors 
and other 
supervisory 
boards discharge 
their 
responsibilities 
29 The adequacy 
and suitability of 
staff to ensure 
that learners are 
protected 
07/09 23 How effective 
are leadership 
and management 
in raising 
achievement and 
supporting all 
learners? 
24 How effectively 
leaders and 
managers at all 
levels set clear 
direction leading 
to improvement 
and promote 
high quality of 
care and 
education 
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Dimension Year Question Measure Recoding 
25 How effectively 
performance is 
monitored, 
evaluated and 
improved to 
meet challenging 
targets 
26 How well is 
equality of 
opportunity 
promoted and 
discrimination 
tackled so that 
all learners 
achieve as well 
as they can? 
27 How well and 
efficiently are 
resources 
deployed to 
achieve value for 
money? 
28 The extent to 
which governors 
and other 
supervisory 
boards discharge 
their 
responsibilities 
29 Do procedures 
for safeguarding 
learners meet 
current 
government 
requirements? 
10/11 13 How effectively 
is provision in 
the EYFS led 
and managed? 
14 The 
effectiveness of 
leadership and 
management in 
embedding 
ambition and 
driving 
improvement 
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Dimension Year Question Measure Recoding 
15 The 
effectiveness of 
the governing 
body in 
challenging and 
supporting the 
school so that 
weaknesses are 
tackled 
decisively and 
statutory 
responsibilities 
met 
16 The 
effectiveness of 
the school's 
engagement with 
parents and 
carers 
17 The 
effectiveness of 
partnerships in 
promoting 
learning and 
well-being 
18 How well 
equality of 
opportunity is 
promoted and 
discrimination 
eliminated 
19 The 
effectiveness of 
safeguarding 
procedures 
21 How effectively 
and efficiently 
are resources, 
including staff, 
deployed to 
achieve value for 
money? 
Caring 00/04 18 How well the 
school cares 
Excellent 
Very Good Good 
Satisfactory 
Unsatisfactory  
1=Unsatisfactory 
2=Satisfactory 
3=Good 
 4=Excellent 
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Dimension Year Question Measure Recoding 
05/06 22 How well are 
learners cared 
for, guided and 
supported? 
1=Outstanding2=
Good 
3= Satisfactory 
4=Inadequate 
1=Inadequate 
2=Satisfactory 
3=Good 
4=Outstanding 
07/09 22 How well are 
learners cared 
for, guided and 
supported? 
10/11 12 The 
effectiveness of 
care, guidance 
and support 
Learning 
Standards 
00/04 1 Language and 
Literature 
Excellent 
Very Good Good 
Satisfactory 
Unsatisfactory  
1=Unsatisfactory 
2=Satisfactory 
3=Good 
4=Excellent 
2 Maths 
3 Personal and 
social 
development 
4 Knowledge and 
understanding of 
the world 
5 Physical 
development 
6 Creative 
development 
7 Other areas 
05/06 7 How well do 
learners achieve? 
1=Outstanding2=
Good 
3=Satisfactory 
4=Inadequate 
1=Inadequate 
2=Satisfactory 
3=Good 
4=Outstanding 
8 Are the 
standards 
reached by 
learners? 
07/09 7 How well do 
learners achieve? 
8 Are the 
standards 
reached by 
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Dimension Year Question Measure Recoding 
learners? 
10/11 1 How effective is 
the provision in 
meeting the 
needs of children 
in the EYFS? 
2 Children's 
achievement and 
the extent to 
which they enjoy 
learning 
As can be observed from the table above, each dimension of quality is measured by 
calculating the mean of several associated questions. In order to determine if this is a 
valid way to measure each dimension, a statistical calculation of internal consistency 
is conducted. As a result of the calculation a Cronbach’s alpha for each dimension 
was found.  
Cronbach’s alpha is an estimator of reliability. The calculation is used for scaled data 
to confirm that each item included in the overall measure is correlated with the group 
total. As such, the results range from 0 (indicating none of the items are correlated 
with the group total) to 1 (indicating that all items are perfectly correlated with the 
total). Within social science a coefficient of 0.7 or above is usually acceptable, 
though for scientific research much higher coefficients are needed (Kline 1999). 
Where the coefficient is less than 0.7 further factor analysis is needed in order to 
identify which item is not correlated with the group total and should be reversed or 
removed from the variable. However, for every dimension of quality the coefficients 
were above 0.7 so no further analysis was required. Therefore, analysis proceeds 
with the items and variables listed in table 3.5. 
Independent Variables 
An independent variable is not dependent on any other variable in an analysis. It is 
the variable that is being analysed to see if it has a significant impact on the 
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dependent variables. In this investigation the independent variable is regulation 
status. 
Licensing  
Licensing is the legal requirement for an individual to obtain a licence before they 
can legally work. Licences can only be obtained once a given level of competency is 
displayed. Licensing came into effect as a result of the Childcare Act 2006. As such, 
reports conducted before 2006 occurred pre-licensing and reports conducted in 2006 
or later, occurred post licensing. The variable created for licensing is binary: 1 
signifies presence of licensing and 0 indicates an absence. As each report contains 
the date of inspection this is used to generate the licensing variable. 
It is the intention of the remainder of this paper to investigate the impact licensing 
has had on these 5 different measures of quality. However, in order not to inflate the 
results, some of the analysis will also take into account other factors which may have 
an impact on quality, and these will be the control variables. 
Control Variables 
Control variables are other factors that may impact the quality of childcare provided. 
Their inclusion prevents the impact licensing may have had, becoming over 
exaggerated. To ensure key factors were included as control variables, interviews 
were conducted with experienced childcare workers. In all, 15 interviews were 
conducted with the aim of defining variables that should be included in the analysis 
as controls. 
The 15 interviews conducted consisted of 9 with nursery school leaders and 6 with 
head teachers of primary schools across England. The interviews were conducted 
between July and August 2011. Each interview lasted between 90 and 120 minutes. 
The sample was selected out of convenience. Although this may result in some bias, 
location was not considered a significant factor in forming an opinion with regard to 
childcare. In addition, as the interviews are used to support the methodology and do 
not contribute directly to the results, the restricted sample of interviews is not of 
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grave concern. The interviews were largely unstructured but one main question was 
posed: what factors, beyond the quality of staff, have a significant impact on the 
quality of childcare given?  
When asked, eight of the respondents thought that the smaller the age range covered, 
the greater the amount of attention each child would receive and as a result the 
greater the development of the child would be. The smaller the size of the nursery 
was also believed to have a positive association with quality, according to nine of the 
respondents. The majority of respondents (12 out of 15) highlighted the need for 
consistency in care for children. As such, most of the nursery leaders (7 out of 9) 
stated that a change in nursery leader could have an impact on the quality of care, 
either negatively because of a lack of consistency or positively because new ideas 
and approaches are introduced. A sizeable portion (6 out of 15) also mentioned the 
possibility that single sex classes can affect the behaviour and learning of children; 
both identified as signals of quality. 
In addition to internal nursery factors such as size and leadership, respondents also 
stated that factors external to the nursery school may also have an impact on quality. 
Although many different factors were mentioned including the amount of green 
space surrounding the nursery school, whether it was located in an urban or rural 
setting, and how involved the parents were, there is one key factor that was 
mentioned by all of the respondents: “affluence of the area”. All of the respondents 
identified affluence as instrumental in how ‘good’ a nursery school is. Some stated (6 
out of 15) that this was linked to the financial pressure faced by parents because it 
affected how much demand for care there was and how much time was given at 
home to developing children academically and emotionally. No other factors were 
agreed upon by a majority of respondents. 
It is clear from the results of the interviews that there are some factors that are 
commonly regarded by nursery leaders and head teachers as having the ability to 
affect the quality of a nursery school. These are identified from the sample as, size of 
the nursery, the age range of children, if the class is mixed or single sex, and if the 
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leader has changed. The external factor raised was the affluence of the area in which 
the nursery school is located. Therefore the control variables used in the analysis are: 
Year 
The year the report was conducted is found through the date of inspection. The need 
for inclusion of the year variable is to account for any trend, either positive or 
negative, over time. As such this is a continuous variable. 
Experience 
This variable is found by recording how many times the nursery school had been 
inspected after 2000. The rationale for the inclusion of this variable is that the more 
experienced a nursery is at undergoing inspections, the more areas for improvement 
they have been given, the better their quality will become. Further, the more 
inspections a nursery experiences, the greater their ability to clearly signal the 
qualities to an inspector. 
Change in Provision Leader 
This variable is found through observing who the provision leader was at the time of 
the report and who the provision leader was the last time the nursery was inspected. 
This is a binary variable coded 1 for a change in provision leader and 0 for no 
change. The reason for including a variable is to account for the impact a leader has 
on the quality of nursery care given by the provider. 
Number on Roll 
This is found on the inspection report. The number on the roll is a discrete variable 
with a minimum value of 1.  
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Single Sex  
The gender composition is recorded in the inspectors’ report. The variable is coded 1 
for a single sex cohort and 0 for mixed. The reason for including the variable is in 
response to some interviewees reporting that the gender composition of the cohort 
may impact upon the behaviour and learning of the children. 
Age Range 
The ages covered by a provision are recorded on the inspectors’ report. The variable 
is generated by counting all the possible ages that could be present in the nursery 
school. For example, if a nursery school covers children between 3 and 5, the ages a 
child could be are 3, 4 or 5, as such the age range is 3. This variable is continuous. 
The reason for including age range as a control is the assumption that the smaller the 
age range of the children, the higher the quality of care.  
All of these control variables are present within the Ofsted dataset. However, the last 
control variable, affluence, does not feature in the Ofsted reports. Therefore, an 
additional database had to be used:  Community Analysis Methods and Evaluative 
Options (CAMEO).  
CAMEO classification is a UK system for analysis and segmentation of the 
population by postcode. CAMEO is executed in the UK by “Callcredits”, a London 
based company that markets itself as a tool for marketing and customer analysis for 
businesses across the economy. It was first established in 1991 and contains data on 
each of the 1.9 million postcodes in the UK. 
CAMEO can define various characteristics of any given postcode but the 
characteristics of interest, as highlighted from the interviews, is affluence and 
financial pressure. As such, every postcode of the nurseries included in the dataset 
had to be found, following on from which, the CAMEO results for the affluence and 
credit risks of each postcode were researched. The dataset consists of 1,139 
investigations, as there are 1,139 reports included in the dataset. The variable derived 
from CAMEO to be used in the investigation is defined below: 
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Affluence 
CAMEO measures of affluence are based upon the following variables: 
• Average income 
• Occupation 
• Number of directorships 
• Number of part-time workers 
• Unemployment rates 
• Tax credits 
• Pension rates 
• Student grants and loans 
CAMEO uses government reports and data including the Family Resources Survey 
(FRS), British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and, the Annual Survey of Hours 
and Earnings (ASHE). As such, it is used by many of the top-ranking companies in 
the UK (Callcredit 2013). 
The overall measure comprises of all of these measures and is postcode specific. The 
results are broken down into 57 categories. In turn these categories are divided into 
10 main classification groups which are further reduced to 5 broad measures of 
affluence. The categorisation is presented in table 3.6 below. 
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Table 3-6: CAMEO Social Types 
Affluence Social Group Social Sub-Group 
Amongst the 
Most Affluent 
in the UK 
Affluent Singles 
and Couples in 
Exclusive 
Urban 
Neighbourhoods 
1A: Opulent couples and singles in executive 
city and suburban areas 
1B: Wealthy singles in small city flats and 
suburban terraces 
1C: Urban living professional singles and 
couples 
1D: Wealthy and educated singles in student 
areas 
Wealthy 
Neighbourhoods 
Nearing and 
Enjoying 
Retirement 
2A: Opulent older and retired households in 
special urban properties 
2B: Affluent mature families and couples in 
large exclusive detached homes 
2C: Affluent mature couples and singles 
some with school age children 
2D: Wealthy suburban professionals in 
mixed tenure 
Higher than 
Average 
Affluent Home 
Owning 
Couples and 
Families in 
Large Houses 
3A: Wealthy older families in spacious and 
rural detached and semis 
3B: Young and mature couples and families 
in large rural dwellings 
3C: Well-off older couples and families in 
large detached and semis 
3D: Wealthy mixed households living in 
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Affluence Social Group Social Sub-Group 
rural communities 
Suburban 
Homeowners in 
Smaller Private 
Family Homes 
4A: Executive households in suburban 
terraces and semis 
4B: Professional home owners in detached 
and semi suburbia 
4C: White collar home owners in outer 
suburbs and coastal areas 
4D: Mature owner occupiers in rural and 
coastal areas 
4E: Couples and families in modern rural and 
suburban developments 
4F: Mature couples and families in 
mortgaged detached and semis 
Average Comfortable 
Mixed Tenure 
Neighbourhoods 
5A: Singles, couples and school aged 
families in mixed houses 
5B: Young and older single mortgagees and 
renters in terraces and flats 
5C: Mature and retired singles in areas of 
small mixed housing 
5D: Young and older households in coastal, 
rural and suburban areas 
5E: Mature households in Scottish industrial 
suburbs and rural communities 
5F: Young and older households in areas of 
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Affluence Social Group Social Sub-Group 
mixed tenure 
5G: Older couples and singles in suburban 
family semis 
Lower then 
Average 
Less Affluent 
Family 
Neighbourhoods 
6A: Less affluent communities in areas of 
mixed tenure 
6B: Older and mature households in 
suburban semis and terraces 
6C: Mixed households in mostly welsh 
suburban communities and rural areas 
6D: Couples and families with school age 
and older children in spacious semis 
6E: Mature households in less affluent 
suburban and rural areas 
6F: Less affluent couples in suburban family 
neighbourhoods 
6G: Young singles and family communities 
in small terraces and rented flats 
Less Affluent 
Singles and 
Students in 
Urban Areas 
7A: Single mortgages and renters in pre-
school family neighbourhoods 
7B: singles and families in ethnically mixed 
inner city and suburban areas 
7C: Young flat-dwelling singles and couples 
in inner city student areas 
7D: Young singles, couples and students in 
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Affluence Social Group Social Sub-Group 
urban areas 
7E: Young singles in privately rented and 
housing association properties 
Poorer White 
and Blue Collar 
Workers 
8A: Poorer retired households in owned and 
rented accommodation 
8B: Older and mature households in 
suburban areas of mixed tenure 
8C: Older households with school age 
children in towns and suburbs 
8D: Poorer young singles in suburban family 
areas 
8E: Mixed mortgagees and council tenants in 
outer suburbs 
8F: Singles and couples in smaller terraced 
properties 
Low Poorer Family 
and Single 
Parent 
Households 
9A: Poorer singles in outer suburban family 
neighbourhoods 
9B: Poorer singles and families in mixed 
tenure 
9C: Suburban Scottish households in small 
terraces and flats 
9D: Ethnically mixed young families and 
singles in terraced housing 
9E: Poorer couples and school aged families 
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Affluence Social Group Social Sub-Group 
in terraced and semis 
9F: Flat dwellers in council and housing 
association accommodation 
9G: Young and older households in housing 
association and mortgaged homes 
Poorer Council 
Tenants 
Including Many 
Single Parents 
10A: Hi-rise flat dwellers in cosmopolitan 
areas of mixed tenure 
10B: Council tenants and mortgagees in 
Scottish suburbia 
10C: Poorer mortgages and council renters in 
family neighbourhoods 
10D: Singles and single parents in suburban 
high-rise flats 
10E: Mature households in small terraces and 
semis 
10F: Poorer singles in local authority family 
neighbourhoods 
10G: Single renters in mixed age high-rise 
communities 
Source: CAMEO Handbook 2013 
As a result, affluence is measured on a 5-point scale from 1-5, where 1 represents the 
least affluent and 5 the most.   
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Therefore, the data used in the quantitative analysis concerning the impact licensing 
has on the quality of childcare provided by nursery workers are drawn from two 
sources: Ofsted and CAMEO. The data source used for each variable is outlined in 
table 3.7. 
Table 3-7: Data source for analysis 
Variable Data Source Type of Variable 
Quality Ofsted Dependent 
Licensing Ofsted Independent 
Year Ofsted Control 
Experience Ofsted Control 
Change in Provision Leader Ofsted Control 
Number On Role Ofsted Control 
Single Sex Cohort Ofsted Control 
Age Range Ofsted Control 
Affluence of the Area CAMEO Control 
Credit Risk CAMEO Control 
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3.2.3 Analysis 
The aim of this paper is to determine whether the following hypotheses are correct: 
H1: Licensing of nursery workers increases the quality of childcare 
 H1a: Licensing of nursery workers increases the quality of provision 
 H1b: Licensing of nursery workers improves the behaviour of children 
H1c: Licensing of nursery workers increases the quality of             
leadership/management 
 H1d: Licensing of nursery workers increases the quality of caring 
H1e: Licensing of nursery workers improves learning standards 
In order to investigate these hypotheses and conclude if a significant effect has been 
made on quality since the Childcare Act 2006 came into force and required the 
licensing of nursery workers, a statistical analysis is undertaken. Two statistical tools 
are used, t-tests and regression. 
 t-Test  
In the first instance, to observe if there is a significant difference in the mean scores 
relating to each of the quality dimensions, a t-test is conducted.  
Although a t-test is a good tool for an initial assessment, the test is limited by its 
inability to control for other factors that may influence the mean of the variable of 
interest. In this case, there may be other factors affecting the levels of quality beyond 
the presence of licensing. Therefore, in order not to inflate the influence licensing 
has had, a further statistical analysis is conducted that takes into account these 
variables. 
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Regression 
A regression is conducted to assess the relationship between licensing and quality 
whilst controlling for other factors that may moderate the relationship. 
There are two types of least square regressions: ordinary least square and non-linear 
squares. Ordinary least squares (OLS), is appropriate for use on a finite set of 
variables and uses a closed expression in order to compute the associations between 
the dependent and independent variables. The dataset being constructed is finite and 
the variables used are scaled, thus the OLS method is used. 
A significant association is concluded if the beta value calculated (the correlation 
between the variable in question and the dependent variable) has an associated 
significance of less than 0.05, and a very significant association is concluded if this 
value is less than 0.01. The effectiveness of the model is determined by its ability to 
explain the dependent variable. This is shown by the R-squared of the model. The R-
squared shows the portion of the dependent variable explained by the model. The R-
squared adjusted shows this in terms of the standard deviation of the dependent 
variable. The higher the R-squared, the better the model. 
A summary of the variables included in each regression is presented in table 3.8. 
Table 3-8: Summary of Regression Variables 
Type Variable 
Dependent Learning Standards 
Behaviour of Children 
Quality of Care 
Quality of Provision 
Quality of Leadership and Management 
Independent Presence of Licensing 
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Type Variable 
Control Characteristic of the Nursery Year 
Experience 
Change in Provision Leader 
Number on Role 
Single Sex 
Age Range 
Characteristics of the Area Affluence of the Area 
Credit Risk of the Area 
 
As a result of including the variables listed above the model generated from the 
analysis into the impact regulation has on quality will take the following form: 
Yquality = βihXih + βijXij + βirXir + ε 
Where Xih represents characteristics of the nursery variables, Xij denotes area 
characteristics, Xir is the licensing variable and ε is the error. 
3.2.4 Limitations 
Despite every effort to produce reliable and valid results, every analysis has 
limitations. Through using Ofsted reports spanning 10 years as the basis for the 
dataset, one would presume that every nursery must be present in the data. However, 
it is possible that some are missing. As mentioned previously, this may have 
occurred because the nurseries were not in existence long enough to require an 
Ofsted inspection, or it may be because they started after 2008 and are not due their 
first inspection before 2011. As the population cannot be assumed to be included, 
one of the limitations of the analysis is one faced by any analysis using a sample. 
The results may not represent every nursery in the population.  
An additional limitation is the process by which the control variables were defined. 
Whilst interviewing professionals with experience of providing childcare may be 
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useful, the sample size is small at 15 and the results are likely to be very subjective 
because they are based on personal experience. However, as the majority of 
interviewees mentioned the same variables, the results would be suggestive of 
reliability. 
The Ofsted inspection reports may also pose a problem. Although Ofsted accredits 
the compulsory training courses for nursery workers, and the reports focus on the 
EYFS, there may be issues with the reliability of the reports. First, the reports assess 
quality on a restrictive framework containing a 5-point scale. Therefore, the reports 
may not capture the full picture of the quality of a nursery school. Second, although a 
scale is used, the inspectors’ perceptions of a nursery school are fairly subjective and 
heavily influenced by the quality of other nursery schools inspected. Third, the 
limited number of questions within an Ofsted report may mean that not everyone’s 
definition of quality in childcare is covered. However, as this investigation intends to 
assess the implications of licensing on a national level, no other data is available on 
the quality of childcare over the period 2000-2011. As a consequence, despite 
potential issues with its reliability, Ofsted is the only valid option. 
3.3 Results 
The aim of this paper is to investigate whether the Childcare Act 2006 and the 
subsequent licensing of nursery workers has had a positive effect on the quality of 
childcare. The measures of quality used are based upon the 5 aims of the Act with 
regard to quality, and the 5 core units covered by the compulsory training scheme for 
licensed workers. In order to investigate the association between licensing and the 
quality of childcare data were derived from the Ofsted reports and the CAMEO 
postcode database.  
First, a description of the quality measures will be provided followed by the t-test 
results that analyse if there has been a significant change in the mean score of each 
provision since the change in regulation.  
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Second, a description of the characteristics of nursery schools is presented, following 
on from which the results from a correlation analysis concerned with the association 
of each characteristic and each measure of quality is presented. Then the results from 
a t-test are tabulated. The t-test analysed if there had been a significant change in 
each of the variables since the change in regulation. 
Third, a description of the affluence of the nurseries’ area are provided, after which 
the association between affluence and the characteristics of nurseries, and the 
different measures of quality is shown through a presentation of a correlation 
analysis. Lastly, t-test results analyse if the affluence of the area nurseries are located 
has significantly changed since the change in regulation. 
Fourth, the regression results are presented. The results are from a regression 
analysis that tests the relationship between licensing and each measure of quality 
whilst also controlling for the characteristics of the nursery and the affluence of the 
area. 
3.3.1 Measures of Quality 
As discussed, the quality of childcare provided is defined by five parameters: 
learning standards, the behaviour of children, the standard of care delivered, the 
quality of provision and the quality of leadership and management.  
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.9 contains the average levels of quality found within each measure. 
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Table 3-9: Description of quality measures 
Quality 
Learning 
Standards 
Behaviour 
of Children 
Standard 
of 
Caring 
Quality of 
Provision 
Quality of 
Leadership 
and 
Management 
Mean 3.26 3.62 3.47 3.47 3.43 
Median 3.00 4.00 3.50 3.50 3.50 
Mode 3.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 
Std. Dev. 0.62 0.53 0.55 0.55 0.56 
Range 3.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 
Minimum 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Maximum 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 
Responses 1139 1139 1139 1139 1139 
It is clear from table 3.9 that all the measures of quality are positively skewed. This 
is concluded because the mean of each parameter is greater than the respective 
median. It is also interesting to note that whilst the majority of the measures of 
quality span the whole scale (1:unsatisfactory to 4:excellent), no report records 
behaviour of children as unsatisfactory. However, all measures record some 
observations as excellent. 
Learning standards and behaviour of children have higher mean scores compared to 
the other measures. Similarly, the quality of leadership and management has the 
lowest mean scores when compared to the other measures. In terms of standard 
deviation, learning standards has the greatest variance, whereas behaviour of children 
has the least variance, though this could be partly because of the lack of 
unsatisfactory observations. 
 283 
 
Table 3-10: Quality of learning standards over time 
Learning 
Standards 
Mean Median Mode Std. Dev. Responses 
2000 2.72 3.00 3.00 0.65 81 
2001 3.11 3.00 3.00 0.49 93 
2002 3.56 3.50 4.00 0.42 72 
2003 3.24 3.00 3.00 0.37 20 
2004 3.24 3.00 3.00 0.39 54 
2005 2.82 3.00 3.00 0.63 47 
2006 2.87 3.00 2.50 0.63 113 
2007 3.77 4.00 4.00 0.40 159 
2008 3.07 3.00 3.00 0.54 122 
2009 3.28 3.00 3.00 0.56 155 
2010 3.48 3.50 4.00 0.60 151 
2011 3.36 3.50 4.00 0.63 72 
Total 3.26 3.00 3.00 0.62 1139 
Table 3.10 breaks the average scores of learning standards down by year. The results 
indicate that there are no obvious changes in the mean scores for learning standards 
over the 11-year period, although some fluctuations do occur. There are also no 
marked changes in variance over the period in question. 
Table 3-11: Behaviour over time 
Behaviour Mean Median Mode Std. Dev. Responses 
2000 3.72 4.00 4.00 0.47 81 
2001 3.68 4.00 4.00 0.51 93 
2002 3.67 4.00 4.00 0.53 72 
2003 3.45 3.00 3.00 0.51 20 
 284 
 
Behaviour Mean Median Mode Std. Dev. Responses 
2004 3.31 3.00 3.00 0.47 54 
2005 3.09 3.00 3.00 0.62 47 
2006 3.50 4.00 4.00 0.54 113 
2007 3.75 4.00 4.00 0.45 159 
2008 3.61 4.00 4.00 0.55 122 
2009 3.71 4.00 4.00 0.48 155 
2010 3.68 4.00 4.00 0.48 151 
2011 3.61 4.00 4.00 0.52 72 
Total 3.62 4.00 4.00 0.53 1139 
Similarly, table 3.11 indicates no obvious trend in the average scores concerning the 
behaviour of children, or the variance of scores. However, a dip in the average scores 
is seen between 2003 and 2006 when the mean recorded scores are lower than in 
other years.  
Table 3-12: Quality of care over time 
Standard of 
Care 
Mean Median Mode Std. Dev. Responses 
2000 3.61 4.00 4.00 0.51 81 
2001 3.61 4.00 4.00 0.53 93 
2002 3.68 4.00 4.00 0.50 72 
2003 3.30 3.00 3.00 0.47 20 
2004 3.33 3.00 3.00 0.47 54 
2005 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.69 47 
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Standard of 
Care 
Mean Median Mode Std. Dev. Responses 
2006 3.57 4.00 4.00 0.56 113 
2007 3.62 4.00 4.00 0.55 159 
2008 3.61 4.00 4.00 0.55 122 
2009 3.54 4.00 4.00 0.54 155 
2010 3.70 4.00 4.00 0.49 151 
2011 3.56 4.00 4.00 0.55 72 
Total 3.57 4.00 4.00 0.55 1139 
With regard to the standard of care observed in the inspections, there appears to be 
no obvious trend in the average scores. There are fluctuations, particularly in 2004 
and 2005 when the mean score of observations is lower than in other years. The 
variance is very similar across all the years, though 2004 is lower relative to the other 
years.  
Table 3-13: Quality of provision over time 
Quality of 
Provision 
Mean Median Mode Std. Dev. Responses 
2000 3.51 3.50 4.00 0.43 81 
2001 3.52 3.75 4.00 0.52 93 
2002 3.62 4.00 4.00 0.47 72 
2003 3.25 3.00 3.00 0.47 20 
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Quality of 
Provision 
Mean Median Mode Std. Dev. Responses 
2004 3.24 3.00 3.00 0.41 54 
2005 2.89 3.00 3.00 0.63 47 
2006 3.30 3.00 3.00 0.59 113 
2007 3.48 3.50 4.00 0.54 159 
2008 3.61 3.50 4.00 0.46 122 
2009 3.64 4.00 4.00 0.46 155 
2010 3.51 4.00 4.00 0.61 151 
2011 3.39 3.50 4.00 0.65 72 
Total 3.48 3.50 4.00 0.55 1139 
Table 3.13 contains the results concerning the quality of provision. There is no 
obvious trend in the average scores of the observations. However, the mean score for 
2005 is particularly low at 2.89, which is classified as below average (average=3). 
There is also no obvious pattern in the variance of the observations but the standard 
deviations do fluctuate between 0.41 and 0.65. This may suggest inconsistency 
between inspectors in years where the standard deviation is high.  
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Table 3-14: Quality of leadership/management over time 
Quality of 
Leadership/ 
Management 
Mean Median Mode Std. Dev. Responses 
2000 3.56 3.75 4.00 0.49 81 
2001 3.55 4.00 4.00 0.56 93 
2002 3.58 4.00 4.00 0.55 72 
2003 3.21 3.00 3.00 0.38 20 
2004 3.24 3.00 3.00 0.40 54 
2005 2.89 3.00 3.00 0.64 47 
2006 3.23 3.17 3.00 0.61 113 
2007 3.44 3.50 4.00 0.52 159 
2008 3.41 3.36 4.00 0.57 122 
2009 3.52 3.75 4.00 0.48 155 
2010 3.54 3.75 4.0 0.53 151 
2011 3.42 3.56 4.00 0.59 72 
Total 3.43 3.50 4.00 0.56 1139 
 
Similar results are displayed in table 3.14. As with the other measures of quality, 
there appears to be no obvious trend across the time period analysed. There are 
fluctuations in the average scores (2005 has a relatively low mean score), but there is 
no clear pattern to be observed. The same is true for the variance of observations, 
where there is also no clear trend seen. 
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t-Test Results 
To understand the relationship between licensing and the different measures of 
quality, the point of departure is to observe if there are significant changes in the 
mean quality scores for each time period. The results of the t-tests conducted are 
presented below. 
Table 3-15: T-test results for licensing by measures of quality 
Quality N Mean 
Difference 
in Mean 
t 
Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
Learning 
Standards 
Pre-
Licensing 
367 3.1042 0.22933 5.885** 0.000 
Post-
Licensing 
772 3.3335 
Behaviour Pre-
Licensing 
367 3.5450 0.11178 3.371** 0.001 
Post-
Licensing 
772 3.6568 
Standard of 
Care 
Pre-
Licensing 
367 3.4905 0.11446 3.290** 0.001 
Post-
Licensing 
772 3.6049 
Quality of 
Provision 
Pre-
Licensing 
367 3.4040 0.10123 2.897** 0.004 
Post-
Licensing 
772 3.5052 
Quality of 
Leadership/ 
Management 
Pre-
Licensing 
367 3.4080 0.03115 0.882 0.378 
Post-
Licensing 
772 3.4392 
**. Difference in mean is significant at the 0.01 level  
*. Difference in mean is significant at the 0.05 level  
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The t-test results, as shown in table 3.15, indicate that there is a significant increase 
in most of the measures of quality in the post-licensing period compared to the 
means in the pre-licensing period. The only exception is the quality of leadership and 
management, which shows no significant difference between the two time periods.  
As significant differences were found, further investigation into the significance of 
the relationship has been undertaken in the form of regression analysis. In order to 
produce reliable and valid results, the investigation must account for other variables 
that might impact upon the quality of childcare. The variables included form two 
categories: characteristics of the nursery and characteristics of the location of the 
nursery. Each is presented in turn. 
3.3.2 Characteristics of Nurseries 
The characteristics considered in this analysis are: changes in leadership, age range 
covered by the provider, gender composition of the children and, the number of 
children on roll. A description of each variable, followed by the results of a 
correlation analysis assessing their association with each measure of quality, is 
presented. Following on from that, the results from a t-test conducted to observe if 
there are any significant changes in each of the characteristic variables since 
licensing came into effect are provided.  
Table 3-16: Leadership changes 
Leadership Frequency Per cent 
Cumulative  
Per cent 
Changed Provision 
Leader 
877 77 77 
No Change in Leader 262 23 100 
Total 1139 100  
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Table 3.16 details the change in leadership. Change in leadership is determined if the 
provision leader has changed since the last inspection, within the 2000-2011 time 
period. The results indicate that of the 1,139 reports, 77% indicate a change in 
provision leader since the previous report. Therefore, only 23% have the same 
provision leader for every report conducted between 2000 and 2011.  
Table 3-17: Age range of children 
Age Range of Children 
(years) 
Frequency Per cent Cumulative Per cent 
2 543 47.7 47.7 
2.5 1 0.1 47.8 
3 502 44.1 91.8 
4 27 2.4 94.2 
5 30 2.6 96.8 
6 35 3.1 99.9 
8 1 0.1 100 
Total 1139 100  
The results presented in table 3.17 show that nearly 92% of the sample provides care 
for children of up to 3 consecutive ages. This suggests that nurseries and playgroups 
have a very low variance in age with regard to children in their care. However, 
compared to an average primary school class that has children of up to two different 
ages, for example a year two class which comprises 6 and 7 year olds, perhaps 
nurseries and playgroups are shown to merely mirror the approach taken higher up in 
the education system. 
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Table 3-18: Gender of children 
Gender of Children Frequency Per cent Cumulative Per cent 
Mixed 1135 99.6 99.6 
Single Sex 4 0.4 100 
Total 1139 100  
The results in table 3.18 show that almost all nurseries and playgroups in the sample 
have a mixture of girls and boys on roll. Only 0.4% are recorded as being single sex. 
Table 3-19: Number of children on roll 
 Number of Children on Roll 
Mean 86.15 
Median 80.00 
Mode 80.00 
Standard Deviation 31.24 
Range 255.00 
Minimum 5.00 
Maximum 260.00 
 
In terms of the number of children on roll, the results presented in table 3.19 show 
that nurseries and playgroups have a mean number of 86 children on their books. 
This may appear to be high, especially compared to class sizes in schools. However, 
it is very unlikely that every child on roll will be present in every session. Some will 
enrol but have low attendance. Many children may come to a handful of sessions a 
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week, not every day. Or nurseries may offer morning and afternoon sessions to 
different children reducing the attendees to half the enrolled number. The results also 
show that there is a large variance between the sizes of nurseries; some have 260 
enrolled where as others have only 5. The difference in size indicates how diverse 
the care providers are and how important it is to consider the characteristics of care 
providers when embarking on any analysis in the sector. 
In summary, of the characteristics relating to the size, composition and leadership 
made available through the Ofsted reports, one can conclude that there is vast 
variance amongst nurseries and playgroups. Some are small whilst others potentially 
provide care for hundreds of children. Some focus on caring for a narrow age range, 
whereas others cover many ages. Some provider leaders remain with the same 
nursery for many years and others change leaders frequently. The differences serve 
to show how important it is to consider each nursery or playgroup as unique and 
limit the temptation to stereotype the sector into rigid definitions. 
Correlation Results 
Table 3.20 contains the results of the associations between the characteristics of the 
nurseries and playgroups with the five measures of quality. 
Table 3-20: Correlation results: Quality by characteristics of the nursery 
 
Learning 
Standards 
Behaviour 
of Children 
Standard 
of Care 
Quality of 
Provision 
Quality of 
Leadership 
Management 
Year ρ 
 
0.199** 0.034 0.035 0.04 0.002 
Sig.  
2-tailed 
0.000 0.253 0.243 0.173 0.949 
N 
 
1139 1139 1139 1139 1139 
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Learning 
Standards 
Behaviour 
of Children 
Standard 
of Care 
Quality of 
Provision 
Quality of 
Leadership 
Management 
No. 
Inspection 
ρ 
 
0.209** 0.123** 0.069* 0.106** 0.074* 
Sig.  
2-tailed 
0.000 0.000 0.21 0.000 0.012 
N 
 
1139 1139 1139 1139 1139 
Change in 
Provision 
Leader 
ρ 
 
-0.18 -0.014 -0.037 -0.099** -0.095** 
Sig.  
2-tailed 
0.551 0.627 0.209 0.001 0.001 
N 
 
1139 1139 1139 1139 1139 
Age 
Range 
ρ 
 
0.044 -0.021 -0.038 -0.007 0.009 
Sig.  
2-tailed 
0.134 0.475 0.196 0.812 0.751 
N 
 
1139 1139 1139 1139 1139 
Single-Sex  ρ 
 
0.011 -0.014 -0.034 -0.024 -0.016 
Sig.  
2-tailed 
0.711 0.645 0.248 0.420 0.595 
N 1139 1139 1139 1139 1139 
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Learning 
Standards 
Behaviour 
of Children 
Standard 
of Care 
Quality of 
Provision 
Quality of 
Leadership 
Management 
 
Number of 
Children 
ρ 
 
0.063* 0.067* 0.098** 0.101** 0.100** 
Sig.  
2-tailed 
0.034 0.023 0.001 0.001 0.001 
N 
 
1139 1139 1139 1139 1139 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
The results presented in table 3.10 indicate that all of the measures of quality are 
significantly positively associated with the number of inspections. This suggests that 
the more inspections a nursery or playgroup has over the time period, the observed 
quality is likely to be higher. All of the measures are shown to have a significant 
positive association with the number of children on roll. Therefore, the more children 
on roll, the higher the quality measures are likely to be. The results also show that 
learning standards are positively associated with the year suggesting that learning 
standards are increasing over time.  
A significant negative correlation is found between the quality of provision and the 
quality of leadership/management, with a change in provider leader. This implies 
that when the leader of a nursery or playgroup has changed between two inspections, 
the observed quality of provision and quality of leadership and management is likely 
to reduce. 
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t-Test Results 
In order to conclude if there have been significant changes in the characteristics of 
nurseries since licensing came into force, a t-test was conducted. The results of 
which are presented below. 
Table 3-21: T-test results: Licensing by characteristics of the nursery 
Characteristics of Nurseries N Mean 
Difference 
in Mean 
t 
Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
Number of 
Inspections 
Pre-
Licensing 
367 1.0381 1.25848 36.592** 0.000 
Post-
Licensing 
772 2.2966 
Change in 
Leader 
Pre-
Licensing 
367 0.0163 0.31526 12.602** 0.000 
Post-
Licensing 
772 0.3316 
Age Range Pre-
Licensing 
367 2.5627 0.19640 3.452** 0.001 
Post-
Licensing 
772 2.7591 
Single Sex Pre-
Licensing 
367 0.0027 0.00116 0.309 0.757 
Post-
Licensing 
772 0.0039 
Number of 
Children 
Pre-
Licensing 
367 83.7520 3.53552 1.787 0.074 
Post-
Licensing 
772 87.2576 
**. Difference in mean is significant at the 0.01 level 
*. Difference in mean is significant at the 0.05 level  
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The t-test results presented in table 3.21 show that there are some significant changes 
in the characteristics of nurseries over the two time periods. The number of previous 
inspections recorded is significantly increased post-licensing. This is expected, as 
licensing occurs in the latter part of the period covered by the data. As such, one 
would expect nurseries inspected during this period to have been inspected before. 
The results could also suggest that nurseries are inspected more frequently following 
coming into force, though further investigation is needed to make a firm conclusion. 
Changing of the provision leader is also more likely post-licensing. This could be as 
a result of increased pressure to adhere to the licensing and Early Years Framework 
regulations. There is also a significantly greater age range being covered by nurseries 
post-licensing. This could be a way in which nurseries are recouping any cost 
incurred as a result of licensing. By increasing the ages covered by their provision, 
they are increasing their potential customer base and therefore, potentially, their 
turnover. However, the lack of a significant increase in children on the roll may 
dispute this. Instead, perhaps the change is a result of increased competition or 
demand from parents returning to employment. 
3.3.3 Characteristics of the Location 
In addition, considering the characteristics of the nurseries and playgroups, the 
characteristics of the area are also considered. This is in response to interviews held 
with head teachers and playgroup leaders who indicated that some characteristics are 
likely to influence the characteristics of a nursery or playgroup, and subsequently 
their quality levels. The characteristics highlighted centre on the affluence of the area 
in which the nursery or playgroup is located. The affluence of the area is recorded, as 
are two sub-components of affluence; average credit score and credit risk. 
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Descriptives 
Table 3-22: Area information: credit score 
Credit Score Frequency Per cent 
Cumulative  
Per cent 
1 79 6.9 6.9 
1.5 90 7.9 14.8 
2 125 11.0 25.8 
2.5 67 5.9 31.7 
3 448 39.3 71.0 
3.5 20 1.8 72.8 
4 205 18.0 90.8 
4.5 62 5.4 96.2 
5 43 3.8 100 
Total 1139 100  
Table 3.22 indicates the median credit score associated with the postcode of each 
nursery or playgroup in the sample. The results show that over 25% of all those in 
the sample are located in a postcode with a lower than average credit score. 
However, this means that nearly 75% are located in a postcode with at least an 
average credit score. This may hint at an association between credit scores and 
presence of childcare provision. The suggestion would be that childcare provision is 
more likely to be in areas with a good credit rating. As credit scores are linked to 
income, savings and financial management this would enforce the notion that 
childcare is used predominately by those in higher status jobs. 
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Table 3-23: Credit score over time 
Credit 
Score 
Mean Median Mode Std. Dev. Responses 
2000 2.81 3.00 3.00 1.09 81 
2001 3.09 3.00 3.00 1.03 93 
2002 3.08 3.00 3.00 0.88 72 
2003 2.75 3.00 3.00 1.06 20 
2004 2.96 3.00 3.00 0.91 54 
2005 2.72 3.00 3.00 1.23 47 
2006 2.91 3.00 3.00 1.08 113 
2007 3.04 3.00 3.00 0.96 159 
2008 2.93 3.00 3.00 1.05 122 
2009 2.93 3.00 3.00 1.03 155 
2010 2.98 3.00 3.00 0.97 151 
2011 2.87 3.00 3.00 1.02 72 
Total 2.95 3.00 3.00 1.02 1139 
Table 3.23 shows the average and variance of credit scores by year. The results show 
that over time there is no obvious trend, either positive or negative. There are 
fluctuations in both the mean and standard deviations, but they follow no easily 
observable pattern. 
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Table 3-24: Credit risk over time 
Credit 
Risk 
Mean Median Mode Std. Dev. Responses 
2000 716.63 750.00 656.00 163.82 81 
2001 756.72 774.00 769.00 132.77 93 
2002 762.28 769.00 724.00 103.62 72 
2003 704.95 772.00 361.00 171.55 20 
2004 719.81 769.00 774.00 175.79 54 
2005 699.53 753.00 549.00 173.54 47 
2006 727.77 769.00 656.00 162.24 113 
2007 749.02 769.00 724.00 135.02 159 
2008 731.05 769.00 769.00 155.16 122 
2009 734.71 769.00 656.00 146.64 155 
2010 739.08 769.00 769.00 139.79 151 
2011 728.28 758.50 549.00 149.95 72 
Total 735.37 769.00 769.00 148.08 1139 
Table 3.24 contains the credit risk assessment for the postcodes where each nursery 
or playgroup is located. A credit risk is found by considering ‘bad’ debts, county 
court judgments and late payments. It is heavily linked to credit scores, however, the 
measurements are far more precise than a credit score (measured on a scale of 0 to 
1000 rather than 0-5, as a credit score would be). The results do, however, mirror 
those of the credit score results presented in table 3.24. The findings show no clear 
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pattern or trend over time but do suggest that childcare provision is more likely in 
financially affluent areas. 
Table 3-25: Are information: affluence 
Affluence Frequency Per cent 
Cumulative  
Per cent 
Low 88 7.7 7.7 
Lower than Average 589 51.7 59.4 
Average 194 17 76.5 
Above Average 231 20.3 96.8 
Amongst Most 
Affluent 
37 3.2 100 
Total 1139 100  
Table 3.25 contains the results of the overall measurement of affluence. This takes 
into account credit scores but also average earnings. The results indicate that over 
59% of care providers are located in a postcode which has lower than average 
affluence levels. Further, only 23.5% are recorded as being located in postcodes of 
higher than average levels affluence. This may suggest that the greatest demand for 
childcare in the form of nurseries and playgroups is in less affluent areas where more 
children are likely to reside in dual income families. As such, families in these areas 
rely on childcare in order to earn enough money, creating a big demand for childcare 
providers.  
Given the lower than average income of childcare workers it could also be the case 
that less affluent postcodes have cheaper property costs. This is attractive to care 
providers as low property costs reduce overheads and increase the chance of making 
a profit or paying staff more to reduce turnover rates. 
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Table 3-26: Affluence over time 
Affluence Mean Median Mode Std. Dev. Responses 
2000 2.58 2.00 2.00 1.04 81 
2001 2.69 2.00 2.00 1.04 93 
2002 2.63 2.00 3.00 0.98 72 
2003 2.50 2.00 2.00 0.76 20 
2004 2.50 2.00 2.00 0.91 54 
2005 2.74 2.00 2.00 1.05 47 
2006 2.65 2.00 2.0 1.01 113 
2007 2.60 2.00 2.00 0.99 159 
2008 2.58 2.00 2.00 1.03 122 
2009 2.59 2.00 2.00 1.05 155 
2010 2.54 2.00 2.00 0.96 151 
2011 2.50 2.00 2.00 0.98 72 
Total 2.60 2.00 2.00 1.00 1139 
Table 3.26 shows the average and variance of affluence level by year for the 
observations in the sample. Despite fluctuations in the mean levels or affluence and 
the variation of these levels, there is no obvious pattern to the results suggesting a 
lack of a significant positive or negative association between affluence and time.  
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Correlation Results 
Characteristics of Nurseries 
To confirm if the characteristic of the location in which nurseries or playgroups are 
found is associated with the characteristics of the nursery or playgroup, a correlation 
was conducted. The results are presented in table 3.27. 
Table 3-27: Correlation results: Affluence by nursery characteristics 
  Year 
Number of 
Children 
Age 
Range 
Change 
in Leader 
No. 
Inspection
s 
Affluence ρ 
 
-0.029 0.029 -0.091** 0.023 0.029 
Sig.  
2-tailed 
0.336 0.323 0.002 0.446 0.336 
N 
 
1139 1139 1139 1139 1139 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
The results show that there is a significant negative association between affluence 
and the age range covered by a nursery or playgroup. This suggests that the nurseries 
or playgroups in affluent areas are more likely to provide care for children of a 
concentrated age range. Those nurseries or playgroups in less affluent areas are more 
likely to care for children of various ages. The results show no other significant 
associations. 
In all the characteristics of the location of the nursery or playgroup they are not 
shown to be particularly significant with the characteristics of the care provider. 
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There are some significant associations between the location characteristic and the 
quality of care provided. However, these associations are not as prevalent or 
significant as the correlation results concerning the characteristics of the nurseries or 
playgroups.  
Measures of Quality 
In order to confirm if the characteristics of the location of a nursery are associated 
with each measure of quality a correlation was conducted. The results are presented 
below. 
Table 3-28: Correlation results: Quality by affluence 
  
Learning 
Standards 
Behaviour 
of Children 
Standard 
of Care 
Quality of 
Provision 
Quality of 
Leadership/ 
Management 
Affluence ρ 
 
0.061* 0.033 -0.023 0.010 -0.019 
Sig.  
2-tailed 
0.039 0.270 0.428 0.744 0.521 
N 
 
1139 1139 1139 1139 1139 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
Table 3.28 contains the results of a correlation analysis between the characteristics of 
the location of the nursery or playgroup, and the different measures of quality. There 
is a significant positive association of the affluence of an area and the average 
observed learning standards. The result implies that the higher the recorded 
affluence, the higher the learning standards are likely to be. 
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t-Test Results 
The results from the t-tests concerning significant differences in where the nurseries 
are located are presented in table 3.29. 
Table 3-29: T-test results: Licensing by affluence 
Characteristics of Location N Mean 
Difference 
in Mean 
t 
Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
Affluence Pre-
Licensing 
367 2.6240 -0.04108 -0.649 0.517 
Post-
Licensing 
772 2.5829 
**. Difference in mean is significant at the 0.01 level  
*. Difference in mean is significant at the 0.05 level  
The results in the table above show that there is no significant change in the 
affluence of the postcode where nurseries are located.  
3.3.4 Regression Results 
As significant changes are found in the mean scores of quality since licensing came 
into effect, further investigation into the relationship between licensing and quality 
was justified. In order not to inflate the impact licensing has on quality, control 
variables were added to the regression analysis. As both the characteristics of the 
nursery and the affluence (credit score and affluence are too heavily correlated with 
one another for both be included) of the area are found to be associated with quality, 
these variables were included. 
The results of the regression conducted for each measure of quality are presented in 
turn below. 
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Learning Standards 
Table 3-30: Regression results: Impact of licensing on learning standards (no controls) 
 Beta Sig. 
Licensing 0.229* 0.000 
R-Squared 0.030 
R-Squared Adjusted 0.029 
N 1139 
**. Beta is significant at the 0.01 level  
*. Beta is significant at the 0.05 level  
The regression results presented in table 3.30 show that when only the licensing 
variable is included in the analysis, it has a significant positive relationship. 
However, when the control variables are added into the analysis, the significance and 
magnitude of the relationship is depleted. 
Table 3-31: Regression results: Impact of licensing on learning standards  
(with controls) 
 Beta Sig. 
Licensing 0.024 0.766 
Year 0.015 0.277 
No. Inspection 0.124** 0.002 
Change in Provision Leader -0.156** 0.001 
Age Range 0.015* 0.464 
Single Sex 0.055 0.857 
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 Beta Sig. 
No. Children 0.001** 0.134 
Affluence 0.039* 0.033 
R-Squared 0.062 
R-Squared Adjusted 0.055 
N 1139 
**. Beta is significant at the 0.01 level  
*. Beta is significant at the 0.05 level 
The results presented in table 3.31 are the regression results when all the control 
variables are included. The results show that once the other variables are included 
there is no significant relationship between licensing and learning standards. As a 
result, the hypothesis that licensing will increase learning standards is rejected. 
The results indicate that there is a significant positive relationship between the 
number of previous inspections a nursery has had and its score for learning 
standards. This means the more inspections a nursery has, the higher the learning 
standards tend to be. There is also a significant positive relationship between the age 
range of children and learning standards. This means the greater the range of ages 
covered by the provider, the higher their score for learning standards is likely to be. 
In addition there is a significant relationship shown between the number of children 
on roll and the learning standards scores. As a consequence, larger nurseries can be 
expected to receive higher learning standards scores. 
There is also a significantly positive relationship between the affluence of the area in 
which a nursery is located and its learning scores. The more affluent the postcode the 
higher the scores are likely to be.  
A significant negative relationship is found between a change in provider leader and 
learning standards. This suggests that, on average, where the leader of a nursery 
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changes between inspections, the scores for learning standards fall in the subsequent 
inspection. 
In summary there is no significant relationship between licensing and learning 
standards once the control variables are included in the model. There are however, 
significant relationships between some of the control variables and learning 
standards scores. 
Behaviour of Children 
Table 3-32: Regression results: Impact of licensing on behaviour of children  
(no controls) 
 Beta Sig. 
Licensing 0.112** 0.001 
R-Squared 0.010 
R-Squared Adjusted 0.009 
N 1139 
**. Beta is significant at the 0.01 level  
*. Beta is significant at the 0.05 level 
The regression results presented in table 3.32 show that when only the licensing 
variable is included in the analysis, it has a significant positive relationship. When 
the control variables are added, the magnitude of the relationship and its significance 
changes. 
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Table 3-33: Regression results: Impact of licensing on behaviour of children  
(with controls) 
 Beta Sig. 
Licensing 0.356** 0.000 
Year -0.075** 0.000 
No. Inspection 0.206** 0.000 
Change in Provision Leader -0.091* 0.018 
Age Range -0.008 0.652 
Single Sex -0.161 0.531 
No. Children 0.001** 0.005 
Affluence 0.008 0.606 
R-Squared 0.061 
R-Squared Adjusted 0.055 
N 1139 
**. Beta is significant at the 0.01 level  
*. Beta is significant at the 0.05 level 
Table 3.33 contains the results from the regression analysis containing the licensing 
variable and all other control variables. The results indicate a significant positive 
relationship between licensing and the observed behaviour of children. Despite the 
inclusion of the control variables, the magnitude of their relationship increases in the 
second model. This may be because of the significant negative associations found 
between some of the control variables and observed behaviour scores. As a 
consequence of the results, the hypothesis that licensing will improve the behaviour 
of children is accepted. 
 309 
 
A significant negative relationship is found between the year and behaviour scores. 
This suggests that over time the average scores for behaviour are decreasing. There is 
also a significant negative relationship found between a change in provision leader 
and observed behaviour. This suggests that where a leader has changed since the last 
inspection, the observed behaviour of the children worsens. However, a significant 
positive relationship is found between the number of children on roll and the 
observed behaviour. This means that the larger the nursery, the more positive the 
observed behaviour is. 
In summary, licensing is shown to have a significant positive relationship with 
observed behaviour scores even once control variables are added. There are also 
some significant relationships, both positive and negative, between nursery 
characteristics and observed behaviour. 
 Standard of Care 
Table 3-34: Regression results: Impact of licensing on standard of care (no controls) 
 Beta Sig. 
Licensing 0.114** 0.001 
R-Squared 0.009 
R-Squared Adjusted 0.047 
N 1139 
**. Beta is significant at the 0.01 level  
*. Beta is significant at the 0.05 level 
The regression results presented in table 3.34 show that when the licensing variable 
only is included in the analysis, it has a significant positive relationship. The 
relationship remains significantly positive even when control variables are included 
in the model. 
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Table 3-35: Regression results: Impact of licensing on standard of care (with controls) 
 Beta Sig. 
Licensing 0.367** 0.000 
Year -0.055** 0.000 
No. Inspection 0.102** 0.005 
Change in Provision Leader -0.107** 0.009 
Age Range -0.031 0.097 
Single Sex -0.333 0.220 
No. Children 0.002** 0.000 
Affluence -0.020 0.227 
R-Squared 0.047 
R-Squared Adjusted 0.040 
N 1139 
**. Beta is significant at the 0.01 level  
*. Beta is significant at the 0.05 level 
Table 3.35 contains the results from the regression model that included the licensing 
variable and all other control variables. Licensing is shown to maintain a 
significantly positive relationship with the standard of care score. In fact, the 
magnitude of the association increases once the control variables are added. This 
might be caused by the significant negative relationship some nursery characteristics 
have on the standard of care provided. As a consequence of the results, the 
hypothesis that licensing will increase the standard of care is accepted. 
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There is a significantly negative relationship found between the year and the standard 
of care. This suggests that over time the standard of care is decreasing. Similarly 
there is a significantly negative relationship between changing the provision leader 
and the standard of care. This means that the average observed standard of care is 
reduced when a provider leader has changed since the previous inspection. However, 
a significantly positive relationship is found between the number of children and the 
observed standard of care. This means that the larger the nursery is, in terms of 
children on roll, the greater the average scores for standard of care are likely to be. 
In summary, licensing is shown to have a significant positive relationship with 
observed standards of care scores even once control variables are added. There are 
also some significant relationships, both positive and negative, between nursery 
characteristics and standards of care. 
Quality of Provision 
Table 3-36: Regression results: Impact of licensing on quality of provision (no controls) 
 Beta Sig. 
Licensing 0.101** 0.004 
R-Squared 0.007 
R-Squared Adjusted 0.006 
N 1139 
**. Beta is significant at the 0.01 level  
*. Beta is significant at the 0.05 level 
The regression results presented in table 3.36 show that when only the licensing 
variable is included in the analysis, it has a significant positive relationship. When 
the control variables are added, the magnitude of the relationship and its significance, 
changes. 
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Table 3-37: Regression results: Impact of licensing on quality of provision  
(with controls) 
 Beta Sig. 
Licensing 0.311** 0.000 
Year -0.060** 0.000 
No. Inspection 0.186** 0.000 
Change in Provision Leader -0.212** 0.000 
Age Range -0.006 0.762 
Single Sex -0.234 0.386 
No. Children 0.002** 0.000 
Affluence -0.001 0.931 
R-Squared 0.064 
R-Squared Adjusted 0.057 
N 1139 
**. Beta is significant at the 0.01 level  
*. Beta is significant at the 0.05 level 
Table 3.37 contains the regression results for the model where licensing and all 
control variables are included. The results show that the relationship between 
licensing and the quality of provision have remained significantly positive. Overall, 
the magnitude of the relationship has increased with the inclusion of the control 
variables. As a consequence of the results, the hypothesis that licensing will increase 
the quality of provision is accepted. 
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However, some significantly negative relationships are found between some of the 
characteristics of the nurseries and the quality of provision. There is a significantly 
negative relationship between the year and the quality of provision. This suggests 
that over time the quality of provision is decreasing. There is also a significantly 
negative relationship between change in provision leader and quality of provision. As 
a result, if a leader changes after an inspection, then the scores relating to quality of 
provision are likely to be less in the subsequent report. 
There is a significantly positive relationship found between the number of children 
on roll and the quality of provision. This suggests that the larger the nursery, in terms 
of children, the greater the quality of provision. 
In summary, licensing is shown to have a significant positive relationship with 
observed quality of provision scores even once control variables are added. There are 
also some significant relationships, both positive and negative, between nursery 
characteristics and quality of provision. 
Quality of Leadership/Management 
Table 3-38: Regression results: Impact of licensing on quality of 
leadership/management (no controls) 
 Beta Sig. 
Licensing 0.031 0.378 
R-Squared 0.001 
R-Squared Adjusted 0.000 
N 1139 
**. Beta is significant at the 0.01 level  
*. Beta is significant at the 0.05 level 
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When only licensing is included in the regression, there is shown to be no significant 
relationship between licensing and the quality of leadership and management. 
However, when the control variables are added, a significant positive relationship is 
found. 
Table 3-39: Regression results: Impact of licensing on quality of 
leadership/management (with controls) 
 Beta Sig. 
Licensing 0.175* 0.017 
Year -0.053** 0.000 
No. Inspection 0.191** 0.000 
Change in Provision Leader -0.176** 0.000 
Age Range 0.005 0.809 
Single Sex -0.148 0.590 
No. Children 0.002** 0.000 
Affluence -0.018 0.277 
R-Squared 0.048 
R-Squared Adjusted 0.041 
N 1139 
**. Beta is significant at the 0.01 level  
*. Beta is significant at the 0.05 level 
Table 3.39 contains the results from a regression analysis where licensing and all 
other control variables are included. The results show that licensing has a 
significantly positive association with the quality of leadership and management; 
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licensing increased the quality. However, there are more significant relationships 
found between some of the control variables and the quality of leadership and 
management. As a consequence of the results, the hypothesis that licensing will 
improve the quality of leadership and management is accepted. 
There is a significantly positive relationship between the number of children on roll 
and the quality of leadership and management. This means that larger nurseries, in 
terms of number of children, have higher mean scores for quality of leadership and 
management. However, there is a significantly negative relationship between the 
year and quality of leadership and management. This suggests that quality is 
decreasing over time. A significantly negative relationship is also found between a 
change in provision leader and quality of leadership and management. This implies 
that if a provision leader changes after an Ofsted inspection the scores on the next 
report are reduced.  
In summary, licensing is shown to have a significant positive relationship, (once 
control variables are added), with observed quality of leadership and management. 
There are also some significant relationships, both positive and negative, between 
nursery characteristics and quality of leadership and management. 
3.3.5 Summary 
The results from the various regression analyses indicate many significant 
relationships between licensing and control variables, with the different measures of 
quality. The findings are summarised in table 3.40 below. 
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Table 3-40: Summary of results 
Significant 
Relationships 
Learning 
Standards 
Behaviour 
of Children 
Standard of 
Care 
Quality of 
Provision 
Quality of 
Leadership/ 
Management 
Licensing  + + + +* 
Year  - - - - 
No. 
Inspection 
+ + + + + 
Change in 
Provision 
Leader 
- -* - - - 
Age Range +*     
Single Sex      
No. Children + + + + + 
Affluence +*     
* Only significant at the 0.05 level, all others are significant at the 0.01 level 
As can be observed from the above table some of the variables have a significant 
relationship across many of the measures of quality.  
Licensing, the variable of interest in this investigation, is shown to have a 
significantly positive association with all of the quality measures apart from learning 
standards. The relationship with the quality of leadership and management is shown 
to be significantly positive but only at the 0.05 level. The results therefore, confirm 
the following hypotheses: 
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H1a: Licensing of nursery workers increase the quality of provision 
H1b: Licensing of nursery workers improves the behaviour of children 
H1c: Licensing of nursery workers increases the quality of             
leadership/management 
H1d: Licensing of nursery workers increases the quality of caring 
Therefore, there is strong evidence to suggest that licensing has a positive impact on 
the quality of childcare. 
R-Squared 
In an ideal data set one could control for many factors that impact upon the observed 
quality of childcare. From the interviews conducted with nursery leaders and head 
teachers, it became clear that the quality of home life is very important in a child’s 
development and behavior. Good parenting, resources and safety were stated as 
being of particular importance. The measure of affluence is used in the analysis to 
act as a proxy measure of some of these factors. However, the proxy is not an ideal 
measure of good parenting or how content and safe a child feels. This is likely to be 
why the R-squares are so low. However, given the restricted data that is available the 
variables included are as detailed and inclusive as possible.  
3.4 Discussion 
The aim of this paper is to assess the impact of licensing nursery workers on the 
quality of childcare. The measures of quality were derived from the aims of the 
Childcare Act 2006 and the core units of the compulsory training course all workers 
must attend and pass if they wish to become licensed. The measures of quality are as 
follows: 
1. Quality of provision 
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2. Behaviour of children 
3. Quality of leadership and management 
4. Standard of caring 
5. Learning standards 
Data on the measures of quality were derived from Ofsted reports dating from 2000 
to 2011. As licensing came into effect in response to the Childcare Act 2006, the data 
gives quality measures both before and after licensing was introduced. Whist 
investigating the relationship between the measures of quality and licensing, other 
factors that may impact upon the quality of childcare were included in the analysis. 
Control variables were used to prevent the relationship between licensing and each 
measure of quality becoming exaggerated. The control variables used, consisted of 
internal characteristics of the nursery and characteristics of the location of the 
nursery. The variables included were formulated in response to interviews with head 
teachers and nursery leaders. The interviewees were asked what other factors, 
beyond the quality of nursery workers, would increase the quality of childcare. Their 
most common answers formed the basis of the control variables. 
The results concerning each of the measures of quality are discussed below. 
3.4.1 Quality of Provision 
This measure of quality was derived from the Act’s aim to ensure children’s social 
and economic well-being. Licensing aims to meet this by requiring applicants to 
attend and pass a training unit entitled ‘Reflect on and develop practice’. The course 
trains applicants in understanding the importance of developing and progressing their 
practice so that minimum standards of quality can be met and improved upon. The 
quality of provision measures a nursery’s ability to observe, critique and develop 
their practices.  
Licensing is shown by the results to have a significant positive relationship to the 
quality of the provision. This would suggest that, through licensing, the Childcare 
Act 2006 has achieved its aim to increase the quality of provision and raise the 
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development of nursery schools. As a result this suggests that licensing is 
rebalancing the knowledge asymmetry (Leland 1979). This is because licensing is a 
signal, which consumers can understand, which ensures a good level of quality for 
childcare. This fully supports the premise that training has a positive effect on quality 
levels in childcare (Tanner et al. 2006). 
The quality of provision was shown to be declining over time. There is a significant 
negative association between the year and the quality of provision. This could be the 
result of inspectors becoming less forgiving the more nurseries they inspect or it may 
be a general downward trend as a result of lack of resources or continuous training. 
There is a significant positive association found between the number of children on 
roll and the quality of provision. This might occur because the more children that are 
present, the greater the revenues and as a result, the more resources available to the 
nursery and the children. 
3.4.2 Behaviour of Children 
Measuring quality by the behaviour of children is in response to the aims of the 
Childcare Act 2006 to ensure children and nurseries contribute to society in a 
positive way. The emotional control learned in the early years is key because it is the 
most influential period of a child’s emotional development (Stroufe 1997). Further, 
in our early years, the way in which we learn how to respond appropriately predicts 
how we will respond throughout our lives (Corsaro 1985).  
The compulsory unit in protecting and promoting children’s rights realises the aim. 
The training course teaches the importance of nursery workers in detecting 
underlying issues with children. Such detection is achieved through observing 
children’s behaviour. If the behaviour of a child causes concern or is unruly, nursery 
workers should endeavour to alter this pattern. If the behaviour cannot be controlled, 
then consultation should be sought from experts such as social services.   
Licensing is shown by the results to have a significant positive relationship with the 
behaviour of children. This would indicate that through licensing the Act has 
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achieved its aim of ensuring a positive contribution to society. Further, the results 
suggest that issues of moral order surrounding childcare (Mooney and Munton 1997) 
are being addressed through licensing. This adds to the notion that childcare can be a 
taught profession and enforces the idea that licensing can have a positive effect on 
society in general. This is because the behaviour of infants is indicative of the 
behaviour of future adults and their contribution to society. If licensing improves 
behaviour of infants it may continue to have a positive impact in the future.  
Beyond licensing and its positive impact on behaviour, the number of children on 
roll also has a significant positive impact. This might be the case because children 
are shown to learn better in larger groups, so perhaps learning standards also extend 
to learning socially acceptable behaviour. What is concerning is the significant 
negative association found between behaviour and time. This finding would suggest 
that over time the behaviour of children is worsening. This would mean that every 
generation is behaving worse than the previous. However, licensing and more 
extensive education of nursery workers could possibly slow the decline in standards 
of behaviour. 
3.4.3 Quality of Leadership and Management 
The quality of leadership and management is particularly important in meeting the 
Act’s aim of protecting children from harm and neglect. Neglect is of particular 
importance because it is heavily linked with socialisation, behaviour and emotional 
development (Kotch et al. 2008). The importance of developing and maintaining a 
healthy, safe and secure environment for children is highlighted by the compulsory 
training course containing a specific core module in the area.  
The results conclude that licensing is significantly positively related to the quality of 
leadership and management. This would suggest that the availability of healthy, safe 
and secure environments have increased as a result of licensing. As the skills of 
nursery workers have appeared to increase as a result of licensing, licensing may 
have rebalanced the paradox of skill levels between childcare managers and their 
customers (Cameron et al. 2002). This is, however, contrary to Angrist and Guryan 
 321 
 
(2008) who find that standardising training reduces the quality of individuals 
entering into the education sector. 
However, change of leadership is consistently negatively associated with quality. 
There are two main explanations for this: first, where there is a change in leadership 
the new leader has a settling in period, which may result in a drop in quality. This 
may occur because within the nursery sector nursery leaders are usually recruited 
externally; therefore they do not know the children, staff or children’s parents. This 
results in initial conflict and unrest within the nursery. The other disadvantage of 
having a new leader is that they are not privy to all of the background and historical 
information gathered at the last inspection. Second, a reverse effect may be seen. If a 
nursery is seen to be declining in quality the leader may be replaced assuming that 
this is the root of the problem. If this assumption is wrong the nursery will continue 
to perform badly because of other factors. 
3.4.4 Caring Standards 
The quality of caring provided by nursery school workers is associated with the 
Act’s aim to ensure the physical and mental, and emotional well-being of children. 
The quality of care-giving is one of the key components in development (Mustard 
2006). This aim is of such importance that the compulsory training course contains a 
core unit solely covering the development and promotion of positive relationships 
between nursery workers and children, but also children and the wider community. It 
is through providing a good quality of care that such relationships can materialise. 
Licensing is shown to have a significant positive relationship with care standards. 
This indicates that the development and promotion of positive relationships has 
increased since licensing was implemented. Such a finding also refutes the claim that 
training cannot enforce the mothering aspect of childcare (Mooney and Munton 
1997). Though it may suggest that it is possible for childcare to be separated into a 
series of instrumental tasks that can be improved through increasing functional 
knowledge (Cameron and Boddy 2006). If this is the case then the perception of 
childcare as a natural extension of one’s caring nature which requires no specialist 
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knowledge or training is incorrect. Childcare is shown to act as any other profession 
where training results in higher quality. 
If the quality of care is indicative of the frequency of accidents within a nursery then 
the findings also support Currie and Hotz (2004). Their study finds that regulation of 
childcare workers in the US reduces the number of accidents and injuries involving 
young children. However, the results did show that standards of care were decreasing 
significantly over time. 
The number of children on roll was found to have a significant positive association 
with standards of care. Therefore, the greater the number of children, the better the 
care is likely to be. This might be as a result of a requirement to have more licensed 
members of staff present the more children there are, as per the ratio requirements of 
the EYFS. It might also be the case that the more children a nursery has, the greater 
the income and the more resources available. 
3.4.5 Learning Standards 
Learning standards cover the quality of education, training and recreation provided 
through childcare. One of the Act’s main aims is to ensure quality in such areas - so 
much so that one of the core modules that must be attended and passed in order to 
become licensed focuses solely on promoting children’s development. Development, 
both academic and otherwise, in the early years is shown to be very important 
because it can affect how someone will succeed throughout the rest of their lives 
(Kotch et al. 2008). Beyond mental implications there are also physical impacts with 
regard to brain pathways, which form in response to early years’ experiences 
(Mustard 2006). 
Licensing is shown to have no significant relationship with learning standards. This 
would indicate that the Act and subsequent licensing has not achieved its aim to 
improve the training, education and recreation of children. This in turn suggests that 
there have been no significant improvements in children’s developments as a result 
of licensing. Although the findings show that no improvement is found, they do 
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contradict Bergma and Toma’s (1994) findings which are that, when teachers are 
regulated the SAT scores of children reduces. Therefore, whilst learning standards 
have not increased, at least they are no lower as a result of licensing.  
Interestingly learning standards are shown to have a significant relationship with the 
number of children in the nursery. This is counter to many commonly held beliefs 
about the best learning occurring in small groups of children. Perhaps it is the case 
that in the early years, learning takes place best when children are in a larger groups 
rather than in more concentrated one to one situations. This might suggest that early 
years education is different to the compulsory education system. If this is the case, 
then one might question how appropriate it is to have the same inspecting body 
covering both early years and compulsory education. If this is a valid concern, then 
the reliability of the data used in the analysis is in question.  
Learning standards are also significantly related to the affluence of an area in which 
a nursery is located. This suggests that affluence of parents is far more significant 
than the licensing of nursery workers. Perhaps in relation to learning standards, the 
quality of learning is extrinsic to the nursery setting. Learning is significantly 
affected by a child’s home environment, so there is little training nursery workers 
can do to improve standards. 
3.4.6 Summary 
As significant positive relationships are found between licensing and four of the 
measures of quality, the results suggest that licensing has improved overall quality 
levels of childcare. Such a finding supports other research based in the education 
sector. Currie and Hotz (2004) also find a positive association between licensing and 
reducing the levels of accidents and fatal injuries in young children.  
Where the analysis in this paper differs from previous research is the way in which 
quality is measured. The measurements of quality used are derived directly from the 
Childcare Act 2006 and the core modules required from the licensing. As such, this 
analysis has tested exactly what the licensing was intended to achieve, rather than 
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secondary effects such as exam results or more qualified staff. This is important 
because if the analysis was concerned with other measures of quality, not specifically 
mentioned in the Act, then different results may have been found. Therefore, one of 
the key limitations of the results is that they only present evidence relating to the 
measures Ofsted deems indicative of quality childcare. 
The suggestion that licensing does have a positive effect on the quality of childcare is 
an important finding with regards to wider society. Early years care is shown to have 
significant effects on the well-being of children and their development (Mustard 
2006). However, wider societal effects may be felt as a consequence of poor 
childcare. If childcare is not of a good quality then there is likely to be fewer parents 
willing to enrol their children. As a result there may be fewer women in the labour 
market because they remain unemployed to raise their children; given women are 
usually the primary carers of young children (Mooney and Munton 1997).  
In addition, if childcare quality is low, then the perception of nursery workers will 
remain low. Therefore, fewer women (or men) are likely to want to work within the 
sector because it will not be regarded as a true profession (Osgood 2010). This may 
reduce the number of women in the labour market because nursery work is a female-
dominated occupation (Greer 2009).  The take up rate of childcare would also 
reduce, as confidence in the service decreases.  
Therefore, if licensing is shown to increase the quality of childcare it is also shown to 
reduce the negative effects of poor childcare on society. Hence licensing is shown to 
reduce the costs to society borne from poor practitioners. This complies with 
Moore’s (1961) argument as to how licensing can be concluded to be within the 
public interest. 
Yet there are some areas of concern. First there is a significantly negative association 
between the year and measure of quality. This would suggest that over time the 
quality of childcare is decreasing. If licensing is to correct this, then it may be 
necessary to enforce compulsory top up and continuous training for nursery workers 
which could prevent complacency and outdated procedures. Second, the affluence in 
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a nursery’s location is more significant than the licensing of nursery workers. This is 
concerning because licensing is failing to result in a standardisation of ability levels 
for children when they enter into full time education. It may be beyond licensing to 
reduce the differences in children’s backgrounds, but it does suggest that there needs 
to be greater research into how to improve the learning for less affluent children. 
This is crucial if polarisation of learning between the affluent and poor is to cease. 
Third, every measure of quality is significantly positively related to the number of 
inspections a nursery has experienced. This may be because the nurseries are putting 
into practice the recommendations of the inspectors and are improving as a result. 
However, it might also be the case that the more inspections undertaken,  the better 
managers understand what indicators an inspector looks for, and so the easier it is to 
portray higher quality than is actually being provided. If the latter is true then the 
reliability of the inspectors’ reports might not be as high as first imagined. However, 
it is unlikely that a nursery could fool an inspector to a great degree, especially given 
the short notice periods given for a visit. 
On balance, licensing is shown to have a positive impact on quality. However, in 
order for this to remain the case, enforcing continuous training for nursery staff and 
ensuring greater learning resources for less affluent areas may be necessary. These 
are both areas that warrant greater investigation given the importance early years 
education has for children, but also society as a whole. 
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Conclusion 
Through this first investigation into occupational regulation in the UK, it is apparent 
that regulation is very prevalent with 189 occupations (out of 353) having regulation 
present, to some extent, within them. Licensing is shown to be the most prevalent 
form of regulation being present in 23% of occupation unit groups, and accreditation 
is the second most prevalent at 18% of unit groups. Certification is the third most 
prevalent at 6% and registration the least prevalent type of regulation, at 5% of unit 
groups. From the database constructed there are no obvious trends to the occupations 
covered by regulation; regulations appear across the spectrum of occupations. 
However, through observing the database, it is evident that each type of regulation 
has unique characteristics, and these now follow. 
Licensing:  is predominantly enforced by government agencies or regulatory 
bodies. It’s almost always at least partly funded by the government 
and is very likely to be set up with the aim of protecting the public. 
Licences require a full spectrum of qualification levels from 
equivalent GCSEs up to postgraduate qualifications. Criminal 
Record Background (CRB) checks are also required by licensing far 
more than any other type of regulation. 
Certification:  is, like licensing, predominantly enforced by a government agency 
and is at least in part, government funded. Most certification requires 
qualifications equivalent to at least a degree. Out of all the types of 
regulation, certification requires the greatest levels of qualification. 
The main reason for their existence, as stated by certification 
schemes, is to protect the public. 
Accreditation:  is almost all enforced by professional bodies that are made up of 
industry experts. The schemes are also completely self-funded. The 
primary aim of accreditation schemes is to demonstrate competency 
to the public. It is rare that accreditation schemes require a CRB 
check but most require qualifications of at least A-level equivalency, 
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with many also require work experience from applicants.  The main 
reason for accreditation is to enhance the professionalism of 
occupations. 
Registration:  is almost all enforced by a government agency, and is government 
funded. Given the nature, no levels of competency are required by 
registration. The main reason for registration, as stated by the 
enforcing bodies, is to protect the public. 
After applying the regulation database to the Labour Force Survey (LFS) the 
prevalence of regulation could be determined at the individual level. The results 
showed that the upper bound estimate of regulation status was 60%, the lower bound 
estimate was 28%. This means that at least 28% of the working population is part of 
a regulated occupation. The results also show that more men work in regulated 
occupations than women, and fewer individuals from ethnic minorities work in 
regulated occupations. This was suggested to be as a result of reduced time in the 
labour market, job insecurity and language barriers (in the case of ethnic minorities), 
all of which reduce the chance of individuals recouping the costs of becoming 
regulated.  
Impact 
The application of the database to the LFS also allowed for the impact of regulation 
to be assessed. This is the first time an analysis involving all occupations and 
considering all types of regulation has been conducted. The results indicated that 
whilst there is a variation between different occupations with regard to the impact 
regulation has, overall regulation is shown to have a positive impact on both wages 
and skill levels.  
The highest wage premiums are found where regulations have full coverage over 
occupation unit groups. Where this is the case, accreditation has the largest wage 
premium followed by certification, registration and licensing respectfully. Where 
regulation has partial coverage of an occupation unit group, the results are more 
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diverse. However, this indicates the need for improving data on regulation statuses 
rather than causing alarm. 
With regard to skill levels, the greatest impacts are found where a regulation has 
complete coverage over an occupation unit group. Where this is the case, all 
regulations are shown to have a significant positive association with skill levels. The 
greatest impact is found with licensing, followed by certification, accreditation and 
registration respectably. As is the case with the impact on wages, where regulations 
only have partial coverage, the results are far more diverse. 
In order to assess the impact of regulation quality, an investigation into the effects 
licensing nursery workers has on the quality of childcare was conducted. The 
measures of quality were derived from the aims of the Childcare Act 2006 that led to 
the subsequent licensing of nursery workers. The data used were drawn from Ofsted 
inspector reports from 2000-2011. The results indicate that licensing has a significant 
positive impact on four of the five measures of quality used. This suggests that 
licensing has a significant impact on the quality of early years childcare. Although it 
is not possible to extrapolate such a finding to all types of regulation and all 
occupations, the investigation supports the theory that through controlling the quality 
of input, regulation can improve the quality of output. 
Implications 
As this is the first investigation into occupational regulation in the UK there are 
obvious contributions to the existing international literature surrounding the topic. 
However, in addition to contributing to the literature, the investigations conducted 
within this thesis have wider implications for other UK labour market institutions 
(such as trade unions) and wider policy implications. 
Implications for Trade Unions 
The closed shop in the UK is defined as the requirement to be part of a union in order 
to gain or maintain employment. There are two types of closed shop: pre-entry, 
where individuals have to be part of a union in order to be employed, and post-entry 
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where individuals have to agree to join the union once they are employed in order to 
get a job.  
In a similar vein, occupational regulation (most notably licensing) aims to control the 
supply of labour through setting barriers to entry such as exams, fees or CRB checks. 
For the purpose of comparison, the closed shop will be considered in terms of 
licensing as they are the most similar in terms of labour restriction. Unlike the closed 
shop, licensing is enforced through legislation, and the reason for regulation is either 
to protect the public or because there is a vested interest for the workers to make 
their profession regulated. According to general theory (see page 40) there is only a 
need for licensing where there is a risk to public safety.  
There are clear and fundamental differences between licensing and the closed shop. 
The closed shop is a union-led institution whose aim is to benefit its members. 
Licensing is a state-led scheme that is, theoretically, enforced to protect the public 
and not just to protect the interests of its members. Despite the aims of the two 
institutions being different, there are similarities. McCarthy (1964) argues that 
unionists feel the closed shop could achieve the following: first to reduce sporadic 
membership; second to ensure that working rules, disciplinary actions and strikes are 
complied with and; third, to reduce the chance of union workers being substituted 
with non-union workers.  Through licensing, the government can exercise its power 
to coerce workers to restrict the entry into an occupation, to affect the use of 
complementary and substitution workers and to control the prices, and wages, of 
workers (Stigler 1974). The goals of the two institutions, therefore, appear to be very 
similar in that each is used to restrict entry to an occupation, stabilise the number of 
workers in a given occupation and control the substitutes and complements to 
union/regulated workers.  
Yet how successful each institution is at achieving these goals is arguably what 
really matters. The closed shop is shown in various pieces of research (Blanchflower 
1994, Brown and Wadhwani 1990, Greg and Yates 1991, Stewart 1987) to restrict 
supply and thereby increase wages. Unfortunately, the prevalence and impact of 
regulation in the UK has not been investigated to the same degree, so it is difficult to 
 330 
 
conclude that licensing has the same effect as closed shops and trade union coverage. 
However, indicative research shows that licensing has a wage premium suggesting it 
may be effective at restricting supply (Humphris et al. 2010). Though in the US both 
licensing and unions are shown to result in a wage premium, only unionisation has 
the effect of significantly reducing wage variation (Kleiner and Kruegar 2011). This 
could enforce the notion that licensing is predominantly in place for the benefit of 
consumers and not necessarily practitioners. The closed shop has long ceased to exist 
in the UK but the presence of unions continues. Membership of a union is 
completely optional and can now no longer be enforced by employers or union 
officials. As such, unions can no longer restrict supply but can offer members legal 
protection and benefits from collective bargaining agreements focusing on pay and 
working conditions.  
Licensing may offer an additional benefit over that of the closed shop or union 
membership; it is very rare that once an occupation becomes regulated it will become 
unregulated and as such, compared to a closed shop arrangement, licensing may offer 
a more secure occupational route (Kleiner 2000). This is the result of a key 
difference between licensing and union membership. When an individual moves 
workplace they need to re-join a union or enter a closed shop. This is not the case 
with licensing or other regulations that are attached to the individual worker and not 
the workplace or employer (Fossum 1999). As such, when an individual spends time, 
effort and resources obtaining a license, certificate, accreditation or joining a register 
it becomes permanently part of their human capital (as long as they maintain 
membership). This is not the case with union membership, which is external to the 
individual’s locus of control.  
Unions and licensing are not mutually exclusive. For example the BMA, a registered 
union, used to be responsible for the regulating of doctors (although this is now the 
responsibility of the GMC). As no in-depth research into the interaction of unions 
and occupational regulation in the UK currently exists, it is impossible to presume 
the effects with accuracy. However, research conducted in the US indicates that 
unionisation appears to increase the strength of licensing regimes although there is 
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little empirical evidence to support the claims that this enhances the outcomes of 
licensing schemes (Kleiner and Petree 1988).  
Given the extent of research into unions and the closed shop it seems startling that an 
institutional actor so similar to unionisation should be neglected to such a degree. 
Occupational regulation should theoretically have many of the same effects as 
unionisation, and the closed shop, but because of the lack of research and mapping of 
such regulation in the UK it was previously impossible to conclude if regulation is as 
prevalent as unionisation or if its impact is as great. Yet, given how unionisation has 
shaped our labour market and employment relations into what we experience today, 
one would have expected regulation to have a similar effect. Indeed the results of the 
investigation conducted suggest that regulation is very prevalent and has a significant 
impact, not just on wages but also skill levels and, potentially, quality. Further, 
because regulation is still present in the labour market, any effects found can be 
extrapolated to predict future labour market behaviour. This is one of the reasons 
why it is imperative that regulation is mapped and investigated in the UK, and 
clearly indicates how the research has addressed a clear gap in the research into the 
UK labour market. Further, from the prevalence and impact regulation is shown to 
have through this research one could imply that resources would be better spent 
analysing regulation further rather than adding to the over saturated literature on 
trade unions. 
Implications for Policy 
The implications for policy resulting from this thesis hinge on the benefits and 
drawbacks of implementing regulation. 
Benefits of Regulation 
Occupational regulation has the potential to increase skill levels. Regulation can 
achieve this through setting barriers to entry that force entrants to attain a certain 
level of qualification. The results have shown support for this effect. This is 
particularly important given the current climate of skill miss-match and high 
unemployment in the UK.  
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As a result of increasing skill levels, regulation can increase the quality of output. 
This is based on the assumption that through increasing the quality of input (by 
increasing skill levels) the quality of output will also increase. Again, the results 
presented in paper three support such a claim within the childcare sector where 
licensing is shown to have a significantly positive impact on the quality of childcare 
available.  
What is clear from the results is that regulation can have some significant benefits. 
However, these benefits vary in magnitude depending on the characteristics of the 
occupation and the type of regulation implemented. Certification, for example, is 
shown to have the biggest impact on skill levels, and registration is shown to have no 
effect. Therefore it is impossible to create an overarching statement that adequately 
describes the benefits drawn from regulation. Instead the complex regulation system 
in the UK lends itself to an equally complex range of implications. 
Drawbacks of Regulation 
Despite some significant benefits of regulation there are some potential drawbacks. 
As a result of setting barriers of entry and therefore limiting entrance, regulation may 
drive up wages and prices. This could result in consumers no longer being able or 
willing to pay for the practitioner or their services. This could be very harmful if the 
service in question is essential to consumers’ well-being. The results show a 
significant positive wage differential associated with regulation. However, the 
impact on prices is not investigated. Therefore the results can only allude to such an 
effect. 
Further to consumers’ welfare, the social mobility of individuals may be negatively 
affected by regulation. The results show that there are significantly fewer women and 
individuals from ethnic minorities in regulated occupations. If this is purely as a 
result of the regulation, then the barriers to entry appear to be discriminating against 
certain proportions of society effecting the occupations they enter and the wages they 
earn. However, in order to make a firm conclusion as to the impact regulation has on 
mobility, further investigation is required.  
 333 
 
Policy Decisions 
The range of benefits and drawbacks resulting from regulation raise three important 
questions when considering policy: 
1. Is there a case for regulation? 
2. What type of regulation should be implemented? 
3. Who will govern the regulation? 
The most common case for regulation is the need to protect the public. The results 
have shown that this is almost exclusively the case for any form of legally enforced 
regulation. Different schemes are shown to be used depending on the extent to which 
the public may be harmed. Licensing and registration are most likely to be 
implemented when harm to the public is most likely and most costly. Certification is 
also heavily associated with public safety. Conversely, accreditation is more likely to 
be implemented to increase professionalism as opposed to concern over the public. 
As a result, when assessing if an occupation should be regulated and which type of 
regulation to implement, policy makers should assess the potential harm to the public 
that may result from poor practitioners and compare it to the cost of implementing 
and monitoring a regulation scheme.  
Policy makers must also consider the governance of regulation. In legally enforced 
regulation covering both protection of title and function (licensing and registration) 
the enforcement body is at least partly funded by the government and is likely to be 
either a government department or a QUANGO. Where only a function is protected 
(certification) there are more cases of professional bodies being responsible for the 
governance of the regulation, but the dominant form is still a government department 
or a QUANGO. Only where there is no legal protection of title or function 
(accreditation) is a regulation exclusively governed by an independent professional 
body that is self-funded. As such, licensing, certification and registration all result in 
costs of implementation for the government, thus public money. Financially 
speaking, only when the cost of potential harm is greater than this cost should policy 
consider implementing any of these regulations. 
 334 
 
Limitations of the Research 
Although every effort has been made to ensure the data and analyses are robust, there 
are limitations.  
Paper One: Prevalence  
The presence of two estimates is the main weakness of the research. It is impossible 
to accurately compute a single figure that is representative of the presence of 
regulation in the UK because of the way in which occupations are coded. However, 
this is the most accurate approach that can be taken. Further, as this is the first initial 
investigation in to all types of regulation, allowances for measurement error are 
inevitable and unavoidable until questions concerning regulation appear on national 
surveys. A further limitation to the analysis is the reliance on the enforcement bodies 
to give honest answers when interviewed, although every effort was taken to 
minimise false information by cross checking answers with regulatory documents.  
Paper Two: Impact 
The main limitation of this analysis is the unavoidable situation of two estimates 
relating to the prevalence of regulation. As explained in the first paper, two estimates 
occur because of the SOC classification system and because regulations are not 
always compulsory for every individual in regulated occupations. As there is no 
other way of determining an individual’s regulation status other than applying the 
regulation database, there is nothing that can be done to remedy the situation. 
A further limitation relates to the human capital variables included in the analysis. 
The variables, whilst extensively cover many aspects which impact upon wage and 
skill levels, are a finite list. In reality there are many more factors that can impact 
upon wage and skill levels, however the variables used are reflective of traditional 
labour economic models. In addition the measurement of skills may not capture 
every aspect of a skill. The NQF only approximates vocational and academic 
qualifications; some skills are not so easily quantified. Yet this is the most valid way 
in which to define skill levels in such a large sample.  
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Paper Three: Quality 
Despite every effort to produce reliable and valid results, every analysis has 
limitations. Through using Ofsted reports spanning 10 years as the basis for the 
dataset, one would presume that every nursery must be present in the data. However, 
it is possible that some are missing. This may have occurred because the nurseries 
were not in existence long enough to require an Ofsted inspection or it may be 
because they started after 2008 and are not due their first inspection before 2011. As 
the population cannot be assumed to be included, one of the limitations of such an 
analysis is faced by any analysis using a sample; the results may not represent every 
nursery in the population. 
An additional limitation is the process by which the control variables were defined. 
Whilst interviewing professionals with experience of providing childcare may be 
useful, the sample size is small at 15 and the respondents are likely to be very 
subjective because they are based on personal experience. However, as the majority 
of interviewees mentioned the same variables, the results would be suggestive of 
reliability. 
The Ofsted inspection reports may also pose a problem. Although Ofsted accredits 
the compulsory training courses for nursery workers, and the reports focus on the 
EYFS, there may be issues with the reliability of the reports. First, the reports assess 
quality on a restrictive framework containing a 5-point scale. Therefore, the reports 
may not capture the full picture of the quality of a nursery school. Second, although a 
scale is used, the inspectors’ perception of the nursery school will remain fairly 
subjective and heavily influenced by the quality of other nursery schools inspected. 
Third, the limited amount of questions within an Ofsted report may mean that not 
everyone’s definition of quality in childcare is covered. However, as this 
investigation intends to assess the implications of licensing on a national level, there 
still is no other data on the quality of childcare over the period of 2000-2011. As a 
consequence despite potential issues with its reliability, Ofsted is the only valid 
option. 
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Future Research 
Whilst this first investigation has been very beneficial in providing an important 
overview into occupational regulation the investigation has several limitations as 
noted above. As a result of these limitations, areas for future research have been 
highlighted. 
First, the need for more accuracy when mapping regulation is required. As a 
consequence of the occupational coding system used, only bound estimates can be 
generated. One clear way of improving these estimates is to include specific 
questions relating to regulation in the national surveys such as the Labour Force 
Survey (LFS). Only by including these questions can the regulation status of all 
individuals be certain. Once the mapping is more accurate, the estimates relating to 
wage and skill differentials can be concluded with greater accuracy.  
Second, the results alluded to the potential impact regulation has on the employment 
of women and ethnic minorities. Given the cross sectional data used and the rough 
estimates employed, the direction of the relationship and its significance cannot yet 
be determined. Through using longitudinal, data further investigation can be 
conducted to determine whether regulation is impacting upon the mobility of 
minority groups within the labour market. 
Third, the results show that there is a positive association between licensing and 
quality of childcare. However, in order to make a universal conclusion as to the 
association between regulation and quality, more occupations must be assessed. Of 
all the occupations regulated, those who became regulated recently provide 
opportunities to conduct a pre and post regulation comparison of quality. Examples 
of such occupations include security guards, legal secretaries and brokers. 
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Directors and Chief 
Executives of Major 
Organisations 
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1113 
Senior Officials in 
Local Government 
Unregula
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Senior Officials of 
Social Interest 
Organisations 
Unregula
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Production, Works 
and Maintenance 
Managers 
Unregula
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1122 
Managers in 
Construction 
Accredit
ation 
All job 
titles No 
UK 
Contracto
rs Group 
Non-
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A 1995 
Demonstrat
e 
competence 
NVQ Level 4 and 
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and test 0 No 
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Managers in Mining 
and Energy 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1131 
Financial Managers 
and Chartered 
Secretaries 
Registrat
ion 
Some 
job 
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Financial 
Services 
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Governmen
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Governm
ent 
funded 
Financial 
Services 
and 
Markets 2000 
Protection 
of public None 0 No 
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Marketing and Sales 
Managers 
Accredit
ation 
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Chartered 
Institute 
of 
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demonstrat
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Diploma in 
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degree in 
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experience  3 No 
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Managers 
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Managers 
Unregula
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1135 
Personnel, Training 
and Industrial 
Relations Managers 
Accredit
ation 
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titles Yes 
Chartered 
Institute 
for 
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and 
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Self-
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demonstrat
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University 
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Level 
professional 
Standards of the 
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Technology 
Managers 
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ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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Unregula
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1141 
Quality Assurance 
Managers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1142 
Customer Care 
Managers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1151 
Financial Institution 
Managers 
Registrat
ion 
All job 
titles N/A 
Financial 
Services 
Authority 
Governmen
t Agency 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Financial 
Services 
and 
Markets 
Act 2000 2000 
protection 
of public None 0 No 
1152 Office Managers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1161 
Transport and 
Distribution 
Managers 
Accredit
ation 
All job 
titles Yes 
Chartered 
Institute 
of 
Logistics 
and 
Transport  
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A  1926 
Adherence 
to codes of 
conduct, 
demonstrat
e 
competence 
University 
degree 
(accredited) 
BSc/MSc 0 No 
1162 
Storage and 
Warehouse 
Managers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1163 
Retail and 
Wholesale 
Managers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1171 
Officers in Armed 
Forces Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
The 
Armed 
Forces 
(governm
ent) 
Governmen
t Agency 
Governm
ent 
funded Don't know Don't know 
Demonstrat
e 
competence 
GCSE Maths & 
English (A-C), 
Army training 
(cadet forces or 
university units) 
A minumum of 
180 UKAS points 
for Sandhurst 0 
Pass 
individual 
and group 
tests, in-
depth 
interview 
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Regulat
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s) 
Entry 
require
ment 
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of work 
experie
nce) 
Other 
Entry 
Requirem
ent 
1172 
Police Officers 
(Inspectors and 
above) Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
The Home 
Office 
(police) 
plus Local 
Forces 
Governmen
t Agency 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Metropolit
an Police 
Act 1829 1829 
Demonstrat
e 
competence
, protection 
of public 
Initial Police 
Learning and 
Development 
Programme 
(local training 
schemes vary), 
pass Police 
Action Checklist 
(set by the 
Home Office) 0 
UK 
resident, 
medical 
assessment
, 
assessment 
tests/intere
view, 
fitness 
tests, CRB 
checks (all 
before 
training 
commence
s). 
1173 
Senior Officers in 
Fire, Ambulance, 
Prison and Related 
Services Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
Prison 
Service, 
Home 
Office, 
Fire 
Service 
Governmen
t Agency 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Prison Act 
1952/Fires
ervice ct 
1947 1952/1947 
Demonstrat
e 
competence
, protection 
of public 
Varies 
depending on 
the service/ job 
specific training 
rather than 
general 0 
Medical 
assessment
, fitness 
tests, CRB 
checks, age 
and height 
restrictions 
1174 Security Managers Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
Security 
Industry 
Authority 
Non-
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded 
Private 
Security 
Industry 
Act 2001 2003 
protection 
of public 
NVQ Level 2 in 
relevant course 0 CRB check 
1181 
Hospital and Health 
Service Managers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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SOC title 
Regulat
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Status 
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Protec
tion of 
Title 
Enforce
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Body 
Characteri
stics of 
Enforcem
ent Body 
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of 
Enforce
ment 
Body 
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nt 
Date of 
Commenc
ement 
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for 
Regulation 
Entry 
Requirement 
(qualification
s) 
Entry 
require
ment 
(years 
of work 
experie
nce) 
Other 
Entry 
Requirem
ent 
1182 Pharmacy Managers Licensing  
Some 
job 
titles N/A 
General 
Pharmace
utical 
Council 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
1852 
Pharmacy 
Act/ 
Pharmacy 
Order 2010 1855 
Protection 
of public, 
adherence 
to codes of 
conduct 
Masters in 
Pharmacy 0 
52 week 
training 
programm
e and pass 
the 
registration 
examinatio
n, good 
health 
1183 
Healthcare Practice 
Managers 
Accredit
ation 
All job 
titles Yes 
 Institute 
of 
Healthcar
e 
Managem
ent and 
Associatio
n of 
Medical 
Secretarie
s  
Non-
Chartered 
Profession
al Body 
Self-
funded N/A 1926 
Gain 
professional 
recognition 
Diploma in 
Primary Care 
Management or 
Management of 
Health and 
Social Care 
(NVQ Level 4) 2 No 
1184 
Social Services 
Managers Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
General 
Social 
Care 
Council 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Care 
Standards 
Act 2000 2005 
protection 
of public 
Honours degree 
or/and 
postgraduate 
degree in social 
work approved 
by GSCC. Then 
register with 
GSCC 0 
None, but 
individual 
has to 
demonstrat
e 
continuous 
developme
nt during 
the first 3 
years of 
registration
, known as 
post-
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SOC(2000) 
Unit Group 
SOC title 
Regulat
ion 
Status 
Cover
age 
Any 
Protec
tion of 
Title 
Enforce
ment 
Body 
Characteri
stics of 
Enforcem
ent Body 
Funding 
of 
Enforce
ment 
Body 
Statutory 
Instrume
nt 
Date of 
Commenc
ement 
Rationale 
for 
Regulation 
Entry 
Requirement 
(qualification
s) 
Entry 
require
ment 
(years 
of work 
experie
nce) 
Other 
Entry 
Requirem
ent 
registration 
training.  
1185 
Residential and Day 
Care Managers Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
National 
Care 
Standards 
Commissi
on and 
the 
General 
Social 
Care 
Council 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Care 
Standards 
Act 2000 2005 
protection 
of public 
Honours degree 
or/and 
postgraduate 
degree in social 
work approved 
by GSCC. Then 
register with 
GSCC 0 
None, but 
individual 
has to 
demonstrat
e 
continuous 
developme
nt during 
the first 3 
years of 
registration
, known as 
post-
registration 
training.  
1211 Farm Managers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1212 
Natural 
Environment and 
Conservation 
Managers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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Enforce
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Enforce
ment 
Body 
Statutory 
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Commenc
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require
ment 
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of work 
experie
nce) 
Other 
Entry 
Requirem
ent 
1219 
Managers in Animal 
Husbandry, Forestry 
and Fishing NEC 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1221 
Hotel and 
Accommodation 
Managers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1222 
Conference and 
Exhibition Managers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1223 
Restaurant and 
Catering Managers Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
Local 
Authoritie
s/ 
Chartered 
Institute 
of 
Environm
ental 
Health 
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Food 
Safety Act 
1990 1990 
protection 
of public 
Food Hygiene 
Certificate 0 No 
1224 
Publicans and 
Managers of 
Licensed Premises Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
British 
Institute 
of 
Innkeepin
g & Local 
Authoritie
s  
Non-
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded 
Licensing 
Act 2003 1869 
protection 
of public 
National 
Certificate for 
Personal License 
Holders (Level 
2) 0 
CRB check 
by local 
authorities 
1225 
Leisure and Sports 
Managers 
Registrat
ion 
Some 
job 
titles N/A 
Gambling 
Commissi
on 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Gambling 
Act 2005 2007 
protection 
of public None 0 
CRB check, 
Financial 
Circumstan
ces check 
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Regulat
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Status 
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tion of 
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Enforce
ment 
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of 
Enforce
ment 
Body 
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nt 
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Commenc
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Requirement 
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s) 
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require
ment 
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of work 
experie
nce) 
Other 
Entry 
Requirem
ent 
1226 
Travel Agency 
Managers 
Accredit
ation 
All job 
titles No 
Associatio
n of 
British 
Travel 
Agents 
Non-
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A 2006 
Establish/m
aintain 
industry 
standards 
Various levels of 
membership 
but: NVQ Level 
2/Apprenticeshi
p plus 2-7 years 
experience 
depending on 
membership 
type 0 No 
1231 
Property, Housing 
and Land Managers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1232 
Garage Managers 
and Proprietors 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1233 
Hairdressing and 
Beauty Salon 
Managers and 
Proprietors 
Certificat
ion 
All job 
titles Yes 
The 
Hairdressi
ng Council  
Non-
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded 
Hairdresser
s 
Registratio
n Act 1964 1964 
Establish/m
aintain 
industry 
standards NVQ level 2 0 No 
1234 
Shopkeepers and 
Wholesale/Retail 
Dealers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1235 
Recycling and 
Refuse Disposal 
Managers 
Accredit
ation 
Some 
job 
titles Yes 
Chartered 
Institute 
of Wastes 
Managem
ent 
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A  2002 
Health and 
safety, 
protection 
of public 
Degree or 
Postgraduate 
Qualification, 
min 4 years 
experience, 
Interview by 
CIWM 0 
Optional: 
Structured 
Learning & 
Developme
nt 
Programm
e, to help 
with 
interview 
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Unit Group 
SOC title 
Regulat
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Status 
Cover
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Any 
Protec
tion of 
Title 
Enforce
ment 
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Enforcem
ent Body 
Funding 
of 
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Body 
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nt 
Date of 
Commenc
ement 
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(qualification
s) 
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require
ment 
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of work 
experie
nce) 
Other 
Entry 
Requirem
ent 
1239 
Managers and 
Proprietors in Other 
Services NEC 
Registrat
ion 
Some 
job 
titles N/A 
Gambling 
Commissi
on 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Gambling 
Act 2005 2007 
protection 
of public None 0 
CRB check, 
Financial 
Circumstan
ces check 
2111 Chemist 
Accredit
ation 
All job 
titles Yes 
Royal 
Society of 
Chemists 
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A  1980 
Health and 
safety, 
protection 
of public 
 Bachelor's 
degree, 10 No 
2112 
Biological Scientists 
and Biochemists 
Accredit
ation 
Some 
job 
titles Yes 
Society of 
Biology 
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A  2009 
Health and 
safety, 
protection 
of public 
 Bachelor's 
degree, 10 No 
2113 
Physicists, 
Geologists and 
Meteorologists 
Accredit
ation 
All job 
titles Yes 
Royal 
Meteorolo
gical 
Society/ 
The 
Geological 
Society 
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A 1883/1825 
Health and 
safety, 
protection 
of public 
 relevant 
Bachelor's 
degree, 5 No 
2121 Civil Engineers 
Certificat
ion 
All job 
titles Yes 
Engineerin
g Council 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Royal 
Charter 
1981 1985 
Health and 
safety, 
protection 
of public 
Masters  for 
Chartered 
status 0 No 
2122 Medical Engineers 
Certificat
ion 
All job 
titles Yes 
Engineerin
g Council 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Royal 
Charter 
1981 1985 
Health and 
safety, 
protection 
of public 
Masters  for 
Chartered 
status 0 No 
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Regulat
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ment 
(years 
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nce) 
Other 
Entry 
Requirem
ent 
2123 Electrical Engineer 
Certificat
ion 
All job 
titles Yes 
Engineerin
g Council 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Royal 
Charter 
1981 1985 
Health and 
safety, 
protection 
of public 
Masters  for 
Chartered 
status 0 
CRB check 
if working 
for nuclear 
and 
defence-
related 
industries 
2124 Electronic Engineers 
Certificat
ion 
All job 
titles Yes 
Engineerin
g Council 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Royal 
Charter 
1981 1985 
Health and 
safety, 
protection 
of public 
Masters  for 
Chartered 
status Varies 
varies 
depending 
on 
institution 
(see 
comments) 
2125 Chemical Engineers 
Certificat
ion 
All job 
titles Yes 
Engineerin
g Council 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Royal 
Charter 
1981 1985 
Health and 
safety, 
protection 
of public 
Masters  for 
Chartered 
status Varies 
varies 
depending 
on 
institution 
(see 
comments) 
2126 
Design and 
Development 
Engineers 
Certificat
ion 
All job 
titles Yes 
Engineerin
g Council 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Royal 
Charter 
1981 1985 
Health and 
safety, 
protection 
of public 
Masters  for 
Chartered 
status Varies 
varies 
depending 
on 
institution 
(see 
comments) 
2127 
Production and 
Process Engineers 
Certificat
ion 
All job 
titles Yes 
Engineerin
g Council 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Royal 
Charter 
1981 1985 
Health and 
safety, 
protection 
of public 
Masters  for 
Chartered 
status Varies 
varies 
depending 
on 
institution 
(see 
comments) 
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Regulat
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Status 
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tion of 
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Enforce
ment 
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Enforcem
ent Body 
Funding 
of 
Enforce
ment 
Body 
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Instrume
nt 
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Commenc
ement 
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s) 
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require
ment 
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of work 
experie
nce) 
Other 
Entry 
Requirem
ent 
2128 
Planning and Quality 
Control Engineers 
Certificat
ion 
All job 
titles Yes 
Engineerin
g Council 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Royal 
Charter 
1981 1985 
Health and 
safety, 
protection 
of public 
Masters  for 
Chartered 
status Varies 
varies 
depending 
on 
institution 
(see 
comments) 
2129 
Engineering 
Professionals NEC 
Certificat
ion 
All job 
titles Yes 
Engineerin
g Council 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Royal 
Charter 
1981 1985 
Health and 
safety, 
protection 
of public 
Masters for 
Chartered 
status Varies 
varies 
depending 
on 
institution 
(see 
comments) 
2131 
IT Strategy and 
Planning 
Professionals 
Accredit
ation 
Some 
job 
titles Yes 
Chartered 
Institute 
for IT 
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A Don't know 
Demonstrat
e 
competence 
Academic 
qualifications 
welcome, but 8-
10 years of 
experience 
essential 0 
Professiona
l reference, 
Assessmen
t Interview, 
Test  
2132 
Software 
Professionals 
Accredit
ation 
Some 
job 
titles Yes 
Chartered 
Institute 
for IT 
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A Don't know 
Demonstrat
e 
competence 
Academic 
qualifications 
welcome, but 8-
10 years of 
experience 
essential 0 
Professiona
l reference, 
Assessmen
t Interview, 
Test  
2211 
Medical 
Practitioners Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
General 
Medical 
Council 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Medical 
Act 1983 Don't know 
Health and 
safety, 
protection 
of public 
BSc/MSc degree 
from a medical 
School 
recognised by 
the British 
Medical Council 0 
Assessmen
t of Fitness 
to practice 
questionna
ire 
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of work 
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nce) 
Other 
Entry 
Requirem
ent 
2212 Psychologists Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
Health 
Profession
s Council 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Health 
Care and 
Associated 
Professions 
Order 2009 
Health and 
safety, 
protection 
of public 
A BScor MSc 
degree 
recognised by 
the Health 
Professions 
council 0 CRB check 
2213 
Pharmacists/Pharm
acologists Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
General 
Pharmace
utical 
Council 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
1852 
Pharmacy 
Act/ 
Pharmacy 
Order 2010 1855 
Protection 
of public, 
adherence 
to codes of 
conduct 
Masters 
Qualifications in 
Pharmacy 0 
52 week 
training 
programm
e and pass 
the 
registration 
examinatio
n, good 
health 
2214 
Ophthalmic 
Opticians Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
General 
Optical 
Council 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Opticians 
Act 1958 1958 
Health and 
safety, 
protection 
of public 
UG Bachelor's 
degree in 
optometry 0 
Membershi
p of an 
approved 
professiona
l 
association
, 
demonstrat
e  that 
possess a 
set of 
competenc
es set by 
GOC 
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nce) 
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Entry 
Requirem
ent 
2215 Dental Practitioners Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
General 
Dental 
Council 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Dentists 
Act 1921 1921 
Health and 
safety, 
protection 
of public 
UG degree in 
Dentistry from a 
university 
recognised by 
the GDC 0 No 
2216 Veterinarians Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
Royal 
College of 
Veterinary 
Surgeons 
Regulatory 
Body 
Self-
funded 
Veterinary 
Surgeons 
Act 1966 1966 
Health and 
safety, 
protection 
of public 
UG degree in 
Veterinary 
Science from a 
university 
recognised by 
the RCVS 0 No 
2311 
Higher Education 
Teaching 
Professionals 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2312 
Further Education 
Teaching 
Professions 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2313 
Education Officers, 
School Inspectors 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2314 
Secondary 
Education Teaching 
Professionals Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
Training 
and 
Developm
ent 
Agency/ 
Departme
nt for 
Education 
Governmen
t Agency 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Higher 
Education 
Act 1998 1998 
protection 
of public 
First degree in 
a relevant 
subject or non-
relevant 
degree plus 
vocational 
qualification 
(e.g. 
Postgraduate 
Certificate) 0 
CRB 
check; 
initial 
teacher 
training 
(done in a 
school or 
HE 
instituation
) 
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Regulat
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nce) 
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Entry 
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ent 
2315 
Primary and Nursery 
Education Teaching 
Professionals Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
Training 
and 
Developm
ent 
Agency/ 
Departme
nt for 
Education 
Governmen
t Agency 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Higher 
Education 
Act 1998 1998 
protection 
of public 
First degree in 
a relevant 
subject or non-
relevant 
degree plus 
vocational 
qualification 
(e.g. 
Postgraduate 
Certificate) 0 
CRB 
check; 
initial 
teacher 
training 
(done in a 
school or 
HE 
instituation
) 
2316 
Special Needs 
Education Teaching 
Professionals Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
Training 
and 
Developm
ent 
Agency/ 
Departme
nt for 
Education 
Governmen
t Agency 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Higher 
Education 
Act 1998 1998 
protection 
of public 
First degree in 
a relevant 
subject or non-
relevant 
degree plus 
vocational 
qualification 
(e.g. 
Postgraduate 
Certificate) 0 
CRB 
check; 
initial 
teacher 
training 
(done in a 
school or 
HE 
instituation
) 
2317 
Registrars and 
Senior 
Administrators of 
Educational 
Establishments 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2319 
Teaching 
Professionals NEC 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2321 
Scientific 
Researchers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2322 
Social Science 
Researchers 
Accredit
ation 
Some 
job 
titles Yes 
Royal 
Geographi
cal Society 
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A 1830 
Demonstrat
e 
competence 
Can have 
relevent 
degrees/qualific
ation 0 No 
2329 Researchers NEC 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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of work 
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Requirem
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2411 
Solicitors and 
Lawyers, Judges and 
Coroners Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
Solicitors 
Regulatio
n 
Authority/ 
Bar 
Council 
Regulatory 
Body 
Self-
funded 
Solicitors 
Act 1974/ 
Courts and 
Legal 
Services 
Act 1990 1894 
protection 
of public 
Degree in Law 
or Graduate 
Diploma in Law, 
Legal Practice 
Course. For 
Barristers also a 
Bar professional 
training Course 2 No 
2419 
Legal Professionals 
NEC Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
Solicitors 
Regulatio
n 
Authority/ 
Bar 
Council 
Regulatory 
Body 
Self-
funded 
Solicitors 
Act 1974/ 
Courts and 
Legal 
Services 
Act 1990 1894 
protection 
of public 
Qualifying law 
degree or 
Graduate 
Diploma in Law 4 No 
2421 
Chartered and 
Certified 
Accountants 
Accredit
ation 
All job 
titles Yes 
Institute 
of 
Chartered 
Accountan
ts 
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A 1880 
protection 
of public 
BSc Degree, ACA 
qualification 0 
training 
contract 
with an 
employer 
2422 
Management 
Accountants 
Accredit
ation 
All job 
titles Yes 
Chartered 
Institute 
of 
Managem
ent 
Accountan
ts 
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A 1995 
Protection 
of public, 
demonstrat
e 
competence 
One must study 
for the CIMA 
qualification 
equivalent to 
MSc 0 
sumbit a 
portofolio 
of work 
based 
practical 
experience 
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2423 
Management 
Consultants, 
Actuaries, 
Economists and 
Statisticians 
Accredit
ation 
All job 
titles Yes 
 Institute 
and 
Faculty of 
Actuaries/ 
Royal 
Statistical 
Society 
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A 1990/1993 
Protection 
of public, 
demonstrat
e 
competence 
Equivalent to 
MSc courses & 
exams 
(exemptions if 
bachelor's 
degree from 
accredited 
universities)/ 
UG or Master's 
degree for 
statisticians Varies 
sumbit a 
portofolio 
of work 
based 
practical 
experience
/ 5 years 
work 
experience 
for 
statisticians  
2431 Architects 
Certificat
ion 
All job 
titles Yes 
Architects 
Registrati
on Board 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
1997 
Architects 
Act 1997 
Demonstrat
e 
competence 
UG degree in 
architecture, 
Diploma in 
Architecture 
and then take a 
prescribed 
professional 
exam  2 No 
2432 Town Planners 
Accredit
ation 
All job 
titles Yes 
Royal 
Town 
Planning 
Institute 
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A 1959 
Demonstrat
e 
competence 
Accrediated 
MSc 
qualification  2 No 
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2433 Quantity Surveyors 
Accredit
ation 
All job 
titles Yes 
Royal 
Institute 
of 
Chartered 
Surveyors 
Regulatory 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A Don't know 
protection 
of public, 
demonstrat
e 
competence 
BSc Degree 
(approved by 
RICS), 23 
months 
structured 
training to meet 
Assessment of 
Professional 
Competence 
requirements 0 
Assessmen
t Interview 
with RICS 
2434 Chartered Surveyors 
Accredit
ation 
All job 
titles Yes 
Royal 
Institute 
of 
Chartered 
Surveyors 
Regulatory 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A 1881 
protection 
of public, 
demonstrat
e 
competence 
BSc Degree 
(approved by 
RICS), 23 
months 
structured 
training to meet 
Assessment of 
Professional 
Competence 
requirements 0 
Assessmen
t Interview 
with RICS 
2441 
Public Service 
Administrative 
Professionals 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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2442 Social Workers Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
General 
Social 
Care 
Council 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Care 
Standards 
Act 2000 2005 
protection 
of public 
Honours degree 
or/and 
postgraduate 
degree in social 
work approved 
by GSCC. Then 
register with 
GSCC. 0 
None, but 
individual 
has to 
demonstrat
e 
continuous 
developme
nt during 
the first 3 
years of 
registration
, known as 
post-
registration 
training.  
2443 Probation Officers Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
National 
Probation 
Service 
Governmen
t Agency 
Governm
ent 
funded don’t know Don't know 
protection 
of public 
Diploma in 
probation 
studies 0 No 
2444 Clergy 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2451 Librarians 
Accredit
ation 
All job 
titles Yes 
Chartered 
Institute 
of Library 
and 
Informatio
n 
Profession
als 
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A 1898 
Demonstrat
e 
competence 
CILIP accredited 
degree or post-
graduate 
qualification 0 No 
2452 
Archivists and 
Curators 
Accredit
ation 
All job 
titles Yes 
Society of 
Archivists 
Non-
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A 1996 
Demonstrat
e 
competence 
Level 4 
qualifications 
(accredited 
course or 
Society's 
Diploma 0 
demonstrat
e CPD 
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3111 
Laboratory 
Technicians 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
3112 
Electrical/Electronic
s Technicians Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
Joint 
Industry 
Board 
Non-
Chartered 
Profession
al Body 
Self-
funded 
Building 
Reguations 
2000 2005 
protection 
of public NVQ Level 2 0 
H&S test, 
CRB check 
3113 
Engineering 
Technicians 
Certificat
ion 
All job 
titles Yes 
Engineerin
g Council 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Royal 
Charter 
1981 1985 
Health and 
safety, 
protection 
of public 
Masters  for 
Chartered 
status 0 No 
3114 
Building and Civil 
Engineering 
Technicians 
Certificat
ion 
All job 
titles Yes 
Engineerin
g Council 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Royal 
Charter 
1981 1985 
Health and 
safety, 
protection 
of public 
Masters  for 
Chartered 
status 0 No 
3115 
Quality Assurance 
Technicians 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A  N/A N/A N/A 
3119 
Science and 
Engineering 
Technicians NEC 
Certificat
ion 
Some 
job 
titles Yes 
Engineerin
g Council 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Royal 
Charter 
1981 1985 
Health and 
safety, 
protection 
of public 
Masters  for 
Chartered 
status 0 No 
3121 
Architectural 
Technologists and 
Town Planning 
Technicians 
Certificat
ion 
All job 
titles Yes 
Architects 
Registrati
on Board 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
1997 
Architects 
Act 1997 
Demonstrat
e 
competence 
UG degree in 
architecture, 
Diploma in 
Architecture 
and then take a 
prescribed 
professional 
exam  2 No 
3122 Draughtsperson 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A  N/A N/A N/A 
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3123 Building Inspectors 
Accredit
ation 
All job 
titles No 
Constructi
on 
Industry 
Council 
Non-
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A 1984 
Demonstrat
e 
competence
, protection 
of public 
Exam (testing 
knowledge) and 
Interview 0 No 
3131 
IT Operations 
Technicians 
Accredit
ation 
Some 
job 
titles Yes 
Chartered 
Institute 
for IT 
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A Don't know 
Demonstrat
e 
competence 
Academic 
qualifications 
welcome, but 8-
10 years of 
experience 
essential 8 
Professiona
l reference, 
assessment 
Interview, 
test  
3132 
IT User Support 
Technician 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
3211 Nurses Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
Nurshing 
and 
Midwifery 
Council 
Non-
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded 
Nurses 
Registratio
n Act 1919 1919 
protection 
of public 
UG degree or 
Diploma  0 
CRB check, 
Declaration 
of good 
character 
from HE 
Institution 
where 
training 
was 
undertaken  
3212 Midwives Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
Nurshing 
and 
Midwifery 
Council 
Non-
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded 
Midwives 
Registratio
n Act 1902 1902 
protection 
of public 
UG degree or 
Diploma  0 
CRB check, 
Declaration 
of good 
character 
from HE 
Institution 
where 
training 
was 
undertaken  
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3213 Paramedics Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
Health 
Profession
s Council 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
For those 
employed 
by the 
NHS: 
Profession
als 
Supplemen
tary to 
Medicine 
Act 1960; 
For all 
practitione
rs: Health 
Professions 
Act 2001 
1960/Feb 
2002 
protection 
of public 
Diploma in 
Higher 
Education in 
Paramedics 0 
CRB check, 
1 year's 
clean/full 
driving 
license, 
fitness test, 
occupation
al health 
screening, 
medical 
assessment  
3214 
Medical 
Radiographers Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
Health 
Profession
s Council 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
For those 
employed 
by the 
NHS: 
Profession
als 
Supplemen
tary to 
Medicine 
Act 1960; 
For all 
practitione
rs: Health 
Professions 
Act 2001 
1960/Feb 
2002 
protection 
of public 
Approved BSc 
courses or 
Postgraduate 
diplomas 0 
Character 
reference, 
CRB Check 
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ment 
(years 
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ent 
3215 Chiropodists Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
Health 
Profession
s Council 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
For those 
employed 
by the 
NHS: 
Profession
als 
Supplemen
tary to 
Medicine 
Act 1960; 
For all 
practitione
rs: Health 
Professions 
Act 2001 
1960/Feb 
2002 
protection 
of public 
Approved BSc or 
MSc courses 0 
Character 
reference, 
CRB Check 
3216 Dispensing Opticians Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
General 
Optical 
Council 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Opticians 
Act 1958 1958 
Health and 
safety, 
protection 
of public 
Approved 
BSc/Msc 
courses 0 
Professiona
l qualifying 
examinatio
n 
3217 
Pharmaceutical 
Dispensers Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
General 
Pharmace
utical 
Council 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
1852 
Pharmacy 
Act/ 
Pharmacy 
Order 2010 1855 
Protection 
of public, 
adherence 
to codes of 
conduct 
NVQ Level 2/ 3 
for pharmacy 
technicians. 
BTEC 2 
Good 
health 
3218 
Medical and Dental 
Technicians Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
General 
Dental 
Council 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Dental Act 
1984 1984 
Health and 
safety, 
protection 
of public 
UG degree or 
Diploma 
(related) 
approved by the 
General Dental 
council 0 No 
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3221 Physiotherapists Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
Health 
Profession
s Council 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
For those 
employed 
by the 
NHS: 
Profession
als 
Supplemen
tary to 
Medicine 
Act 1960; 
For all 
practitione
rs: Health 
Professions 
Act 2001 
1960/Feb 
2002 
protection 
of public 
Approved BSc 
courses or MSc 
courses 0 
Character 
reference, 
CRB Check 
3222 
Occupational 
Therapist Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
Health 
Profession
s Council 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
For those 
employed 
by the 
NHS: 
Profession
als 
Supplemen
tary to 
Medicine 
Act 1960; 
For all 
practitione
rs: Health 
Professions 
Act 2001 
1960/Feb 
2002 
protection 
of public 
Approved BSc or 
MSc courses 0 
Character 
reference, 
CRB Check 
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Regulat
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tion of 
Title 
Enforce
ment 
Body 
Characteri
stics of 
Enforcem
ent Body 
Funding 
of 
Enforce
ment 
Body 
Statutory 
Instrume
nt 
Date of 
Commenc
ement 
Rationale 
for 
Regulation 
Entry 
Requirement 
(qualification
s) 
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of work 
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nce) 
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Entry 
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ent 
3223 
Speech and 
Language Therapists Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
Health 
Profession
s Council 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
For those 
employed 
by the 
NHS: 
Profession
als 
Supplemen
tary to 
Medicine 
Act 1960; 
For all 
practitione
rs: Health 
Professions 
Act 2001 
1960/Feb 
2002 
protection 
of public 
Approved Bsc or 
MSc courses 0 
Character 
reference, 
CRB Check 
3229 Therapists NEC Licensing  
Some 
job 
titles N/A 
Health 
Profession
s Council 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
For those 
employed 
by the 
NHS: 
Profession
als 
Supplemen
tary to 
Medicine 
Act 1960; 
For all 
practitione
rs: Health 
Professions 
Act 2001 
1960/Feb 
2002 
protection 
of public 
Approved Bsc or 
MSc courses 0 
Character 
reference, 
CRB Check 
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ent 
3231 
Youth and 
Community Workers Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
National 
Youth 
Agency Other 
Self-
funded Don't know  2010 
protection 
of public 
Approved BSc 
course 
(minimum) 0 
Character 
reference, 
CRB Check 
3232 
Housing and 
Welfare Officers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
3311 
NCOs and Other 
Ranks 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
3312 
Police Officers 
(Sergeant and 
Below) Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
The Home 
Office 
(police) 
plus Local 
Forces 
Governmen
t Agency 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Metropolit
an Police 
Act 1829 1829 
Demonstrat
e 
competence
, protection 
of public 
Initial Police 
Learning and 
Development 
Programme 
(local training 
schemes vary), 
pass Police 
Action Checklist 
(set by the 
Home Office) 0 
UK 
resident, 
medical 
assessment
, 
assessment 
tests/intere
view, 
fitness 
tests, CRB 
checks (all 
before 
training 
commence
s). 
3313 
Fire Service Officers 
(Leading Fire 
Officers and Below) Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
Governme
nt  
oversees 
(Fire 
Rescue 
Service), 
but 
devolutio
n of 
power to 
Governmen
t Agency 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Fire 
Services 
Act 1947 1948 
protection 
of public 
Basic numeracy 
and literacy 0 
Test of 
attitude 
and 
motivation, 
problem-
solving and 
physical 
ability. 
Medical 
exam 
  
 
3
7
6
 
SOC(2000) 
Unit Group 
SOC title 
Regulat
ion 
Status 
Cover
age 
Any 
Protec
tion of 
Title 
Enforce
ment 
Body 
Characteri
stics of 
Enforcem
ent Body 
Funding 
of 
Enforce
ment 
Body 
Statutory 
Instrume
nt 
Date of 
Commenc
ement 
Rationale 
for 
Regulation 
Entry 
Requirement 
(qualification
s) 
Entry 
require
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Fire 
Authoritie
s (locally) 
3314 
Prison Service 
Officers (Below 
Principal Officer) Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
The Prison 
Service 
Governmen
t Agency 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Prison Act 
1952 1952 
protection 
of public, 
demonstrat
e 
competence  
Prison Officer 
Entry-Level 
Training plus 
Custodial Care 
NVQ Level 3 0 
Prison 
Officer 
Selection 
test, 
Medical 
Examinatio
n, fitness 
test, EU 
national, 
not 
undischarg
ed 
bankrupt 
or member 
of racist 
organisatio
n, 
3319 
Protective Service 
Associate 
Professionals NEC Licensing  
Some 
job 
titles N/A 
Maritime 
and Coast 
Guard 
Agency 
Governmen
t Agency 
Governm
ent 
funded don't know Don't know 
protection 
of public, 
demonstrat
e 
competence  
Train with the 
Maritime and 
Coastguard 
Agency (NVQ 
Level 3) 0 
Medical 
Fitness Test 
3411 Artists 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
3412 Authors and Writers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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3413 
Actors and 
Entertainers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
3414 
Dancers and 
Choreographers 
Accredit
ation 
Some 
job 
titles Yes 
Royal 
Academy 
of Dance 
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A Don't know 
Demonstrat
e 
competence 
RAD 
Advanced 2 0 No 
3415 Musicians 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
3416 
Arts Officers, 
Producers and 
Directors 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
3421 Graphic Designers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
3422 
Product, Clothing 
and Related 
Designers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
3431 
Journalists, 
Newspaper and 
Periodical Editors 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
3432 
Broadcasting 
Associate 
Professionals 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
3433 
Public Relations 
Officers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
3434 
Photographers and 
Audio-Visual 
Equipment 
Operators 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
3441 Sports Players 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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3442 
Sports Coaches, 
Instructors and 
Officials Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
National 
Governing 
Body of 
Chosen 
Sport Varies 
Self-
funded 
Industry 
initiative Various 
Demonstrat
e 
competence 
Basic Referee 
Training course 
for all sports, 
but details very 
depending on 
the sport. For 
coaching, 
appropriate 
coaching 
qualification as 
set by the 
National 
Governing Body 
of chosen sport  0 
CRB check 
for 
community 
coaching 
3443 Fitness Instructors 
Certificat
ion 
All job 
titles No 
Register 
of 
Exercise 
Profession
als 
Regulatory 
Body 
Self-
funded 
Establishe
d by 
SkillsActiv
e 2002 
Demonstrat
e 
competence 
Level 2,3 &4 
qualifications 
available 0 
Civil 
liability 
insurance 
cover 
3449 
Sports and Fitness 
Occupations NEC 
Certificat
ion 
All job 
titles No 
Register 
of 
Exercise 
Profession
als 
Regulatory 
Body 
Self-
funded 
Establishe
d by 
SkillsActiv
e 2002 
Demonstrat
e 
competence NVQs Level 2&3 0 
Civil 
liability 
insurance 
cover 
3511 
Air Traffic 
Controllers Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
Civil 
Aviation 
Authority 
Governmen
t Agency 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Civil 
Aviation 
Act 1971 
and 
Directive 
2006/23/E
C 1971 
protection 
of public, 
demonstrat
e 
competence 
ATC licence (Air-
Traffic and 
Aviation 
Management 
Foundation 
Degree) 0 
Medical 
Certificate 
including 
Hearing, 
Vision 
requireme
nts, 21 
years old, 
good 
command 
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3512 
Air craft Pilots and 
Flight Engineers Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
Civil 
Aviation 
Authority 
Governmen
t Agency 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Don't 
know. 
Licensing, 
Administra
tion and 
Stardadisat
ion 
Operating 
Requireme
nts and 
Safety 
(2008) Don't know 
protection 
of public, 
demonstrat
e 
competence 
Frozen Airline 
Transport Pilot's 
License, then 
Commerical 
Pilot's License, 
Pass the Civil 
Aviation 
Authority's Class 
1 Medical 
Examination 0 
Civil 
Aviation 
Authority's 
Class 1 
Medical 
Examinatio
n, 21+ 
years old, 
good 
command 
of english 
3513 
Ship Hovercraft 
Officers Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
Maritime 
and Coast 
Guard 
Agency 
Governmen
t Agency 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Internation
al 
Convention 
on 
Standards 
of Training, 
Certificatio
n and 
Watchkeep
ing 1978 1978 
protection 
of public, 
demonstrat
e 
competence 
VQ Level 3 for 
officers, VQ 
level 4 for 
Masters 0 
Medical 
Certificate 
including 
Hearing, 
Vision 
requireme
nts 
3514 Train Drivers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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3520 
Legal Associate 
Professionals Licensing  
Some 
job 
titles N/A 
Council 
for 
Licensed 
Conveyan
cers 
Regulatory 
Body 
Self-
funded 
Administra
tion of 
Justice Act 
1985 1987 
protection 
of public 
CLC Training 
Course: Level 3 
Certificate/Diplo
ma in Law & 
Practice and 
then a Level 4 
Bsc degree 0 No 
3531 
Estimators, Valuers 
and Assessors 
Accredit
ation 
All job 
titles Yes 
Royal 
Institute 
of 
Chartered 
Surveyors 
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A  2010 
protection 
of public, 
demonstrat
e 
competence 
Associate 
member of RICS 
and RICS 
associate 
qualification 
and 4 yrs 
experience OR 4 
years' 
experience and 
a relevant NVQ 
level 3 
qualification 0 
Professiona
l indemnity 
insurance 
and 
complaints 
& claims 
notification
s 
3532 Brokers 
Registrat
ion 
All job 
titles N/A 
Financial 
Services 
Authority 
Governmen
t Agency 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Financial 
Services 
and 
Markets 
Act 2000 2000 
protection 
of public Other 0 No 
3533 
Insurance 
Underwriters 
Accredit
ation 
All job 
titles Yes 
Chartered 
Insurance 
Institute 
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A 1912 
Demonstrat
e 
competence 
CII qualifications 
(equivalent to 
BSc degrees and 
higher national 
diplomas) 0 No 
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3534 
Finance and 
Investment 
Analysis/Advisor 
Registrat
ion 
All job 
titles N/A 
Financial 
Services 
Authority 
Governmen
t Agency 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Financial 
Services 
and 
Markets 
Act 2000 2000 
protection 
of public None 0 No 
3535 Taxation Experts Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
Office for 
Fair 
Trading 
Governmen
t Agency 
Governm
ent 
funded Don't know Don't know 
protection 
of public UG degree 0 No 
3536 Importers/Exporters 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
3537 
Financial and 
Accounting 
Technicians 
Accredit
ation 
Some 
job 
titles No 
Associatio
n of 
Chartered 
Certified 
Accountan
ts 
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A 1974 
Demonstrat
e 
competence 
NVQ level 4 
courses 
provided by the 
Association 0 No 
3539 
Business and 
Related Associate 
Professionals NEC  
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
3541 
Buyers and 
Purchasing Officers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
3542 
Sales 
Representatives 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
3543 
Marketing Associate 
Professionals 
Accredit
ation 
Some 
job 
titles Yes 
Chartered 
Institute 
of 
Marketing 
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A  1989 
Adherence 
to codes of 
conduct, 
demonstrat
e 
competence 
Diploma in 
Marketing (CIM) 
or a university 
degree in 
marketing plus 
experience  3 No 
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3544 
Estate Agents and 
Auctioneers 
Registrat
ion 
Some 
job 
titles N/A 
Ombudsm
an for 
Estate 
Agents or 
Surveyors 
Ombudsm
an Service 
Non-
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded 
Consumers
, Estate 
Agents and 
Redress 
Act 2007 2008 
Adherence 
to codes of 
conduct, 
protection 
of public None 0 No 
3551 
Conservation and 
Environmental 
Protection Officers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
3552 
Countryside and 
Park Rangers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
3561 
Public Service 
Associate 
Professionals 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
3562 
Personnel and 
Industrial Relations 
Officer 
Accredit
ation 
All job 
titles Yes 
Chartered 
Institute 
for 
Personnel 
and 
Developm
ent 
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A 1955 
Adherence 
to codes of 
conduct, 
demonstrat
e 
competence 
University 
course that 
provides the 
practitioner 
Level 
professional 
Standards of the 
CIPD 3 No 
3563 
Vocational and 
Industrial Trainers 
and Instructors 
Accredit
ation 
All job 
titles Yes 
Chartered 
Institute 
for 
Personnel 
and 
Developm
ent 
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A 1955 
Adherence 
to codes of 
conduct, 
demonstrat
e 
competence 
University 
course that 
provides the 
practitioner 
Level 
professional 
Standards of the 
CIPD 3 No 
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3564 
Careers Advisors 
and Vocational 
Guidance Specialists 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
3565 
Inspectors of 
Factories, Utilities 
and Trading 
Standards Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A various Varies 
Governm
ent 
funded Various Various 
protection 
of public, 
demonstrat
e 
competence Various Varies Various 
3566 Statutory Examiners Licensing  
Some 
job 
titles N/A various Varies 
Governm
ent 
funded Various Various 
protection 
of public, 
demonstrat
e 
competence Various Varies Various 
3567 
Occupational 
Hygienists and 
Safety Officers 
(Health and Safety) 
Accredit
ation 
Some 
job 
titles Yes 
Institution 
of 
Occupatio
nal Health 
and Safety 
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A 2005 
protection 
of public, 
demonstrat
e 
competence 
Level 3 NQF 
qualifications 5 No 
3568 
Environmental 
Health Officers Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
Environm
ental 
Health 
Registrati
on Board 
Governmen
t Agency 
Governm
ent 
funded Don't know Don't know 
protection 
of public 
Completion of 
EHRB accredited 
courses, 
diploma and 
higher 
certificates 0 Interview 
4111 
Civil Service 
Executive Officers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
4112 
Civil Service 
Administrative 
Officers and 
Assistants 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
4113 
Local Government 
Clerical Officers and 
Assistants 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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4114 
Officers of Non-
Governmental 
Organisations 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
4121 Credit Controllers 
Registrat
ion 
All job 
titles N/A 
Financial 
Services 
Authority 
Governmen
t Agency 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Financial 
Services 
and 
Markets 
Act 2000 2000 
protection 
of public None 0 No 
4122 
Accounts and Wages 
Clerks, Book-
Keepers, Other 
Financial Clerks 
Accredit
ation 
Some 
job 
titles Yes 
Institute 
of 
Chartered 
Accountan
ts 
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A 1880 
protection 
of public 
Degree, ACA 
qualification 0 
training 
contract 
with an 
employer 
4123 Counter Clerks 
Registrat
ion 
Some 
job 
titles N/A 
Gambling 
Commissi
on 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Gambling 
Act 2005 2007 
protection 
of public None 0 
CRB check, 
Financial 
Circumstan
ces check 
4131 
Filing and other 
Records 
Assistants/Clerks 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
4132 
Pensions and 
Insurance Clerks 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
4133 Stock Control Clerks 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
4134 
Transport and 
Distribution Clerks 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
4135 
Library 
Assistants/Clerks 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
4136 
Database 
Assistants/Clerks 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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4137 
Market Research 
Interviewers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
4141 Telephonists 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
4142 
Communication 
Operators 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
4150 
General Office 
Assistants/Clerks 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
4211 Medical Secretaries 
Registrat
ion 
All job 
titles N/A 
British 
Society of 
Medical 
Secretarie
s and 
Administr
ators 
Non-
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded Don't know Don't know 
Gain 
professional 
recognition 
None, but 
courses 
available 0 No 
4212 Legal Secretaries 
Accredit
ation 
All job 
titles Yes 
National 
Associatio
n of 
Licensed 
Paralegals 
Non-
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A 2005 
protection 
of public 
Diploma or first 
degree 
accredited by 
the association 
with a strong 
legal element 
into it  2 CPD 
4213 School Secretaries 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
4214 
Company 
Secretaries 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
4215 
Personal Assistants 
and Other 
Secretaries 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
4216 Receptionists 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
4217 Typists Unregula N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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5111 Farmers Licensing  
Some 
job 
titles N/A 
Organic 
Control 
Bodies 
(Soil 
Associatio
n, Organic 
Farmers 
and 
Growers, 
Organic 
Food 
Federatio
n, Quality 
Food 
Federatio
n, Quality 
Welsh 
Food 
Certificati
on, 
Biodynami
c 
Agricultur
al 
Associatio
n and the 
Scottish 
Organic 
Producers 
Associatio
n 
Non-
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded 
Council 
Regulation 
(EEC) No 
2092/91 1991 
Adherence 
to codes of 
conduct, 
demonstrat
e 
competence 
Study of farm, 
soil, planning 
etc.  0 
Declaration 
of 
compliance
. 
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5112 Horticultural Trades 
Accredit
ation 
Some 
job 
titles Yes 
Landscape 
Institution 
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A 1997 
Demonstrat
e 
competence 
Related degree 
or postgraduate 
degree 0 No 
5113 
Gardeners and 
Groundsmen/Groun
dswomen 
Accredit
ation 
Some 
job 
titles Yes 
Landscape 
Institution 
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A  1997 
Demonstrat
e 
competence 
Related degree 
or postgraduate 
degree 0 No 
5119 
Agricultural and 
Fishing Trades NEC 
Accredit
ation 
Some 
job 
titles Yes 
Institute 
of 
Chartered 
Foresters 
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A  1982 
Demonstrat
e 
competence 
Related degree 
or postgraduate 
degree 0 
Written 
assessment 
and oral 
examinatio
n by the 
institute 
5211 
Smiths and Forge 
Workers Licensing  
Some 
job 
titles N/A 
Farriers 
Registrati
on Council 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Farriers 
Registratio
n Act 1975' 1980 
protection 
of public 
DipWCF or NVQ 
Level 3 0 No 
5212 
Moulders, Core 
Makers, Die Casters 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
5213 
Sheet Metal 
Workers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
5214 
Metal Plate 
Workers, 
Shipwrights, 
Riveters 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
5215 Welding Trades 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
5216 Pipe Fitters 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
5221 
Metal Machining 
Setters and Setter 
Operators 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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5222 
Tool Makers, Tool 
Fitters and Markers-
Out 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
5223 
Metal Working 
Production and 
Maintenance Fitters 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
5224 
Precision Instrument 
Makers and 
Repairers 
Accredit
ation 
All job 
titles No 
Worshipfu
l Company 
of 
Clockmack
ers 
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A Don't know 
Demonstrat
e 
competence 
Certificate in 
Clock and 
Watch Servicing 0 No 
5231 
Motor Mechanics, 
Auto Engineers Licensing  
Some 
job 
titles N/A 
The 
Vehicle 
and 
Operator 
Service 
Agency 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded   Don't know 
Demonstrat
e 
competence 
Complete 
'Nominated 
Tester Training' 
and sit the 
assessment. 0 
Full and 
valid 
driving 
licence 
5232 
Vehicle Body 
Builders and 
Repairers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
5233 Auto Electricians 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
5234 
Vehicle Spray 
Painters 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
5241 
Electricians, 
Electrical Fitters 
Accredit
ation 
Some 
job 
titles No 
Electrician
s (ECS) 
Non-
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A 1993 
protection 
of public NVQ Level 3 0 
Health and 
Safety 
Test/techni
cal test 
5242 
Telecommunication
s Engineers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
5243 
Lines Repairers and 
Cable Joiners 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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5244 
TV, Video and Audio 
Engineers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
5245 
Computer 
Engineers, 
Installation and 
Maintenance 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
5249 
Electrical/Electronic
s Engineer NEC 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
5311 Steel Erectors 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
5312 Bricklayers, Masons 
Accredit
ation 
Some 
job 
titles Yes 
Chartered 
Institute 
of Builders 
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A 1980 
Upskilling of 
Profession 
Can have 
relevant NVQs 2 No 
5313 
Roofers, Roof Tillers 
and Slaters 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
5314 
Plumbers, Heating 
ventilating 
Engineers Licensing  
Some 
job 
titles N/A 
Gas Safety 
Register 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Gas Safety 
(Instilation 
and Use) 
Regulation
s 1990 1991 
protection 
of public 
Can have 
relevant NVQs 0 
Technical 
Test from 
the 
Institute/W
ork 
experience 
5315 Carpenters 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
5316 
Glaziers, Window 
Fabricators and 
Fitters 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
5319 
Construction Trades 
NEC 
Accredit
ation 
Some 
job 
titles No 
Constructi
on Skills 
Certificati
on 
Scheme 
Non-
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A 1995 
Upskilling of 
Profession 
Relevant 
NVQs 0 
Health and 
Safety Test 
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5321 Plasterers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
5322 
Floorers and Wall 
Tillers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
5323 
Painters and 
Decorators 
Accredit
ation 
Some 
job 
titles No 
Painting 
and 
Decoratin
g 
Associatio
n 
Non-
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A  2002   
Upskilling of 
Profession 
City and Guilds 
Craft Certificate 
and past a CITB 
Skills Test 1 No 
5411 
Weavers and 
Knitters 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
5412 Upholsterers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
5413 
Leather and Related 
Trades 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
5414 
Tailors and 
Dressmakers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
5419 
Textiles, Garments 
and Related Trades 
NEC 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
5421 
Originators, 
Compositors and 
Print Repairers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
5422 Printers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
5423 
Book Binders and 
Print Finishers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
5424 Screen Printers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
5431 
Butchers, Meat 
Cutters Licensing  
Some 
job 
titles N/A 
Chartered 
Institute 
of 
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded 
Food 
Safety Act 
1990 1990 
protection 
of public 
Food Hygiene 
Certificate 0 No 
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Environm
ental 
Health 
5432 
Bakers, Flour 
Confectioners Licensing  
Some 
job 
titles N/A 
Chartered 
Institute 
of 
Environm
ental 
Health 
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded 
Food 
Safety Act 
1990 1990 
protection 
of public 
Food Hygiene 
Certificate 0 No 
5433 
Fishmongers, 
Poultry Dressers Licensing  
Some 
job 
titles N/A 
Chartered 
Institute 
of 
Environm
ental 
Health 
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded 
Food 
Safety Act 
1990 1990 
protection 
of public 
Food Hygiene 
Certificate 0 No 
5434 Chefs, Cooks Licensing  
Some 
job 
titles N/A 
Chartered 
Institute 
of 
Environm
ental 
Health 
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded 
Food 
Safety Act 
1990 1990 
protection 
of public 
Food Hygiene 
Certificate 0 No 
5491 
Glass and Ceramics 
Makers, Decorators 
and Fishers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
5492 
Furniture Makers, 
Other Craft 
Woodworkers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
5493 
Pattern Makers 
(Moulds) 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
5494 
Musical Instrument 
Makers and Tuners 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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5495 
Goldsmiths, 
Silversmiths, 
Precious Stone 
Workers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
5496 
Floral Arrangers, 
Florists 
Accredit
ation 
All job 
titles No 
British 
Florist 
Associatio
n 
Non-
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A  1960s 
Upskilling of 
Profession 
Diploma in 
Floristry (NPTC 
Level 4) and 
Master Diploma 
in Floristry (level 
5) 0 No 
5499 
Hand Craft 
Occupations NEC 
Accredit
ation 
Some 
job 
titles No 
British 
Toymaker
s Guild 
(BTG), The 
Institute 
of 
Trichologi
sts 
Non-
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A 1956/1902 
Gain 
professional 
recognition 
Examination 
from 
Regulatory/Prof
essional Body 0 No 
6111 Nursing Auxiliaries Licensing  
Some 
job 
titles N/A 
Nursing 
and 
Midwifery 
Council 
Governmen
t Agency 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Midwives 
Registratio
n Act 1902, 
Nurses 
Registratio
n Act 1919, 
Medical 
Act 1983 1902/1919 
protection 
of public 
Nursing 
Qualifications 0 No 
6112 Ambulance Staff 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
6113 Dental Nurses Licensing  
Some 
job 
titles N/A 
General 
Dental 
Council 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Dentists 
Act 1984 1956 
protection 
of public 
Professional 
Qualifications 0 No 
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6114 
Houseparents and 
Residential Wardens 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
6115 
Care Assistants and 
Home Carers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
6121 Nursery Nurses Licensing  
Some 
job 
titles N/A OFSTED 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Childcare 
Act 2006 2007 
protection 
of public 
First Aid 
Certificate 0 
CRB Check/ 
Declaration 
of 
adherence 
6122 
Childminders and 
Related Occupations Licensing  
Some 
job 
titles N/A OFSTED 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Childcare 
Act 2006 2007 
protection 
of public 
First Aid 
Certificate 0 
CRB Check/ 
Declaration 
of 
adherence 
6123 
Playgroup 
leaders/Assistants Licensing  
Some 
job 
titles N/A OFSTED 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Childcare 
Act 2006 2007 
protection 
of public 
First Aid 
Certificate 0 
CRB Check/ 
Declaration 
of 
adherence 
6124 
Education 
Assistants Licensing  
Some 
job 
titles N/A OFSTED 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Childcare 
Act 2006 2007 
protection 
of public 
First Aid 
Certificate 0 
CRB Check/ 
Declaration 
of 
adherence 
6131 
Veterinary Nurses 
and Assistants 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
6139 
Animal Care 
Occupations 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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6211 
Sports and Leisure 
Assistants 
Registrat
ion 
Some 
job 
titles N/A 
Gambling 
Commissi
on 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Gambling 
Act 2005 2007 
protection 
of public None 0 
CRB check, 
Financial 
Circumstan
ces check 
6212 Travel Agents 
Accredit
ation 
All job 
titles No 
Associatio
n of 
British 
Travel 
Agents 
Non-
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A 2006 
Establish/m
aintain 
industry 
standards 
Various levels of 
membership 
but: NVQ Level 
2/Apprenticeshi
p plus 2-7 years 
experience 
depending on 
membership 
type 0 No 
6213 
Travel and Tour 
Guides 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
6214 Air Travel Assistants 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
6215 
Rail Travel 
Assistants 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
6219 
Leisure and Travel 
Service Occupations 
NEC 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
6221 
Hairdressers, 
Barbers 
Accredit
ation 
Some 
job 
titles No 
Hairdressi
ng Council 
Non-
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A 1964 
Gain 
professional 
recognition 
Professional 
Qualifications 0 No 
6222 
Beauticians and 
Related Occupations 
Registrat
ion 
Some 
job 
titles N/A 
Local 
Authority 
Governmen
t Agency 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Local 
Governme
nt 
(Miscellane
ous 1983 
Protection 
of public None 0 
Inspection 
of 
Workplace 
  
 
3
9
5
 
SOC(2000) 
Unit Group 
SOC title 
Regulat
ion 
Status 
Cover
age 
Any 
Protec
tion of 
Title 
Enforce
ment 
Body 
Characteri
stics of 
Enforcem
ent Body 
Funding 
of 
Enforce
ment 
Body 
Statutory 
Instrume
nt 
Date of 
Commenc
ement 
Rationale 
for 
Regulation 
Entry 
Requirement 
(qualification
s) 
Entry 
require
ment 
(years 
of work 
experie
nce) 
Other 
Entry 
Requirem
ent 
Provisions) 
Act 1982 
6231 
Housekeepers and 
Related Occupations 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
6232 Caretakers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
6291 
Undertakers and 
Mortuary Assistants 
Accredit
ation 
All job 
titles No 
British 
Institute 
of Funeral 
Directors 
Non-
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A 2002 
Protection 
of public, 
demonstrat
e 
competence  
Diploma in 
Funeral 
Directing or 
BTEC 0 CPD log 
6292 Pest Control Officers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
7111 
Sales and Retail 
Assistants 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
7112 
Retail Cashiers and 
Check-Out 
Operators 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
7113 
Telephone 
Salesperson 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
7121 
Collector 
Salesperson and 
Credit Agents 
Registrat
ion 
Some 
job 
titles N/A 
Office of 
Fair 
Trading 
Governmen
t Agency 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Consumer 
Credit Act 
1974 1974 
protection 
of public None 0 
OFT 
'fitness' 
test 
7122 
Debt, Rent and 
Other Cash 
Collectors 
Registrat
ion 
Some 
job 
titles N/A 
Office of 
Fair 
Trading 
Governmen
t Agency 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Consumer 
Credit Act 
1974 1974 
protection 
of public None 0 
OFT 
'fitness' 
test 
7123 
Roundsmem/Wome
n and Van 
Salespersons 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
  
 
3
9
6
 
SOC(2000) 
Unit Group 
SOC title 
Regulat
ion 
Status 
Cover
age 
Any 
Protec
tion of 
Title 
Enforce
ment 
Body 
Characteri
stics of 
Enforcem
ent Body 
Funding 
of 
Enforce
ment 
Body 
Statutory 
Instrume
nt 
Date of 
Commenc
ement 
Rationale 
for 
Regulation 
Entry 
Requirement 
(qualification
s) 
Entry 
require
ment 
(years 
of work 
experie
nce) 
Other 
Entry 
Requirem
ent 
7124 
Market and Street 
Traders and 
Assistants 
Registrat
ion 
Some 
job 
titles N/A 
Local 
Authority 
Local 
Authority 
Governm
ent 
funded Various Various 
protection 
of public None 0 No 
7125 
Merchandisers and 
Window Dressers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
7129 
Sales Related 
Occupations NEC 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
7211 
Call Centre 
Agents/Operators 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
7212 
Customer Care 
Occupations 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
8111 
Food, Drink and 
Tobacco Process 
Operatives Licensing  
Some 
job 
titles N/A 
Chartered 
Institute 
of 
Environm
ental 
Health 
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded 
Food 
Safety Act 
1990 1990 
protection 
of public 
Food Hygience 
Certificate 0 No 
8112 
Glass and Ceramics 
Process Operatives 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
8113 
Textile Process 
Operatives 
Accredit
ation 
Some 
job 
titles Yes 
Chartered 
Institute 
of Textile 
Technolog
ists 
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A 1925 
Gain 
professional 
recognition 
Can have 
relevent 
degrees/qualific
ation 1 No 
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8114 
Chemical and 
Related Process 
Operatives 
Accredit
ation 
All job 
titles Yes 
Society of 
Dyers and 
Colourists 
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A 1963 
Gain 
professional 
recognition 
Recognised 
professional 
qualification or 
substantial 
relevant 
experience 0 No 
8115 
Rubber Process 
Operatives 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
8116 
Plastics Process 
Operatives 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
8117 
Metal Making and 
Treating Process 
Operatives 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
8118 Electroplaters 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
8119 
Process Operatives 
NEC 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
8121 
Paper and Wood 
Machine Operatives 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
8122 
Coal Mine 
Operatives 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
8123 
Quarry Workers and 
Related Operatives 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
8124 
Energy Plant 
Operatives 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
8125 
Metal Working 
Machine Operatives 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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age 
Any 
Protec
tion of 
Title 
Enforce
ment 
Body 
Characteri
stics of 
Enforcem
ent Body 
Funding 
of 
Enforce
ment 
Body 
Statutory 
Instrume
nt 
Date of 
Commenc
ement 
Rationale 
for 
Regulation 
Entry 
Requirement 
(qualification
s) 
Entry 
require
ment 
(years 
of work 
experie
nce) 
Other 
Entry 
Requirem
ent 
8126 
Water and Sewage 
Plant Operatives 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
8129 
Plant and Machine 
Operatives NEC 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
8131 
Assemblers 
(Electrical Products) 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
8132 
Assemblers 
(Vehicles and Metal 
Goods) 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
8133 
Routine Inspectors 
and Testers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
8134 
Weighers, Graders, 
Sorters 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
8135 
Tyre, Exhaust and 
Windscreen Fitters 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
8136 Clothing Cutters 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
8137 Sewing Machinists 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
8138 
Routine Laboratory 
Testers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
8139 
Assemblers and 
Routine Operatives 
NEC 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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SOC(2000) 
Unit Group 
SOC title 
Regulat
ion 
Status 
Cover
age 
Any 
Protec
tion of 
Title 
Enforce
ment 
Body 
Characteri
stics of 
Enforcem
ent Body 
Funding 
of 
Enforce
ment 
Body 
Statutory 
Instrume
nt 
Date of 
Commenc
ement 
Rationale 
for 
Regulation 
Entry 
Requirement 
(qualification
s) 
Entry 
require
ment 
(years 
of work 
experie
nce) 
Other 
Entry 
Requirem
ent 
8141 
Scaffolders, Stagers, 
Riggers 
Accredit
ation 
Some 
job 
titles No 
Constructi
on 
Industry 
Scaffolder
s Record 
Scheme 
(CISRS) 
Non-
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A 1979 
Upskilling of 
Profession 
Basic 
Scaffolding 
course, Part 1 
and 2. NVQ 
level 2/ Health 
and Safety 
Certificate 0 No 
8142 
Road Construction 
Operatives 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
8143 
Rail construction 
and Maintenance 
Operatives 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
8149 
Construction 
Operatives NEC 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
8211 
Heavy Goods 
Vehicle Drivers Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
Driving 
Standards 
Agency/ 
Departme
nt for 
Transport 
Governmen
t Agency 
Governm
ent 
funded 
1903 
Motor Car 
Act  1903 
protection 
of public C1 or C license 0 No 
8212 Van Drivers Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
Driving 
Standards 
Agency/ 
Departme
nt for 
Transport 
Governmen
t Agency 
Governm
ent 
funded 
1903 
Motor Car 
Act 1903 
protection 
of public C1 or C license 0 No 
8213 
Bus and Coach 
Drivers Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
Driving 
Standards 
Agency/ 
Departme
nt for 
Transport 
Governmen
t Agency 
Governm
ent 
funded 
1903 
Motor Car 
Act 1903 
protection 
of public 
D1 or D1E 
license 0 No 
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SOC(2000) 
Unit Group 
SOC title 
Regulat
ion 
Status 
Cover
age 
Any 
Protec
tion of 
Title 
Enforce
ment 
Body 
Characteri
stics of 
Enforcem
ent Body 
Funding 
of 
Enforce
ment 
Body 
Statutory 
Instrume
nt 
Date of 
Commenc
ement 
Rationale 
for 
Regulation 
Entry 
Requirement 
(qualification
s) 
Entry 
require
ment 
(years 
of work 
experie
nce) 
Other 
Entry 
Requirem
ent 
8214 
Taxi, Cab Drivers 
and Chauffeurs Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
Local 
Authority 
Local 
Authority 
Governm
ent 
funded 
1903 
Motor Car 
Act 1903 
protection 
of public 
Examination 
from local 
authority/ Full 
Driving 
License (B) 0 
Health 
Check, 
Criminal 
Record 
Check 
8215 Driving Instructors Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
Driving 
Standards 
Agency/ 
Departme
nt for 
Transport 
Governmen
t Agency 
Governm
ent 
funded 
1903 
Motor Car 
Act 1903 
protection 
of public 
Driving 
Instructor 
License (three 
tests) 0 No 
8216 
Rail Transport 
Operatives 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
8217 
Seafarers (Merchant 
Navy); Barge, 
Lighter and Boat 
Operatives 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
8218 
Air Transport 
Operatives 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
8219 
Transport 
Operatives NEC 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
8221 Crane Drivers Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
Driving 
Standards 
Agency/ 
Departme
nt for 
Transport 
Governmen
t Agency 
Governm
ent 
funded 
1903 
Motor Car 
Act 1903 
protection 
of public 
Health and 
Safety 
Certificate 0 F License 
8222 
Fork-Lift Truck 
Drivers Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
Driving 
Standards 
Agency/ 
Departme
nt for 
Transport 
Governmen
t Agency 
Governm
ent 
funded 
1903 
Motor Car 
Act 1903 
protection 
of public 
Health and 
Safety 
Certificate 0 F License 
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SOC(2000) 
Unit Group 
SOC title 
Regulat
ion 
Status 
Cover
age 
Any 
Protec
tion of 
Title 
Enforce
ment 
Body 
Characteri
stics of 
Enforcem
ent Body 
Funding 
of 
Enforce
ment 
Body 
Statutory 
Instrume
nt 
Date of 
Commenc
ement 
Rationale 
for 
Regulation 
Entry 
Requirement 
(qualification
s) 
Entry 
require
ment 
(years 
of work 
experie
nce) 
Other 
Entry 
Requirem
ent 
8223 
Agricultural 
Machinery Drivers Licensing  
All job 
titles N/A 
Driving 
Standards 
Agency/ 
Departme
nt for 
Transport 
Governmen
t Agency 
Governm
ent 
funded 
1903 
Motor Car 
Act 1903 
protection 
of public 
Health and 
Safety 
Certificate 0 F License 
8229 
Mobile Machine 
Drivers and 
Operatives NEC 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
9111 Farm Workers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
9112 Forestry workers 
Accredit
ation 
Some 
job 
titles Yes 
Landscape 
Institution 
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A 1997 
Demonstrat
e 
competence 
Related degree 
or postgraduate 
degree 0 No 
9119 
Fishing and 
Agricultural Related 
Occupations NEC 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
9121 
Labourers in 
Building and 
Woodworking 
Trades 
Accredit
ation 
All job 
titles Yes 
Chartered 
Institute 
of Builders 
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded N/A 1980 
Upskilling of 
Profession 
Can have 
relevant NVQs 2 No 
9129 
Labourers in Other 
Construction Trades 
NEC 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
9131 
Labourers in 
Foundries 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
9132 
Industrial Cleaning 
Process Occupations 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
9133 
Printing Machine 
Minders and 
Assistants 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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Unit Group 
SOC title 
Regulat
ion 
Status 
Cover
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Protec
tion of 
Title 
Enforce
ment 
Body 
Characteri
stics of 
Enforcem
ent Body 
Funding 
of 
Enforce
ment 
Body 
Statutory 
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nt 
Date of 
Commenc
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s) 
Entry 
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ment 
(years 
of work 
experie
nce) 
Other 
Entry 
Requirem
ent 
9134 
Packers, Bottlers, 
Canners, Fillers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
9139 
Labourers in Process 
and Plant 
Operations NEC 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
9141 
Stevedores, Dockers 
and Slingers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
9149 
Other Goods 
Handling and 
Storage Occupations 
NEC 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
9211 
Postal Workers, Mail 
Sorters, 
Messengers, 
Couriers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
9219 
Elementary Office 
Occupations NEC 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
9221 Hospital Porters 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
9222 Hotel Porters 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
9223 
Kitchen and 
Catering Assistants Licensing  
Some 
job 
titles N/A 
Local 
Authoritie
s/ 
Chartered 
Institute 
of 
Environm
ental 
Health 
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Food 
Safety Act 
1990 1990 
protection 
of public 
Food Hygiene 
Certificate 0 No 
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SOC(2000) 
Unit Group 
SOC title 
Regulat
ion 
Status 
Cover
age 
Any 
Protec
tion of 
Title 
Enforce
ment 
Body 
Characteri
stics of 
Enforcem
ent Body 
Funding 
of 
Enforce
ment 
Body 
Statutory 
Instrume
nt 
Date of 
Commenc
ement 
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for 
Regulation 
Entry 
Requirement 
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s) 
Entry 
require
ment 
(years 
of work 
experie
nce) 
Other 
Entry 
Requirem
ent 
9224 Waiters, Waitresses 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
9225 Bar Staff Licensing  
Some 
job 
titles N/A 
Local 
Authority 
Local 
Authority 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Licensing 
Act 2003 2005 
protection 
of public 
NCPLH personal 
licence holder 
training course 0 
Criminal 
records 
check 
9226 
Leisure and Theme 
Park Attendants 
Registrat
ion 
Some 
job 
titles N/A 
Gambling 
Commissi
on 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Gambling 
Act 2005 2007 
protection 
of public None 0 
CRB check, 
Financial 
Circumstan
ces check 
9229 
Elementary Personal 
Services 
Occupations NEC 
Registrat
ion 
Some 
job 
titles N/A 
Gambling 
Commissi
on 
Regulatory 
Body 
Governm
ent 
funded 
Gambling 
Act 2005 2007 
protection 
of public None 0 
CRB check, 
Financial 
Circumstan
ces check 
9231 Window Cleaners 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
9232 Road Sweepers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
9233 Cleaners, Domestics 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
9234 
Launderers, Dry 
Cleaners, Pressers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
9235 
Refuse and Salvage 
Occupations 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
9239 
Elementary Cleaning 
Occupations NEC 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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SOC(2000) 
Unit Group 
SOC title 
Regulat
ion 
Status 
Cover
age 
Any 
Protec
tion of 
Title 
Enforce
ment 
Body 
Characteri
stics of 
Enforcem
ent Body 
Funding 
of 
Enforce
ment 
Body 
Statutory 
Instrume
nt 
Date of 
Commenc
ement 
Rationale 
for 
Regulation 
Entry 
Requirement 
(qualification
s) 
Entry 
require
ment 
(years 
of work 
experie
nce) 
Other 
Entry 
Requirem
ent 
9241 
Security Guards and 
Related Occupations Licensing  
Some 
job 
titles N/A 
Security 
Industry 
Authority 
Non-
Chartered 
Professional 
Body 
Self-
funded 
Private 
Security 
Industry 
Act 2001 2003 
protection 
of public 
NVQ Level 2 in 
relevant course 0 CRB check 
9242 Traffic Wardens 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
9243 
School Crossing 
Patrol Attendants 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
9244 
School Midday 
Assistants 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
9245 Car Park Attendants 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
9249 
Elementary Security 
Occupations NEC 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
9251 Shelf Fillers 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
9259 
Elementary Sales 
Occupations NEC 
Unregula
ted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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Appendix 2: Nursery school data 
Key 
 
 Variable Coding 
Quality of Provision 1=Inadequate, 2=Satisfactory, 3=Good, 4=Outstanding 
Behaviour 1=Inadequate, 2=Satisfactory, 3=Good, 4=Outstanding 
Quality of 
Leadership/Management 
1=Inadequate, 2=Satisfactory, 3=Good, 4=Outstanding 
Quality of Caring 1=Inadequate, 2=Satisfactory, 3=Good, 4=Outstanding 
Learning Standards 1=Inadequate, 2=Satisfactory, 3=Good, 4=Outstanding 
Change in Leadership Since 
Last Inspection 
1=Yes, 0=No 
Affluence 
1=Low, 2=Lower than average, 3=Average, 4=Higher 
than average, 5=Amongst highest in the UK 
Gener of Cohort 1=Single Sex, 0=Mixed 
Age of Cohort Number of different ages covered by the provision 
Number on Role Number of children registered 
Number of Inspection 
How many inspections has the provision previously had 
(since 2000) 
Year 
0=2000, 1=2001, 2=2002, 3=2003, 4=2004, 5=2005, 
6=2006, 7=2007, 8=2008, 9=2009, 10=2010, 11=2011 
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YEAR 
INSPECTION 
NUMBER 
Postco
de 
CHANGE IN 
PROVISION 
LEADER 
AGE 
RANGE 
SINGLE 
SEX 
Numbe
r on 
Role 
LEARNING 
STANDARDS 
BEHAVIOUR CARING 
QUALITY OF 
PROVISION 
LEADERSHIP AND 
MANAGEMENT 
Affluence 
0 1 
B33 
8QB 0 2 0 67 2.25 3 4 3.25 3.5 5 
0 1 
B19 
3XJ 0 2 0 104 3 3 4 4 2.75 2 
0 1 
B35 
6DU 0 2 0 95 2.25 3 4 3.75 3.5 2 
0 1 
MK42 
9LS 0 3 0 127 1.5 4 3 3.75 3.25 2 
0 1 
OX3 
8LH  0 3 0 79 2.75 4 3 3.5 3 4 
0 1 
B29 
5LB 0 2 0 65 3 4 4 3.75 3.25 2 
0 1 
B11 
1ED 0 2 0 39 3.25 4 4 4 4 2 
0 1 
B14 
4BH 0 2 0 51 2.25 3 3 3 3 2 
0 1 
B12 
9NX 0 2 0 77 2.25 3 4 3.25 3 2 
0 1 B8 2SY 0 2 0 160 2.25 3 3 3.5 3.5 2 
0 1 
BB2 
1QU 0 2 0 70 3 4 3 3 3 2 
0 1 
BB3 
2DN 0 2 0 103 3 4 4 3.75 3.5 2 
0 1 
BL3 
4AH 0 3 0 120 2.75 4 4 3.5 3.333333333 2 
0 1 
BD8 
9AH 0 3 0 55 3 4 4 3.75 4 2 
0 1 
NW10 
9SD 0 3 0 124 2.25 3 3 2.75 1.5 2 
0 1 
BS5 
7SY 0 2 0 81 3.5 4 4 3.5 3.5 1 
0 1 
HP6 
6NW  0 3 0 90 2.25 4 3 3.5 3.75 5 
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YEAR 
INSPECTION 
NUMBER 
Postco
de 
CHANGE IN 
PROVISION 
LEADER 
AGE 
RANGE 
SINGLE 
SEX 
Numbe
r on 
Role 
LEARNING 
STANDARDS 
BEHAVIOUR CARING 
QUALITY OF 
PROVISION 
LEADERSHIP AND 
MANAGEMENT 
Affluence 
0 1 
BL9 
6HR 0 4 0 90 2 4 4 3 3.5 3 
0 1 
CB4 
2LD 0 2 0 80 3.25 4 3 3.75 4 3 
0 1 
TR14 
7DT 0 3 0 56 2 4 3 4 4 2 
0 1 
LA14 
5TS 0 2 0 86 2.25 4 3 3.5 3.75 2 
0 1 
LA9 
4PH0 0 2 0 66 2.5 4 4 3 3.25 5 
0 1 
LA18 
4JE 0 2 0 80 2.5 4 4 3.5 4 3 
0 1 
DE1 
1GJ 0 2 0 62 2 4 4 3.5 3.75 2 
0 1 
DE1 
2PU 0 2 0 52 3 3 3 3.25 3 3 
0 1 
DE55 
7JA 0 2 0 99 4 4 4 3 4 2 
0 1 
SK17 
9QT 0 2 0 43 3 3 4 3.75 3.75 4 
0 1 
DE5 
3HE 0 3 0 146 2.25 4 4 3.75 4 4 
0 1 
DL14 
7RF 0 2 0 78 3 4 3 3 4 4 
0 1 
SR8 
4TB 0 2 0 103 3 4 4 3.5 3.5 2 
0 1 
DH9 
7LR 0 2 0 132 3 4 4 3 3.5 2 
0 1 
SR7 
7NN 0 2 0 78 2.5 4 4 3.5 4 2 
0 1 
DL16 
6EX 0 2 0 56 3 4 4 3.75 3 2 
0 1 
SE7 
8AF 0 2 0 88 3 4 4 3.75 4 3 
0 1 
WA8 
8DF 0 2 0 90 3 4 4 3.5 4 2 
  
 
4
0
8
 
YEAR 
INSPECTION 
NUMBER 
Postco
de 
CHANGE IN 
PROVISION 
LEADER 
AGE 
RANGE 
SINGLE 
SEX 
Numbe
r on 
Role 
LEARNING 
STANDARDS 
BEHAVIOUR CARING 
QUALITY OF 
PROVISION 
LEADERSHIP AND 
MANAGEMENT 
Affluence 
0 1 
WA8 
OAR 0 2 0 69 3 4 4 3.75 4 2 
0 1 
UB3 
2PD 0 3 0 123 2.25 4 3 3.25 4 4 
0 1 
HD8 
8RX 0 2 0 74 3 3 4 3 4 2 
0 1 
SW2 
1PL 0 3 0 146 1.75 2 3 2.5 3 2 
0 1 
SW2 
2RW 0 3 0 124 2.5 4 4 4 4 5 
0 1 
SW4 
8LW 0 3 0 89 3 4 3 3.5 4 1 
0 1 
SE4 
2QQ 0 2 0 125 3.5 4 4 4 3.5 1 
0 1 
OL13 
8EF 0 2 0 80 2.5 4 4 3.75 4 2 
0 1 
PR7 
3DU 0 3 0 79 4 4 4 4 4 2 
0 1 
BB12 
6DY 0 2 0 65 2.25 4 4 4 4 2 
0 1 
BB7 
1EL 0 2 0 100 3 3 4 4 3.5 2 
0 1 
BB4 
7UE 0 2 0 110 3 3 3 3 3 2 
0 1 
L14 
1PW 0 2 0 61 3.5 4 4 4 4 2 
0 1 
NE15 
8PY 0 3 0 78 3 4 4 4 4 3 
0 1 
NR5 
8DB 0 2 0 134 2 4 4 4 4 2 
0 1 
BD23 
2ES 0 2 0 54 2.25 4 4 4 4 3 
0 1 
NN3 
6DW 0 2 0 68 3 4 3 2.5 3.25 4 
0 1 
OL10 
4QJ 0 2 0 75 3 4 4 4 3.75 2 
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YEAR 
INSPECTION 
NUMBER 
Postco
de 
CHANGE IN 
PROVISION 
LEADER 
AGE 
RANGE 
SINGLE 
SEX 
Numbe
r on 
Role 
LEARNING 
STANDARDS 
BEHAVIOUR CARING 
QUALITY OF 
PROVISION 
LEADERSHIP AND 
MANAGEMENT 
Affluence 
0 1 
M24 
4AD 0 2 0 43 3.25 4 3 3.25 3 2 
0 1 S65 2LY 0 3 0 130 1.75 4 3 3 3 2 
0 1 L20 6PJ 0 3 0 56 2 3 2 3 3 2 
0 1 
S10 
2DN 0 3 0 113 4 4 4 4 4 3 
0 1 S2 5SB 0 2 0 61 1.5 4 4 4 4 1 
0 1 
SL2 
5JW 0 3 0 120 3 4 4 4 4 3 
0 1 
NE35 
9DG 0 2 0 78 3.25 4 4 4 4 2 
0 1 
WS12 
5AR 0 2 0 71 3.25 4 4 3.5 4 2 
0 1 
SK5 
6JW 0 2 0 56 1.25 3 3 3 3 2 
0 1 
SK4 
3NB 0 2 0 77 4 3 3 3 3 4 
0 1 SK3 0BJ 0 2 0 107 2.75 3 3 2.75 3 3 
0 1 
SK3 
9PH 0 2 0 47 3 4 4 4 3.5 2 
0 1 
DH5 
8AE 0 2 0 69 3.25 4 4 4 4 4 
0 1 SR4 6JR 0 3 0 53 2.25 4 4 3.75 4 2 
0 1 
NE38 
OLA 0 2 0 78 3 4 4 3.75 4 2 
0 1 
SR4 
9AX 0 2 0 93 1 4 4 3.75 4 2 
0 1 E1 4PZ 0 3 0 104 2.25 4 3 3.25 3 2 
0 1 
WV12 
4JQ 0 3 0 104 2.5 4 4 3.25 3 4 
0 1 
WS3 
1HT 0 3 0 97 1.5 3 3 3 3 4 
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0
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NUMBER 
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de 
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LEADER 
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RANGE 
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LEARNING 
STANDARDS 
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QUALITY OF 
PROVISION 
LEADERSHIP AND 
MANAGEMENT 
Affluence 
0 1 
E17 
9SB 0 2 0 77 3.75 4 4 4 4 4 
0 1 
SW15 
5PW 0 2 0 49 3.25 3 3 3 3 2 
0 1 
SW11 
3ND 0 3 0 76 3.5 4 4 4 4 3 
0 1 
CV9 
1LF 0 2 0 75 3 4 4 4 4 4 
0 1 
RH13 
5UT 0 3 0 67 2 4 3 3 3.5 2 
0 1 
SW1V 
3RT 0 3 0 58 3.25 4 4 4 4 1 
0 1 
SL4 
3RU 0 3 0 115 3.75 3 3 3 3 5 
0 1 
CH46 
2QF 0 3 0 84 3 3 3 3 3 4 
0 1 
WV11 
2LH 0 2 0 78 2.25 4 3 3.5 3 2 
1.00 1.00 
OX1 
4QH 0 3 0 72 4 4 4 3.75 4 1 
1.00 1.00 
OX5 
2LG 0 3 0 42 2.5 4 4 3.5 3 4 
1.00 1.00 
N14 
5DJ 0 3 0 82 3.75 4 4 3.25 3.5 4 
1.00 1.00 N3 1NR 0 3 0 76 4 4 3 3.5 3.5 3 
1.00 1.00 
MK42 
9DR 0 3 0 113 3.75 4 4 3.25 3.5 3 
1.00 1.00 
MK42 
9HE 0 3 0 72 3.5 4 4 3.25 3.75 3 
1.00 1.00 B8 1HN 0 4 0 126 3.5 3 3 3 3.666666667 2 
1.00 1.00 
B14 
6RP 0 2 0 52 4 3 3 3.5 3.5 2 
1.00 1.00 B7 5BX 0 2 0 70 3.5 3 4 4 3.75 1 
1.00 1.00 
B39 
6AU  0 2 0 66 3.5 4 3 3.25 3.75 1 
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de 
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LEADER 
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STANDARDS 
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QUALITY OF 
PROVISION 
LEADERSHIP AND 
MANAGEMENT 
Affluence 
1.00 1.00 B26 2JL 0 2 0 72 3.75 4 4 4 4 4 
1.00 1.00 B8 3QU 0 2 0 118 3.75 3 3 2.75 1.75 2 
1.00 1.00 
B38 
8SY 0 2 0 61 2 3 3 3 3 4 
1.00 1.00 
B23 
6UB 0 2 0 60 2 3 3 3.25 2.75 2 
1.00 1.00 
B29 
6BP 0 2 0 52 3.75 3 3 2.5 2.333333333 2 
1.00 1.00 
B29 
5QD 0 2 0 52 3.5 4 3 3 3.25 2 
1.00 1.00 
BB1 
1HN 0 2 0 80 3.75 3 3 3.25 3 2 
1.00 1.00 
BB2 
3NF 0 2 0 80 3.5 3 3 3.25 3.25 2 
1.00 1.00 
BD9 
5AD 0 2 0 63 4 4 4 3.75 4 2 
1.00 1.00 
BD8 
7DJ 0 2 0 72 3 4 4 4 4 2 
1.00 1.00 
NW6 
5RA  0 2 0 76 3 3 3 3 3.75 1 
1.00 1.00 
BS7 
0DL 0 2 0 123 3.75 4 4 4 4 2 
1.00 1.00 
CB1 
2LZ 0 3 0 79 3.25 4 4 3.75 4 3 
1.00 1.00 
CB24 
9LL 0 2 0 80 4 4 4 4 4 4 
1.00 1.00 
CB1 
7ST 0 2 0 119 4 4 3 4 4 4 
1.00 1.00 
PE29 
1AD 0 2 0 119 3.25 4 4 3.75 4 2 
1.00 1.00 
CR5 
3BT  0 2 0 53 3.5 4 4 4 4 5 
1.00 1.00 
CR8 
2NE 0 2 0 91 3.75 4 3 3 3 3 
1.00 1.00 CR7 0 3 0 91 3 3 3 3 3 2 
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PROVISION 
LEADERSHIP AND 
MANAGEMENT 
Affluence 
8RS 
1.00 1.00 
CRO 
6TY 0 3 0 104 3.5 4 4 4 4 3 
1.00 1.00 
DE1 
3RL 0 3 0 63 3.25 4 4 3.25 3.25 2 
1.00 1.00 
SK22 
AQ 0 3 0 60 3.5 4 4 4 4 4 
1.00 1.00 
NG16 
6NA 0 3 0 57 3 4 4 3.5 4 2 
1.00 1.00 
DE55 
2JB 0 2 0 84 3.25 3 4 3 2.5 2 
1.00 1.00 
EX2 
6DJ 0 3 0 67 2.25 2 2 2.25 2 2 
1.00 1.00 
DH8 
6AY 0 2 0 78 3.25 4 4 4 4 2 
1.00 1.00 
YO16 
7BS 0 2 0 111 2.5 4 4 4 4 2 
1.00 1.00 
HU17 
7BT 0 3 0 140 3 4 4 4 4 2 
1.00 1.00 
SE8 
3EH 0 2 0 95 3.25 4 4 4 2.75 2 
1.00 1.00 
W14 
9BH 0 3 0 77 3 4 4 4 3.75 3 
1.00 1.00 
TS25 
2AW 0 2 0 61 3 4 4 4 4 2 
1.00 1.00 
AL5 
5BQ 0 2 0 100 3 4 4 4 4 4 
1.00 1.00 
AL10 
0PD 0 3 0 109 3 4 3 3.25 4 4 
1.00 1.00 
WD25 
0DX 0 2.5 0 56 3 4 4 4 3 3 
1.00 1.00 
EN11 
0LN 0 2 0 120 3 4 4 4 4 4 
1.00 1.00 
SG7 
6HD 0 2 0 105 3 3 3 3 3 2 
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PROVISION 
LEADERSHIP AND 
MANAGEMENT 
Affluence 
1.00 1.00 
SW3 
5JE 0 3 0 59 3 4 4 3.75 4 4 
1.00 1.00 
W10 
6TT 0 3 0 75 3 4 4 4 4 1 
1.00 1.00 
KT5 
8RS 0 3 0 80 3 4 4 3.75 4 4 
1.00 1.00 
BB9 
7QH 0 2 0 140 3 4 4 4 4 2 
1.00 1.00 
BB5 
0LD 0 2 0 80 3 3 4 4 4 2 
1.00 1.00 
BB4 
5NH 0 2 0 86 3 4 4 4 4 2 
1.00 1.00 
L39 
4RY 0 2 0 80 3 3 3 3 3 3 
1.00 1.00 
BB12 
6AJ 0 2 0 63 3 3 3 3 3 2 
1.00 1.00 
BB9 
8BP 0 2 0 76 3 4 3 3 3 3 
1.00 1.00 
LN6 
0FB 0 2 0 85 3 3 3 3 3 3 
1.00 1.00 
LN3 
4LQ 0 2 0 141 3 4 4 4 4 4 
1.00 1.00 L8 7QA 0 2 0 51 3 4 4 4 4 3 
1.00 1.00 L7 3HD 0 3 0 28 3 3 4 4 4 2 
1.00 1.00 
L11 
2RY 0 2 0 49 3 4 4 4 4 2 
1.00 1.00 
LU1 
5EA 0 3 0 94 3 4 3 3.25 3.5 4 
1.00 1.00 LU4 9JL 0 4 0 96 3 4 4 4 4 1 
1.00 1.00 
MK6 
4LW 0 2 0 33 3 3 3 2.25 3 2 
1.00 1.00 
NE4 
6JR 0 3 0 85 2 3 3 3 4 2 
1.00 1.00 
E16 
3PB 0 2 0 101 3 3 3 3 3 2 
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PROVISION 
LEADERSHIP AND 
MANAGEMENT 
Affluence 
1.00 1.00 E6 6BU 0 2 0 156 3 4 4 4 4 2 
1.00 1.00 
BD23 
1ET 0 2 0 62 3 4 4 4 4 3 
1.00 1.00 
PE4 
6EX 0 2 0 116 3 4 4 4 4 4 
1.00 1.00 
NN2 
8DF 0 2 0 80 3 4 4 4 4 4 
1.00 1.00 
PL6 
8UN 0 3 0 64 3 4 2 2.5 2.25 2 
1.00 1.00 
RG30 
4UA 0 3 0 68 3 4 4 4 2.75 4 
1.00 1.00 
OL16 
2EP 0 2 0 108 3 4 3 3 3 2 
1.00 1.00 
L20 
9LQ 0 2 0 92 3 2 3 3 2.75 1 
1.00 1.00 
SL1 
5NL 0 3 0 129 3 4 4 3.25 3.25 4 
1.00 1.00 
ST5 
0EX 0 2 0 48 2 3 3 2.5 3 4 
1.00 1.00 
ST16 
3NN 0 2 0 62 4 4 4 4 3.25 2 
1.00 1.00 
SK2 
5LB 0 2 0 73 3 4 4 4 4 2 
1.00 1.00 
SK5 
7EU 0 6 0 98 3 3 3 3 3 4 
1.00 1.00 
ST6 
6PB 0 2 0 54 3 4 3 3.5 2.75 3 
1.00 1.00 
ST3 
1QZ 0 3 0 40 3 3 4 2.5 4 2 
1.00 1.00 
IP1 
6DW 0 2 0 100 3 4 4 4 4 4 
1.00 1.00 
WF1 
5NU 0 2 0 76 3 4 4 4 4 2 
1.00 1.00 
WS5 
4NN 0 2 0 80 3 4 4 4 4 2 
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LEADERSHIP AND 
MANAGEMENT 
Affluence 
1.00 1.00 
WS8 
6AU 0 3 0 46 3 4 4 4 4 2 
1.00 1.00 
WS3 
2HR 0 2 0 120 3 4 4 4 4 2 
1.00 1.00 
WA1 
3DX 0 2 0 42 3 4 4 4 4 5 
1.00 1.00 
CV12 
0DP 0 2 0 78 3 4 4 4 4 4 
1.00 1.00 
CV34 
4LJ 0 2 0 79 3 3 4 3.5 3.25 4 
1.00 1.00 
CV31 
2PW 0 2 0 79 3 4 3 3 3 2 
1.00 1.00 RG5 4JJ 0 3 0 145 3 3 3 3 3 5 
1.00 1.00 
WV14 
0LT 0 3 0 46 1.5 4 4 2.5 4 2 
1.00 1.00 
WV4 
6EL 0 2 0 72 2 4 4 4 4 2 
1.00 1.00 
YO24 
4BD 0 2 0 109 3 4 4 4 4 4 
2.00 1.00 
OX11 
7HX 0 3 0 60 3.25 4 4 3.75 3.25 3 
2.00 1.00 
OX5 
1EA 0 2 0 52 3.5 4 4 3.5 2.75 4 
2.00 1.00 
OX9 
3HU 0 3 0 52 3.5 4 4 4 4 4 
2.00 1.00 
OX2 
9JZ 0 3 0 74 3 4 4 3 2.75 4 
2.00 1.00 
OX3 
8QQ 0 3 0 63 3.75 4 4 3.75 3.25 3 
2.00 1.00 
EN4 
8SD 0 3 0 83 3.5 4 4 3.5 3.5 3 
2.00 1.00 
EN4 
9NT 0 3 0 102 3.75 4 4 3.5 3 4 
2.00 1.00 
B42 
2PX 0 2 0 58 3.25 3 4 2.75 2.75 2 
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LEADERSHIP AND 
MANAGEMENT 
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2.00 1.00 
BL4 
8AR  0 3 0 82 3.5 3 4 3.25 4 2 
2.00 2.00 
NW10 
9SD 1 3 0 124 3.25 4 3 3 3.5 2 
2.00 1.00 
BN2 
0GR 0 3 0 113 3.25 4 4 3.75 4 2 
2.00 1.00 
BS16 
2LL 0 3 0 76 3.75 4 4 3.5 4 3 
2.00 1.00 
BS2 
0DT 0 2 0 65 3 3 2 2.5 2 1 
2.00 1.00 
HP13 
6HR 0 2 0 85 3.25 4 4 3.75 4 1 
2.00 1.00 
WC1N 
2NY 0 6 0 108 3.5 3 4 3.5 4 1 
2.00 1.00 
LU6 
1DL 0 2 0 84 3 4 3 2.75 2.75 2 
2.00 1.00 
LU5 
4QU 0 3 0 64 4 4 3 3 2.25 4 
2.00 1.00 
SE25 
5PL 0 3 0 31 3 2 3 2.75 2.5 2 
2.00 1.00 
CA25 
5LW 0 2 0 43 3 4 4 4 4 2 
2.00 1.00 
DL3 
7PY  0 2 0 150 4 4 4 4 4 4 
2.00 1.00 
SK13 
0LU 0 6 0 68 4 4 4 4 4 2 
2.00 1.00 W3 7LL 0 2 0 62 4 4 4 4 4 3 
2.00 1.00 
HU12 
8JB 0 3 0 129 4 3 4 3.5 4 4 
2.00 1.00 
SE2 
0SX 0 3 0 120 3.75 4 4 4 4 1 
2.00 1.00 E9 5BY 0 2 0 85 3.5 4 4 4 4 2 
2.00 1.00 W6 8PF 0 3 0 46 3 3 3 4 3 2 
2.00 1.00 
W12 
7PH 0 5 0 144 4 4 4 4 4 1 
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2.00 1.00 
W12 
9JA 0 3 0 45 3.5 2 3 3 2.5 2 
2.00 1.00 
GU34 
2DR 0 3 0 56 4 4 4 4 3.75 2 
2.00 1.00 
EN8 
9DW 0 3 0 72 3.5 3 4 2.75 3.25 4 
2.00 1.00 
EN8 
8DH 0 2 0 63 3.5 4 4 4 4 4 
2.00 1.00 
HP1 
1TT 0 2 0 61 3.75 4 3 3.5 3 4 
2.00 1.00 
WD19 
4RL 0 2 0 80 2.75 3 3 2.75 3 2 
2.00 1.00 
SG2 
9EA 0 2 0 85 3 4 3 4 3 3 
2.00 1.00 
SG5 
1XA 0 2 0 110 4 4 4 4 4 4 
2.00 1.00 
HU2 
9AP 0 2 0 39 2.75 4 4 4 4 2 
2.00 1.00 
HU6 
8HT 0 2 0 140 3.5 4 4 4 4 2 
2.00 1.00 
BB10 
3ES 0 2 0 80 3.25 3 3 3 3 2 
2.00 1.00 
BB11 
4BU 0 2 0 64 4 4 4 4 4 2 
2.00 1.00 
BB12 
8TG 0 2 0 76 3.75 4 4 4 4 2 
2.00 1.00 
BB9 
5BE 0 2 0 79 4 4 4 4 4 2 
2.00 1.00 
PE21 
0LJ 0 2 0 75 3.75 4 4 4 4 2 
2.00 1.00 
DN21 
2RR 0 2 0 89 3.5 4 4 4 4 2 
2.00 1.00 
NG31 
9BB 0 2 0 107 3.5 4 4 4 4 3 
2.00 1.00 
MK2 
2HB 0 2 0 86 4 4 4 4 4 3 
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2.00 1.00 E6 1AS 0 3 0 137 4 4 4 4 4 3 
2.00 1.00 
DN33 
2EW 0 2 0 93 4 4 4 4 4 3 
2.00 1.00 
NN8 
2AX 0 2 0 59 3 3 3 3 3 2 
2.00 1.00 
NN5 
7DF 0 3 0 109 4 4 4 4 4 4 
2.00 1.00 
RG4 
5AU 0 2 0 123 4 4 4 4 4 3 
2.00 1.00 
TW9 
2HP 0 3 0 84 3 3 3 3 3 4 
2.00 1.00 
S016 
3EP 0 2 0 122 3 3 3 3 3 2 
2.00 1.00 
SE21 
8QS 0 2 0 120 3.5 4 4 4 4 1 
2.00 1.00 
SE15 
6DY 0 2 0 82 3 3 3 3 3 2 
2.00 1.00 
L35 
4NW 0 2 0 70 3.5 4 4 4 4 4 
2.00 1.00 
B77 
2AH 0 5 0 90 4 3 3 3.5 3 4 
2.00 1.00 
ST2 
0HW 0 2 0 60 4 3 4 3.75 3.75 2 
2.00 1.00 
ST3 
7AN 0 3 0 60 3.5 4 3 3.5 3 2 
2.00 1.00 
ST1 
4LR 0 3 0 45 2.25 3 3 3 3 2 
2.00 1.00 
DH5 
0AH 0 2 0 76 4 4 4 4 4 4 
2.00 1.00 
NE37 
3BL 0 2 1 126 4 4 4 4 4 4 
2.00 1.00 
RH 4 
1BY 0 3 0 71 4 4 4 4 4 2 
2.00 1.00 
TF7 
5ET 0 2 0 82 4 4 4 4 4 2 
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PROVISION 
LEADERSHIP AND 
MANAGEMENT 
Affluence 
2.00 1.00 
TF2 
6AL 0 3 0 68 3 3 3 3 3 4 
2.00 1.00 
SW12 
8JL 0 3 0 69 3.75 4 4 4 4 2 
2.00 1.00 
CV8 
1JP 0 2 0 80 4 4 4 4 4 4 
2.00 1.00 
RG17 
0HY 0 3 0 62 3.75 3 3 3 3.5 3 
2.00 1.00 
BN15 
9QX 0 3 0 141 3.5 3 3 4 4 4 
2.00 1.00 
W9 
3DF 0 3 0 60 4 4 4 4 4 2 
2.00 1.00 
WN2 
3HJ 0 2 0 44 4 4 4 4 4 2 
2.00 1.00 
WV1 
2HH 0 2 0 60 3.25 3 3 3 3.5 2 
2.00 1.00 
WR11 
1DG 0 2 0 42 4 4 4 4 4 2 
3.00 1.00 
BS2 
0SU 0 2 0 119 3.714285714 4 4 3.2 3.75 2 
3.00 1.00 
DY2 
9QF 0 2 0 45 3 4 4 3.6 3 2 
3.00 1.00 
DH7 
8LL 0 3 0 78 3 3 3 3 3 2 
3.00 1.00 
UB2 
5PF 0 5 0 120 3.571428571 4 3 3 3 3 
3.00 1.00 
UB1 
2JL 0 3 0 80 3.428571429 4 4 3.6 4 3 
3.00 1.00 NI 5RF 0 3 0 57 3.714285714 4 3 4 3.25 1 
3.00 1.00 
PO13 
0UY 0 6 0 140 3.428571429 4 4 3.6 3.25 3 
3.00 1.00 
PR6 
0SL 0 2 0 67 4 4 4 4 4 3 
3.00 1.00 
BB12 
0BU 0 2 0 80 3 4 3 3 3 2 
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LEADERSHIP AND 
MANAGEMENT 
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3.00 1.00 
PE30 
5PT 0 3 0 71 3 3 3 3 3 3 
3.00 1.00 
NN8 
4AB 0 2 0 120 4 4 4 4 4 4 
3.00 1.00 
OL12 
0PP 0 2 0 43 3 3 3 3 3 2 
3.00 1.00 
S26 
3XH 0 6 0 80 3 3 3 3 3 4 
3.00 1.00 
PR9 
8ND 0 2 0 79 3 3 3 3 3 2 
3.00 1.00 
S12 
3AB 0 3 0 156 3 3 3 3 3 2 
3.00 1.00 
WS11 
5BU 0 3 0 31 3 3 3 3 3 3 
3.00 1.00 
WF8 
2ER 0 2 0 52 3 3 3 3 3 2 
3.00 1.00 
WS2 
9UP 0 2 0 130 3 3 3 3 3 2 
3.00 1.00 
PO21 
2TB 0 3 0 103 3 3 3 3 3 2 
3.00 1.00 
CH44 
4BB 0 3 0 51 3 3 3 3 3 3 
4.00 1.00 
OX25 
2SN  0 2 0 52 2.857142857 4 3 3 2.8 4 
4.00 1.00 
OX33 
1NN 0 3 0 28 3.142857143 3 3 3 3.2 4 
4.00 1.00 
B23 
7HG  0 2 0 80 3.142857143 3 4 3.5 3.6 2 
4.00 1.00 
B15 
2AF 0 6 0 72 3.142857143 3 4 3.5 3.4 1 
4.00 1.00 
BD8 
8HT 0 3 0 56 3.571428571 3 3 3 2.8 2 
4.00 1.00 
BD21 
4LW 0 3 0 129 3 4 4 3.5 2.6 4 
4.00 1.00 
BS4 
1BX 0 5 0 170 3.857142857 4 4 3.5 3.4 2 
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PROVISION 
LEADERSHIP AND 
MANAGEMENT 
Affluence 
4.00 1.00 
BS4 
1NN 0 3 0 84 3 3 3 2.5 2.6 2 
4.00 1.00 
BS1 
6RR 0 5 0 80 3.142857143 4 4 3.5 3.8 1 
4.00 1.00 
SG15 
6SL 0 3 0 73 3.571428571 4 4 3 4 2 
4.00 1.00 
SG18 
0PT 0 3 0 115 3.142857143 4 3 3.5 3.8 2 
4.00 1.00 
DL1 
1SG 0 3 0 111 3.571428571 3 3 3 3 2 
4.00 1.00 
DE24 
9AX 0 2 0 102 3.857142857 4 4 4 3.4 2 
4.00 1.00 
SK13 
2DW 0 2 0 89 3.857142857 4 4 4 4 2 
4.00 1.00 
DL14 
6PX 0 2 0 73 3 3 3 3 3 3 
4.00 1.00 
SE10 
0EA 0 5 0 218 4 4 3 3.5 3.4 3 
4.00 1.00 
WA8 
7TH 0 2 0 101 3 4 4 4 4 4 
4.00 1.00 AL3 5JB 0 3 0 181 3 3 3 3 3 3 
4.00 1.00 
W10 
5YU 0 2 0 44 3 3 3 3 3 2 
4.00 1.00 
W10 
6NQ 0 3 0 51 3 3 3 3 3 3 
4.00 1.00 
DA11 
9JS 0 3 0 65 3 3 3 3 3 2 
4.00 1.00 
HU5 
2SG 0 3 0 58 4 4 4 4 4 2 
4.00 1.00 
HD1 
3SP 0 3 0 97 3 3 3 3 3 2 
4.00 1.00 
SE11 
6UP 0 3 0 55 3.285714286 4 4 4 4 1 
4.00 1.00 
SE8 
5NH 0 6 0 126 3 3 3 3 3 3 
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PROVISION 
LEADERSHIP AND 
MANAGEMENT 
Affluence 
4.00 1.00 
BB5 
2LH 0 2 0 110 4 4 4 4 3.8 4 
4.00 1.00 
BB9 
9AG 0 2 0 108 3 3 3 3 3.6 2 
4.00 1.00 
LU3 
2BT 0 2 0 152 3 3 3 3 3.2 4 
4.00 1.00 
LU4 
OPE 0 3 0 135 3 3 3 3 3.2 2 
4.00 1.00 
LU1 
1RB 0 3 0 50 3 3 3 3 3 3 
4.00 1.00 
NE4 
8XT 0 2 0 104 3 3 3 3 3 2 
4.00 1.00 
DN37 
9NN 0 2 0 114 3 3 3 3 3 4 
4.00 1.00 
NN4 
8PH 0 2 0 79 4 4 4 4 4 2 
4.00 1.00 
PO4 
0DT 0 2 0 44 3 3 3 3 3 3 
4.00 1.00 
RG4 
8BH 0 3 0 67 3 3 3 3 3 4 
4.00 1.00 
S62 
6AD 0 3 0 137 3 3 3 3 3 2 
4.00 1.00 
NE31 
1QY 0 2 0 70 3 3 3 3 3 2 
4.00 1.00 
NE32 
5UP 0 2 0 36 4 3 4 3 3.4 2 
4.00 1.00 
SE1 
3BW 0 2 0 152 3 3 3 3 3 3 
4.00 1.00 ST2 8JY 0 3 0 33 3 3 3 3 3 2 
4.00 1.00 
SR5 
5QL 0 2 0 56 3 3 3 3 3 2 
4.00 1.00 E3 3HL 0 3 0 95 3 3 3 3 3 2 
4.00 1.00 E2 7PG 0 2 0 92 4 4 4 4 4 2 
4.00 1.00 E2 0PS 0 2 0 93 3 3 3 3 3 2 
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PROVISION 
LEADERSHIP AND 
MANAGEMENT 
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4.00 1.00 
WS3 
3LU 0 2 0 53 3 3 3 3 3 4 
4.00 1.00 
WS10 
7RU 0 3 0 38 3 3 4 3 3.2 2 
4.00 1.00 
CV10 
8HL 0 2 0 74 4 4 4 4 3.2 2 
4.00 1.00 
NW8 
8DE 0 4 0 260 4 4 4 4 3.6 1 
4.00 1.00 
WN1 
3SU 0 2 0 104 3 3 3 3 3 2 
4.00 1.00 
SL6 
9BT 0 3 0 69 3 3 3 3 3 4 
4.00 1.00 
SL6 
7PG 0 3 0 71 3 3 3 3 3 4 
4.00 1.00 
WV10 
8JP 0 3 0 69 3 3 3 3 3 2 
4.00 1.00 
WV10 
9JN 0 3 0 39 3 3 3 3 3 2 
4.00 1.00 
WV2 
3JS 0 2 0 37 3 3 3 3 3 3 
5.00 2.00 
BB2 
1QU 0 2 0 70 2.5 3 3 3 3 2 
5.00 1.00 
B31 
3HB 0 2 0 72 3 3 3 3 3 3 
5.00 2.00 
BL3 
4AH 0 3 0 120 2.5 4 4 3.5 3.166666667 2 
5.00 1.00 
BL5 
2SE 0 3 0 50 2 2 2 2.5 1.833333333 4 
5.00 1.00 
BL1 
2XN 0 4 0 87 2.5 3 3 2 2.166666667 2 
5.00 1.00 
BD18 
4NJ 0 3 0 92 2 2 2 2 2.333333333 2 
5.00 2.00 
BD8 
9AH 1 3 0 55 2.5 4 4 3 3.333333333 2 
5.00 1.00 
NW10 
3PH 0 5 0 56 2.5 3 2 2.5 2.833333333 5 
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LEADER 
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SINGLE 
SEX 
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r on 
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PROVISION 
LEADERSHIP AND 
MANAGEMENT 
Affluence 
5.00 1.00 
BN2 
0BT 0 2 0 40 3 3 3 3 3 4 
5.00 2.00 
BL9 
6HR 1 3 0 90 1.5 3 3 2 2 3 
5.00 1.00 
CB5 
8ND 0 2 0 89 3 3 2 2.5 2.666666667 2 
5.00 1.00 
CW2 
7LJ 0 3 0 53 3 3 3 3 2.833333333 2 
5.00 1.00 
CH1 
2DW 0 2 0 104 3 3 3 3 3 3 
5.00 1.00 
TR1 
3RJ 0 3 0 30 2.5 2 2 2.5 2.5 4 
5.00 1.00 
SE25 
5BD 0 2 0 89 3 3 3 3 3 2 
5.00 2.00 
LA9 
4PH 1 2 0 66 3 3 3 3 3 5 
5.00 1.00 
DE23 
8PE 0 3 0 83 2 3 2 1.5 1.666666667 2 
5.00 1.00 
DE23 
6TJ 0 2 0 75 2 2 2 2 2 2 
5.00 1.00 
DE23 
8QJ 0 2 0 80 3.5 3 3 3 3 2 
5.00 1.00 
DE1 
3PJ 0 4 0 92 3 4 4 3 3.166666667 3 
5.00 1.00 
DL15 
8QG 0 2 0 69 3.5 4 4 4 3.666666667 4 
5.00 2.00 
SR8 
4TB 0 2 0 103 3.5 4 4 4 4 2 
5.00 1.00 
DL16 
6RU 0 2 0 78 3 3 3 3 3 2 
5.00 2.00 
DH9 
7LR 0 2 0 132 2.5 4 4 2.5 3 2 
5.00 1.00 
TS28 
5BD 0 3 0 74 4 3 3 3 3.5 2 
5.00 1.00 
HU18 
1PB 0 2 0 118 1.5 2 2 2 1 5 
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LEADERSHIP AND 
MANAGEMENT 
Affluence 
5.00 1.00 
NE8 
2XD 0 3 0 51 3 3 3 3 3 2 
5.00 2.00 
WA8 
0AR 0 3 0 69 4 4 4 4 3.666666667 2 
5.00 1.00 
AL7 
3RP 0 3 0 149 2.5 3 3 3 3.166666667 2 
5.00 1.00 AL6 9JF 0 3 0 81 2 2 2 2.5 2 5 
5.00 2.00 
HD8 
8RX 1 3 0 74 3 3 3 3 2.833333333 2 
5.00 1.00 
WF13 
2SU 0 3 0 117 2 2 2 2 2 2 
5.00 1.00 
BB9 
0HW 0 3 0 83 2.5 3 2 2 2 2 
5.00 1.00 
PR1 
3XU 0 4 0 98 3 3 3 3 3 1 
5.00 2.00 
L14 
1PW 0 3 0 61 4 4 4 4 3.666666667 2 
5.00 1.00 
NE30 
4AG 0 3 0 113 3 3 3 3 3 3 
5.00 2.00 
BD23 
2ES 1 3 0 54 3 4 4 4 4 3 
5.00 1.00 
YO11 
1UB 0 2 0 101 3 3 3 3 3 5 
5.00 2.00 
BD23 
1ET 0 3 0 62 4 4 4 4 4 3 
5.00 1.00 
NN16 
9PH 0 2 0 60 3 3 3 3 3 3 
5.00 2.00 
M24 
2AH 0 3 0 43 4 4 4 4 4 2 
5.00 1.00 
SL1 
3EA 0 3 0 129 3 3 3 3 3 3 
5.00 1.00 
NE36 
0DL 0 3 0 77 3 3 3 2 2.666666667 4 
5.00 1.00 
DH5 
9DG 0 2 0 59 2 3 3 3 3 2 
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LEADERSHIP AND 
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5.00 1.00 
SR3 
2LE 0 3 0 79 3 3 3 3 3 2 
5.00 1.00 E1 4NQ 0 3 0 75 2.5 3 3 3 3 3 
5.00 1.00 
RG14 
1EH 0 3 0 112 3 3 3 3 3 3 
6.00 1.00 
OX4 
3AJ 0 3 0 80 2 3 2 2.5 2 3 
6.00 1.00 
OX7 
5DZ 0 3 0 71 4 4 3 4 4 5 
6.00 1.00 
OX3 
8LH 0 3 0 79 3 4 3 3 3.333333333 4 
6.00 2.00 
MK42 
9LS 1 3 0 127 2 3 3 3 2.833333333 2 
6.00 2.00 
Mk42 
9HE 0 3 0 72 4 4 4 4 3.833333333 3 
6.00 2.00 
B33 
8QB 0 2 0 52 1.5 2 2 2 2 5 
6.00 1.00 
B19 
2XJ 0 2 0 104 3 4 4 4 3.666666667 4 
6.00 2.00 
B35 
6DU 0 3 0 95 2.5 3 3 3 2.833333333 2 
6.00 2.00 
B29 
5LB 1 2 0 65 3 3 3 3 2.833333333 2 
6.00 1.00 
B44 
8RL 0 2 0 69 3.5 4 4 4 3.833333333 2 
6.00 2.00 
B11 
1ED 1 2 0 39 2.5 3 3 3 2.666666667 2 
6.00 2.00 
B14 
4BH 1 2 0 51 2 3 3 2.5 2 2 
6.00 2.00 
B12 
9NX 0 2 0 77 2 3 3 2.5 2 2 
6.00 2.00 
B38 
8SY 1 2 0 61 3 3 4 3 3.166666667 4 
6.00 1.00 B5 7LX 0 2 0 73 3 3 4 4 4 2 
6.00 1.00 B45 0 2 0 80 2 3 2 2 1.833333333 3 
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LEADERSHIP AND 
MANAGEMENT 
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9PB 
6.00 1.00 
B31 
1BS 0 2 0 61 2.5 3 4 3 3 2 
6.00 1.00 B8 2SY 0 2 0 160 2.5 3 4 3 3 2 
6.00 2.00 
BB3 
2DN 0 2 0 102 2.5 4 4 3 3.333333333 2 
6.00 2.00 
BL4 
8AR 0 3 0 82 2.5 4 4 3 3 2 
6.00 2.00 
BD9 
5AD 1 3 0 63 3 4 4 4 3.833333333 2 
6.00 1.00 
NW10 
8DX 0 3 0 42 1.5 3 2 2 2 1 
6.00 1.00 
BS13 
0JW 0 3 0 102 2.5 4 4 3.5 3.833333333 2 
6.00 2.00 
BS5 
7SY 1 2 0 81 2.5 3 4 3 3 1 
6.00 1.00 BS2 9JE 0 2 0 59 2.5 3 4 3 3.166666667 3 
6.00 2.00 
HP6 
6NW 0 2 0 90 2.5 4 4 3.5 2.833333333 5 
6.00 2.00 
CB4 
2LD 0 2 0 80 3.5 4 4 4 3.833333333 3 
6.00 2.00 
TR14 
7DT 1 3 0 56 2.5 3 3 3 3.166666667 2 
6.00 1.00 
LA14 
2RX 0 5 0 54 2.5 3 3 3 2.833333333 2 
6.00 1.00 
CA26 
3PF 0 2 0 38 2 3 3 2.5 2 2 
6.00 2.00 
LA14 
5TS 0 2 0 86 2.5 3 3 3 3 2 
6.00 2.00 
LA18 
4JE 0 2 0 80 3 4 4 4 3.833333333 3 
6.00 2.00 
DL3 
7PY  1 3 0 150 4 4 4 4 3.833333333 4 
6.00 2.00 
DE1 
2PU 1 2 0 36 3 3 3 3 3 3 
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6.00 2.00 
DE55 
7JA 0 2 0 99 3.5 3 4 4 3.833333333 2 
6.00 2.00 
SK17 
9QT 1 2 0 43 2.5 3 4 3 3.333333333 4 
6.00 2.00 
DE5 
3HE 0 2 0 146 3.5 4 4 4 4 4 
6.00 2.00 
EX2 
6DJ 1 3 0 67 3.5 3 4 4 4 2 
6.00 1.00 
EX4 
1HL 0 2 0 73 2 2 3 2.5 2 2 
6.00 2.00 
DL14 
7RF 0 2 0 78 2.5 3 3 2 2 4 
6.00 1.00 
SR7 
7NN 0 2 0 78 3 4 4 4 3.833333333 2 
6.00 2.00 
DL16 
6EX 0 2 0 56 3.5 4 4 4 4 2 
6.00 2.00 
HU12 
8JB 1 2 0 129 3.5 4 4 4 3.833333333 4 
6.00 2.00 
HU17 
7BT 0 3 0 140 4 4 4 4 4 2 
6.00 1.00 
WA8 
8DF 0 3 0 90 3 4 3 3.5 2.833333333 2 
6.00 2.00 
PO13 
0UY 1 3 0 130 3.5 4 4 3.5 3.5 3 
6.00 1.00 
N15 
3SD 0 2 0 76 2.5 3 4 3 3 2 
6.00 1.00 
AL2 
1JG 0 3 0 59 2 3 3 3 3 3 
6.00 2.00 
UB3 
2PD 1 3 0 123 3 4 4 4 3.833333333 4 
6.00 2.00 
HU6 
8HT 1 3 0 140 2.5 4 4 3 2.833333333 2 
6.00 1.00 
LA1 
5QB 0 2 0 48 3.5 4 4 3 3.333333333 3 
6.00 2.00 
OL13 
8EF 1 2 0 80 2.5 3 3 3 2.666666667 2 
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6.00 2.00 
PR7 
3DU 1 2 0 79 4 4 4 3.5 3.833333333 2 
6.00 2.00 
BB12 
6DY 0 2 0 65 3 4 3 3 3 2 
6.00 2.00 
BB7 
1EL 1 2 0 100 3 3 3 3 2.833333333 2 
6.00 1.00 
BB11 
3PU 0 2 0 96 2.5 4 4 3 3.166666667 2 
6.00 2.00 
BB12 
6AJ 1 3 0 63 3 4 4 3 3 2 
6.00 2.00 
BB4 
7UE 0 2 0 110 3 4 4 3.5 3.5 2 
6.00 2.00 
BB11 
5AE 0 2 0 64 2.5 4 3 3 3 2 
6.00 2.00 
BB9 
8BP 0 2 0 76 3 4 4 4 4 3 
6.00 2.00 
LN3 
4LQ 0 2 0 141 4 4 4 4 4 4 
6.00 2.00 
L11 
2RY 0 3 0 29 2.5 3 3 3 3 2 
6.00 1.00 LU2 0JS 0 3 0 117 3.5 4 4 4 4 2 
6.00 1.00 
M40 
7QD 0 3 0 71 3 4 4 4 3.666666667 1 
6.00 1.00 
NE4 
7NL 0 2 0 58 2 3 4 3.5 3.5 1 
6.00 2.00 
NE15 
8PY 0 2 0 78 3.5 3 4 4 4 3 
6.00 2.00 
NR5 
8DB 0 3 0 134 2.5 4 3 3.5 3.166666667 2 
6.00 1.00 
PE14 
8AY 0 3 0 80 2.5 4 4 4 4 4 
6.00 2.00 
DN33 
2EW 1 2 0 93 4 4 4 4 4 3 
6.00 2.00 
NN8 
2AX 0 2 0 59 2.5 3 3 3 3 2 
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6.00 2.00 
NN3 
6DW 0 2 0 68 3 4 4 3.5 3.166666667 4 
6.00 1.00 
PL2 
2NJ 0 3 0 85 3 4 3 3 2.833333333 2 
6.00 2.00 
PL6 
8UN 0 2 0 64 3 3 3 3 2.833333333 2 
6.00 1.00 
RG2 
7NT 0 3 0 81 1.5 3 3 2 1.833333333 3 
6.00 2.00 
OL10 
4QJ 0 3 0 75 2.5 3 4 3 3 2 
6.00 2.00 
S26 
3XH 0 2 0 80 4 4 4 4 3.833333333 4 
6.00 2.00 S65 2LY 0 3 0 130 3 4 4 4 4 2 
6.00 2.00 L20 6PJ 0 3 0 74 2.5 3 3 3 3.333333333 2 
6.00 1.00 
L21 
4NB 0 3 0 42 3 4 3 3.5 3 1 
6.00 2.00 
S10 
2DN 1 3 0 113 3 4 4 2.5 3.5 3 
6.00 2.00 S2 5SB 0 3 0 61 2.5 4 4 3.5 3.666666667 1 
6.00 1.00 
SL1 
3HS 0 2 0 101 2.5 3 3 3 3 2 
6.00 2.00 
SL2 
5JW 1 3 0 120 2.5 4 4 3 3 3 
6.00 2.00 
NE35 
9DG 1 2 0 79 1.5 3 3 2 2 2 
6.00 2.00 
WS12 
5AR 0 2 0 71 4 4 4 4 3.833333333 2 
6.00 2.00 
SK5 
6JW 0 3 0 56 2.5 3 3 3 2.833333333 2 
6.00 2.00 
SK4 
3NB 0 3 0 77 4 4 4 4 4 4 
6.00 2.00 SK3 0BJ 0 3 0 107 4 4 4 4 3.666666667 3 
6.00 2.00 
SK3 
9PH 1 3 0 47 2.5 4 3 3 3.166666667 2 
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LEADERSHIP AND 
MANAGEMENT 
Affluence 
6.00 1.00 
DH5 
8AB 0 2 0 69 3 3 4 3 2.666666667 2 
6.00 2.00 SR4 6JR 0 2 0 70 2.5 4 4 3 2.833333333 2 
6.00 1.00 
NE38 
0LA 0 2 0 79 3 3 4 3 3 2 
6.00 2.00 
SR4 
9AX 0 2 0 93 3 4 4 4 3.833333333 2 
6.00 1.00 
GU1 
1NR 0 3 0 151 3 3 3 3.5 2.666666667 4 
6.00 2.00 E1 4NQ 1 3 0 59 2.5 4 3 3 3 3 
6.00 2.00 
WF1 
5NU 0 3 0 76 3 3 4 4 3.666666667 2 
6.00 2.00 
WV12 
4JQ 1 2 0 104 2.5 4 4 3 3 4 
6.00 2.00 
WS3 
1HT 0 2 0 79 2.5 3 3 3 3 4 
6.00 1.00 
E11 
3HF 0 2 0 103 2.5 3 3 3 3 2 
6.00 2.00 
E17 
9SB 0 2 0 77 4 4 4 4 3.833333333 4 
6.00 1.00 E4 7LQ 0 2 0 79 3 3 4 3.5 3.166666667 5 
6.00 1.00 
E17 
8BE 0 3 0 60 3.5 4 4 4 3.666666667 2 
6.00 2.00 
SW15 
5PW 1 3 0 49 3 3 3 3 3 2 
6.00 2.00 
SW11 
3ND 0 2 0 76 3.5 4 4 4 4 3 
6.00 2.00 
CV9 
1LF 1 2 0 75 3.5 4 4 4 3.833333333 4 
6.00 2.00 
CV12 
0DP 0 2 0 78 3 3 3 3 3 4 
6.00 2.00 
CV34  
4LJ 0 2 0 69 2 3 3 2 2 4 
6.00 1.00 
PO19 
7AB 0 2 0 119 3.5 4 4 4 3.833333333 4 
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6.00 2.00 
RH13 
5UT 1 2 0 67 2.5 3 4 3 3.166666667 2 
6.00 2.00 
SL4 
3RU 1 3 0 120 3 3 4 3.5 4 5 
6.00 2.00 
CH46 
2QF 0 3 0 84 2.5 3 3 3 3 4 
6.00 2.00 
WV11  
2LH 1 2 0 77 2.5 4 4 3 3 2 
6.00 1.00 
WR11 
1DG 0 2 0 52 4 4 4 4 4 2 
7.00 2.00 
OX1 
4QH 0 3 0 72 4 4 4 4 3.833333333 1 
7.00 2.00 
OX11 
7HX 0 3 0 95 4 4 4 4 4 3 
7.00 2.00 
OX5 
2LG 0 3 0 42 4 4 4 3.5 3.5 4 
7.00 2.00 
OX5 
1EA 0 2 0 49 4 3 4 3 3.333333333 4 
7.00 2.00 
OX9 
3HU 0 3 0 22 3 3 2 2 2 4 
7.00 2.00 
0X3 
8QQ 0 3 0 72 4 4 4 3.5 2.833333333 3 
7.00 2.00 
OX2 
9JZ 0 3 0 42 3 3 3 3 3 4 
7.00 2.00 
EN4 
8SD 1 3 0 83 4 4 3 3.5 3.166666667 3 
7.00 2.00 
N14 
5DJ 1 3 0 82 4 4 4 4 3.833333333 4 
7.00 2.00 N3 1NR 1 3 0 130 4 4 4 3.5 3 3 
7.00 2.00 
EN4 
9NT 0 3 0 102 4 4 4 3.5 3.666666667 4 
7.00 2.00 
MK42 
9DR 0 3 0 113 4 4 4 3.5 3 3 
7.00 2.00 B8 1HN 0 5 0 126 3 3 3 3 2.833333333 2 
7.00 2.00 B14 1 3 0 52 4 4 4 3.5 3.833333333 2 
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6RP 
7.00 2.00 B7 5BX 1 3 0 70 4 4 4 4 4 1 
7.00 2.00 
B23 
6AU 1 3 0 66 3 3 3 2 2 1 
7.00 2.00 B26 2JL 1 2 0 78 3.5 4 3 3 3.166666667 4 
7.00 2.00 B8 3QU 1 2 0 118 4 3 4 3.5 3.833333333 2 
7.00 1.00 
B19 
2NS  0 3 0 60 4 4 4 4 3.833333333 2 
7.00 2.00 
B23  
6UB 1 2 0 60 4 4 4 3 3 2 
7.00 2.00 
B42 
2PX 0 2 0 58 4 4 4 3 3.166666667 2 
7.00 2.00 
B29 
6BP 1 2 0 52 4 4 4 4 3.833333333 2 
7.00 2.00 
BB1  
1HN 1 2 0 80 3 3 3 3 3 2 
7.00 2.00 
BB2 
3NF 0 2 0 80 4 3 3 3.5 3 2 
7.00 1.00 
BD5 
9HL 0 3 0 104 4 4 4 4 4 2 
7.00 2.00 
BD8 
7DJ 0 3 0 72 4 4 4 4 4 2 
7.00 3.00 
NW10 
9SD 0 5 0 102 3 3 2 2 2 2 
7.00 2.00 
BN2 
0GR 0 5 0 113 4 4 4 4 4 2 
7.00 2.00 
BS7 
0DL 1 3 0 123 4 4 4 3 3.166666667 2 
7.00 2.00 
 BS16 
2LL 0 3 0 79 4 4 3 4 3.333333333 3 
7.00 2.00 
BS2 
0DT 1 4 0 40 3 3 2 2 2.833333333 1 
7.00 2.00 
BS2 
0SU 1 3 0 102 4 4 4 3 3 2 
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MANAGEMENT 
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7.00 2.00 
HP13 
6HR 0 3 0 85 4 4 4 4 3.833333333 1 
7.00 2.00 
CB1 
2LZ 1 2 0 79 4 3 4 4 3.5 3 
7.00 2.00 
CB4 
4LL 0 2 0 80 4 4 4 4 4 4 
7.00 2.00 
CB1 
7ST 0 2 0 119 4 4 4 4 4 4 
7.00 2.00 
PE29 
1AD 0 3 0 119 4 4 4 4 3.666666667 2 
7.00 2.00 
LU5 
4QU 1 3 0 64 4 4 4 4 3.833333333 4 
7.00 1.00 
CV1 
5GR 0 3 0 167 3 3 3 2 2.833333333 3 
7.00 2.00 
CR5 
3BT 1 3 0 53 3.5 3 3 3 3 5 
7.00 2.00 
CR8 
2NE 1 3 0 91 4 4 4 3.5 3.833333333 3 
7.00 2.00 
SE25 
SPL 1 4 0 31 2.5 3 3 3 3 2 
7.00 2.00 
CR7 
8RF 1 3 0 91 3 3 3 2.5 2.666666667 2 
7.00 2.00 CRO TY 0 2 0 104 4 3 3 3.5 3 3 
7.00 2.00 
CA25 
5LW 1 2 0 77 4 4 4 4 3.833333333 2 
7.00 2.00 
DE1  
1GJ 0 2 0 62 4 3 3 3 2.833333333 2 
7.00 2.00 
DE1 
3LR 0 3 0 63 4 4 4 3 3 2 
7.00 2.00 
DE24 
9AX 0 2 0 93 4 4 4 3.5 3.166666667 2 
7.00 2.00 
SK13 
0LU 0 3 0 68 4 4 4 4 4 2 
7.00 2.00 
SK13 
2DW 0 2 0 99 4 3 4 4 3.833333333 2 
  
 
4
3
5
 
YEAR 
INSPECTION 
NUMBER 
Postco
de 
CHANGE IN 
PROVISION 
LEADER 
AGE 
RANGE 
SINGLE 
SEX 
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PROVISION 
LEADERSHIP AND 
MANAGEMENT 
Affluence 
7.00 2.00 
SK22 
4AQ 1 2 0 60 4 4 4 3 3 4 
7.00 2.00 
NG16 
6NA 0 3 0 57 3.5 4 4 4 4 2 
7.00 2.00 
DE55 
2JB 0 3 0 84 4 4 4 4 4 2 
7.00 2.00 
3DY2 
9QF 0 2 0 103 4 4 3 3 3 2 
7.00 2.00 
DH8 
6AY 0 2 0 78 4 4 4 4 4 2 
7.00 2.00 
DH7 
8LL 0 2 0 78 3.5 4 4 3.5 3 2 
7.00 2.00 
UB2 
5PF 1 6 0 61 4 3 4 4 4 3 
7.00 2.00 W3 7LL 1 4 0 62 3.5 4 3 3.5 3.166666667 3 
7.00 2.00 
YO16 
7BS 1 2 0 111 3 4 3 3 2.833333333 2 
7.00 2.00 
SE2 
0SX 0 3 0 110 3 3 3 3 3 1 
7.00 2.00 
SE8 
3EH 1 3 0 95 4 4 3 3 2.833333333 2 
7.00 2.00 E9 5BY 0 2 0 85 4 4 4 4 4 2 
7.00 2.00 W6 8PF 0 3 0 46 4 4 4 4 3.833333333 2 
7.00 2.00 
W14 
9BH 0 3 0 77 4 4 4 3.5 3 3 
7.00 2.00 
W12 
7PH 1 5 0 144 3 3 3 3 2.833333333 1 
7.00 2.00 
W12 
9JA 1 2 0 45 4 4 4 4 4 2 
7.00 2.00 
GU34 
2DR 1 3 0 56 3.5 4 4 4 3.5 2 
7.00 1.00 
SO22 
6AJ 0 3 0 96 3.5 4 4 3.5 3.666666667 2 
7.00 1.00 
N17 
9XE 0 2 0 84 4 4 4 3 3 1 
  
 
4
3
6
 
YEAR 
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Postco
de 
CHANGE IN 
PROVISION 
LEADER 
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SEX 
Numbe
r on 
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PROVISION 
LEADERSHIP AND 
MANAGEMENT 
Affluence 
7.00 1.00 
N17 
7LT 0 5 0 75 4 4 4 3 3.333333333 2 
7.00 2.00 
TS25 
2AW 1 3 0 61 4 4 3 3 3 2 
7.00 2.00 
EN8 
9DW 1 3 0 72 4 4 4 4 4 4 
7.00 2.00 
AL5 
5BQ 0 2 0 100 4 4 4 4 3.833333333 4 
7.00 2.00 
AL10 
0PD 0 2 0 109 4 4 4 4 4 4 
7.00 2.00 
EN8 
8DH 1 3 0 75 3 3 3 3 3 4 
7.00 2.00 
HP1 
1TT 0 2 0 61 4 4 3 3 4 4 
7.00 2.00 
WD25 
0DX 0 2 0 56 3 3 3 3 3 3 
7.00 2.00 
WD19 
4RL 1 3 0 80 4 4 4 3.5 3.166666667 2 
7.00 2.00 
EN11 
0LN 0 2 0 120 4 4 4 4 4 4 
7.00 2.00 
SG7 
6HD 0 2 0 105 4 4 4 4 3.833333333 2 
7.00 2.00 
SG5 
1XA 0 2 0 110 4 4 4 4 4 4 
7.00 2.00 
SW3 
5JE 0 3 0 59 4 4 4 4 4 4 
7.00 2.00 
W10 
6TT 1 3 0 75 4 4 4 4 4 1 
7.00 2.00 
KT5 
8RS 0 2 0 105 4 4 4 4 4 4 
7.00 2.00 
BB10 
3ES 0 2 0 80 4 4 3 3 3.166666667 2 
7.00 2.00 
BB9 
7QH 0 2 0 140 4 4 4 4 4 2 
7.00 2.00 
BB5 
0LD 0 2 0 80 3.5 4 4 4 4 2 
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3
7
 
YEAR 
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de 
CHANGE IN 
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SINGLE 
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PROVISION 
LEADERSHIP AND 
MANAGEMENT 
Affluence 
7.00 2.00 
PR6 
0SL 1 2 0 67 3 3 3 3 2.833333333 3 
7.00 2.00 
BB4 
5NH 0 2 0 86 4 4 4 3 3.333333333 2 
7.00 2.00 
L39 
4RY 0 2 0 80 4 4 4 4 4 3 
7.00 2.00 
BB12 
0BU 0 2 0 80 4 4 3 3 3 2 
7.00 2.00 
BB12 
8TG 0 2 0 76 4 4 4 4 4 2 
7.00 2.00 
BB9 
5BE 1 2 0 79 3 3 2 2 2.333333333 2 
7.00 2.00 
PE21 
0JL 0 2 0 75 4 4 4 4 3.666666667 3 
7.00 2.00 
DN21 
2RR 0 3 0 89 3 3 4 3.5 3 2 
7.00 2.00 
NG31 
9BB 0 2 0 107 4 4 4 3 3 3 
7.00 2.00 L8 7QA 0 3 0 51 4 2 3 3.5 3.166666667 3 
7.00 2.00 L7 3HD 1 3 0 28 3 4 3 3 2.833333333 2 
7.00 2.00 
LU1 
5EA 1 3 0 94 4 3 4 3 3 4 
7.00 2.00 LU4 9JL 1 3 0 100 4 4 4 4 3.833333333 1 
7.00 2.00 
MK2 
2HB 0 2 0 86 3.5 4 3 3.5 3 3 
7.00 2.00 
MK6 
4LW 0 3 0 33 4 4 3 3 3.166666667 2 
7.00 2.00 
NE4 
6JR 1 2 0 85 4 4 4 4 4 2 
7.00 2.00 
E16 
3PB 0 3 0 101 3 4 3 3 3 2 
7.00 2.00 E6 6BU 0 2 0 156 4 4 4 4 4 2 
7.00 1.00 E15 3JT 0 3 0 84 3 4 3 3 2.833333333 1 
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PROVISION 
LEADERSHIP AND 
MANAGEMENT 
Affluence 
7.00 2.00 E6 1AS 1 3 0 137 4 3 3 3 3 3 
7.00 2.00 
PE4 
6EX 0 4 0 116 4 4 4 3 4 4 
7.00 1.00 
NN17 
1BJ 0 2 0 103 4 4 4 3 3.833333333 2 
7.00 2.00 
NN16 
9PH 0 2 0 60 4 4 3 3 3 3 
7.00 2.00 
NN5 
7DE 1 5 0 109 4 4 4 4 4 2 
7.00 2.00 
NN2 
8DF 1 2 0 80 3.5 4 3 3.5 2.666666667 4 
7.00 2.00 
RG30 
4UA 1 3 0 68 4 4 4 3 3.666666667 4 
7.00 2.00 
RG4 
5AU 1 3 0 123 4 4 3 3.5 3 3 
7.00 2.00 
TW9 
2HP 0 3 0 84 4 4 4 4 4 4 
7.00 2.00 
OL16 
2EP 1 3 0 145 4 4 4 4 3.833333333 2 
7.00 2.00 
L20 
9LQ 0 6 0 92 3 3 3 3.5 3.666666667 1 
7.00 2.00 
SL1 
5NL 0 3 0 129 4 4 4 4 3.833333333 4 
7.00 2.00 
SO16 
3EP 0 4 0 122 3 3 4 3.5 3 2 
7.00 2.00 
SE21 
8QS 1 3 0 120 3.5 4 3 3 3 1 
7.00 2.00 
SE15 
6DT 0 3 0 82 3 3 3 3 3 1 
7.00 2.00 
L35 
4NW 1 3 0 70 4 4 3 3 3 4 
7.00 2.00 
ST5 
0EX 1 2 0 48 3 3 3 3 2.833333333 4 
7.00 2.00 
B77 
2AH 1 3 0 90 3 3 3 3 3 4 
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PROVISION 
LEADERSHIP AND 
MANAGEMENT 
Affluence 
7.00 2.00 
SK2 
5LB 0 3 0 71 4 4 4 4 3.666666667 2 
7.00 2.00 
SK5 
7EU 1 3 0 98 4 4 3 3 3 4 
7.00 2.00 
ST6 
6PB 1 3 0 54 4 4 4 4 4 3 
7.00 1.00 
ST4 
2DQ 0 3 0 45 4 4 4 4 3.833333333 3 
7.00 2.00 
ST3 
1QZ 0 3 0 40 4 4 4 4 3.833333333 2 
7.00 2.00 
IP1 
6DW 1 2 0 100 4 4 4 4 3.833333333 4 
7.00 2.00 
DH5 
0AH 0 2 0 80 4 4 4 4 3.666666667 4 
7.00 2.00 
NE37 
3BL 0 2 1 126 3 3 3 3 3 4 
7.00 2.00 
RH4 
1BY 0 3 0 71 4 4 4 4 4 2 
7.00 2.00 
TF7 
5ET 0 2 0 82 4 4 4 4 4 2 
7.00 2.00 
TF2 
6EP 0 2 0 70 4 4 2 3 3.166666667 2 
7.00 2.00 
WS5 
4NN 0 2 0 80 4 4 3 3 3 2 
7.00 2.00 
WS8 
6AU 0 2 0 46 3 3 3 3 2.833333333 2 
7.00 2.00 
WS10 
7RU 1 2 0 33 3.5 4 4 4 4 2 
7.00 2.00 
WS3 
2HR 1 2 0 120 4 4 4 4 4 2 
7.00 2.00 
SW12 
8JL 0 3 0 69 4 4 4 4 3.833333333 2 
7.00 1.00 
WA2 
9HY 0 3 0 90 3.5 4 4 3 3.333333333 2 
7.00 2.00 
CV8 
1JP 0 3 0 80 4 4 4 4 4 4 
  
 
4
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PROVISION 
LEADERSHIP AND 
MANAGEMENT 
Affluence 
7.00 2.00 
CV31 
2PW 0 2 0 79 4 4 4 4 3.833333333 2 
7.00 2.00 
RG17 
0HY 0 3 0 68 4 4 4 4 4 3 
7.00 2.00 
BN15 
9QY 1 5 0 141 4 4 4 4 4 4 
7.00 2.00 
BN15 
9QX 0 3 0 137 4 4 3 3.5 2.833333333 4 
7.00 1.00 W9 3JY 0 3 0 80 4 4 4 3 3.166666667 2 
7.00 2.00 
W9 
3DS 1 3 0 60 4 4 4 4 3.833333333 2 
7.00 1.00 
WN2 
4LG 0 3 0 120 3 3 3 3 2.166666667 2 
7.00 2.00 
SL6 
9BT 0 3 0 68 4 4 4 4 4 4 
7.00 1.00 
CH49 
8HB 0 3 0 103 4 4 4 4 4 2 
7.00 2.00 RG5 4JJ 0 3 0 145 4 4 4 4 4 5 
7.00 2.00 
WV14 
0LT 1 5 0 46 4 4 4 4 4 2 
7.00 2.00 
WV10 
8JP 0 2 0 86 4 4 4 4 4 2 
7.00 2.00 
WV1 
2HH 0 3 0 60 4 4 4 4 4 2 
7.00 2.00 
WV10 
9JN 1 2 0 71 3 3 3 3 3 2 
7.00 2.00 
WV2 
3JS 0 3 0 40 4 3 4 3 3.333333333 3 
7.00 2.00 
WV4 
6EL 1 2 0 72 4 4 4 4 3.833333333 2 
7.00 2.00 
YO24 
4BD 1 2 0 109 4 4 4 3 3.833333333 4 
8.00 2.00 
OX25 
2SN  0 2 0 38 3 3 3 3 2.857142857 4 
8.00 2.00 OX33 0 3 0 38 3 3 3 3 2.714285714 4 
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PROVISION 
LEADERSHIP AND 
MANAGEMENT 
Affluence 
1NN 
8.00 2.00 
B23 
7HG 0 2 0 93 3 3 4 3.5 3.142857143 2 
8.00 2.00 
B12 
2AF 0 3 0 80 3 3 4 3.5 3.571428571 1 
8.00 2.00 
B29 
5QD 1 2 0 52 3 3 4 3.5 3.142857143 2 
8.00 2.00 
B31 
3HB 0 2 0 72 2.5 3 3 3 2.857142857 3 
8.00 3.00 
BB2 
1QU 1 2 0 70 2.5 4 3 3.5 2.857142857 2 
8.00 3.00 
BL3 
4AH 0 6 0 120 2.5 3 3 3 2.714285714 2 
8.00 2.00 
BL4 
7BQ 1 3 0 98 3 4 4 4 2.857142857 4 
8.00 2.00 
BL1 
2XN 0 3 0 57 3 4 4 4 4 2 
8.00 2.00 
BD8 
8HT 1 3 0 121 2.5 3 4 3.5 3 2 
8.00 2.00 
BD18 
4NJ 0 3 0 95 3 4 4 4 3.285714286 2 
8.00 2.00 
BD8 
9QW 0 6 0 91 3.5 4 4 4 4 2 
8.00 2.00 
BD21 
4LW 1 3 0 135 2.5 3 4 3.5 3.285714286 4 
8.00 2.00 
NW10 
3PH 0 2 0 37 3.5 4 4 4 4 5 
8.00 2.00 
NW6 
5RA 0 3 0 40 2.5 3 3 3 2.714285714 1 
8.00 2.00 
BN2 
OBT 1 2 0 63 3.5 3 4 3.5 3.714285714 4 
8.00 2.00 
B54 
1BX  0 5 0 173 3.5 3 4 3.5 4 2 
8.00 2.00 
BS4 
1NN 1 2 0 90 3.5 4 4 4 4 2 
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PROVISION 
LEADERSHIP AND 
MANAGEMENT 
Affluence 
8.00 2.00 
BS1 
6RR 1 2 0 70 4 4 4 4 4 1 
8.00 2.00 
CB5 
8ND 0 2 0 103 3 3 4 3.5 4 2 
8.00 2.00 
WC1N 
2NY 1 6 0 108 3.5 4 4 4 4 1 
8.00 2.00 
5G15 
6SL 1 3 0 65 3 4 4 4 3 2 
8.00 2.00 
SG10 
0PT 0 2 0 78 2.5 3 3 3 3 2 
8.00 2.00 
LU6 
1DL 0 3 0 84 3 4 3 3.5 2.857142857 2 
8.00 2.00 
CH1 
2DW 0 3 0 82 4 4 4 4 4 3 
8.00 2.00 
TR1 
3RJ 0 2 0 59 3.5 4 4 4 4 4 
8.00 2.00 
SE25 
SED 0 3 0 95 2.5 2 3 2.5 3 2 
8.00 3.00 
LA9 
4PH 0 2 0 90 3 3 3 3 3 5 
8.00 2.00 
DL1 
1SG 0 0 0 90 2.5 3 4 3.5 3 2 
8.00 2.00 
DE23 
8PE 0 2 0 79 2.5 4 4 4 3.428571429 2 
8.00 2.00 
DE23 
6TJ 0 2 0 65 2.5 4 3 3.5 2.857142857 2 
8.00 2.00 
DE23 
8QJ 0 2 0 82 3 4 4 4 3.857142857 2 
8.00 2.00 
DE1 
3PJ 0 2 0 80 3 4 3 3.5 3 3 
8.00 2.00 
DL14 
6PX 0 2 0 78 3.5 4 4 4 3.857142857 3 
8.00 2.00 
DL15 
8QG 0 2 0 78 3.5 4 4 4 4 4 
8.00 3.00 
DL14 
7RF 1 2 0 72 2 4 3 3.5 2.285714286 4 
  
 
4
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PROVISION 
LEADERSHIP AND 
MANAGEMENT 
Affluence 
8.00 3.00 
SR8 
4TB 0 2 0 70 3.5 4 4 4 3.857142857 2 
8.00 2.00 
DL16 
6RU 0 2 0 78 4 4 4 4 4 2 
8.00 3.00 
DH9 
7LR 0 2 0 182 3.5 4 4 4 4 2 
8.00 1.00 
SR8 
3BQ 0 3 0 115 3.5 4 4 4 4 4 
8.00 2.00 
T528 
5BD 0 2 0 77 4 4 4 4 4 2 
8.00 2.00 
UB1 
2JG 1 3 0 100 3.5 4 4 4 4 3 
8.00 2.00 
H18 
1PB 1 2 0 113 2.5 3 3 3 2.857142857 5 
8.00 2.00 
NE8 
2XD 0 3 0 67 4 4 4 4 4 2 
8.00 2.00 
SE10 
0EA 1 2 0 90 3 3 3 3 3 3 
8.00 2.00 
WA8 
7TH 0 3 0 120 4 4 4 4 4 4 
8.00 2.00 
AL7 
3RP 1 2 0 144 3 3 4 3.5 4 2 
8.00 2.00 AL3 5JB 0 6 0 68 3.5 3 4 3.5 4 2 
8.00 2.00 AL6 9JF 1 3 0 60 3 4 4 4 3.285714286 5 
8.00 1.00 
W10 
5TN 0 6 0 48 3.5 3 4 3.5 4 2 
8.00 2.00 
W10 
6NQ 1 3 0 51 2 3 3 3 2.142857143 3 
8.00 2.00 
DA11 
9JS 1 3 0 90 3.5 4 3 3.5 3.428571429 2 
8.00 2.00 
HU2 
9AP 1 4 0 39 3 4 4 4 4 2 
8.00 2.00 
HU5 
2SG 1 3 0 58 4 3 4 3.5 4 2 
8.00 2.00 WF13 0 3 0 117 3.5 4 4 4 3.857142857 2 
  
 
4
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PROVISION 
LEADERSHIP AND 
MANAGEMENT 
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2SU 
8.00 2.00 
HD1 
3SP 1 3 0 120 2 3 3 3 2 2 
8.00 2.00 
SE11 
6UP 1 3 0 67 3.5 4 4 4 4 1 
8.00 2.00 
SW2 
2RW 0 3 0 124 4 4 4 4 4 5 
8.00 1.00 
LE8 
5PB 0 3 0 42 2 2 2 2 2 4 
8.00 2.00 
SE8 
5NH 1 3 0 108 2.5 3 3 3 3 3 
8.00 2.00 BB5 2H 1 2 0 110 3.5 4 4 4 3.857142857 4 
8.00 2.00 
BB9 
9AG 0 2 0 110 3.5 4 4 4 4 2 
8.00 2.00 BB8 0JF 0 2 0 96 3 4 3 3.5 3 2 
8.00 2.00 
PR1 
3XU 0 2 0 87 3 4 4 4 4 1 
8.00 2.00 
LN6 
0FB 0 2 0 85 3 4 3 3.5 3 3 
8.00 3.00 
L14 
1PW 1 3 0 84 4 4 4 4 4 2 
8.00 1.00 L6 2WF 0 3 0 134 3 3 4 3.5 4 2 
8.00 2.00 
LU3 
2BT 0 2 0 148 3 3 3 3 3 4 
8.00 2.00 
LU4 
OPE 1 3 0 97 2.5 3 3 3 3 2 
8.00 2.00 
LU1 
1RB 0 3 0 120 2.5 3 3 3 3 3 
8.00 1.00 
M15 
6PA 0 3 0 46 3.5 4 4 4 3.857142857 1 
8.00 2.00 
NE4 
8XT 0 2 0 104 2.5 3 3 3 3 2 
8.00 1.00 NE6 2LJ 0 2 0 104 3 4 4 4 4 2 
  
 
4
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PROVISION 
LEADERSHIP AND 
MANAGEMENT 
Affluence 
8.00 3.00 
NE15 
8PY 0 2 0 78 3.5 4 4 4 3.857142857 3 
8.00 1.00 
NE6 
4XW 0 2 0 104 4 4 4 4 4 4 
8.00 1.00 E7 0PH 0 3 0 118 2.5 2 3 2.5 3.142857143 1 
8.00 1.00 E15 1JP 0 3 0 110 2.5 3 3 3 3 2 
8.00 1.00 
E12 
5QP 0 2 0 120 3 4 4 4 4 2 
8.00 2.00 
PE30 
5PT 0 3 0 78 2.5 4 3 3.5 3 3 
8.00 2.00 
DN37 
9NN 0 2 0 104 3 4 4 4 2.857142857 4 
8.00 2.00 
NE30 
4EG 1 2 0 116 4 4 4 4 4 3 
8.00 2.00 
BD23 
2ES 0 3 0 49 2.5 3 3 3 2.571428571 3 
8.00 2.00 
YO11 
1UB 1 3 0 84 3 4 3 3.5 3 5 
8.00 1.00 
NG17 
2HT 0 3 0 82 2.5 4 4 4 3 2 
8.00 2.00 
NN4 
8PH 1 2 0 93 3 4 3 3.5 3.142857143 2 
8.00 2.00 
NN8 
4AB 1 2 0 120 2.5 4 4 4 3 4 
8.00 2.00 
PO4 
0DT 0 3 0 88 2.5 4 3 3.5 2.857142857 3 
8.00 2.00 
RG4 
8BH 1 3 0 58 2.5 3 3 3 2.857142857 4 
8.00 1.00 
RG30 
6UB 0 6 0 226 3.5 4 4 4 4 2 
8.00 2.00 
OL12 
0PP 0 3 0 52 4 4 4 4 3.857142857 2 
8.00 3.00 
M24 
2AH 0 3 0 49 3.5 4 4 4 3.857142857 2 
8.00 2.00 S62 0 3 0 101 3 4 4 4 4 2 
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PROVISION 
LEADERSHIP AND 
MANAGEMENT 
Affluence 
6AD 
8.00 2.00 
PR9 
8ND 0 3 0 70 4 4 4 4 3.857142857 4 
8.00 2.00 
S12 
3AB 0 3 0 134 3.5 4 4 4 4 2 
8.00 3.00 
S10 
2DN 0 3 0 132 3 3 4 3.5 3 3 
8.00 2.00 
SL1 
3EA 0 3 0 135 2.5 4 4 4 2.857142857 3 
8.00 2.00 
NE31 
1QY 0 2 0 68 3.5 4 4 4 3.857142857 2 
8.00 2.00 
NE32 
5UP 1 2 0 56 3.5 4 4 4 4 2 
8.00 2.00 
NE36 
0DL 0 2 0 78 2 3 2 2.5 2.142857143 4 
8.00 2.00 
SE1 
3BW 1 6 0 151 2.5 3 3 3 3 3 
8.00 2.00 
WS11 
5BU 0 2 0 38 3.5 4 4 4 3.857142857 3 
8.00 2.00 
ST3 
7AN 1 3 0 60 3 4 4 4 4 2 
8.00 1.00 
ST2 
9AS 0 2 0 52 3 4 4 4 4 2 
8.00 2.00 
DH5 
9DG 1 2 0 30 2.5 4 3 3.5 3 2 
8.00 2.00 
DH5 
8AE 0 2 0 50 4 4 4 4 3.714285714 4 
8.00 2.00 
SR5 
5QY 0 2 0 73 2.5 4 3 3.5 2.857142857 2 
8.00 2.00 
SR3 
2LE 1 3 0 81 2.5 4 3 3.5 2.857142857 2 
8.00 2.00 E3 3EU 1 3 0 96 2.5 4 4 4 3.857142857 2 
8.00 2.00 E2 7PG 1 3 0 96 2.5 3 3 3 3.285714286 2 
8.00 1.00 E1 0RJ 0 2 0 120 3.5 3 3 3 3 2 
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PROVISION 
LEADERSHIP AND 
MANAGEMENT 
Affluence 
8.00 2.00 E2 0PS 1 2 0 99 3.5 4 4 4 4 2 
8.00 2.00 
WF8 
2ER 1 3 0 56 2.5 3 3 3 2.857142857 2 
8.00 2.00 
WS2 
9UP 0 3 0 120 3 4 4 4 3.857142857 2 
8.00 2.00 
WS3 
3LU 0 2 0 96 4 4 4 4 4 4 
8.00 2.00 
CV10 
8HW 1 3 0 76 3 4 4 4 3 2 
8.00 2.00 
RG14 
1EH 0 3 0 138 3 4 3 3.5 2.857142857 3 
8.00 2.00 
PO21 
2TB 0 5 0 133 3.5 4 4 4 4 2 
8.00 2.00 
NW8 
8DE 0 6 0 68 2.5 3 3 3 3 1 
8.00 2.00 
WN1 
3SU 1 3 0 97 3 4 3 3.5 2.428571429 2 
8.00 2.00 
SL6 
7PG 1 3 0 60 3 2 4 3 3.285714286 1 
8.00 2.00 
CH44 
4BB 1 3 0 54 2.5 4 3 3.5 3 3 
9.00 2.00 
OX4 
3AJ 0 3 0.00 80 2.5 4 3 3.5 3.25 3.00 
9.00 3.00 
OX5 
2LG 1 3 0.00 44 3 4 3 3 3 4.00 
9.00 3.00 
OX9 
3HU 0 2 0.00 35 3 4 3 3 2.875 4.00 
9.00 2.00 
OX3 
8LH 1 3 0.00 78 3 4 3 3.5 3.125 4.00 
9.00 2.00 
OX7 
5DZ 1 3 0.00 72 4 4 4 4 4 5.00 
9.00 3.00 
N3 
11NR 0 2 0.00 71 4 3 4 4 3.75 3.00 
9.00 3.00 
MK42 
9LS 0 6 0.00 113 2.5 3 3 3.5 3.125 2.00 
  
 
4
4
8
 
YEAR 
INSPECTION 
NUMBER 
Postco
de 
CHANGE IN 
PROVISION 
LEADER 
AGE 
RANGE 
SINGLE 
SEX 
Numbe
r on 
Role 
LEARNING 
STANDARDS 
BEHAVIOUR CARING 
QUALITY OF 
PROVISION 
LEADERSHIP AND 
MANAGEMENT 
Affluence 
9.00 3.00 
MK42 
9DR 0 6 0.00 139 3 3 3 3 2.875 3.00 
9.00 3.00 
MK42 
9HE 1 3 0.00 89 2.5 3 3 3 3 3.00 
9.00 3.00 B8 1HN 1 6 0.00 125 3 4 3 3 3.25 2.00 
9.00 3.00 
B14 
6RP 0 5 0.00 170 3.5 4 4 4 3.875 2.00 
9.00 3.00 
B33 
8QB 1 2 0.00 67 2.5 3 3 3 3.125 5.00 
9.00 2.00 
B19 
3XJ 0 2 0.00 104 3.5 4 4 4 4 2.00 
9.00 3.00 
B35 
6DU 0 2 0.00 80 3 4 4 4 4 2.00 
9.00 3.00 
B29 
5LB 0 2 0.00 36 3 4 3 3 3 2.00 
9.00 3.00 B26 2JL 1 2 0.00 82 3 3 3 3 3 4.00 
9.00 2.00 
B44 
8RL 0 2 0.00 52 4 3 4 4 4 2.00 
9.00 3.00 
B11 
1ED 0 3 0.00 55 2.5 4 3 3.5 2.875 2.00 
9.00 3.00 
B14 
4BH 0 2 0.00 52 2.5 3 3 3 3 2.00 
9.00 3.00 
B12 
9NX 0 2 0.00 81 2.5 2 3 3 2.875 2.00 
9.00 3.00 
B38 
8SY 0 2 0.00 68 4 4 4 4 4 4.00 
9.00 2.00 B5 7XL 0 2 0.00 78 3 4 4 4 4 2.00 
9.00 2.00 
B45 
9PB 0 2 0.00 80 2.5 3 3 3 2.875 3.00 
9.00 2.00 
B31 
1BS 1 5 0.00 63 3 3 3 3 2.875 2.00 
9.00 2.00 B8 2SY 1 5 0.00 170 3 4 4 4 3.875 2.00 
9.00 3.00 
BB1 
1HN 1 2 0.00 62 2 4 3 2 2.125 2.00 
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9.00 3.00 
BB2 
3NF 0 2 0.00 80 3 3 3 4 3 2.00 
9.00 3.00 
BB3 
2DN 0 2 0.00 103 3.5 4 4 4 4 2.00 
9.00 3.00 
BL4 
8AR 0 3 0.00 98 4 4 4 4 4 2.00 
9.00 3.00 
BD9 
5AD 0 3 0.00 75 4 4 4 4 3.875 2.00 
9.00 4.00 
NW10 
9SD 1 2 0.00 103 3 3 3 3 2.875 2.00 
9.00 2.00 
NW10 
8DX 1 3 0.00 45 3 3 3 3 3 1.00 
9.00 3.00 
BS7 
0DL 0 3 0.00 141 4 4 4 4 4 2.00 
9.00 2.00 
BS13 
0JW  0 6 0.00 181 3 4 4 4 4 2.00 
9.00 3.00 
BS5 
7SY 0 2 0.00 74 3 4 4 4 3.875 1.00 
9.00 1.00 BS2 9JF 0 5 0.00 54 3 4 4 4 3.875 1.00 
9.00 3.00 
HP6 
6NW 0 2 0.00 84 3 4 3 3.5 3 5.00 
9.00 3.00 
BL9 
6HR 0 3 0.00 42 3 4 3 3.5 3 5.00 
9.00 3.00 
CB4 
2LD 1 3 0.00 80 3.5 4 4 4 4 3.00 
9.00 3.00 
CB4 
9LL 0 3 0.00 80 4 4 4 4 4 4.00 
9.00 3.00 
LU6 
1DL 1 3 0.00 92 3 3 3 3 3 2.00 
9.00 2.00 
CW2 
7LJ 0 2 0.00 60 4 4 4 4 4 2.00 
9.00 3.00 
TR14 
7DT 0 4 0.00 130 3.5 4 4 4 4 2.00 
9.00 3.00 
CR5 
3BT 0 2 0.00 60 3 4 4 3.5 3.375 5.00 
  
 
4
5
0
 
YEAR 
INSPECTION 
NUMBER 
Postco
de 
CHANGE IN 
PROVISION 
LEADER 
AGE 
RANGE 
SINGLE 
SEX 
Numbe
r on 
Role 
LEARNING 
STANDARDS 
BEHAVIOUR CARING 
QUALITY OF 
PROVISION 
LEADERSHIP AND 
MANAGEMENT 
Affluence 
9.00 3.00 
CA25 
5LW 0 3 0.00 43 4 4 4 4 4 2.00 
9.00 3.00 
LA14 
5TS 0 2 0.00 78 2.5 3 3 3.5 3.125 2.00 
9.00 3.00 
LA18 
4JE 1 2 0.00 80 2.5 4 3 3.5 3 3.00 
9.00 3.00 
DL3 
7PY 1 2 0.00 150 4 3 4 4 4 4.00 
9.00 3.00 
DE1 
2PU 0 3 0.00 37 3 4 2 3 2.875 3.00 
9.00 2.00 
DE1 
3LR 1 3 0.00 62 3 3 4 3 3.375 2.00 
9.00 3.00 
DE55 
7JA 0 2 0.00 101 4 4 4 4 4 2.00 
9.00 3.00 
SK17 
9QT 0 3 0.00 39 4 4 4 4 3.875 4.00 
9.00 3.00 
SK22 
4AQ 0 2 0.00 5 3.5 3 3 3 3 4.00 
9.00 3.00 
DE5 
3HE 0 2 0.00 147 3.5 4 4 4 3.875 4.00 
9.00 2.00 
EX4 
1HL 0 2 0.00 100 3 3 3 3 3.125 2.00 
9.00 2.00 
SR7 
7NN 0 2 0.00 76 3 4 4 4 3.875 2.00 
9.00 3.00 
DL16 
6EX 1 2 0.00 60 3 4 4 3.5 3.375 2.00 
9.00 1.00 
W3 
8RX 0 3 0.00 45 3 3 3 3.5 3.375 3.00 
9.00 3.00 
HU17 
7BT 0 2 0.00 140 4 4 4 4 4 2.00 
9.00 2.00 
SE7 
8AF 1 2 0.00 88 4 4 4 4 4 3.00 
9.00 3.00 
SE8 
3EH 0 5 0.00 120 4 4 2 4 3.5 2.00 
9.00 2.00 N1 5RF 0 2 0.00 76 3.5 4 4 4 4 1.00 
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9.00 3.00 
WA8 
8DF 0 3 0.00 93 3 4 3 3 3.125 2.00 
9.00 3.00 
WA8 
0AR 0 3 0.00 102 4 4 4 4 4 2.00 
9.00 3.00 
W14 
9BH 0 3 0.00 74 4 4 4 4 3.875 3.00 
9.00 3.00 
PO13 
0UY 1 3 0.00 140 4 4 4 4 4 3.00 
9.00 2.00 
N15 
3SD 0 6 0.00 55 3.5 3 3 3.5 2.875 2.00 
9.00 3.00 
TS25 
2AW 0 3 0.00 61 4 4 3 4 3.625 2.00 
9.00 3.00 
EN8 
9DW 1 4 0.00 79 3.5 3 3 3 3 4.00 
9.00 2.00 
AL2 
1JG 0 2 0.00 42 2.5 4 3 3 3 3.00 
9.00 3.00 
WD19 
4RL 0 3 0.00 78 3.5 3 4 4 3.875 2.00 
9.00 2.00 
SG2 
9EA 1 2 0.00 85 3.5 4 4 4 3.875 3.00 
9.00 3.00 
UB3 
2PD 0 3 0.00 132 3 4 4 4 3.75 4.00 
9.00 3.00 
SW3 
5JE 0 3 0.00 60 4 4 4 4 4 4.00 
9.00 2.00 
SW2 
1PL 0 4 0.00 146 3.5 4 4 4 4 2.00 
9.00 2.00 
SW4 
8LW 1 3 0.00 89 3 4 4 4 4 1.00 
9.00 1.00 
SW4 
7JQ 0 3 0.00 67 4 4 4 4 4 1.00 
9.00 2.00 
SE4 
2QQ 1 3 0.00 125 3 3 4 4 3.875 1.00 
9.00 3.00 
OL13 
8EF 0 2 0.00 88 3.5 4 4 4 3.875 2.00 
9.00 3.00 
BB10 
3ES 1 2 0.00 80 3 3 3 3 3 2.00 
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9.00 3.00 
PR7 
3DU 0 2 0.00 80 4 4 4 4 3.875 2.00 
9.00 3.00 
BB12 
6DY 0 2 0.00 66 3 4 3 3.5 3.25 2.00 
9.00 1.00 
BB10 
1JD 0 2 0.00 118 3 3 3 3 3.25 2.00 
9.00 2.00 
BB7 
1EL 0 2 0.00 116 3.5 4 4 4 4 2.00 
9.00 2.00 
BB11 
3PU 0 2 0.00 94 2.5 4 3 3.5 3 2.00 
9.00 3.00 
BB12 
6AJ 0 2 0.00 70 3 4 4 4 4 2.00 
9.00 3.00 
BB4 
7UE 1 2 0.00 119 3.5 4 4 4 4 2.00 
9.00 3.00 
BB11 
5AE 1 3 0.00 58 3 3 3 3 3 2.00 
9.00 3.00 
DN21 
2RR 0 3 0.00 73 4 4 4 4 4 2.00 
9.00 3.00 
LU1 
5EA 1 6 0.00 151 3 3 3 3 3 4.00 
9.00 2.00 LU2 0JS 1 3 0.00 151 3.5 4 4 4 4 2.00 
9.00 2.00 
M40 
7QD 1 3 0.00 91 2.5 4 3 3.5 3 1.00 
9.00 2.00 
NE4 
7NL 1 2 0.00 74 3 4 4 4 4 1.00 
9.00 3.00 
E16 
3PB 0 3 0.00 115 3.5 4 3 4 3.75 2.00 
9.00 3.00 
NR5 
8DB 0 4 0.00 143 2 3 3 3 3 2.00 
9.00 2.00 
PE14 
8AY 0 3 0.00 74 3 4 4 4 3.875 4.00 
9.00 3.00 
DN33 
2EW 0 3 0.00 53 4 4 4 4 4 3.00 
9.00 3.00 
BD23 
1ET 1 3 0.00 84 3 4 3 3 3 3.00 
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9.00 1.00 
NG7 
3AB 0 4 0.00 112 2.5 3 3 3 2.875 3.00 
9.00 3.00 
NN8 
2AX 0 4 0.00 118 3.5 4 4 4 3.875 2.00 
9.00 3.00 
NN3 
6DW 0 2 0.00 70 4 4 4 4 4 4.00 
9.00 2.00 
NN17 
1BJ 0 2 0.00 104 4 4 4 4 4 2.00 
9.00 3.00 
NN5 
7DE 1 6 0.00 128 4 4 4 4 4 2.00 
9.00 2.00 
PL2 
2NJ 0 5 0.00 105 3 4 4 4 3.625 2.00 
9.00 3.00 
PL6 
8UN 0 2 0.00 64 3.5 3 3 3.5 3 2.00 
9.00 2.00 
RG2 
7NT 0 3 0.00 147 2.5 4 3 3.5 3 3.00 
9.00 3.00 
TW9 
2HP 1 2 0.00 75 3.5 4 4 4 4 4.00 
9.00 3.00 
OL10 
4QJ 0 3 0.00 66 3 4 4 3.5 3.25 2.00 
9.00 3.00 
OL16 
2EP 1 3 0.00 108 4 4 3 3 3.375 2.00 
9.00 3.00 S65 2LY 1 6 0.00 158 3 4 4 4 4 2.00 
9.00 3.00 L20 6PJ 0 3 0.00 56 3 4 4 4 3.875 2.00 
9.00 2.00 
L21 
4NB 0 2 0.00 21 4 4 4 4 4 1.00 
9.00 3.00 S2 5SB 0 6 0.00 65 3 4 4 4 4 1.00 
9.00 2.00 
SL1 
3HS 0 2 0.00 118 3 3 3 3.5 3 2.00 
9.00 3.00 
SL1 
5NL 0 3 0.00 134 3.5 4 3 3 3 4.00 
9.00 3.00 
SL2 
5JW 0 3 0.00 120 3.5 4 4 4 3.875 3.00 
9.00 3.00 
NE35 
9DG 0 2 0.00 78 2.5 3 3 3.5 3 2.00 
  
 
4
5
4
 
YEAR 
INSPECTION 
NUMBER 
Postco
de 
CHANGE IN 
PROVISION 
LEADER 
AGE 
RANGE 
SINGLE 
SEX 
Numbe
r on 
Role 
LEARNING 
STANDARDS 
BEHAVIOUR CARING 
QUALITY OF 
PROVISION 
LEADERSHIP AND 
MANAGEMENT 
Affluence 
9.00 1.00 
SE15 
6BP 0 2 0.00 79 2.5 3 3 3 3 1.00 
9.00 1.00 
SE1 
2TT 0 2 0.00 148 3 4 4 4 4 1.00 
9.00 3.00 
WS12 
5AR 0 3 0.00 16 4 4 4 4 3.625 2.00 
9.00 3.00 
SK5 
6JW 0 2 0.00 51 2.5 4 3 3 3.25 2.00 
9.00 3.00 
SK4 
3NB 1 3 0.00 78 4 4 4 4 3.875 4.00 
9.00 3.00 SK3 0BJ 1 3 0.00 104 4 4 3 4 3.25 3.00 
9.00 3.00 
SK3 
9PH 0 3 0.00 44 2.5 4 3 3.5 3.25 2.00 
9.00 3.00 
SK5 
7EU 0 3 0.00 97 3.5 3 3 3 3 4.00 
9.00 3.00 
ST6 
6PB 0 3 0.00 59 4 4 4 4 4 3.00 
9.00 3.00 
IP1 
6DW 0 2 0.00 104 4 4 4 4 4 4.00 
9.00 3.00 SR4 6JR 0 2 0.00 71 2.5 4 3 3.5 3 2.00 
9.00 3.00 
NE38 
0LA 0 2 0.00 70 3 4 3 3.5 3 2.00 
9.00 2.00 
SR4 
9AX 0 2 0.00 100 3 4 4 4 3.75 2.00 
9.00 2.00 
GU1 
1NR 0 3 0.00 151 3 3 3 3 3 4.00 
9.00 3.00 E1 4NQ 0 2 0.00 75 3.5 4 4 4 4 3.00 
9.00 2.00 E1 4PZ 0 3 0.00 104 3.5 3 3 3 3 2.00 
9.00 1.00 
WF4 
3EB 0 6 0.00 137 3.5 4 4 4 3.875 4.00 
9.00 3.00 
WF1 
5NU 0 3 0.00 76 3 4 4 4 4 2.00 
9.00 3.00 
WS5 
4NN 0 3 0.00 80 4 4 4 4 4 2.00 
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9.00 3.00 
WV12 
4JQ 1 2 0.00 108 4 4 4 4 3.875 4.00 
9.00 3.00 
WS3 
1HT 0 2 0.00 100 3 4 4 4 4 4.00 
9.00 2.00 
E11 
3HF 0 2 0.00 115 2.5 3 3 3 2.875 2.00 
9.00 3.00 
E17 
9SB 0 2 0.00 70 3 4 3 3.5 3 4.00 
9.00 2.00 E4 6XQ 0 2 0.00 120 2.5 3 3 3.5 2.875 5.00 
9.00 2.00 
E17 
8BE 0 3 0.00 76 4 4 4 4 4 2.00 
9.00 3.00 
SW11 
3ND 1 2 0.00 73 4 4 4 4 4 3.00 
9.00 3.00 
CV9 
1LF 0 2 0.00 83 3.5 4 4 4 3.5 4.00 
9.00 3.00 
CV12 
0DP 1 3 0.00 80 2.5 4 3 3.5 3 4.00 
9.00 3.00 
CV34 
4LJ 1 3 0.00 75 2 2 2 2 2 4.00 
9.00 2.00 
PO19 
7AB 0 2 0.00 141 3.5 4 4 4 3.875 4.00 
9.00 3.00 
RH13 
5UT 0 2 0.00 84 4 4 4 4 3.875 2.00 
9.00 2.00 
SW1V 
3RT 0 3 0.00 58 4 4 4 4 3.75 1.00 
9.00 3.00 
SL4 
3RU 0 3 0.00 121 4 4 4 4 4 5.00 
9.00 3.00 
CH46 
2QF 0 3 0.00 89 2.5 4 3 3.5 3.375 4.00 
9.00 3.00 
WV11 
2LH 0 2 0.00 78 3.5 4 4 4 3.875 2.00 
9.00 3.00 
WV10 
8JP 1 3 0.00 76 3 3 3 3 3 2.00 
9.00 3.00 
WV4 
6EL 0 2 0.00 61 4 3 4 4 4 2.00 
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9.00 3.00 
WR11 
1DG 0 2 0.00 52 3.5 4 4 4 3.75 2.00 
10.00 3.00 
OX1 
4QH 0 3 0 89 4 4 4 4 4 1 
10.00 3.00 
OX11 
7HX 0 3 0 110 4 4 4 4 4 3 
10.00 3.00 
OX5 
1EA 0 2 0 53 3 4 4 3 3.125 4 
10.00 3.00 
OX3 
8QQ 0 3 0 79 3 4 4 3 3.25 3 
10.00 3.00 
EN4 
8SD 0 3 0 82 4 4 4 4 4 3 
10.00 3.00 
N14 
5JD 1 2 0 93 4 4 4 4 3.75 4 
10.00 3.00 B7 5BX 1 5 0 101 4 4 3 4 4 1 
10.00 3.00 
B23 
6AU 0 2 0 69 3 3 3 3 2.75 1 
10.00 2.00 
B19 
2NS 0 4 0 88 3 4 4 4 4 2 
10.00 3.00 
B23 
6UB 1 3 0 60 3 3 3 3 2.375 2 
10.00 3.00 
B42 
2PX 0 2 0 53 3 3 4 3 3.125 2 
10.00 3.00 
B29 
6BP 0 2 0 52 4 4 4 4 4 2 
10.00 3.00 
B15 
2AF 0 3 0 80 4 4 4 4 3.875 1 
10.00 3.00 
B31 
3HB 0 2 0 84 3 4 4 3 3.5 3 
10.00 4.00 
BB1 
1HN 1 2 0 54 3 4 3 3 3.375 2 
10.00 3.00 
BL5 
2SE 0 3 0 76 3 3 3 3 3.375 4 
10.00 2.00 
BD5 
9HL 1 3 0 104 3 4 4 3 3.25 2 
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10.00 3.00 
BD8 
7DJ 0 3 0 100 3.5 4 4 4 3.875 2 
10.00 3.00 
NW10 
3PH 0 3 0 56 4 4 4 4 3.75 5 
10.00 3.00 
NW6 
5RA  0 3 0 76 3 3 4 3 3.625 1 
10.00 3.00 
BN2 
0GR 1 6 0 80 4 4 4 4 3.75 2 
10.00 3.00 
BS16 
2LL 1 2 0 76 3 3 3 3 3 3 
10.00 3.00 
BS2 
0DT 0 3 0 65 3 3 4 3 3.25 1 
10.00 3.00 
BS2 
0SU 0 3 0 119 3 3 3 3.5 3.375 2 
10.00 3.00 
HP13 
6HR 0 3 0 101 4 4 4 4 4 1 
10.00 3.00 
CB1 
2LZ 1 2 0 80 4 4 4 4 4 3 
10.00 3.00 
CB1 
7ST 0 2 0 100 4 4 4 4 4 4 
10.00 3.00 
PE29 
1AD 0 3 0 120 4 4 4 4 4 2 
10.00 3.00 
CB5 
8ND 0 3 0 98 3 4 4 3 3.375 2 
10.00 2.00 
SG18 
0PT 1 2 0 122 3 3 4 3 3 2 
10.00 3.00 
LU5 
4QU 0 3 0 95 4 4 4 4 3.875 4 
10.00 2.00 
CV1 
5GR 0 5 0 150 4 4 4 4 3.875 3 
10.00 3.00 
CR8 
2NE 0 3 0 96 3.5 4 4 3 3.25 3 
10.00 3.00 
CR7 
8RF 0 3 0 108 3 3 3 3 2.625 2 
10.00 2.00 
LA14 
2RX 1 2 0 82 3.5 4 4 4 3.875 2 
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10.00 2.00 
CA26 
3PF 1 3 0 52 3 3 3 3 3.125 2 
10.00 3.00 
DE1 
1GJ 1 2 0 48 2 3 3 2 2.25 2 
10.00 3.00 
DE24 
9AX 0 2 0 84 3 4 4 3 3 2 
10.00 3.00 
SK13 
0LU 0 2 0 144 4 4 4 4 3.875 2 
10.00 3.00 
NG16 
6NA 1 6 0 87 4 4 4 4 4 2 
10.00 3.00 
DE55 
2JB 1 3 0 89 4 4 4 4 4 2 
10.00 3.00 E2 6DJ 1 3 0 82 1 3 2 1.5 1.75 2 
10.00 3.00 
DY2 
9QF 1 3 0 190 3 4 4 3 3.25 2 
10.00 3.00 
DH8 
6AY 0 3 0 59 4 4 4 4 4 2 
10.00 3.00 
DL15 
8QG 0 3 0 55 4 4 4 4 3.875 4 
10.00 2.00 
SR8 
3BQ 0 3 0 78 4 4 4 4 3.75 4 
10.00 3.00 
TS28 
5BD 0 3 0 67 4 4 4 4 4 2 
10.00 3.00 W3 7LL 1 3 0 80 3 4 3 3 3.125 3 
10.00 3.00 
YO16 
7BS 1 3 0 107 3.5 4 4 4 4 2 
10.00 3.00 
HU12 
8JB 0 3 0 117 4 4 4 4 4 4 
10.00 3.00 
SE10 
0EA 0 2 0 136 4 4 4 4 4 3 
10.00 3.00 E9 5BY 0 3 0 90 4 4 4 4 4 2 
10.00 3.00 
W12  
7PH 0 3 0 120 4 4 4 4 4 1 
10.00 3.00 
GU34 
2DR 0 4 0 56 3.5 4 4 4 4 2 
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Affluence 
10.00 2.00 
SO22 
6AJ 0 4 0 99 4 4 4 4 4 2 
10.00 2.00 
N17 
7LT 1 6 0 80 3 3 4 3 3.375 2 
10.00 3.00 
N15 
3SD 0 2 0 65 3 3 3 3.5 3.25 2 
10.00 1.00 
HA2 
0LW 0 3 0 69 3 4 4 3 3.125 4 
10.00 3.00 
AL5 
5BQ 0 2 0 119 3.5 4 4 4 4 4 
10.00 3.00 
AL10 
0PD 0 2 0 119 4 4 4 4 3.75 4 
10.00 3.00 
EN8 
8DH 0 2 0 98 3.5 3 3 3 3 4 
10.00 3.00 
HP1 
1TT 0 2 0 65 3 4 3 3 3 4 
10.00 3.00 
AL7 
3RP 0 3 0 149 3.5 4 4 4 4 2 
10.00 3.00 
EN11 
0LN 0 2 0 95 4 3 4 4 3.75 4 
10.00 3.00 
SG7 
6HD 0 3 0 105 4 4 4 4 4 2 
10.00 3.00 
SG5 
1XA 0 2 0 120 4 4 4 3.5 3.875 4 
10.00 3.00 
W10 
6TT 0 3 0 75 4 4 4 4 4 1 
10.00 3.00 
DA11 
9JS 0 3 0 84 4 4 4 4 3.75 2 
10.00 3.00 
HU2 
9AP 0 3 0 61 4 4 4 4 4 2 
10.00 3.00 
HU5 
2SG 1 3 0 75 3 3 3 3 3.125 2 
10.00 1.00 
HU6 
8HT 1 3 0 185 3.5 4 4 3.5 3.5 2 
10.00 3.00 
KT5 
8RS 0 3 0 118 4 4 4 4 3.875 4 
  
 
4
6
0
 
YEAR 
INSPECTION 
NUMBER 
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de 
CHANGE IN 
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LEADER 
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RANGE 
SINGLE 
SEX 
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PROVISION 
LEADERSHIP AND 
MANAGEMENT 
Affluence 
10.00 3.00 
HD8 
8RX 1 4 0 88 3 3 3 2.5 3.25 2 
10.00 2.00 
LE8 
5PB 1 3 0 16 3 3 3 3 2.875 4 
10.00 2.00 
LA1 
5QB 0 2 0 75 4 4 4 4 4 3 
10.00 3.00 
BB9 
7QH 0 2 0 140 3.5 4 4 4 4 2 
10.00 3.00 
BB5 
0LD 0 3 0 80 4 4 4 4 3.875 2 
10.00 3.00 
BB4 
5NH 0 3 0 80 3 3 3 3 3 2 
10.00 3.00 
BB9 
9AG 0 3 0 94 3.5 4 4 4 4 2 
10.00 3.00 
L39 
4RY 0 3 0 77 4 4 4 4 4 3 
10.00 3.00 BB8 0JF 1 3 0 69 2 3 3 2 2.25 2 
10.00 3.00 
BB12 
0BU 0 2 0 80 3 3 4 3 3 2 
10.00 3.00 
BB9 
8BP 0 3 0 79 4 4 4 4 4 3 
10.00 3.00 
BB12 
8TG 1 3 0 79 4 4 4 4 4 2 
10.00 3.00 
BB9 
5BE 0 3 0 80 3 3 3 3 3 2 
10.00 3.00 
PE21 
0LJ 0 3 0 91 4 4 4 4 3.875 2 
10.00 3.00 
LN3 
4LQ 0 2 0 151 4 4 4 4 4 4 
10.00 3.00 
NG31 
9BB 1 3 0 106 4 4 4 4 4 3 
10.00 3.00 L8 7QA 1 3 0 58 3 4 3 3 3 3 
10.00 3.00 L7 3HD 1 2 0 28 3 3 4 3 4 2 
10.00 3.00 
L11 
2RY 1 3 0 49 3 3 3 3 2.875 2 
  
 
4
6
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YEAR 
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de 
CHANGE IN 
PROVISION 
LEADER 
AGE 
RANGE 
SINGLE 
SEX 
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r on 
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LEARNING 
STANDARDS 
BEHAVIOUR CARING 
QUALITY OF 
PROVISION 
LEADERSHIP AND 
MANAGEMENT 
Affluence 
10.00 3.00 
LU1 
1RB 0 3 0 108 2.5 3 3 2 2.625 3 
10.00 3.00 LU4 9JL 1 4 0 120 3.5 4 4 3 3.375 1 
10.00 3.00 
MK2 
2HB 0 2 0 96 4 4 4 4 3.875 3 
10.00 3.00 
NE4 
6JR 0 2 0 104 4 4 4 4 4 2 
10.00 2.00 
NE6 
4XW 0 3 0 104 4 4 4 4 4 4 
10.00 2.00 E7 0PH 0 3 0 120 3 3 4 3 3.25 1 
10.00 3.00 E6 6BU 0 2 0 180 3 3 4 3 3.125 2 
10.00 4.00 
DN33 
2EW 0 2 0 52 3 3 3 3 3 3 
10.00 2.00 
NG17 
2HT 0 3 0 98 3 3 3 3 3.25 2 
10.00 3.00 
PE4 
6EX 1 4 0 141 4 4 4 4 3.75 4 
10.00 3.00 
NN16 
9PH 0 2 0 90 4 4 4 4 4 3 
10.00 3.00 
NN2 
8DF 0 2 0 79 3 4 3 3 2.75 4 
10.00 3.00 
RG30 
4UA 0 3 0 73 3.5 3 3 3 3.25 4 
10.00 3.00 
RG4 
8BH 1 3 0 53 3 3 3 3 2.75 4 
10.00 3.00 
OL12 
0PP 0 3 0 48 3.5 4 4 3.5 3.125 2 
10.00 3.00 
S26 
3XH 0 3 0 74 4 4 4 4 4 4 
10.00 3.00 
L20 
9LQ 0 3 0 171 2 3 2 2 2 1 
10.00 3.00 
PR9 
8PA 0 3 0 56 4 4 4 4 4 2 
10.00 3.00 
S12 
3AB 0 3 0 154 3 3 3 3 3 2 
  
 
4
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LEADER 
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r on 
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PROVISION 
LEADERSHIP AND 
MANAGEMENT 
Affluence 
10.00 3.00 
SO16 
3EP 0 6 0 99 3 3 4 4 3.125 2 
10.00 3.00 
SE1 
3BW 1 3 0 120 3 3 3 3 3 3 
10.00 2.00 
SE15 
6DT 0 3 0 92 3 3 3 3 3 1 
10.00 3.00 
L35 
4NW 0 3 0 78 4 4 4 4 4 4 
10.00 3.00 
WS11 
5BU 0 2 0 38 4 4 4 4 4 3 
10.00 3.00 
ST5 
0EX 1 2 0 42 4 4 4 4 3.875 4 
10.00 1.00 
ST16 
3NQ 0 5 0 165 3 3 4 3 3.125 2 
10.00 3.00 
B77 
2AH 0 8 0 65 4 4 3 4 4 4 
10.00 3.00 
SK2 
5LB 1 2 0 73 4 4 4 4 4 2 
10.00 2.00 
ST2 
0HW 0 2 0 60 3.5 4 4 4 3.75 2 
10.000
0 3.0000 
ST3 
7AN 0.0000 2.0000 0.0000 60.0000 3.0000 3.0000 4.0000 3.0000 3.2500 2.0000 
10.000
0 3.0000 
ST3 
1QZ 0.0000 3.0000 0.0000 38.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 2.0000 
10.000
0 3.0000 
DH5 
0AH 0.0000 3.0000 0.0000 78.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 3.8750 4.0000 
10.000
0 3.0000 
SR5 
5QL 1.0000 2.0000 0.0000 62.0000 2.5000 4.0000 4.0000 3.0000 3.1250 2.0000 
10.000
0 3.0000 
SR3 
2LE 1.0000 2.0000 0.0000 48.0000 2.0000 3.0000 3.0000 2.0000 2.5000 2.0000 
10.000
0 3.0000 
NE37 
3BL 1.0000 3.0000 1.0000 
105.000
0 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 4.0000 
10.000
0 3.0000 
RH4 
1BY 0.0000 4.0000 0.0000 68.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 3.5000 3.7500 2.0000 
10.000
0 3.0000 
TF7 
5ET 1.0000 2.0000 0.0000 77.0000 4.0000 4.0000 3.0000 4.0000 3.6250 2.0000 
  
 
4
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LEADER 
AGE 
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PROVISION 
LEADERSHIP AND 
MANAGEMENT 
Affluence 
10.000
0 3.0000 
TF2 
6EP 0.0000 2.0000 0.0000 68.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 2.0000 
10.000
0 3.0000 E3 3EU 0.0000 3.0000 0.0000 95.0000 3.5000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 3.7500 2.0000 
10.000
0 3.0000 
WS8 
6AU 1.0000 2.0000 1.0000 54.0000 3.5000 4.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.1250 2.0000 
10.000
0 3.0000 
WS10 
7RU 0.0000 2.0000 0.0000 54.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 2.0000 
10.000
0 3.0000 
WS3 
2HR 1.0000 3.0000 0.0000 
117.000
0 3.5000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 2.0000 
10.000
0 3.0000 
SW12 
8JL 0.0000 3.0000 0.0000 70.0000 3.5000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 2.0000 
10.000
0 3.0000 
SW15 
5PW 0.0000 3.0000 0.0000 85.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 2.0000 
10.000
0 2.0000 
WA2 
9HY 0.0000 3.0000 0.0000 
124.000
0 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 2.0000 
10.000
0 3.0000 
CV8 
1JP 1.0000 3.0000 0.0000 80.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 
10.000
0 3.0000 
CV31 
2PW 0.0000 2.0000 0.0000 82.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 2.0000 
10.000
0 3.0000 
RG17 
0HY 1.0000 2.0000 0.0000 70.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 3.0000 
10.000
0 3.0000 
RG14 
1EH 0.0000 3.0000 0.0000 
137.000
0 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 
10.000
0 3.0000 
W9 
3DS 0.0000 3.0000 0.0000 60.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 2.0000 
10.000
0 3.0000 
WN1 
3SU 0.0000 2.0000 0.0000 63.0000 3.0000 4.0000 4.0000 3.0000 3.3750 2.0000 
10.000
0 2.0000 
WN2 
4LG 1.0000 2.0000 0.0000 
120.000
0 1.0000 2.0000 3.0000 1.0000 1.8750 2.0000 
10.000
0 3.0000 
SL6 
9BT 1.0000 2.0000 0.0000 75.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 
10.000
0 2.0000 
CH49 
8HB 0.0000 6.0000 0.0000 
123.000
0 3.5000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 2.0000 
10.000
0 3.0000 RG5 4JJ 0.0000 3.0000 0.0000 
156.000
0 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 5.0000 
  
 
4
6
4
 
YEAR 
INSPECTION 
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LEADERSHIP AND 
MANAGEMENT 
Affluence 
10.000
0 3.0000 
WV14 
0LT 1.0000 2.0000 0.0000 58.0000 3.5000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 3.8750 2.0000 
10.000
0 3.0000 
WV1 
2HH 0.0000 2.0000 0.0000 97.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 2.0000 
10.000
0 3.0000 
WV10 
9JN 0.0000 2.0000 0.0000 80.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 2.0000 
10.000
0 3.0000 
WV2 
3JS 0.0000 4.0000 0.0000 55.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 
10.000
0 3.0000 
YO24 
4BD 0.0000 3.0000 0.0000 
116.000
0 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 3.5000 4.0000 4.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
OX25 
2SN  1.0000 2.0000 0.0000 52.0000 2.0000 3.0000 3.0000 2.0000 2.1250 4.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
OX2 
9JZ 0.0000 3.0000 0.0000 46.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
OX33 
1NN 0.0000 3.0000 0.0000 52.0000 2.0000 3.0000 3.0000 2.0000 2.2500 4.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
EN4 
9NT 1.0000 3.0000 0.0000 
142.000
0 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 
11.000
0 2.0000 
B23 
7HG 0.0000 3.0000 0.0000 92.0000 3.0000 4.0000 4.0000 3.0000 3.2500 2.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
B29 
5QD 0.0000 2.0000 0.0000 
104.000
0 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 3.8750 2.0000 
11.000
0 2.0000 
BD8 
8HT  0.0000 6.0000 0.0000 88.0000 3.0000 4.0000 3.0000 3.0000 2.8750 2.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
BD21 
4LW 1.0000 3.0000 0.0000 
135.000
0 3.0000 4.0000 4.0000 3.0000 3.2500 4.0000 
11.000
0 2.0000 
BS4 
1BX 1.0000 5.0000 0.0000 
220.000
0 3.5000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 2.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
BS1 
6RR 0.0000 5.0000 0.0000 86.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 1.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
WC1N 
2NY 0.0000 3.0000 0.0000 
106.000
0 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 3.8750 2.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
SG15 
6SL 0.0000 3.0000 0.0000 66.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 2.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
TR1 
3RJ 1.0000 2.0000 0.0000 70.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 3.5000 4.0000 4.0000 
  
 
4
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LEADERSHIP AND 
MANAGEMENT 
Affluence 
11.000
0 3.0000 
SE25 
5PL 1.0000 3.0000 0.0000 79.0000 3.0000 4.0000 4.0000 3.0000 3.2500 2.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
CR0 
6TY 1.0000 2.0000 0.0000 
102.000
0 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 3.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
DL1 
1SG 0.0000 3.0000 0.0000 82.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 2.0000 2.7500 2.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
DE23 
8PE 0.0000 2.0000 0.0000 80.0000 4.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 2.7500 2.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
DE23 
6TJ 0.0000 2.0000 0.0000 79.0000 3.0000 4.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.1250 2.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
DE23 
8QJ 1.0000 2.0000 0.0000 80.0000 3.5000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 3.8750 2.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
SK13 
2DW 1.0000 2.0000 0.0000 
127.000
0 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 3.8750 2.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
DL14 
6PX 0.0000 2.0000 0.0000 75.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 3.7500 3.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
DH7 
8LL 0.0000 3.0000 0.0000 76.0000 3.0000 4.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.1250 2.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
DL16 
6RU 0.0000 3.0000 0.0000 77.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 2.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
UB1 
2JG 0.0000 6.0000 0.0000 
145.000
0 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 3.5000 3.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
HU18 
1PB 1.0000 2.0000 0.0000 99.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 5.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
NE8 
2XD 1.0000 3.0000 0.0000 69.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.2500 2.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
SE2 
0SX 0.0000 2.0000 0.0000 
120.000
0 4.0000 3.0000 4.0000 4.0000 3.7500 1.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
WA8 
7TH 0.0000 2.0000 0.0000 
119.000
0 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
W12 
9JA 1.0000 2.0000 0.0000 63.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 2.0000 
11.000
0 1.0000 
N17 
9EX 0.0000 2.0000 0.0000 
106.000
0 3.0000 3.0000 4.0000 3.0000 3.6250 2.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
WD25 
0DX 1.0000 3.0000 0.0000 74.0000 2.0000 3.0000 3.0000 2.0000 2.3750 3.0000 
  
 
4
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LEADERSHIP AND 
MANAGEMENT 
Affluence 
11.000
0 3.0000 AL6 9JF 1.0000 2.0000 0.0000 75.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 5.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
W10 
6NQ 0.0000 3.0000 0.0000 53.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 3.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
HD1 
3SP 0.0000 3.0000 0.0000 
130.000
0 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 2.8750 2.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
SE8 
5NH 1.0000 3.0000 0.0000 97.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 2.8750 3.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
PR6 
0SL 0.0000 3.0000 0.0000 78.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
BB5 
2LH 1.0000 2.0000 0.0000 
110.000
0 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
PR1  
3XU  0.0000 2.0000 0.0000 96.0000 3.5000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 3.8750 1.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
LN6 
0FB 1.0000 3.0000 0.0000 84.0000 2.0000 3.0000 3.0000 2.0000 3.0000 3.0000 
11.000
0 2.0000 L6 2WF 0.0000 3.0000 0.0000 
130.000
0 3.5000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 3.7500 2.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
LU3 
2BT 0.0000 2.0000 0.0000 
153.000
0 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 4.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
LU4 
0PE 0.0000 2.0000 0.0000 
144.000
0 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.5000 3.1250 2.0000 
11.000
0 2.0000 
M15 
6PA 0.0000 3.0000 0.0000 52.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 1.0000 
11.000
0 1.0000 
MK6 
4LP 0.0000 2.0000 0.0000 57.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 2.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
NE4 
8XT 1.0000 2.0000 0.0000 
103.000
0 3.0000 3.0000 2.0000 3.0000 3.0000 2.0000 
11.000
0 2.0000 NE6 2LJ 0.0000 3.0000 0.0000 
104.000
0 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.5000 3.5000 2.0000 
11.000
0 2.0000 E15 3JT 1.0000 2.0000 0.0000 
110.000
0 2.0000 3.0000 2.0000 2.0000 2.0000 1.0000 
11.000
0 2.0000 E15 1JP 1.0000 3.0000 0.0000 
120.000
0 3.0000 4.0000 4.0000 3.5000 3.2500 2.0000 
11.000
0 2.0000 
E12 
5PB 0.0000 2.0000 0.0000 
179.000
0 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 2.8750 2.0000 
  
 
4
6
7
 
YEAR 
INSPECTION 
NUMBER 
Postco
de 
CHANGE IN 
PROVISION 
LEADER 
AGE 
RANGE 
SINGLE 
SEX 
Numbe
r on 
Role 
LEARNING 
STANDARDS 
BEHAVIOUR CARING 
QUALITY OF 
PROVISION 
LEADERSHIP AND 
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11.000
0 3.0000 E6 1AS 1.0000 3.0000 0.0000 
146.000
0 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 3.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
PE30 
5PT 1.0000 2.0000 0.0000 72.0000 2.0000 3.0000 3.0000 2.0000 2.0000 3.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
E30 
4AG 0.0000 3.0000 0.0000 
140.000
0 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
NN4 
8PH 0.0000 2.0000 0.0000 99.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 2.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
PO4 
0DT 0.0000 5.0000 0.0000 92.0000 3.5000 4.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
RG4 
5AU 0.0000 3.0000 0.0000 
120.000
0 3.5000 4.0000 4.0000 3.5000 3.3750 3.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
S62 
6AD 1.0000 3.0000 0.0000 
112.000
0 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 2.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
SL1 
3EA 0.0000 2.0000 0.0000 
112.000
0 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 3.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
NE31 
1QY 0.0000 3.0000 0.0000 75.0000 3.5000 4.0000 4.0000 3.5000 4.0000 2.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
NE32 
5UP 1.0000 3.0000 0.0000 63.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 2.8750 2.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
NE36 
0DL 0.0000 2.0000 0.0000 73.0000 2.0000 2.0000 3.0000 2.5000 2.1250 4.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
SE21 
8QS 0.0000 3.0000 0.0000 
105.000
0 3.0000 4.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 1.0000 
11.000
0 2.0000 
ST2 
9AS 0.0000 2.0000 0.0000 60.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 2.0000 
11.000
0 2.0000 
ST4 
2DQ 0.0000 3.0000 0.0000 45.0000 3.0000 4.0000 4.0000 3.0000 3.7500 3.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 E2 0PS 1.0000 2.0000 0.0000 
100.000
0 3.5000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 2.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
WF8 
2ER 0.0000 2.0000 0.0000 61.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 2.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
WS2 
9UP 1.0000 3.0000 0.0000 
120.000
0 3.5000 4.0000 4.0000 3.5000 3.7500 2.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
WS3 
3LU 1.0000 2.0000 0.0000 76.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 3.8750 4.0000 
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11.000
0 3.0000 
CV10 
8HW 0.0000 2.0000 0.0000 
100.000
0 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 2.0000 
11.000
0 2.0000 W9 3JY 1.0000 3.0000 0.0000 80.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 2.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
NW8 
8DE 0.0000 6.0000 0.0000 62.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 1.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
SL6 
7PG 1.0000 3.0000 0.0000 80.0000 3.5000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 1.0000 
11.000
0 3.0000 
CH44 
4BB 1.0000 3.0000 0.0000 58.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 
 
 
